



Department of State Release of Documents on Argentina and the Latin American Region, 1977–1980

SUMMARY

This collection of documents was selected for two chapters, on Argentina and the Latin American region, to be published in a forthcoming *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on South America, 1977–1980. These 119 documents, totaling 574 pages, are made available to the public today by the U.S. Department of State at the request of the Government of Argentina and in support of the President’s commitment to declassify U.S. Government documents pertaining to human rights abuses committed during Argentina’s 1976–1983 military dictatorship. In autumn 2017, these two chapters, including additional annotation to the documents released today, will be formally published on the Office of the Historian’s public website, history.state.gov. The full volume, including the remaining nine chapters in the *Foreign Relations* volume on South America, 1977–1980, will be published in early 2018. This volume will be one of 32 *Foreign Relations* volumes documenting the foreign policy of the Jimmy Carter presidential administration.

The *Foreign Relations* series, published since 1861 by the Department of State, presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The *Foreign Relations* series is required by law to be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of U.S. foreign policy and serves as one of the longest-running examples of the U.S. commitment to openness and transparency. Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents from all relevant U.S. Government repositories. For this volume and these chapters, historians searched for the documents that were most important in the process of developing and implementing U.S. foreign policy in the following agencies and repositories: the Department of State, the National Archives and Records Administration (including documents held at College Park, Maryland, and the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia), the National Security Council, the Library of Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. These documents include minutes of discussions between the president and foreign leaders, memoranda about deliberations inside the National Security Council and the Department of State, cables from U.S. embassies abroad, and intelligence analyses. Document selection for the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy.

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The documents released today show high-level U.S. concern over human rights violations in the Southern Cone at that time and policy debates within the Carter administration over what exactly to do about those violations. In these years, U.S. policy toward Argentina sought to promote human rights, moderate the internal dynamics of the ruling *junta*, and encourage the reestablishment of electoral democracy and an orderly end to the military government that had taken power in March 1976. At the same time, U.S. officials tried to calm disputes between Argentina and its neighbors, limit the spread of nuclear weapons, encourage the stabilization and growth of the Argentine economy, and, in 1980, ensure Argentine cooperation in the grain embargo that the United States had placed on the Soviet Union. Many of the documents are relevant to the Argentine Government's request regarding information about human rights abuses. However, not all the documents relate specifically to this request; some were selected for inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series because of their importance to other aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward the entire Latin American region. These documents provide context into the entirety of the relationship between the U.S. and Argentina from 1977–1980.

Much of U.S. policy toward Argentina from 1977–1980 grew out of President Carter's new global emphasis on human rights. In addition, it was driven by a Congressionally-mandated halt on U.S. arms sales to Argentina, which was enacted in August 1977 and went into effect on October 1, 1978. U.S. officials grappled with internal disagreements over what tactics should be used to implement the human rights policy. The disagreements inside the Carter administration were not over whether or how to support the Argentine Government, but rather over how to influence its behavior.

The declassification review of the documents in this collection was coordinated by The Office of the Historian under regulations established in Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information." Each document underwent a careful word-by-word review with special emphasis on releasing as much information as possible, consistent with the protection of United States national security. The interagency declassification review resulted in minor excisions in 16 documents and an excision of a paragraph or more in one document. The public release of these documents builds on two previous releases in August and December 2016. Due to the breadth of the search undertaken in U.S. Government documents for information on Argentina's 1976–1983 dictatorship, there is some overlap between documents released earlier and those released today.

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South America; Latin America Region, 1977-1980

South American Regional Compilation

Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV

South American Region

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1.

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-17

Washington, January 26, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 2, PRM/NSC 1-24 [1]. Secret.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 26, 1977

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-17

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The United States Representative to the
United Nations
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Administrator, Agency for International
Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (U)

The President has directed that the PRM/NSC-1 on Panama lead into a broad review of our overall policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The PRC, chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for preparation of this review, which should clearly state areas of inter-agency agreement and disagreement.

The study should analyze the major issues of concern to the U.S. and Latin America and examine whether the current assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward the region as well as the policies

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themselves are appropriate to an effective handling of these issues. The review should concentrate initially on six areas and then proceed to a discussion of an overall policy.

The study should be completed by March 1.

The six areas for initial analysis include:

1. Interests. What economic, political, and military changes have occurred over the past decade in the international environment, in the U.S. and in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean? How have these changes affected the ways in which U.S. policies can advance or protect U.S. interests in the region or influence the internal or external policies of the region's governments?

What are U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean today, and how have they evolved over the past decade? What is the broad psychological climate within the hemisphere into which U.S. policies and action will be projected over the next decade?

2. Economic Issues. The economic issues of concern to Latin America, including trade, commodities, debt, international financial institutions, foreign direct investment, science and technology, and development assistance make up the agenda of the North-South dialogue. Therefore, in developing options for U.S. policies on these issues, the review should include a discussion of (a) how it would impact on U.S. and Latin/Caribbean interests, and (b) how it might be implemented, including possible need for new legislation or a modification of existing legislation. These options should take explicit account of the differentiation of Latin America and the Caribbean as between middle range powers and less-developed countries. Discussion of strategies for each option should address its relationship to the broader North-South dialogue and should identify which institution(s)--if any--might be the most appropriate and effective for dealing with the issue.

The review should also include an analysis and possible options for U.S. policy toward Latin American and Caribbean efforts at regional economic integration, including the Central American

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Common Market, Caribbean Community, Andean Pact, LAFTA, and also the Latin American Economic System (SELA).

3. Human Rights. What options are available for U.S. foreign policy to reflect a higher and more effective level of concern for fundamental human rights in all nations?

Options should be developed for U.S. policy in: (a) bilateral relationships (taking into consideration distinctions between degrees of human rights violations and types of governments); (b) multilateral organizations, including intergovernmental organizations like the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Commission; non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists; and third parties like Western European governments and the Vatican; and (c) signing and ratification of various conventions, including the American Convention on Human Rights.

A discussion should also be included of ways to strengthen the internal capacity of the U.S. Government to assess reports and to make determinations on "consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights". It should also include a review of present U.S. policy with regard to temporary asylum in U.S. Embassies, and emigration to the U.S. of refugees from political repression.

4. Special Country Problems. With regard to each, what are U.S. interests, and in the light of those interests what should U.S. objectives be? What options and strategies are available to the U.S. to attain those objectives?

- a. Cuba (can be dealt with separately and more quickly)
- b. Brazil
- c. Mexico
- d. Central America

5. Caribbean. This section should consider: (a) a discussion of the economic and political problems of the independent and non-self-governing islands of the Caribbean; (b) a review of U.S. security, economic, humanitarian, and political interests in the region, and strategies for advancing or protecting those interests; and (c) the desirability and feasibility of assisting the development of the region

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in a way which will not collide with the aspirations for national independence of the new independent countries of the region.

6. Institutional and Other Issues. Issues for review include, but need not be limited to:

- a. Inter-American System: U.S. purposes with respect to the Organization of American States, the Rio Treaty, and other regional organizations like the Inter-American Defense Board.
- b. U.S. Policies on Territorial Disputes:
 - (1) Bolivia-Chile-Peru
 - (2) Peru-Ecuador
 - (3) El Salvador-Honduras
 - (4) Belize
 - (5) Guyana-Surinam-Venezuela
 - (6) Venezuela-Colombia
- c. Arms Sales, military training and U.S. military representation.
- d. Nuclear Proliferation and safeguards.
- e. Narcotics.
- f. Illegal Immigration.

This review should identify at the conclusion the basic options for an overall U.S.-Latin American policy in light of the options identified for the major issues considered above.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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2.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, March 5, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 39, Peru, 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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March 5, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 2B
SUBJECT: Your Request for an Assessment of Peru's
Military Threat and Appropriate U.S.
Response

Attached at Tab A is the study you requested on the Peruvian armament level and potential threat. State prepared it in consultation with Defense, CIA, and NSC Staff. At Tab B is the quantitative summary of the military capabilities of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and also some options for U.S. policy suggested E.O. 13526. At Tab C is a short paper prepared by the CIA assessing the Peruvian threat. At Tab D, the State Department has prepared a comprehensive list of options for U.S. policy with regard to the arms build-up in the Andes and the possibility of a war.

The principal points made in the studies include:

1. Since 1973, Peru has bought or made commitments to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union valued at approximately \$500 million. This has permitted Peru to gain a considerable advantage in materiel over its neighbors. One reason the Peruvians have done this is to compensate for clear inferiority in human materiel (education and competence of its Indian soldiers).
2. While Peru's neighbors fear its possible expansionist and revanchist (lost territory to Chile in 1879) designs, State, Defense, and CIA believe that, if anything, Peru has grown more cautious as a result of its near-war with Ecuador in December, 1976. The political instability in Peru, however, could conceivably create a situation or a (Peruvian) government that would attack its neighbors. The combined assessment of State and the CIA is that the chances for an outbreak of hostilities this year are slight.

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ADP Declassification Review

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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3. With its military materiel advantage, Peru will undoubtedly call for regional arms limitations agreement, but its neighbors are not likely to want one. The U.S. can try to play the role of honest broker to bring the countries together, but it is possible that our motives would be questioned. Bolivia, however, has invited the United States Government to make a clear public declaration of its strong opposition to conflict in the region.

4. While Peru's neighbors have sent missions abroad to purchase arms, an arms race is hardly inevitable. The Bolivian Foreign Minister, for example, has informed our Ambassador that he believes Bolivia will not shift funds out of economic development into the purchasing of new weapons. Nor are we likely to see a significant shift in preferences from U.S. and western sources of supplies to Soviet sources. In spite of our veto of the Israeli sale of Kfirs to Ecuador, the President of Ecuador has informed our Ambassador that he intends to send a high-level mission, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, to Washington -- not to Moscow -- to reaffirm Ecuador's interest in close ties with the U.S. as well as to discuss their concern for Ecuador's military security.

5. By cutting FMS credits for Peru this year and vetoing the Kfir sale, we have already taken a few steps to show our resistance to an arms race in the region. Besides privately urging the nations of the region, especially Peru, to limit their arms purchases and publicly stating the need for peace in the region, other options for the U.S. (Tab D) include stimulating a multilateral effort among arms suppliers to limit sales and monitoring purchases closely with the idea of trying to lend balance when possible. It is not expected that any U.S. initiative to the Soviet Union, except in a multilateral framework, will succeed in limiting their sales to the region. The Policy Review on Conventional Arms Sales (PRM-12) and on Latin American (PRM-17) will look into these questions more deeply.

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Article in the *National Intelligence Daily*

Washington, March 8, 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 79T00975A, Box 299, Folder 1, National (Current) (Central) Intelligence Daily/Cable. Secret; [*handling restriction and drafting information not declassified*]. The information in this article was covered in the March 11 President's Daily Brief. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 1, 3/1/77–3/13/77)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Latin America: The Human Rights Question

EAS2635(C)

The vigorous actions of military governments in South America against real or perceived threats from subversive groups has led to numerous human rights violations in recent years. The abrogation of constitutional guarantees protecting individual freedoms has also focused the attention of church groups, international agencies, and the international press on human rights practices in that region.

Chile has been the main target of this criticism, but heavy attention has also been directed at other authoritarian regimes in the southern cone. The bloody struggle between the left and right in Argentina, resulting in over 1,200 deaths in 1976 alone, is subjecting the government of President Videla to increasingly adverse criticism.

The Uruguayan government has been widely criticized for its mistreatment of political prisoners. The Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay has ruled with an iron hand for more than 20 years, and its internal security practices have long been a subject of criticism. Less attention has been paid to Brazil in recent months, even though human rights violations still occur there.

As a whole, however, there has probably been a slight improvement in the human rights situation in these countries during the past year. The prospects for further progress are encouraging as long as the full weight of international opinion is brought to bear on the problem. Any US action construed as a threat or reprisal, however, could lead to some backsliding and surely would stimulate more charges that the US is intervening in the domestic affairs of these countries.

Argentina

Human rights violations both by the left and the right remain serious in Argentina, but the frequency and scale of abuses by the security forces and by rightist vigilantes has diminished noticeably since the peak last summer. The government now at least issues public lists of those it detains, although the completeness and accuracy of the lists are open to question.

It is difficult to judge how many prisoners have now been released or at least accounted for, since the total number of those arrested is not known. International criticism and investigations of the human rights situation in Argentina have generated considerable irritation among Argentine officials, particularly those charged with putting an end to leftist guerrilla warfare.

Although the armed forces have had marked success against the terrorists, the job is still far from complete. If the guerrillas stage renewed provocations, there is charge of counterterrorist activities will probably push for a return to the brutal roundups of suspected leftists that were relatively common last year. President Videla

expects some worsening of relations with the US over the human rights issue but apparently finds his hands tied by political constraints imposed by hard-line factions within the armed forces.

Brazil

Brazilian security forces have operated with considerable autonomy since the military took power in 1964. The constitution of 1967 and a number of ex-



Presidents Pinochet (L.) and Videla

traconstitutional decrees have suspended such rights as habeas corpus for persons accused of crimes involving "national security" and given the security forces the authority to detain suspects arbitrarily for lengthy periods, leading to abuses of human rights.

Last year, however, President Geisel took a strong public stand against torture by removing a military security official and a major commander after two civilians died in military jails. Since January 1976, there have been only occasional reports of torture of political prisoners.

There are no reliable figures on the number of political prisoners in Brazil. In October 1976, Amnesty International reported that some 2,000 political prisoners were arrested during 1975 and 1976 and that between 700 and 800 of them were still under detention. US embassy officials in Brasilia believe that both these estimates are exaggerated; they acknowledge, however, that they do not have any firm statistics.

The improvement in the human rights situation in Brazil during the past year has been primarily because of President Geisel's personal intervention on the side of moderation, the strong interest shown by the Brazilian Catholic Church, and the attention given to the subject in the international press.

Chile

The government of President Pinochet has demonstrated progress in its human rights practices over the past several months. Overall improvements have also been noted by some of the junta's most persistent critics and supporters of human rights in Chile, particularly the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The number of prisoners held without charge has declined sharply; the government says only one major figure from the Allende era is still imprisoned without charge. It has offered to exchange him for a prominent prisoner held by the Cubans.

Most of those being tried or serving sentences are now out on bail, on parole, or under house arrest. The government is also taking steps to commute the sentences of many persons already convicted.

Reports of illegal detentions, torture, or killings have tapered off considerably. There have apparently been no such instances this year. On the other hand, the authoritarian control of the junta has not been relaxed, and state-of-siege restric-

tions remain in effect more than three years after the military takeover. Cases of the 13 persons who "disappeared" late last year, along with hundreds of others missing since the 1973 coup, have not been resolved, and suspicion often points to the Directorate of National Intelligence.

The directorate has operated as a secret police force responsible only to Pinochet. It may have refined its practices and adopted more subtle methods of dealing with alleged "enemies of the state," but it remains in effect more than three years after the military takeover. Cases of the 13 persons who "disappeared" late last year, along with hundreds of others missing since the 1973 coup, have not been resolved, and suspicion often points to the Directorate of National Intelligence.

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The government asserts that these people have either fled the country or gone underground. In some cases, leftists may be attempting to discredit the government by concocting stories of alleged missing persons.

The ad hoc group of the UN Human Rights Commission has issued a report condemning the "unlimited power" of the Chilean intelligence directorate and charging that the machinery for political repression in Chile has not been dismantled. Committee members strongly resent the Pinochet government's stubborn refusal to allow an inspection team to visit the country.

Human rights remains a pervasive problem. The junta will probably continue the slow trend toward normalization. The pace, however, will depend largely on the junta's perception of its security requirements and Pinochet's willingness to

conduct more effective reforms.

Uruguay

The military-dominated Menendez government, which came to power last September, has grown increasingly conscious of its poor reputation abroad on the human rights issue. It has shown serious concern over the deteriorating state of its relations with the US.

Some positive measures have been taken, but the military's grip on the government has tightened, and many civilians have been deprived of their political rights.

A high government official, in a recent address to an international organization, publicly committed the government to rectifying the situation. New measures reportedly under consideration include inviting inspection by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and establishing an action committee that would quickly determine the status of individuals about whose concerns is expressed.

Administration officials also have promised that a general liberalization is in the works for the detention system for subversives and that other significant improvements will be announced soon. The government late last year moved to ease severe anti-subversive penalties; other measures that are aimed at restoring due process, however, are bogged down in the legislative process. As of October, about 2,000 persons reportedly were being detained on charges of crimes against the state.

Paraguay

Those concerned about human rights in Paraguay often point to the detention of political prisoners and the treatment of the unassimilated Indian population.

Investigative field trips to Indian areas have failed to confirm any official plan of abuse or genocide. It is likely, however, that Indians living outside these areas do suffer abuse.

President Stroessner heads the most stable regime in South America, but official concern about "terrorism" and "subversion" is paramount and accounts for the state of siege that has been in effect for the past 30 years. Estimates of people currently being detained on such charges range from 100 to 400.

The government has been moved by recent international criticism to take steps to improve its tarnished image. It is apparently living up to its promise to bring subversives to trial and to release those against whom there is no solid evidence. Trials of political prisoners—the first held in years—began at the end of 1975.

Living conditions for most detainees have improved considerably. Press reports also indicate that as many as 60 persons suspected of subversion have been released since August, including four who had been in jail for 23 years.

ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77. Secret. Borg forwarded to Brzezinski under a March 12 covering memorandum and noted that Vance requested that copies of the study be distributed to members of the PRC for use at the PRC meeting scheduled for March 15, which was postponed to March 24. See Document 7.

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM NSC-17

REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

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NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC-17

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW

I. Introduction

We have prepared the response to PRM/NSC-17 in two parts. The first is this overview. It integrates major policy problems into two conceptual and eight specific issues. The second is a set of papers that examines particular policy areas in more detail, presents pros and cons on individual options, and reflects work undertaken prior to preparation of this overview.

In the overview we have sought to be didactic by posing somewhat stark options that show the occasional conflicts among U.S. interests and between U.S. interests and those of other hemispheric nations. We have formulated these issues in ways to elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy directions.

Finally, the outcome of separate Presidential Review Memoranda on human rights, non-proliferation, and North-South questions will have a major impact on U.S. policy toward the hemisphere. Because of their global nature, these issues are touched upon in the overview, but are not drawn out as distinct issues.

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II. The Setting

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are more diverse, prosperous, confident, independent and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third World. They also have an alarming population growth, the dizziest rate of urbanization and the most highly developed systems of military government. As population and economic pressures have increased, the governments of this hemisphere have increasingly moved from the one-man caudillo to institutionalized, largely military regimes. Democracy, never strongly rooted, is weaker today than at any time since the Second World War. Its immediate future is not bright.

Trade and resource flows are the central concerns of the nations of this hemisphere in their dealings with us. Escalating import bills and heavy debt burdens seriously cramp development prospects -- creating strong pressures for better terms of trade and credit from us. They also want us to respect their sovereignty, independent interests, and dignity.

What we want from them is less focused -- and often intrinsically negative. We want them not to aggravate East-West tensions; not to deny us access to their energy reserves and other raw materials; not to develop nuclear capabilities. In sum, we want sufficiently stable and healthy economic and political growth not to weaken our security, create new global problems, or offend our values. We want moderation on North-South issues and support in world councils on matters of importance to us. At our most hopeful we want democratic systems to be revived in this hemisphere.

It is self-evident, however, that the U.S. is neither capable nor ready to undertake the resource transfers on a scale that could eliminate the disparities between us. It is just as self-evident that mounting frustrations over

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trade and financial issues are likely to undermine the international support we have traditionally received from Latin America, increase the flow of the unemployed over our borders, and damage our economic, political and security interests.

Latin America and the Caribbean bring home most dramatically the importance of North-South issues. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own society or create such an implicit obligation to help. The Alliance for Progress made important contributions --"but its programs proved unsustainable both here and in Latin America. Moreover, because it was conceived largely in response to fears of Soviet penetration and assumed greater U.S. influence than in fact existed, the Alliance had strong overtones of intervention.

Our relations since the Alliance have led to a steady reduction of official contacts. For a decade, we have appeared increasingly out of step with the processes of change in either Latin America or the Caribbean, even on matters directly affecting our own interests. Our criticism of repressive governments has now placed us more clearly on the side of change, but we have little leverage on how that change comes about. Our pressures for human rights and non-proliferation have raised new fears about U.S. intervention and paternalism.

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III. ISSUES FOR DECISION

A. Conceptual Issues:

The first two issues are conceptual--designed to elicit overall guidance for considering the directions under the specific issues presented subsequently.

1. The Special Relationship:

Discussion of the "special relationship" has focused in recent years on economic issues. But shared traditions, historical links, and common institutions are also involved. Four concepts are frequently combined under the heading "special relationship":

- preferential economic treatment for Latin America (as a whole or to individual countries such as Mexico);
- an inter-American system of political, cultural and security links based on the OAS and the Rio Treaty.
- our historical hegemony and its freight of paternalism; and
- the accompanying rhetoric about shared values.

We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the first, useful to retain the second, and undesirable to prolong the third. And whether or not we "share values," there is little doubt that we expect more from Latin America and they from us.

To reject the special relationship in toto because of its traditional paternalistic overtones and its irrelevance to most economic issues risks discharging a potential asset in the North-South dialogue and in maintaining hemispheric security.

Issue for Decision. How do we reconcile the "special relationship" with our global commitments and the desired independence of the nations of the Hemisphere?

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Direction A: Seek to end the "special relationship" in its various manifestations. Make clear there will be no hemispheric preferences in the trade area, downplay the OAS and Rio Treaty, and play a passive role in other hemispheric institutions. Move toward eventual withdrawal. Stress bilateral relations and global institutions, pointing out that Latin America's development gives it a relative advantage over other LDC's. Deal with subregional disputes or conflicts through global institutions (UN) or bilaterally. Drop the the rhetoric of shared values and historic ties.

Direction B: Differentiate by using bilateral, regional, and global institutions as necessary. Concentrate on the global for the North-South issues. Strengthen bilateral ties with major hemispheric nations. But remain active in those hemispheric institutions that can further our mutual interests -- particularly the OAS, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and those institutions that promote cultural and technical cooperation. Use the OAS and Rio Treaty for dealing with regional conflicts.

2. A North-South or East-West Approach?

Our reaction to political change in Latin America is critical. Our major interventions of the post-war period--Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, and Chile--have probably had more impact on our relations than all our resource-transfers and business activities combined. They were motivated by a strong East-West bias.

In recent years, we have been thinking more in North-South terms. We are more tolerant of Guyana's Burnham declaring himself Marxist-Leninist, and of Peru's military purchases from the Soviet Union. But should we consider significant help to Manley's Jamaica to divert him from "communism" and Cuba or primarily to assist an important neighbor who is trying to bring about

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social change and development simultaneously?

The following directions are not mutually exclusive. The emergence of North-South issues does not eliminate East-West concerns. We can accept more ideological pluralism in 1977 than we could in 1962--but we could not be happy with a communist Brazil, Mexico or Panama. Can we abide additional Soviet military sales or increased Soviet influence in some countries? Do we have a choice?

Issue for Decision. How do we react to Soviet or Cuban involvement in political change or regional conflict in this hemisphere?

Direction A - East-West Focus: Devise programs and policies--short of military intervention--designed to head off significant Soviet influence or indigenous communist control over governments in the area. Should armed conflicts arise in this hemisphere involving Soviet or Cuban participation, support the other side. Place our economic resources where Soviet or Cuban efforts threaten. Bend our arms sales policies to head off new Soviet inroads in this area.

Direction B - North-South Focus: Our primary concern now is tension between the rich north and the poor south. Encourage independence--political, economic and psychological. Do not discourage diversification of contacts, even with communist countries. Place no ideological conditions on economic assistance. If another communist or radical socialist government emerges, or if a conflict situation arises, avoid actions that

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would polarize it into an East-West problem. Do not deviate from policy lines on arms transfers to head off Soviet sales in the area.

B. Specific Issues:

The new Administration has already set a new course for hemispheric relations. It has confirmed the need for a new treaty with Panama as the best means of protecting our interest in an open, efficient and secure canal. The State Visit of Mexico's President set in motion a reexamination of relations with the Latin American country with the most pervasive impact on our own society. Separate consideration is being given to the reestablishment of contacts with Cuba--a process with important implications for our relations with Latin America, and with the entire Third World.

This overview now raises eight additional specific issues for decision. These issues do not pretend to be all-encompassing. They highlight major problem areas. They also address those problems where the Administration may have the greatest flexibility to give a fresh and more constructive tone to inter-American affairs.

1. Intervention:

Our concerns over human rights, the nature of our relations with military regimes, our past policies toward Cuba, the revelations of CIA activities, and some activities of multi-national corporations affect the way we view ourselves and have significant implications for how others view us.

The common thread linking these concerns is U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Covert intervention in Chile in 1970-73 led the United States to become identified with the military dictatorship that replaced Allende, and associated us to some extent with

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its subsequent abuses of human rights. U.S. actions designed to control Latin American behavior have ranged from economic sanctions to direct military intervention. They have cumulatively cast a pall over our motives and aroused suspicions that may take years to overcome.

Some of our programs and activities are still viewed as interventionist:

- Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain close liaison with local security forces in most countries, collaborating to combat crime and drug traffic, counter communist activities and develop national security information.
- Our efforts on behalf of imprisoned American citizens has led us to urge on governments new laws, changed prison regulations, and new judicial procedures.
- Our concern for human rights has led us to take actions that have been criticized as interventionist by some of the major nations in the hemisphere.
- Can one really exclude the possibility that we may have to intervene in Panama should negotiations break down and violence break out?
- And what of the activities of Cuban exiles and other rightists who operate out of and in the U.S. against foreign nationals and foreign governments? Exile terrorism is frequently believed to be controlled, or at least condoned, by the U.S. Government.

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Issue for Decision: Given our past history and current interests and programs, how do we deal with the continuing charge that we are interventionist in Latin America?

Direction A - Limited Intervention - A Part of Interdependence: Reaffirm publicly and forcefully our commitment to non-intervention in the OAS Charter; announce a policy of broader contacts with all legal political forces, including visas to communists; explain that cooperation with others in combatting drugs, crime, and terrorism requires activities by U.S. agencies abroad; and explain that our promotion of human rights and protection of U.S. citizens is justified under international law. But stress our actions will not extend to interference into internal political processes.

Direction B - Dramatically Reduce Interventionist Activities: Announce a firm commitment to non-intervention combined with a decision to make a major cutback of U.S. activities in the hemisphere. Announce the end of all covert action and make an unequivocal commitment opposing the unilateral use of force in the hemisphere. State firmly that U.S. concerns for human rights will be stressed primarily through recognized multilateral institutions.

2. Relations with Military Regimes:

Fifteen governments in Latin America are now run directly or indirectly by military officers. We are uncomfortable with this level of military involvement in politics, all the more so since some of the regimes involved are consistent violators of human rights.

Our posture toward military regimes is complicated by the fact that:

- Military rule has deep roots in Latin America and is legitimized to some extent in most constitutions;
- The fragmentation of political parties and the relative weakness of civilian institutions sometimes provides no viable alternative to military rule;

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- Military rule, traditionally directed largely at repressing popular disturbances, is now in some cases combined with efforts to expand the technocratic and even political roles of civilians in government.

The military regimes resulting from these patterns vary greatly, reflecting the different conditions in each country. Although these national distinctions and institutional differences are significant, strong generalized U.S. opposition to military rule could unite South American military regimes into a bloc directed against us. Our decreased military presence and our dramatically reduced role as arms supplier has already diminished our capacity to influence -- or even relate to -- the leading military elites.

Moreover, generalized U.S. opposition to military regimes combined with U.S. rhetorical and political support for civilian opposition elements could promote heightened internal tensions and political instability combined with charges of U.S. intervention in internal affairs.

Issue for Decision: Given our objectives on human rights and a clear preference for democracy, how should we relate to military governments in the Western Hemisphere?

Direction A: Work with all Military Regimes.
Develop new programs for military relations as incentives to support democratizing trends and greater civilian participation. Use military training programs, sales and joint maneuvers as tools of influence.

Direction B: Diverse Treatment. Adopt a deliberate and evident strategy distinguishing among civilian regimes, non-repressive military regimes, and the most repressive military regimes. Maintain warm relations with the first, normal relations with the second, and cool but correct relations with the third. Do not attempt to polarize the hemisphere between democracies

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and military regimes, but stress non-military aspects of cooperation with countries where the military come to power. Cut back military programs and contacts with the most repressive military regimes.

3. Arms Transfers

Our policy on arms transfers to the region should be closely related to the previous issue of relations with military regimes. It should also relate to our global arms policies and our posture on non-proliferation. The introduction of costly modern weapons systems into the world's least armed region is creating new dangers of local conflicts and posing new challenges to the global control of conventional arms.

Because military security is the ultimate expression of national sovereignty, an aggressive US posture could easily become counterproductive. We have traditionally maintained a more restrictive policy toward arms sales to this hemisphere than toward the rest of the world. By sharply reducing military programs over the past decade, we have reduced our capacity to influence local military postures or limit new acquisitions. (We are the fourth-ranking arms seller in the region now.) There is little left to cut. To move further in that direction while increasing our attention to human rights could result in a virtual break with the critical institutions in Latin America -- the military.

The United States, however, has taken no major initiatives on arms transfers to Latin America for several years. We have made no high-level pronouncements of any consequence or detail on the growth of local tensions and war fears. The Declaration of Ayacucho in which eight South American nations pledged themselves in 1974 to limit acquisition

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of "offensive" weapons may offer a potential opening for a cooperative review of military security issues.

Issue for Decision: How should we approach arms transfers in the region in view of our declining role with the Latin military and the rising role of extra-hemispheric suppliers?

Direction A - Actively Promote Restraint: Continue our regional restrictive sales of advanced weapons; seek a suppliers agreement to limit sales; and actively promote regional or subregional arms control efforts. Refrain from competitive sales with the Soviets and other suppliers. Resist use of arms sales as means of relating to Latin military establishments.

Direction B - Flexible Approach: Use arms sales modestly to restore U.S. influence with some military regimes (e.g. a carrot for human rights improvement). Also selectively promote U.S. arms sales to limit intrusion of Soviet arms and retain some control over the pattern of regional weapons build-up. Promote voluntary restraint agreements among suppliers and buyers.

4. "Rights"

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a wide variety of social, economic and political "rights". The United States and Latin America tend to view these rights from different perspectives. We emphasize political rights -- from habeas corpus to freedom of assembly and speech. The Latins admire our political freedoms, but believe economic and social rights -- jobs and income -- are more important to most of their citizens, particularly the poor. The debate over "rights" thus frequently becomes a clash between the libertarians and the egalitarians.

Obviously, however, the Latin leaders and military are often egalitarian abroad and elitist

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at home. They do not readily share their wealth. Yet if there is one issue that unites the poor of this hemisphere with their rulers it is that the United States must share more of its wealth and consume less. We must not deceive ourselves -- this growing rich/poor dichotomy is the bottom line in our relations in this hemisphere.

As the United States projects its values on human rights abroad, we can be more effective if we demonstrate in word and deed that we also give great weight to the egalitarian aspirations of the poor nations. We may be entering a period of fiscal restraint on foreign lending (reduced contributions to the IFI's) in order to retain our way of life. We risk being seen as justifying our reductions on moral grounds so that we can continue to absorb a third of the globe's resources. The Harkin Amendment symbolizes to many our overriding stress on political as opposed to economic rights. Moreover, any moves toward trade protectionism will hit Latin America first and most severely. Our concern for fundamental political rights is thus out of phase with the appeals and ideologies of most of the developing world. Most simply, the poor nations see life and survival as more important than liberty.

Issue for Decision: Can we square our renewed emphasis on human rights with the rest of the hemisphere's obsession with economic and social rights?

Direction A - Stress Fundamental Human Rights:
Stress that the real linkage between economic and political rights rests in democracy and mixed economies. Extend Harkin to all IFI's. Voluntarily recognize our responsibility for increased resource transfers but link it to foreign governments' willingness to distribute income.

Direction B - Recognize Link between all Rights:
Move forcefully to expand IFI contributions and bilateral assistance. Take forthcoming posture in

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North-South dialogue. Move to repeal Harkin, re-examine our negative position on the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties and "collective economic security" in the OAS Charter Reform. Pressure governments politically to eliminate torture and assure habeas corpus and due process.

5. Resource Transfers: Private Investment

The outcome of the presidential reviews on North-South issues (PRMs 7 and 8) will be critical to our economic relations with Latin America. Trade -- not aid -- is the issue for Latin America. Any move toward or away from concessions to the Third World affects Latin America first.

This overview addresses two issues where we may have greater flexibility in regional terms: private investment and the MNC's (considered in this section) and public development assistance (considered in the section that follows).

Multinational corporations are key agents of resource, managerial and technology transfers. They have also been one of the most consistent sources of tensions between the US and the other nations of this hemisphere.

Latin American governments are now more secure in their dealings with foreign investors. MNC's are more mature in recognizing the need to respect -- and adapt to -- the laws and development priorities of the host countries. Now that a large portion of investments in extractive industries and utilities have already been nationalized, and that new modes of non-equity investment have become a more prevalent method of doing business in the area, the wave of expropriations that swept Latin America in recent years seems to be receding.

In this changed environment, we may have an opportunity to work out -- with both foreign governments and US corporations -- some new approaches

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to bring our policies on investment disputes and the promotion of US private investment more into line with the new working relationships that are evolving.

We could, for example, revise President Nixon's 1972 policy statement on foreign investment and expropriation to recognize more explicitly the rights of host governments to define the terms of receiving foreign capital, as well as their duties to provide fair treatment. We could even explore the far more legally complex and time-consuming possibility of negotiating bilateral investment treaties with Latin American governments.

Alternatively, we could seek to take advantage of the absence of expropriation disputes and the comparative quiescence of controversy over MNC's to quietly disengage from active promotion of private investment.

As for other forms of private capital flows, there ordinarily is no major role for the US government to play with respect to borrowings from private money markets. Consideration might be given, however, to the establishment of some sort of balance of payments safety net or guarantee facility which would enhance the attractiveness of paper floated by Latin American countries.

Issue for Decision: Should the US government encourage US private investment in Latin America?

Direction A - Disengage: Make clear that MNC's are on their own. Eliminate incentives designed to increase new investment. Say nothing new on expropriation. Stress that these are decisions for private corporations and foreign governments, not for the USG. Maintain a hands off posture toward commercial bank lending.

Direction B - Promote New Investment Relationships: Work on standards of conduct with the private sector and

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foreign governments and formulate a modified US global policy statement on expropriations. Seek repeal of Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments. Consider measures to facilitate Latin American access to U.S. private capital markets.

6. Resource Transfers: Development Assistance

US involvement in development in Latin America and elsewhere takes many forms: trade, debt rescheduling, investment, official development assistance (ODA), actions on international monetary matters, initiatives in the fields of science and technology, food, population, etc.

Official development assistance, which facilitates cooperation in many of these fields, now plays a decreasing role. Bilateral US AID financing for Latin America has been on the decline for a decade. International financial institutions (e.g., IBRD and IDB) now provide the region with most of its official external capital -- but we are in arrears in our contributions. In addition, under present criteria, only Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru will have bilateral aid programs after 1980.

These trends create a gap in the instruments available to us. The IFIs focus their attention on growth; in countries where our bilateral assistance has ended, only limited attention is paid by official capital suppliers to the many problems still associated with income maldistribution. In addition, the middle income countries are important to us politically in the context of the North-South dialogue, but we have virtually no bilateral aid instruments to promote institutional and human resource development in countries other than the poorest.

Issue for Decision: Should US official development assistance be increased, and if so, should the increase extend to both multilateral and bilateral assistance and include middle-income countries as well as poorer countries?

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Direction A - Maintain the Status Quo:

Meet current US commitments to the IDB and OAS. Do not seek to resume bilateral assistance in countries where we no longer have such programs. Continue bilateral aid phase-outs. Sustain the current bilateral aid focus on the poorest countries.

Direction B - Expand, Innovate and Strengthen Development Aid: Strengthen support of IFI's. Develop new ways to cooperate with middle-income countries on institutional and human resource development, food production, technology transfer. Develop new criteria for such cooperation, including harder terms, greater matching contributions, jointly managed projects, and use of US guarantee mechanisms which do not necessarily call for flows of public funds. Expand both bilateral and multilateral assistance to the poorest countries and the poorest sub-regions (Central America and the Caribbean).

7. Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The level of professional and academic exchanges and cultural programs with Latin America, as well as support for research and study on Latin America in the U.S., has fallen drastically over the past 10 years. The Fulbright-Hays program in Latin America (and worldwide) is 30% less in constant dollars than it was in 1968; USIA book publishing and distribution have dropped by 50%; and the staffs of our Binational Cultural Centers have dropped from 114 to 14 in recent years.

Greatly expanding these programs would dramatize a new approach to Latin America and the Caribbean. The goals of such an initiative would be (a) improving intellectual and institutional relationships within the hemisphere; and (b) strengthening the capacities of Latins and North Americans to perceive each other accurately, and to cooperate on the solution of common problems.

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Such a program might include joint initiatives
-- including joint commitments of long-term funds
-- with at least a few of the major Latin American countries.

Such an undertaking would also:

- symbolize our commitment to human rights by providing new means of communication between intellectuals, professional associations (such as lawyers), universities, think tanks and other interested groups in the hemisphere.
- enhance the development of human resources through graduate education and professional exchanges.*

Issue for Decision: By how much should our educational and cultural programs for the hemisphere be increased?

Direction A - Double Funding for Current Educational and Cultural Program to Approximately \$30 Million. Such an increase would enable us to devise and establish much broader linkages between universities and communities, including Hispanic-American groups.

Direction B - Recast and Expand Programs:
Direct the Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, to reexamine basic objectives and programs in consultation with U.S. institutions and with selected Latin American governments, preliminary to making a major specific proposal to the White House.

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- * The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs observes that a greatly increased program in Latin America could produce pressures for similar increases in exchanges with other areas of the world.

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Then approach Congress for new funding (up to \$100 million a year). This level would imply major support for relevant U.S. and Latin institutions. It would subsume some of the activities now conducted by AID, USIA and HEW. Care would have to be exercised to avoid charges of cultural imperialism. New or amended legislation might be required.

8. Style and Attention

Many Latin Americans believe we alternately take them for granted, then expect too much of them. They suspect that US leaders have time for everything and everyone except for Latin America. They feel unheard, unappreciated, and discriminated against.

Much of this is inherent in the relationship. But much is not. We sometimes spring unnecessary surprises by not consulting or informing others in advance on matters of vital interest to them. And their cabinet ministers and even presidents sometimes have a hard time getting through to us.

During 1977, as a minimum program we should plan on one or two additional State Visits by democratically elected Latin American leaders (Perez of Venezuela and perhaps Williams of Trinidad) and a return State Visit by President Carter to Mexico. The Vice President might likewise consider visiting one or more Latin American countries. The Secretary of State should attend the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June for 2-3 days and visit Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil, plus one or two Caribbean countries.

In addition, we should carry out continuing formal and informal consultations with Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Argentina on global issues, such as Law of the Sea and the North-South Dialogue, as well as on bilateral initiatives and our major foreign policy directions in other parts of the world.

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Members of Congress should also be involved whenever possible in both travels and consultations.

A more ambitious program for the President and the Vice President would be to prepare for visits during the Administration's second year to other democracies such as Colombia, Costa Rica and one of the Caribbean nations. Such early "attention" by a newly elected President and Vice President would be unprecedented and would help set a new tone.

Issue for Decision: How much attention should the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary give to Latin America and the Caribbean in the first year?

Direction A - Minimum: Plan two State Visits here, a return Presidential Visit to Mexico, and a possible visit by the Vice President to the region. The Secretary should attend the OASGA, make one or more trips to the region, and exchange occasional letters with key foreign ministers.

Direction B - Maximum: Plan the above plus Presidential trips to two or three democracies in the hemisphere during the President's second year in office. The Vice President might make an additional visit or two as well. Both the President and the Secretary of State would seek to maintain a regular correspondence with their key counterparts.

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5.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, March 14, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 64, PRM-17 [Latin America]: 1/77-3/14/77. Confidential. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Brzezinski initialed the first page of the memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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with ~~SECRET~~ Attachment

March 14, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR *RP*
SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Latin America

"Do We Need a Latin American Policy?"

Your question struck at the heart of the issue. The idea of "Latin America" as a region is a myth. It is composed of extremely diverse economies and politics, which can manage to form a collective negotiating position only when there is a symbolic need to confront the U.S., such as in the case of the Trade Act of 1974 (GSP/OPEC provision). The most important business of the governments of the hemisphere is dealt with bilaterally or globally. One symptom of this trend toward globalism and bilateralism is the decline of the OAS.

Secondly, given the diversity of the economies, it is unrealistic to believe that a single foreign economic policy -- like the Alliance -- to so diverse a region is possible any longer, even if it were desirable.

So the answer to your question is "no." In terms of the objective realities, we do not need a Latin American policy, and I hope that in the future, we will not have one.

But the fact that the President chose Latin America as the one region to have an overall policy review, and the fact that he is being besieged to speak on Pan American Day and to give a major policy address on Latin America, and the fact that the President has repeatedly expressed a special interest in Latin America -- all these are indications that we cannot move from our current policy -- which is indeed a special one -- to no policy in a single step. (To put my point in perspective, I should mention that ARA thinks it would be too risky if the President did not have a Pan American Day speech.) We must do it gradually with some sensitivity to the region and to its constituency in the United States, but

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ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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I agree with you entirely that if there are the same kind of demands for a Latin America speech in the first year of the President's second Administration, then we will have failed. Therefore, the policy that we should seek in this first review is one which will help us to move from a special policy for the region to a global North-South policy.

* * * * *

Attached at Tab A is the response to PRM/NSC-17. There are parts of the Overview and of Tab 1 (Interests Section) which are first-rate, but the document as a whole is unwieldy. The issues slated for decision are posed poorly ^J_M sometimes they miss the principal question entirely. The options are deliberately skewed; they seldom offer a real choice.

The whole exercise has been a great disappointment to me personally, and it has lead me to conclude that if you want new policy directions toward Latin America, the last place you should turn to for advice is ARA. Since ARA is the principal source of advice for Secretary Vance, however, I strongly urge you to discuss with him before Tuesday's meeting what it is you would like to emerge from the meeting. I would also recommend that the meeting follow the agenda rather than the specific issues and options listed in the "Overview."

Permit me to make some suggestions, starting with the peg which we should use to hang the new approach on, and then suggesting the specifics of a new policy.

Outcome of the Meeting

As I wrote to you in my memorandum of March 10 on the request for the President to give a Pan American Day speech, I believe a speech on Latin America by the President is necessary before Pan American Day (April 14) in order to preempt any criticism that he is ignoring the region. There are, however, more important reasons for a speech. If the U.S. is to move to a point where Latin American speeches are not necessary, the President must give the bureaucracy some guidance because they are moving in the other direction. He must also alert Latin America and the entire developing world of his views, concerns, and perspective on this question. Thirdly, it is necessary for him to focus on the problem soon with some guidance from the PRC as to the right approach, least he

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inadvertently send conflicting signals during a press conference to Latin America, to the bureaucracy, and to the U.S. public. Fourth, it would be more desirable for him to make the speech in the United States now rather than save it for a possible trip to the Latin American democracies later in the year, not only because of timing, but more importantly, because Presidential trips tend to bring out the worst kind of rhetoric about our "historic ties" and "shared values," and thus, it would be more difficult to expect an address setting for such a new approach.

What would he say? An outline of the speech can follow the agenda of the meeting.

I. Overall Approach -- General Policy Directions

Important changes within Latin America, within the U.S., and in international politics and economics have dramatically transformed U.S. relations with Latin America, but our psychology and the assumptions underlying current U.S. policy have not adapted to these changes.

- In Latin America, relatively rapid economic development and increasingly institutionalized governments have made them more resistant to foreign influence, particularly North American. At the same time, the economic changes have increased the heterogeneity of the region, making the notion of "Latin America" as an homogenous region more unrealistic than ever before.
- Internationally, Latin Americans have been at the forefront intellectually, politically, and economically of a determined movement by the developing world to alter the terms of exchange between the industrialized and developing worlds.
- In the United States, several developments, including the passing of the Vietnam trauma and the reduced insecurity due to detente, served to divert American interest from the problems of the developing world. At the same time, Americans still maintained the "special relationship" mentality, demanding more from Latin America in human rights, restraint on arms transfers, and on other issues, while also promising (though not delivering) more resources to the region.

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The guiding principles of a new approach -- rather than a new policy -- to the region should include:

1. North-South. Rather than trying to divide Latin America from the rest of the developing world, we should encourage Latin American leaders to take the general issues which concern them to a North-South forum and to take a forward (leadership) position on these issues.

Rationale: Several Latin American leaders have been in the forefront of this movement, and we should recognize their efforts, by adopting a global as opposed to a regional approach. Regionalism in all its manifestations -- the OAS, the Inter-American Defense Board -- has declined in importance over the last two years, and the trend not only seems irreversible, it makes sense. There is less reason to use regional institutions when the issues can only be effectively addressed globally.

2. Global Policy: A Single Standard for the Developing World. U.S. policy on trade, finance, investment, science and technology, aid, human rights, arms transfers and nuclear proliferation should be formulated according to global criteria. In the formulation of these policies we could consult bilaterally with selected governments, or regionally if the forum is an effective one, but the policy we adopt should be a general and a global one.

*raise expectation only here ** Rationale: If we are interested in furthering Latin American economic development, then we should adopt a general policy which will confer special trade and financial benefits on Latin America by the nature of the region's relatively advanced economic position. In the long-term, a special and direct American effort will not bring any more benefits to the region than a general policy, and it is likely to have significant negative political consequences since direct resource transfers inevitably get tied to special American political concerns (i.e., human rights, or treatment of U.S. investors, or anti-Communism), leading to unintended paternalism.

3. Mature bilateralism will be enhanced by a global approach, but particularly from the decline of a regional institution which encourages artificial unity on the wrong issues posed in the least constructive way.

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4. Diversification of Political and Economic Relationships. In response to the central political need of all Latin American countries to reduce their dependence on the United States or any single source, the U.S. should encourage the present trend toward increasingly diversified relations between Latin America, Europe, Japan, and even Eastern Europe. At the same time, the U.S. should exhibit a greater tolerance for regimes of widely different political philosophies, distinguishing only on the basis of their respect for fundamental human rights.

5. Non-Intervention. The U.S. should pledge its full respect for the sovereignty of each Latin American nation and should commit itself not to undertake unilateral military intervention or covert intervention in their internal affairs.

Rationale: This simple statement will go far in a region that has experienced the vast majority of U.S.-military exercises abroad.

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|| The question to which this answer is addressed is not only how do we view and respond to political change in Latin America. but also to what extent and in what ways can we influence it. U.S. policy to Cuba from 1959 to 1961 offers a classic illustration of the way power and its use have been transformed. Currently, our ability to influence events in Latin America appears greatest not when the power equation is most weighted to our advantage, but when we are cognizant and sensitive to the principal norms of the developing world $\frac{1}{M}$ sovereignty and social justice.

Bearing this in mind, a reflexive action by the U.S. to counter Soviet efforts to gain influence $\frac{1}{M}$ either through arms sales or increased trade $\frac{1}{M}$ is more likely to have the opposite effect. Andy Young's argument that we are more likely to influence events in Africa if we pay attention to Africa's obsession $\frac{1}{M}$ racism $\frac{1}{M}$ than to our own with respect to the East-West conflict $\frac{1}{M}$ has direct relevance to Latin America, where the North-South economic issues are their principal preoccupation.

II. Economic Issues

9 || 1. Relevant Criteria for Formulating U.S. Economic Policies. The U.S. should adopt economic policies which relate to two or three levels of development of the Third World, rather than to an heterogeneous

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regional grouping. This means concessional assistance for the poorest countries, and increased trade prospects and improved and coordinated debt management for the middle-income developing countries, which are most of the Latin American countries. Trade, not aid.

2. Thus, external financing to the region should increasingly be made through the international financial institutions, and less and less through bilateral assistance.

X This represents both a political desire to begin a post-aid relationship, where we do not respond to problems as donors and recipients, and an economic urge to get the most out of our money, since U.S. contributions to the IFIs are multiplied more than ten-fold because of other country pledges.

3. On foreign direct investment (FDI), we should recognize the sovereign rights of host countries to set the terms of investment. Similarly, the United States Government should adopt a more independent stance premised on an independent definition of the national interest in investment disputes.

Rationale: We should begin to steer an independent, neutral path between labor, which wants to discourage U.S. FDI, and U.S. corporations, which seek U.S. help. On investment disputes, which have been the source of considerable tension in inter-American relations, the U.S. should also seek to identify a position which is representative of the national as opposed to a specific interest.

4. The U.S. should work with the governments of Latin America to seek ways to increase access of the products of Latin America and other developing regions to the markets of the industrialized world on a non-discriminatory basis.

Rationale: The Lome Agreement between the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries has a discriminatory impact on Latin American exports. Furthermore, vertical and regional preferential arrangements (between industrialized and developing countries) run counter to the U.S. objectives of an open global economy.

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III. Human Rights

1. Single Standard. The U.S. should not adopt a different standard for human rights violations in this hemisphere than for anywhere else.
2. IFIs. Human rights considerations should enter into all U.S. decisions with regard to the developing world, but the U.S. should not adopt any automatic or fixed formulas. This means that we should try to obtain some flexibility of the Harkin amendment (to the Inter-American Development Bank Act), while resisting its extension to other IFIs.
3. Multilaterize Our Efforts. To the extent possible, the U.S. should try to multilateralize its concerns and its efforts on human rights by working through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

IV. Relations with Military Regimes

Excluding the use of punitive sanctions, the U.S. should nevertheless adapt its relations with individual governments to the character of the regime, maintaining warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with non-repressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments. The U.S. should put particular stress on non-military aspects of cooperation with military governments.

V. Arms Transfers

Again, the policy should be a global one, but one which actively promotes restraint in any appropriate fora or framework (bilateral, sub-regional, regional, or global). We should also avoid competitive sales with the Soviets or with other suppliers.

VI. Organization of American States

The OAS should be reorganized so that it only carries out those functions for which it has a comparative advantage. These functions are peacekeeping and human rights. Its economic and technical assistance functions could be done more effectively by the IDB.

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Rationale: Despite recurrent efforts to strengthen the OAS, it continues to decline, largely because the most important business in the hemisphere is not hemispheric. Secretary General Orfila has said this to me in a conversation two weeks ago. He also said that he needed the help of the U.S. to reduce the OAS bureaucracy from its current 1,500 to a staff of about 300 which could have responsibility for peacekeeping and human rights. He would also like to do away with the Permanent Council, and believes that if he obtained the complete support of the U.S. he would succeed. It remains to be seen whether he would succeed, but we should certainly help him do that.

One indication of the irrelevance of the OAS in addressing economic issues is the lack of any enthusiasm (or even support) for the Secretary General's proposal for an OAS Special General Assembly on Economic Cooperation and Development. They still have not yet set a date or a site for this meeting, and it is not clear whether they ever will

VII. Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, should reexamine basic objectives and programs in educational and cultural exchanges in consultation with U.S. institutions and with selected Latin American governments, and suggest a specific proposal to the NSC for improving U.S. policy in this area.

VIII. Country and Sub-Regional Issues

Mexico, Cuba and Panama have all been dealt with in other contexts. The two critical areas demanding some kind of U.S. Government attention are Brazil and the Caribbean.

With regard to Brazil, the critical question is whether the U.S. should maintain the Memorandum of Understanding in the light of quite critical comments of this arrangement made by President Carter during the campaign. Given the extreme sensitivity of our current relationship, it would not be advisable to make the decision on the Memorandum of Understanding at this time.

With regard to the Caribbean, you might want to recommend that we devote a special PRC meeting to that at some future date.

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IX. Final Items

1. President's speech -- University of Texas?
2. A quick trip by the President to the democracies in November?
3. A Vice Presidential trip?

* * * * *

For your use, I have prepared an abbreviated outline of the agenda and the major points recommended in this memorandum. It is attached at Tab B. A draft Presidential Directive is attached at Tab C.

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6.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile

Washington, March 24, 1977, 1455Z

65403

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción 1969–1979. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Zimmermann, cleared by Luers and in INR/DDC/OP-F, and approved by McAfee.

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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SPECIAL HANDLING

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ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: SHUM, PINS, PINR

SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDO

1. THE CIA HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF OPERATION CONDO AS OF MARCH 1977 WHICH WE ARE PASSING FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

2. QTE: OPERATION CONDO IS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY SEC

RTTY

SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, BOLIVIA AND BRAZIL TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION. AS IT WAS FIRST ENVISAGED, THE OPERATION WAS TO BRING ABOUT AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING SERVICES OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, BUT LATER DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF MOUNTING ASSASSINATION OPERATIONS ABROAD. SECURITY SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY AGREED TO SEND TEAMS TO EUROPE, BUT APPARENTLY BRAZIL, BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY DID NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THIS ASPECT OF THE OPERATION. A TRAINING COURSE WAS LATER SET UP IN BUENOS AIRES FOR THE TEAMS THAT WERE TO BE SENT TO EUROPE.

10-13526 A CONDO TEAM OF URUGUAYANS AND ARGENTINES WAS SENT 10-13526 330000Z TO OPERATE AGAINST URUGUAYAN TERRORISTS. THIS TEAM WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING OUT ITS OBJECTIVES AND ITS FAILURE

WAS ATTRIBUTED TO THE OPERATION HAVING BEEN LEAKED TO THE TERRORISTS. AS A RESULT OF THE SUPPOSED LEAK, THE URUGUAYANS WERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN FURTHER JOINT CONDO OPERATIONS.

3. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT 10-13526 330000Z THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONDO OPERATION OUTSIDE OF CONDO COUNTRIES ARE CONFINED TO THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON EXTREMISTS. 10-13526 330000Z REPORT SAID THAT IF INFORMATION IS OBTAINED REVEALING THE WHEREABOUTS OF AN EXTREMIST ABROAD, A CONDO TEAM MIGHT BE SENT TO THE LOCATION, BUT ONLY TO VERIFY THE EXTREMIST'S PRESENCE AND TO DETERMINE HIS FUTURE TRAVEL. IF UNSPECIFIED ACTIONS AGAINST A PARTICULAR EXTREMIST WERE DESIRED, THE CONDO SERVICE WOULD ASK A SECURITY SERVICE OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THE EXTREMIST RESIDES TO CARRY OUT THESE ACTIONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT 10-13526 330000Z ONCE A CONDO COUNTRY REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONDO PROGRAM, THAT COUNTRY IS NO LONGER INCLUDED IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO THIS PROGRAM.

4. RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE CONDO OPERATION MAY BE SHIFTING MORE TO NON-VIOLENT ACTIVITIES. AT A MEETING OF CONDO IN DECEMBER 1976 THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WAS THE PLANNING OF COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST LEFTIST AND RADICAL GROUPS. SOMETIME EARLIER A PROGRAM HAD BEEN APPROVED WHEREBY ONE MEMBER COUNTRY WOULD PUBLISH PROPAGANDA USEFUL TO ANOTHER MEMBER SO THE COUNTRY OF MAJOR INTEREST WOULD NOT BE REVEALED AS THE SOURCE. EXTENSIVE USE WAS TO BE MADE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN CARRYING OUT THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM. ANOTHER CONDO MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN 10-13526 WHICH MAY CLARIFY THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE OPERATION. ENO QUOTE.
VANCE

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7.

Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, March 24, 1977, 3:30–5 p.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are printed in part in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 266.

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

Wednesday, March 24, 1977

Time and Place: 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Latin America

Participants:

State

Warren Christopher
Terence Todman
William Luers

Treasury

Anthony Solomon
Edward Bittner

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Leon Sloss

Defense

Charles Duncan
Major Gen. Richard E. Cavazos

Commerce

Frank Weil

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General George S. Brown
Lt. General William Smith

NSC

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

CIA

Deputy Director Enno Knoche
Robert Hopkins

Thomas Thornton
Robert A. Pastor

Overall Approach: Should the U.S. Move Away From the Special Relationship?

Deputy Secretary Christopher opened the meeting by saying that the new Administration had been dealing with many specific Latin American problems -- for example, Panama, Cuba, and Mexico -- but we had not had an opportunity to develop an overall approach, particularly with respect to those economic issues which were of greatest concern to the Latin Americans.

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He suggested that the best overall policy may be a non-policy. To follow the remarks in the President's United Nations speech, the U.S. should treat Latin America in a global context, rather than think about a regional policy. The President's Pan American Day speech on April 14 provides the natural culmination of this process and the opportunity to suggest this approach.

He then initiated a discussion of whether the U.S. had a special relationship with Latin America or not.

Assistant Secretary Todman suggested that we drop the rhetoric about a special relationship and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional, or global levels depending on the issues. In the major economic areas, it is necessary to deal on a global basis and develop a single policy, and this is also the case on nuclear proliferation and immigration. But because of the geographical proximity, Latin America impinges on us more directly than other areas. For example, we share a border with Mexico and that requires special policies. We have certain regional institutions, and they require special policies.

Under Secretary Anthony Solomon agreed that we had special problems with respect to Mexico and Brazil, but the question of the special relationship relates to the region rather than to individual countries. He suggested that we would need special policies to these two countries. He said that the arguments against an overall special relationship to the region are very powerful.

Enno Knoche said that the possible consequences of ending the special relationship would be that it would tend to encourage Latin America to form blocs against the U.S., but he added that since this would not be in Latin America's long-term interest, he felt such blocs would not endure.

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan said the U.S. has had a special relationship with Latin America, and it still does. General Brown agreed, but he said that our special military relationships are eroding, and that we are going to miss them when they are gone. He said that this relationship -- for example, the training assistance program for foreign air force personnel -- provides an opportunity for us to influence these governments on human rights and other matters.

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Intervention

Todman said that this issue aroused the greatest interest and controversy in Latin America where the U.S. has had a long history of intervention -- most recently in the Dominican Republic and Chile. Now, we are being accused of intervention on behalf of human rights. The question is: to what extent do we need to intervene?

Duncan said that we first needed to define our interests in the hemisphere, and said such a definition would be necessary to decide on the need for a "special relationship." Then, he prefers the option of "limited intervention."

Brzezinski returned to the question of whether we should have a special policy to Latin America. He said that the notion of a special policy is ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a cycle of creating unrealistic expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments. The Monroe Doctrine which underlines this approach is no longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy which has embittered our relationships.

He recommended that if our relationships are to become healthier, then we need to put them on a more normal footing. He said that we can do this by stressing our bilateral relations and in seeing the region's problems in a global context, as the President said in his UN speech. And we should use this as a point of departure in the Pan American Day speech. What was needed was a normalization of our relations with Latin America. We did not want another Alliance for Progress.

Christopher said that he agreed with Brzezinski's assessment.

General Brown agreed and said that we should put the statement in the context that we have recognized that Latin America had reached adulthood. Brzezinski warned, however, that such an approach was also patronizing. Instead, he said that we should encourage Latin America to diversify its relationships with other countries and regions, and that we, in turn, should differentiate our approach to different governments.

Duncan agreed that a bilateral approach makes sense, but he said the relevant question on intervention is how should we react to the Soviets in this hemisphere.

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Brzezinski said that we should not react reflexively; rather we should judge our response in terms of the likely consequences if the U.S. did not intervene. Nevertheless, he does not see a great likelihood of the U.S. intervening in Latin America in response to Soviet probes. He said that individual governments have a good sense of their own independence and therefore our reactions should be contingent on the way the other Latin Americans respond. But we cannot accept a blanket policy for all cases. Later, he said, and Solomon agreed, that a statement on nonintervention might be misinterpreted.

Leon Sloss of ACDA said that he agreed with Brzezinski's emphasis on a global and a bilateral approach, but he said that we should not discourage some regional institutions which have potential to contribute to the solution of certain problems -- for example in arms control areas.

Brzezinski agreed that we should not discourage regional institutions, but he suggested that the healthiest approach would be a hands-off one, where the Latin Americans would approach us -- instead of we, them -- to pay attention to the regional institutions.

Solomon and Brzezinski agreed that the President should redefine our relationship rather than renounce it. Solomon said that the only viable regional economic institution was the Inter-American Development Bank, and a sign of its relative importance is the fact that Secretary Blumenthal will attend its annual ministerial meeting whereas he would not attend the one at the Asian Development Bank. Even the IDB has diversified its relationships -- bringing on donors from Europe and Japan -- although we are still the biggest contributor. But in trade or aid, it is hard to see a special relationship.

David Aaron pressed the issue of the special relationship a couple of steps further. One implication of a change in strategy would involve a shift in the distribution of U.S. resources abroad. Secondly, he noted that there was, in fact, a collective consciousness in Latin America.

Brzezinski said that we should not deceive ourselves. The consciousness is only collective when it is negative and in opposition to the U.S. Constructive relations demand greater specificity.

-- In ideology, we want to show an affinity for democratic states.

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- Security considerations demand that we recognize the geopolitical importance of Brazil and perhaps the special importance of the Caribbean to the United States.
- Economically, we need a more diversified strategy.

However, Brzezinski said we should not try to package these clusters of interests into a single policy.

Weil from Commerce agreed.

Relationships With Military Regimes

Christopher applied the approach suggested by Brzezinski to this next issue. He suggested that we adjust our relations so as to differentiate according to the kind of regime: warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with nonrepressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments.

Brzezinski agreed, noting that Brazil was not so repressive as is commonly thought. Duncan and General Brown also agreed with Christopher and repeated the need to distinguish between kinds of military governments.

David Aaron suggested joining the two agreed approaches -- the movement toward globalism and establishing a closer affinity with democracies -- by a Presidential trip to selected democracies, say in Latin America as well as in Africa or Asia.

Aaron also said that if we are going to be sincere about moving toward a global approach, we must make clear that our policies with respect to democracies or repressive regimes must be the same in Latin America as in Africa or Asia. Given the special constituencies in the U.S., that would not be easy. We will have to go out of our way to do that.

Human Rights

Christopher said that it was very important for us to stay committed on our policy on human rights, but at the same time, we must explore affirmative ways to express our policy.

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Solomon said that we should work with Congress to make clear why they should not be thinking about a Latin American policy on human rights. He and Christopher agreed on the need to obtain more discretionary authority and make more relevant distinctions in the application of our policy. If we define gross violations as torture or degrading treatment, instead of denial of due process, then we only single out seven-ten countries rather than 60 - 80. Then, we can have some impact.

Todman said that we should look at aid as a way to improve human rights conditions in very poor countries. For example in countries like Haiti, violations of human rights occur often because of impoverished conditions, and it does not make much sense for us to cut off aid in these circumstances.

Arms Transfers

Christopher asked whether the United States, as a declining source of arms to Latin America, is justified in adopting a special policy on arms transfers to Latin America.

General Brown reminded everyone that in the early Kennedy years we tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures to nation-building, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other sources to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that they buy from us rather than the Russians.

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this problem globally at both ends. Discuss it with the Soviets and with other suppliers, and at the same time urge restraint by purchasers. If this does not work, he is inclined to agree with George Brown.

Organization of American States

Christopher asked whether the OAS was part of the special relationship.

Todman thought the OAS was useful, but that it wasted a lot of time because it is not well-focused. He said he would like to see it strengthened.

Christopher suggested that we alter our relationship to the OAS to the way we relate to other regional organizations, like CENTO or ASEAN.

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Solomon asked Todman how he would strengthen the OAS, and Todman answered that he would eliminate the Permanent Council and reduce the U.S. contribution, but we should do so after consulting with the Latin Americans.

Solomon said that in his experience in State and in ARA, every Administration had tried to strengthen the OAS and tried to make it more efficient, by cutting personnel and reorganization. The trouble is that the Latin Americans are very sensitive to their "perks," and they perceived every effort to strengthen the OAS as an attempt to weaken it. He concluded that the OAS was useless, and there was nothing that could be done.

David Aaron said that if we want to follow the global approach to its logical conclusion, then our involvement in the OAS, which once played the role of a mini-UN, should be phased out. We really do not need it any longer. We should say we want to deal with Latin America like other regions.

Solomon acknowledged that that would indeed be perceived as the end to the special relationship, but noted that before doing that, we should look at the political ramifications and the domestic reaction, which he predicted would be negative. In conversations he has had with Latin American leaders, they all acknowledged privately that it was a worthless organization, but at the same time, they were horrified at the prospect of its being abolished. But he did not see anything we could do.

In fact, Latin Americans use the global North-South forum more and even take the SELA more seriously than they do the OAS.

Christopher said that the OAS was one of those institutions which would not die a natural death. Whenever it looks like it will, somebody turns the oxygen back on, and it has another life.

Aaron said that rather than try to leave it, abolish it, or resuscitate it with new ideas, the U.S. should just ask the OAS to justify itself.

William Luers from State said that we should be careful in formulating our policy to the OAS and more generally to the hemisphere, least our new policy be perceived as a massive rejection of Latin America.

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Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Todman said that the value of individual contacts is very important to increase mutual understanding.

Christopher asked whether we should return to a more enlightened and generous policy with respect to cultural and educational exchanges with Latin America. Todman nodded yes.

Technical Assistance

Christopher asked whether we should put more money into technical assistance to Latin America.

Weil from Commerce said that question brought the discussion back to the beginning: What are our interests? If they are not special, then we should not give special assistance.

Summary and Miscellaneous

Christopher noted that Todman will be meeting with the Cubans in New York, that the Canal Treaty negotiations will be continuing, and that we should be increasingly sensitive to Brazil. Any overall statement needs to take into account our concern for special problems. He noted that the discussion was a little more philosophical than usual, but that we were probing for a relationship which adapted to the new realities.

The next step is the speech at the Organization of American States.

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8.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, March 29, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 3/77. Secret. At the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "To Warren J."

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

To Warren
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Warren Christopher *WC*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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~~We can increase the number of Career appointments to be announced with this package if you wish.~~

Security Assistance and Human Rights. As you may know, five Latin governments "rejected" American military assistance based on the submission to Congress of the required human rights reports. It is interesting to note that four of the five seem to be having second thoughts about turning their backs on American military aid.

-- Although the Argentines turned down our FY 78 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program of \$15 million, they still want to receive \$700,000 in grant training. They also want to sign contracts for over \$30 million in unobligated FY 77 funds, but we have refused thus far to honor their requests because of human rights conditions in that country.

-- We have begun to receive indications that Brazil didn't realize that its rejection of the \$50 million credits for FY 78 meant that they would be unable to participate in the Foreign Military Sales cash sales program. They may ask permission to buy spare parts for American F-5E fighters and naval equipment, drawing on unobligated FY 77 money.

-- El Salvador and Guatemala are now hedging on their initial refusals to participate in rather small credit and training programs for FY 78 and unobligated FY 77 money.

We have told the Congress that we are not now asking that the FY 78 budget request for these countries be withdrawn. We prefer to let the situation settle down and assess our security relationships at a later date. However, the atmosphere in the House Appropriations Committee is such that some of these FY 78 programs may be eliminated, although we doubt that the Congress would eliminate the FY 77 funds still in the pipelines.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

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9.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RP 77-10090

Washington, April 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 31, RP 77-10090: Soviet Interest in Latin America. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

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Soviet Interest in Latin America

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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RP 77-10090
April 1977

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Soviet Interest in Latin America

*Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1977*

Key Judgments

The Soviet Union has long been interested in increasing its influence in Latin America, but has had difficulty in formulating a successful policy for the area. Early attempts by Moscow to use the local communist parties to gain a foothold failed, in part, because the Soviets did not understand the Latin American milieu and had little expertise in Latin American affairs. Until the early 1960s they seemed to assume that because of the basic instability of the area, "socialist" revolution was inevitable once a local communist party was activated. The basic flaw was their belief that Latin America was, and is, overwhelmingly dominated by conservative forces that have been unsympathetic to Moscow. Moreover, the area did not fit the Soviet mold of revolution in less developed nations. The countries have been independent for a long time; they are culturally and politically developed; they have a rather extensive educated elite, and for the most part, they are not attracted to foreign political ideologies and have regarded the Soviet Union as a political and ideological pariah.

In recent years, however, the Soviets have had some success in the area—most dramatically, of course, in Cuba. They have made these gains by shifting their emphasis from local communist party relationships to state-to-state relations. Soviet prospects are still limited, however, by Moscow's own economic problems and its inability in most cases to provide the Latins with any civilian technology they do not already have. Soviet successes have been partly the result of growing expertise in Latin American affairs and a relative decline of US influence in the area. Other factors have been the latent anti-US nationalism present in Latin America, the Soviet Union's emergence as a global power with observable economic, military, and political clout, and the survival of Castro's Cuba with Soviet assistance.

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There now seems little doubt that the Soviet presence in Latin America will increase in the future, especially as East-West tensions relax. The Soviets are now beginning to view the area not as a region within the US sphere of influence, but as an arena for US-Soviet competition. Although Latin America certainly is not on the "front burner" of Moscow's priorities, the Soviets are not likely to ignore any opportunity to erode the economic and political power of the US. The Latin Americans' grudging appraisal that they have been overly dependent on the US for political, economic, and military assistance and should now seek alternative friends, suppliers, and markets is made to order for Soviet exploitation.

The current economic recession in the West, the increasing effort by many Latin nations to use their raw materials as an economic lever against the US, and the current impasse between Washington and much of Latin America over the human rights issue can only encourage Moscow. As long as the Soviets continue their low-key approach to the region, as long as they are willing to cut their losses during periodic reversals such as in Chile, and as long as the US fails to stabilize its own relationship with the Latins, Moscow will be able to make inroads on the still-preponderant US influence in the area.

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[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

10.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Multiple Recipients

Washington, April 23, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department, 4-5/77. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Vance, Blumenthal, Brown, Bell, Lance, Warnke and Strauss.

#15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

SUBJECT: Follow-up of the President's Latin America
Speech on April 14, 1977

The President wants the State Department to coordinate with appropriate agencies a report which contains proposals to follow-up on his speech of April 14, 1977, before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. Proposals for implementing action need not be limited to the items mentioned in this memorandum. With the exception of the first two items -- American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I, both of which should be forwarded to the White House by April 29 -- please provide a combined status report of no more than ten pages by COB May 2, 1977, covering the following items:

1. The American Convention on Human Rights should be forwarded for signature by the President and transmittal to the Senate. Appropriate reservations should be submitted in two forms: a single general reservation and specific reservations.
2. In coordination with the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department should forward Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with interpretative statements, reservations, or whatever is considered necessary for Presidential signature and Senate ratification.
3. Please provide proposals for implementing the following pledges, initiatives, or concepts mentioned in the President's speech:

- a. To consult with Latin American governments in advance of major decisions on global policies made by the United States and in the formulation of "a wider and more flexible approach" in North-South economic relations, in conventional arms transfers, and in peaceful uses of the atom. (State should coordinate with Defense, Treasury, ACDA, and STR.)
- b. To increase support for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and for other multilateral approaches to promote human rights and democratic values.
- c. To support, in cooperation with international agencies, broadened programs for aiding, protecting, and resettling political refugees. (State should coordinate with the Justice Department.)
- d. To devise and/or expand programs for training technicians for remote sensing and for using space communications technology for helping national television systems to promote educational and cultural objectives. (State should coordinate with NASA, AID, and OMB.)
- e. To develop proposals by which other nations can deal more effectively with the problems of the needy through institutional, human development, and technological approaches. (State should coordinate with AID, Treasury, and OMB.)
- f. To avoid differences and misunderstandings in problems related to U.S. foreign direct investment and Latin American governments. (State should coordinate with Treasury.)
- g. To contribute to the implementation of the Ayacucho Agreement. (State should coordinate with DOD and ACDA.)
- h. To support the peacekeeping efforts of the OAS Secretary General on an individual case basis. (State should coordinate with DOD and ACDA.)
- i. To support regional and subregional integration efforts.
- j. To increase the number and kind of people-to-people programs, bilaterally and through the OAS, to increase professional, cultural and scientific exchanges.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

11.

Report Prepared in the Department of State

No. 785

Washington, April 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30–6/13/77: 3/24/77–6/16/77. Confidential. Drafted by Hyman and Estep. Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 5 covering memorandum from Pastor, who recommended that the report be sent to Mrs. Carter in preparation for her trip to the region. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Inderfurth “apparently” forwarded the report to the First Lady. (Ibid.)



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

PROBLEMS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN WEST COAST

Overview

The developments that have led to the present degree of tension among the West Coast countries of South America extend back over a century. Peru's current efforts to establish itself as the dominant West Coast power have alarmed its neighbors and have provided a South American foothold for the USSR, which has become Peru's major supplier of arms since 1973.

Analysis of the available evidence leads to the following conclusions:

- Peru has and will maintain for some time arms superiority, but it will be unable, in our judgment, to effect a definitive shift in the balance of power on the West Coast because (a) it lacks the economic and human resources, and (b) there is no real, imminent, external threat.
- Peru's arms program will nevertheless spur a costly and divisive arms race with its neighbors and could eventually lead to armed conflict.
- US influence and leverage in this situation is reduced--sharply in comparison with the past. Nevertheless, countries which feel themselves threatened (Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador) look for protection first to the United States and second to the Organization of American States (OAS).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/GDS

Report No. 785
April 28, 1977

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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- ii -

--The roots of any solution over the mid- to long-term lie in South America itself:

- through the efforts (including self-restraint) by the states most directly concerned (i.e., Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia);

- through the efforts of leading South American states (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela); and

- with US support (if not leadership).

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[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

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12.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, May 9, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Terrorism, 5/77-1/78. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. No drafting information appears on the paper. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, Pastor wrote: "File Terrorism."

9 May 1977

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File
Tunisian

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone

The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly carry out operations against subversives on each other's soil. This effort, dubbed "Operation Condor", is not publicly known. One aspect of the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to foreign security services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of cooperation in Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange of intelligence information by governments facing a common problem is a routine practice throughout the world.

The military-controlled governments of the Southern Cone all consider themselves targets of international Marxism. Having endured real and perceived threats from leftist terrorists, these governments believe that the very foundations of their societies are threatened. In most cases, government leaders seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of suspected subversives, but control over security forces generally is not tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated. Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long way toward explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law, for instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In addition, most Latin American constitutions have provisions for states of seige or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments' powers of arrest, detention, and censorship.

There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security officers on government business from one country to the other.

Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay,

EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. The JCR [EO 13526] coordinates activities and provides propaganda and logistical support for its members. The Junta has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involved in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last May and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974. The attache had been involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros, a member group of JCR.

Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was intensified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more detailed, long-range plans. Decisions included:

- The development of a basic computerized data bank in Santiago. All members will contribute information on known or suspected terrorists.
- Brazil agreed to provide gear for "Condortel" -- the group's communications network.
- Uruguay consented to join Chile and Argentina in covert operations against JCR activities [EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)] in Europe.

The basic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was "to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non-terrorists also were reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of Amnesty International were mentioned as targets. Ferreira may have been removed from the list, however, because he is considered to have good contacts among US congressmen. A training course was held in Buenos Aires for the team heading overseas. More recently Condor leaders were considering the dispatch of a team to London -- disguised as businessmen -- to monitor "suspicious activity" in Europe. Another proposal under study included the collection of material on the membership, location, and political activities of human rights groups in order to identify and expose their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to be collected on church and third-world groups.

Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last May, for example, armed men ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic Commission on Immigration and stole records containing information on thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not investigate the crime -- a signal that Latin refugees, principally from Chile and Uruguay were no longer welcome. A month later, 24 Chilean and Uruguay refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted

their interrogators were security officers from Chile and Uruguay. A number of Uruguayans were held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military officers offered to spare them their lives if they would agree to allow themselves to be "captured" by authorities -- as if they were an armed group attempting to invade the country. Moreover, two prominent political exiles in Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances.

Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign. These programs heavily use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists. By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs aim to secure the support of the citizenry in the hope they will report anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to another -- without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source. For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that allegedly support leftist movements. Bolivia will collect information on the groups and then send it to Argentina for publication.

The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype. Member countries communicate via radio and each is required to maintain an open channel. No commercial equipment is used, but each country can monitor the conversations of another over the Condor net. Sensitive data, not of concern to all members, are forwarded via diplomatic pouch. ~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~ that Condor suffers from some organizational inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectiveness. Condor has tightened security measures. ~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~

~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~ Security has been strengthened at Condor's operations center in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been increased. In addition, once a Condor member has declined to participate in an operation, he is excluded from all further details of that particular plan. Hence, less active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia ~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~ -- may not be aware of many operations.

Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation between other security organizations in the region also is strong. For example, intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countries primarily to identify subversives in exile.

13.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 11, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Lister on April 27 and cleared in draft by Todman and Schneider. (National Archives, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights-Latin America) Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 16 covering memorandum by Pastor, who recommended that Brzezinski send the memorandum to Carter and the First Lady. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77) See *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. II, Human Rights, Document 42.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Human Rights Policy Impact: Latin America

The Carter Administration's human rights policy is having a significant impact in Latin America. A good many Latin American governments have reacted negatively, but some of these have nonetheless taken steps to improve their performance. There have been numerous indications of approval in important sectors of Latin American public opinion. Of course these generalizations should be treated with caution.

The United States Government's new higher priority for human rights, as reflected in Administration speeches and statements, diplomatic representations, military aid cuts, actions taken on IFI loans, and Congressional hearings, has caused the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador to reject, in whole or in part, security assistance predicated on human rights considerations (actually the Brazilian Government attributed its reaction to the issuance of our Brazil Human Rights Report, a decision made prior to the Carter Administration). Leaders in these and other governments have expressed resentment and concern, as well as some bewilderment, at the United States Government's human rights stand. Many in Latin American ruling circles regard our actions and words as intervention in their domestic affairs and a self-defeating abandonment of old allies who are fighting a common enemy, international Communism. This reaction has been reflected in pro-government press comment, at least some of which has been directly inspired by local regimes.

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On the other hand, some officials of these governments have privately expressed approval of the Carter human rights policy. And a significant minority of Latin American governments, including those of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia, have openly voiced their support.

Impact on the actual human rights performance of Latin American governments has also been mixed, with a few regimes taking more progressive and repressive measures at the same time. In some cases our human rights campaign seems to have strengthened the hand of hardliners (e.g., in Brazil, Uruguay and probably in Argentina), at least temporarily. The Geisel Government has used alleged Yankee intervention in Brazil's domestic affairs, specifically the Government of Brazil's nuclear energy and human rights performance, to rally domestic support for its policies. Geisel has subsequently weakened the legal opposition MDB through amendment of the Constitution by Executive Decree. However, there is no question but that a good many Latin American governments have become increasingly concerned about their human rights image. Some undoubtedly have been influenced, consciously and/or unconsciously, to release prisoners (e.g., Chile, Paraguay and Haiti), to caution security officers against excesses (e.g., Brazil and Nicaragua), to refrain from repressive actions which otherwise might have been taken, etc. Some of these positive results were already underway even before the Carter Administration, partly as a result of Congressional stimulus. The net incremental changes are difficult to identify and impossible to quantify. No government is likely to admit that it is pursuing a more civilized and humane policy towards its own citizens because of outside advice or pressure. But there are indications that some governments hope for public or tangible recognition of positive steps taken. These might well be encouraged in the direction of still further progress.

It is much more difficult to calculate the reaction of Latin American public opinion. Unquestionably much of it has been positive, although often muted in fear


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of reprisal. There has been considerable favorable, independent press comment. Some Brazilian papers, even while supporting the official reaction to foreign government preparation of a Brazil Human Rights Report, criticized human rights violations and called for a domestic investigation. Many democratic opposition parties and groups have hailed our human rights stand, including the Christian Democrats in Chile, the PRD in the Dominican Republic, some factions of the MDB in Brazil, and the opposition coalition in El Salvador. Catholic church representatives have commented very favorably. And there have been warm words of praise and encouragement from influential intellectuals, journalists, sociologists, etc. Once again, this positive reaction has not been uniform. Various supporters (e.g., some Latin American government officials as well as leaders of the Buenos Aires Jewish community) have quietly cautioned against pushing so hard publicly as to make repressive regimes feel they are being cornered, thus leading them to take even harsher measures.

It is, of course, far too early to make any definitive judgments as to the net impact of our current human rights policy. Many Latin leaders are still trying to sort out where they stand in the face of what they regard as an onslaught on their legitimacy. Some see, or pretend to see, the most recent public human rights statements by United States Government officials as a backing away, at least to some extent, from our previously voiced high priority for human rights. Latin Americans both in and out of government are watching carefully to see whether and how effectively we intend to continue our present human rights commitment. In this connection, there is attached the revealing March 27 comment of Robert Cox, the courageous British editor of the English language Buenos Aires Herald. Mr. Cox predicts President Carter will become "more and more effective" if he sticks to his guns.


Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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14.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, May 19, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum. Vance was in Geneva to meet with Gromyko.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting *WC*

[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

Todman Trip to Latin America. Assistant Secretary Todman returned this week from a quick swing through Latin America. In Colombia, President Lopez Michelsen pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which we are hesitant to deliver because of reported narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral policeman." He urges that we internationalize the

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effort (which of course we are trying to do). Colombian officials pressed their view that we should give special preferences to Latin American goods to offset the preferences the European Community extends to former European colonies.

In Venezuela, President Perez, looking forward to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the single most important issue in our bilateral relations is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of generalized trade preferences.

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentina who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that he understood our human rights position and did not argue with its importance, but that Argentina just could not meet the highest standards until it wins the war against terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of Argentina's difficulties.

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil attaches great importance to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week during the CIEC meeting and will try to put his doubts to rest on this score. Although not discussed extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of primary concern to the Brazilians.

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government officials promised to speed up adjudication of the cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. Based on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution for the cocaine-source coca now produced there.

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[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

15.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. On the first page of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, "ZB—See my comments. DA." Dodson also initialed the memorandum.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 28, 1977

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR *Bob*
SUBJECT: Follow-up on the President's Pan
American Day Speech: Peacekeeping

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*2B-
See my
comment
JF*

In the Pan American Day Speech, when the President said that the United States will support the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS in his "active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solutions to several longstanding disputes in this hemisphere," he was signalling a departure from past policy. Since U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S. policy has been to keep our distance from any territorial problems in the hemisphere because it was felt that our involvement would be the "kiss of death" for any initiative, regardless how desirable. Thus, the U.S. did not even comment favorably when the Andean countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 calling for mutual arms limitation in the region.

This non-profile policy may have been appropriate for the decade after the Dominican Republic, but times have changed. There are now many leaders in the hemisphere -- and I would count Secretary General Orfila as a potential leader -- who are either looking for U.S. support or leadership in this area. The President signalled the possibility of such a new posture in the Pan American Day speech not only in his reference to the OAS peacekeeping efforts, but also in his positive comment about the Ayacucho Declaration.

"I spent most of this morning working on a new United States policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms around the world. Again, you in Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American nations to limit the acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a striking example. If the eight nations can implement their pledge, their own people will not be the only ones to benefit. They will have set a standard for others, throughout the world, to follow."

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There are three relatively serious territorial disputes and several others less serious problems in the hemisphere. The three deserve our attention:

1. Belize - Guatemala. Belize is a colony of Great Britain which would have achieved independence had it not been for the fact that Guatemala, which has claims to Belize, has threatened to invade if it becomes independent. This is the most urgent issue because it has divided Latin America, which supports Guatemala, in varying degrees, and the Caribbean, which support Belize. Panama has recently shifted to the side of Belize, and Guatemala broke diplomatic relations. The British have asked us to help, and Secretary Vance asked ARA for options, which I believe they provided, albeit reluctantly (Luers said he thought it would be a mistake for us to get involved.) - *I agree. DB*

2. El Salvador and Honduras still do not have diplomatic relations. A little support for Orfila's efforts might help there. *Maybe, what's the catch?*

3. Andean Tensions. *DB*

I agree. RT
In the memorandum asking for follow-up on the President's speech, options on peacekeeping efforts were requested, but we never received any. ARA is split on this issue. Bob White, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission to the OAS, believes that we should take a more active role in this area, and Secretary Vance's request for options on Belize is one indication that he may be in agreement with this new posture. Obviously, I think an active -- not necessarily as a leader, but at the least, as an interested party searching for the most effective way to get involved -- role is entirely consistent with the main theme in the President's speech. I mentioned this to Bob White, and he immediately organized a meeting in ARA on May 25, and in my opinion, it was the most productive meeting I have ever gone to in ARA. The people he brought in knew each of the disputes and had some good ideas on what the U.S. could do. Luers attended the meeting only for the first ten minutes, and I suspect he was the one who slipped that ridiculous note to the Secretary which you mentioned on Friday. The irony is that I would bet that the Secretary would support a more active role by the United States in this area.

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Anyway, I suspect that the only way that we will get any movement on this issue is either by a formal request or perhaps a phone call to Secretary Vance.

I would recommend a formal request for two reasons: (1) in order to give us the opportunity to show something to the President on this subject -- letting him choose the options on the questions of future involvement; and (2) so that we can monitor the interagency process to ensure that it is not sandbagged in ARA.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Good idea.
I believe this
the kind of
Follow-up to
the President's speeches,
etc. that should
be taken.

RI

signed 4/14/77

213 -

ARA is a State Dept within the
State Dept. Bill Lewis is extremely
uncooperative with us. (By the way he is
being considered for the Dep Asst Secretary slot
in the Bureau of European Affairs
dealing with the Soviet Bloc.) We
should see out the director
for disciplinary reasons, if not
Eller

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16.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RP 77-10129

Washington, June 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 136, RP77-10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Confidential. *[drafting information not declassified]*.

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Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

June 1977

Key Judgments

Human rights have been violated—sometimes flagrantly—by the authoritarian military regimes that have come to power in the southern cone of Latin America. Repression, characterized by torture and other inhumane practices, has been directed for the most part at leftists, but others have been victimized as well, largely by governments reacting to real and imagined threats to stability. As a result, human rights guarantees have been subordinated to the priority concerns of imposing order on sometimes fractious societies and concentrating on economic development and growth. Our basic judgments about this pattern are that:

- Authoritarian military or quasi-military governments will remain in power for the foreseeable future and will continue to accord low priority to the human rights question.
- Improvements in human rights practices will depend more on the military's assessment of local security and insurgency conditions than on outside pressures
- Where basic reform is instituted, the process will be slow at best and may be measured only in terms of cosmetics rather than substance. Moreover, the continued existence of security apparatuses geared to repression increases the chances of retrogression.
- Where the terrorist threat has subsided, there has been a gradual easing of the worst kinds of offenses, but this trend is by no means irreversible.
- External criticism of human rights abuses in the southern cone may lead to limited improvements; reprisals by Washington will be viewed as infringements on national sovereignty, and are more likely to provoke continued defiance than serve as catalysts for improving the human rights situation in any fundamental way.

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Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America

The judgment of what rights all people are entitled to enjoy is a subjective one, and it varies from culture to culture. Human rights for the purposes of this paper are defined as protection of persons from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, and murder. Although this paper addresses the relationship between authoritarianism and human rights, a broad definition of human rights that includes the right to a democratic form of government and to certain social and economic benefits goes beyond the scope of this discussion.

In trying to define human rights there are limitations in venturing generalizations about a geographic region. In the case of the five South American countries—the southern cone—discussed in this study, however, there are some common trends that can be discerned and various conclusions that can be drawn about recent developments.

The Roots of the Problem

Human rights problems are not new in Latin America. Throughout the history of the region, even so-called “democratic” governments have sometimes engaged in repression and systematic violations of basic individual rights. The notoriety of these acts—especially among the authoritarian governments—has become more pronounced in recent years because of improved worldwide communications and greater international emphasis on human rights problems.

South American military regimes today are reacting in similar fashion to real or imagined threats to order and stability and have adopted a doctrine that is stridently anticommunist, but largely antidemocratic as well. The resort to torture and other inhumane practices to suppress perceived threats to stability has been a part of this pattern.

Constitutional rule has been extinguished or drastically altered; political freedoms have been shelved; and political parties have been banned or tightly circumscribed. Where elections are still held, they are usually rigidly controlled with little doubt as to their outcome.

The protection normally afforded by the judicial process has been abrogated by the imposition of states of siege in some countries, thereby giving the military broad discretionary powers to suspend many rights and guarantees. Governments have used these emergency powers to crack down on suspected subversives. Although the target has been leftist extremists and other opponents, innocent persons have also felt the impact of arbitrary actions.

The preeminent role of the military in countering subversion in Latin America and a long-standing tolerance of highly centralized governments have reinforced the trend away from democratic practices. Once in power, the military has assumed sweeping measures to guarantee security and combat leftist influence.

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There are a number of sociopolitical factors that have facilitated this process. The first is that little value is placed on the rights of the individual. In the Latin American context, fundamental rights are not viewed as sacrosanct. The state is the arbiter of what rights are inalienable and determines how justice will be administered. The vast majority of the people, by and large, is not bothered by what happens to the fringe elements of society. In addition, although a separation of powers exists in theory, in practice the Latin American executive has usually functioned in an autocratic manner. Judicial and legislative organs, where they exist, do not have the independence that marks North American and some West European models. Moreover, in their desire for security and the preservation of their society, Latin Americans have often acquiesced in strong military rule and endured constraints on their individual freedoms.

Those who have had their rights abused tend to come from all walks of life, and their political views or activism seem to be the primary criteria that make them subjects of government repression. In many cases, young people from middle- or upper-class families who have participated in extremist movements or sympathized with leftist causes have been jailed or tortured by security services to obtain information about their associates and subversive organizations.

Among the military officers who now direct the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, there is a firm conviction that former civilian politicians had failed to halt a drift toward political polarization and violence in their societies. The armed forces have equated this failure with the inability of the democratic system to cope with the complex problems of Latin America's "less developed" status. Their authoritarianism has been improvised as a result and does not follow the classic pattern of military dictatorship. The old archetype of the military strongman as defender of the oligarchy and of elite interests has been supplanted by a new image of the military as catalysts of national development and progress as well as defenders of national security.

An important aspect of the trend toward military dominance in the area is the impact of the drive for modernization on the thinking of the current generation of armed forces leaders. The economic difficulties generated by political dislocations have impressed them with the need to channel their countries along a path of sustained development and growth. While most of these countries have been plagued at one time or another by runaway inflation, a lack of investment capital, or economic stagnation, their societies have been strained by the demands of a rapidly expanding urban population and middle class.

After taking power, the military has sought to guide the process of economic transformation by imposing tough and sometimes unpopular policies. A concentration on assuring political stability at any cost to guarantee a continuity of policies within a coherent modernization strategy has frequently meant that concern for basic human rights has had a very low priority.

The Southern Cone

Where the terrorist threat has subsided—in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—we believe there has been a gradual easing of the most offensive kinds of violations, including torture, illegal detention, and political kidnappings. Firm confirmation of this sort of information is hard to come by, but the impression held by **EO 13526** independent international organizations that monitor the human rights situation in Latin America is that fewer violations in these countries have been recorded so far this year than a year ago. In general, there is no discernible pattern in the number of human rights violations in the southern cone, but as long as the repressive machinery remains in place the chances of a resurgence cannot be ruled out.

Repression by the military regime in Brazil has been mitigated, in part, during the past year or so by President Geisel's removal of officials responsible for illegal arrests and torture. Military and police organizations **EO 13526** have orders from high-level officials to prohibit torture and other forms of mistreatment. Detainees in security cases have experienced improved conditions, but

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South America



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Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection
Scale 1:37,000,000
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative

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there are still occasional reports of harsh treatment and arbitrary detentions.

Although leftist guerrilla activity has virtually been wiped out in Brazil and Uruguay, Argentina is still suffering from sporadic acts of terrorism. The zealous pursuit of the remaining terrorists by Argentine security forces still gives rise to abuses. Killings and disappearances continue to characterize the antiradical campaign, even though many hardcore terrorist leaders have been eliminated and their support apparatus gravely weakened.

Argentina may now be at a crossroads. The terrorists, although by no means out of business, are clearly on the run. This is obvious to all Argentines, and the security forces take considerable pride in their achievement. At the same time, however, there are officers who believe that the elimination of the guerrilla activists is merely the beginning and that there must now be a grand offensive against the intellectual authors of subversion to root out the basic causes of terrorism.

Should such an offensive take place, it could occur in the form of purges of school and university faculties, government bureaus, and journalistic, intellectual, and artistic circles to a degree not yet experienced. In such an environment, anyone even remotely identifiable with leftist or merely liberal views would have reason to fear for his job or position, if not his very life. Thus far, the military government has not seemed inclined to move in such a direction. From what we know, President Videla and his supporters are opposed to repressive tactics against these people.

The outcome hinges, however, on Videla's ability to control the so-called "hardline" officers, which he has been able to do so far. Some moderate officers may now be alarmed at the implications of a current investigation of prominent citizens allegedly linked to subversion. Among the hardliners, the more vengeful may want to exploit the case by exaggerating it to "prove" their contention that subversion is so deeply imbedded that extremely harsh measures are justified.

The case centers on the family and associates of a wealthy financier who are under suspicion because of the financier's purported financial assistance to the Montonero guerrillas. The number of persons implicated has grown steadily, but firm charges of subversion have been leveled against few, if any. Moreover, accusations against the principal figures have yet to be substantiated. Many of those implicated are Jewish; some occupied key positions in the Peronist government; some are journalists. One is a former military president. At least some Argentines are becoming uneasy that anti-Semitism—always close to the surface in Argentina—and political retaliation are as much behind the investigation as a genuine belief that real links to subversion exist.

Human rights problems in the smaller and more backward nations of the continent, such as Paraguay and Bolivia, have not aroused as much international attention. These isolated nations have experienced long periods of dictatorial rule, and periodic episodes of abuse are not unusual. The current lack of political turbulence probably accounts for the slight attention paid to violations within these countries. On the other hand, in cases such as Uruguay and Chile, where long traditions of civil liberties existed, the worst aspects of military repression have triggered strong protests abroad.

The military-dominated Mendez government in Uruguay has grown considerably more conscious of its poor reputation on human rights. Prior to the recent US aid cut, Uruguay appeared to be making some effort to bring improvements. In reprisal for US moves, however, military hardliners have put aside—at least temporarily—any plans for further relaxation. The Council of State earlier approved legislation reducing minimum sentences for certain kinds of activities associated with subversion but its effectiveness has not yet been shown. In November 1976, the US embassy estimated that approximately 1,800 persons were still being detained for political reasons. Instances of torture and prolonged detention have decreased, but the military retains a firm grip on the government and has extensive powers in the area of individual rights and guarantees. Most of the violations recently cited by human rights

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critics cover complaints dating back a year or more.

In Chile, the experiment with Marxism under Allende led to the end of a period of democratic rule that had extended over nearly half a century. The intervention of the armed forces in 1973 brought to power a military establishment with little practical political experience, a strong distaste for partisan politics, and no coherent program to deal with Chile's economic and political problems. The result has been the imposition of draconian measures that have made Chile an international pariah—although its human rights violations in many respects have been no worse than those of its neighbors.

Early this year, the Pinochet government appeared to be turning toward legal practice in security cases. The procedural cleanup may have been temporary, however, since new evidence of torture, illegal detentions, and "disappearances" is coming to light. This backsliding comes at a particularly bad time for Chile, since West European governments were beginning to take note of the substantial improvement in human rights practices. A renewed wave of abuse by intelligence organizations is certain to refuel the human rights controversy and provide new ammunition for Chile's critics.

Meanwhile, the courts are pressing the government on past cases, some of which are almost certain to embarrass the regime. Perhaps the most positive advance made by the government in moderating its hardline policy during 1976 was the release of some 2,700 political prisoners, leaving only about 500 still incarcerated on various charges. Civil freedoms remain rigidly restricted, however, and the outlawing of the remaining democratic parties in March was a stark reminder that open political expression is not tolerated.

The Legal and Humanitarian Aspects

While concern for human rights has generally been defined in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN, wide differences of opinion exist about what are violations of human rights. International requirements of states in human rights matters are, for

the most part, vague and nonobligatory. Statements of good intentions about achieving minimum standards are more common than a willingness to take concrete steps to uphold them.

Where military regimes have enforced state-of-siege decrees, prisoners have been denied access to civil courts and have been deprived of such procedural safeguards as *amparo*—the Latin American juridical equivalent of habeas corpus. In some countries, summary courts martial have dealt with internal security cases, normally the most sensitive politically. These tribunals tend to deal more sternly and expeditiously with cases than the civil judiciary, which is notoriously cumbersome and inefficient in much of Latin America. Adding to the problem are the civil judges themselves and their fear that either the subversives or right-wing groups will take action against them.

Some military regimes have rewritten or are in the process of redrafting national security codes. The aim apparently is to ensure that the military has a significantly enhanced role in controlling future situations considered inimical to national security and stability. In spite of legal requisites, in practice the armed forces are likely to act on the basis of expediency rather than any firm dedication to observance of legal principles. As long as constitutional rule is in abeyance and no real independent check on executive authority exists, this situation is not expected to change dramatically.

Deference to legal propriety has been disregarded most often by intelligence and security services, which usually have wide-ranging powers and virtual autonomy in their operations. This broad mandate has been used at times to conduct activities of an illegal nature—although ostensibly designed to protect the national interest. Acting under the state of siege and other extraordinary powers, prisoners have been held incommunicado and without being charged. Authorities have been able to detain, search, and interrogate anyone at any time or place. Physical and psychological torture have been employed as devices to extract information. Such practices have generated strident criticism abroad.

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Working against abandonment of these practices in Latin America is the fact that torture has been found to be an effective tool in rooting out subversion. Intelligence services have obtained information quickly that has enabled them to foil insurgent operations, frequently by surprise. The sophistication of torture technology today is such that there are few individuals who cannot be made to reveal information or to confess to charges. Military regimes have also perceived the utility of the threat of torture to intimidate opposition political movements.

It is highly probable that the leadership in most instances has either condoned such practices outright in the past or at least turned a blind eye to them. External pressures and the reduction of an internal threat evidently are having some success in compelling a few regimes to halt the worst kinds of excesses, but there will probably be no fundamental change as long as these governments deem it necessary to resort to extreme measures against their "enemies."

Obstacles to Reform

The new breed of military ruler in South America has been slow to respond to charges of human rights violations but quick to voice annoyance with what they see as external "meddling" in matters they believe fall exclusively within their sovereign prerogative. Most have insisted that if the rights of a minority have been disregarded, it has been to protect the rights of the majority from internal subversion.

Military and security forces consider themselves to be the front line of defense against a relentless Communist offensive in which they are also usually a prime target. Reinforcing this siege mentality is the officers' conviction that what they are doing is in the highest national interest. They also believe that their mission is partly one of saving Western Christian civilization from Communism, a task that they think has been abandoned by a weakened and divided US. They point to detente as evidence that US accommodation with Communist countries is a

sellout and an invitation to infiltration of alien ideas.

Another closely related factor contributing to the military's rationale that its ironhanded methods are correct is the evident lack of strong opposition on the part of a substantial portion of the population. Most Latin Americans do not view human rights per se as a domestic problem. Indeed, the vast majority is unaffected by the brutal treatment inflicted on a minority considered to be extremists.

The Latin perception of the human rights situation is quite different from that of other Western nations, where it is seen from a different cultural perspective. In countries such as Uruguay and Argentina, where rampant terrorism has caused the most fear and apprehension among substantial elements of the population, the restoration of order by other than legal means has been viewed as a nasty but unavoidable business.

The traditional inclination of Latin Americans to accept authoritarianism may also increase the tendency to overlook behavior that is unacceptable elsewhere. Many Latin Americans have been prone to dismiss criticism from abroad as simply ill-informed or Communist-inspired.

In Chile, the violent and chaotic conditions of the Allende years left a deep scar on the nation, and internal support for the junta was impressive, if not universal, at the outset. Disillusionment has set in during the past several years, but the absence of free opinion makes it difficult to judge the extent of support for the junta or its opponents. Many people are not effusive about the methods of the austere military regime, but have accepted the necessity for it while expressing guarded optimism that gradual improvement is possible.

For most of these governments, however, the future of democratic institutions does not appear bright. Whatever form of government evolves under military auspices, the authoritarian infrastructure is not likely to change sub-

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stantially. Because they have come to power by extraconstitutional means, these governments will probably attempt to compensate for their lack of legitimacy by creating a new institutional framework that reflects and reinforces their own doctrines and ideas. This process probably will offer a few openings for a loosening of the present restrictions on human rights.

Reaction to Foreign Criticism

Criticism by the US and the suspension of aid to Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile have provoked a sharp reaction. Much of the outburst stemmed from a belief that Latin America is being unfairly discriminated against by economic reprisals since Communist nations receive little more than a tongue-lashing. Indignation rose even higher when Latins saw South Korea and the Philippines being granted exceptions because of their security value to the US. Latin Americans resent the insinuation that they are not important to the US.

Latin pique over the US position has been manifested by a conspicuous cooling in relations and, in some cases, the rejection of US aid. The Brazilians acted to terminate military agreements with the US. Argentina made clear that eradication of terrorism will be undertaken by whatever means the military government deems necessary, even if it entails a deterioration in relations with the US. Chilean leaders signaled their displeasure by cracking down on political opponents—particularly former president Frei's Christian Democrats—and by vowing that no further concessions would be made to world opinion, which the Chilean junta believes it cannot appease in any case.

The irritation expressed by the southern cone governments to US chiding on human rights will subside eventually, but the issue seems likely to remain an underlying source of trouble. As tempers cool and military leaders have a chance to reflect on the situation, attitudes may shift enough to permit renewed movement toward moderation.

International censure has had a measurable impact on the human rights situation, in large part because of the efforts of the world press to draw attention to the problem. In Argentina, for instance, the much publicized habeas corpus petitions filed by relatives on behalf of 425 persons whose whereabouts are unknown appear to have prompted the Supreme Court to ask for an investigation by the government.

In addition, organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the human rights commissions of the UN and the OAS have participated in investigating or publicizing human rights violations. Other groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Committee for European Migration have aided in resettlement of political refugees and monitoring of humanitarian conditions. The Catholic Church has been an outspoken source of criticism and has facilitated some improvements in Brazil and Chile; in Argentina it recently issued its first formal condemnation of human rights abuses. In a number of instances, the release of political prisoners, the reduction of torture and illegal disappearances, and better conditions for political prisoners can be attributed to the cumulative efforts of these groups.

Political and economic pressures—such as withholding loans or making arms sales—exerted by other governments have also compelled change in the human rights situation, but the results have varied from country to country and are difficult to evaluate. Where such actions have had a corrective influence, they have not always been without unfortunate side effects. As a quid pro quo for their steps to curb abuses, the military governments expect some recognition of their efforts. The unfavorable image of most of these governments abroad, however, is such that the slow pace in restoring fundamental rights does little to appease their critics.

Private diplomatic persuasion has been used with some limited success to influence the course of human rights protection, but there is no assurance that the device will work in the absence of other means of leverage. Given the

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drawbacks of using the stick, however, the value of using the carrot may be increasing.

An approach tailored for each country that recognizes and applauds even small steps taken to limit human rights violations may induce concessions from governments that employ murder, torture, and kidnaping as weapons against their enemies. But southern cone regimes will continue to be suspicious of US motives as well as of initiatives for international oversight that appear to interfere with their sovereign national rights.

With the restrictions now placed on some of these governments by the US in the areas of economic and military aid, there may be a limited amount of leverage available to achieve substantial new improvements. The Latins have balked at what they believe is a US plan to use aid as a weapon, and they are certain to react negatively to any further moves they consider punitive. Chile, Brazil, and Argentina are already looking elsewhere for military hardware that they cannot procure from the US.

To avoid being further isolated at the international level, the countries of the southern cone may find it prudent to take a new look at possible policy adjustments. They will only do so, however, at a time when it does not appear that they are bowing to foreign pressures. An easing of repression is more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society than from external demands for change, which tend to bolster a siege mentality.

An Inter-American Challenge?

All of the Latin American nations have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and most of them have incorporated it in their respective constitutions. The Chapultepec conference of American states, which met in 1945 to lay the groundwork for the postwar reorganization of the inter-American system, adopted a resolution appealing for the international protection of human rights. Since then the Organization of American States has included provisions on human rights, which are

further strengthened by amendments to the Protocol of Buenos Aires concluded in 1967. Noncompliance with these statements of principle has been the rule more often than the exception.

Recommendations have occasionally been made in Latin America favoring enforcement of basic human rights, but misgivings over possible encroachments on sovereign rights have prevented agreement on any solution. As early as 1945, a Uruguayan foreign minister called for "multilateral collective action, exercised with complete unselfishness" to bring about the "reestablishment of essential rights" in any country suffering under dictatorship. The US gave unqualified support to the idea, but a majority of the American republics turned it down.

The inter-American convention adopted by the OAS Council in 1968 provided for the creation of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Compulsory judgment was to be optional, however, and the court has never been used to settle a human rights dispute because of the special sensitivity of Latin Americans to the question of intervention.

Despite the recent dismal record of Latin American states in upholding human rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, functioning under the OAS, has scored relatively high marks in the past for acting on complaints and undertaking investigations. It has used its powers more boldly than most other regional or international organizations. Its observers have periodically exercised a close supervisory role in monitoring and bringing human rights problems to the attention of governments in the Americas.

The commission has encountered obstacles in fulfilling its objectives. Nevertheless, it is dedicated to impartial fact gathering and to exposure of the more flagrant violations of basic liberties and might well be the most acceptable and workable solution to the question of how to effect action on human rights abuses. This, of course, would depend greatly on the extent

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to which political realities permit even the present commission to operate evenhandedly and to muster majority support for compliance with adequate safeguards.

Members of the commission made an on-the-scene visit to Chile in 1974, but OAS inertia in dealing with the group's findings has done much to immobilize it since then. In any case, Latin Americans would probably prefer dealing with the OAS than with the UN. Relations between Chile and the UN Human Rights Commission have been strained since July 1975, when President Pinochet reneged on a promise to allow a visit by a UN fact-finding mission. While the Chilean junta is hypersensitive to outside attacks on its human rights record, it believes a more sympathetic hearing can be obtained from the American states than from radical third world countries in the UN.

Multilateral representations on human rights make the US less vulnerable to charges of great power coercion. The OAS Secretary General, for example, might serve as a moderating force in encouraging greater hemispheric respect for human rights.

Outlook

We expect that the South American governments singled out most frequently for human rights infractions will remain authoritarian for the foreseeable future. In the absence of any realistic challenges, there is no current alternative to the military as arbiters of power. Respect for human rights will be largely dependent on the military's judgments regarding internal security conditions or local insurgency—not outside pressures.

Where progress occurs, it will be a slow process. Ameliorative action to correct the worst abuses of human rights will probably be taken in the short term, but real movement toward broader liberalization measures is less likely within the next few years.

The ruling generals in most of the southern cone share similar views on enforcing stability—if necessary, by repressing any activity they consider threatening, particularly from the left. The military's mission, as the Chilean junta has stated in its Declaration of Principles, is one of "cleansing our democratic system from the vices that facilitated its destruction."

These countries will remain sensitive to international opinion and will weigh their responses in terms of the potential costs, such as increased isolation or economic and political reprisals. As they comprehend the earnestness of the US commitment on human rights, the principal offenders may strive to alleviate some US concerns, to contain further antagonism over the issue, and to restore some balance to bilateral relations.

On the debit side, it is evident that US-Latin American relationships are apt to be strained for some time over the human rights issue. Continued resentment and defiance on the part of some Latin American governments could persuade them to side more actively in international forums with third world initiatives that run contrary to US interests. If pressures were reduced, on the other hand, these governments might continue to rely on repression and stall on taking measures to liberalize their regimes.

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17.

Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts

Washington, June 8, 1977, 0252Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770203-0746. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Einaudi; cleared in S/S-O and in draft by Devine, Rogers, White, Schneider, Feinberg, Barnebey, and Zimmermann; approved by Luers.

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S/P:RFEINBERG (DRAFT)
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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: SHUM, PA, AR, CO, BR, VE, BL, PE, EC, CI

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON SOUTHERN CONE BLOC INITIATIVES

REFERENCE: ASUNCION 2279

1. REFTEL REPORTS THAT THE PROSPECTIVE JUNE 3 MEETING OF SOUTHERN CONE CHIEFS OF STATE HAS BEEN POSTPONED AND DOWNGRADED TO A PRE-OASGA MEETING IN GRENADA AMONG FOREIGN MINISTERS. THIS CABLE PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDANCE ON OUR RESPONSE TO THIS AND SIMILAR EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE AGAINST OUR POLICIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

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2. WHILE THE DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL OF A GEO-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BLOC CENTERED ON THE SOUTHERN CONE IS CLEAR, THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE PROMOTERS OF A

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CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING SUGGEST THAT PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A BLOC IS STILL LIMITED. UNLESS SOME CATALYTIC EVENT INTERVENES, THEREFORE, WE SUSPECT THAT IF SOME SOUTHERN CONE FOREIGN MINISTERS DO EVENTUALLY MEET IN GRENADA, THEY ARE LIKELY TO DO LITTLE MORE THAN ATTEMPT TO COORDINATE PRIVATELY THEIR VIEWS AND POSITIONS PRIOR TO THE OASGA.

3. AS THERE IS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR LATIN AMERICAN CAUCUSES

PRIOR TO INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS, A SOUTHERN CONE MINI-CAUCUS IN GRENADA DOES NOT IN ITSELF WARRANT ALARM. NOR FOR THAT MATTER, IS IT SOMETHING WE COULD AT THIS POINT DO MUCH TO PREVENT.

4. THE LONGER-RUN IMPLICATIONS OF A REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL COALITION AGAINST OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES ARE CONSIDERABLY MORE SERIOUS, HOWEVER. CLEARLY, IT WOULD SERVE ONLY PINOCHET'S INTERESTS TO INVEIGLE OTHER COUNTRIES INTO IDENTIFICATION WITH CHILE. CONVERSELY OUR INTERESTS WOULD SUFFER. ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN MEMBERSHIP IN SUCH A BLOC WOULD TEND TO PROVIDE MORAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED HUMAN-RIGHTS ABUSES AND RENDER BOTH COUNTRIES LESS AMENABLE TO OUR APPROACHES ON THIS SUBJECT. MOREOVER WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PARAGUAY THAT IT WOULD INVITE THE LAHRC TO VISIT PARAGUAY THIS YEAR. WERE THIS DECISION TO BE CHANGED NOW UNDER PRESSURES FROM AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION OF MILITARY HARDLINERS, THE RESULT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO PROSPECTS FOR MULTILATERALIZING THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONALLY

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PAGE 03

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RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS. LASTLY, WE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A BLOC MIGHT ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM, OR EXERT PRESSURE ON, SOME COUNTRIES THAT ARE marginally inclined to support our policies at present. IT WOULD ALSO INHIBIT ANY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA MIGHT PLAY.

5. OUR RESPONSES TO FEELERS ON THESE MATTERS MUST KEEP SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE DO NOT WANT TO OVERREACT IN WAYS THAT WOULD FUEL FEARS OF US INTERVENTION, PROVIDE AMMUNITION TO HARDLINERS, EMBARRASS OUR FRIENDS, OR OTHERWISE PROVOKE A NEW

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WAVE OF LATIN AMERICAN "SOLIDARITY" AGAINST US. OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE, WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE SUCH A SOFT LINE THAT WE APPEAR DEFENSIVE, CONFUSED, OR PREPARED TO YIELD TO EXTREME NATIONALIST REACTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE NOT APPEAR DISPOSED TO RETREAT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. ACTION REQUESTED. WE SHOULD NOT NOW APPEAR OVERLY INTERESTED OR OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRE-OASGA MINI-CAUCUS. IF ASKED ABOUT MORE FORMAL INITIATIVES TENDING TOWARD BLOC FORMATION, HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT, WHILE WE OBVIOUSLY

CANNOT OBJECT TO MEETINGS AMONG OTHER GOVERNMENTS, WE JUST AS OBVIOUSLY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY MOVES ANTAGONISTIC TO THE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OR, OF COURSE, TO THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY, BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN THE OAS AND ELSEWHERE, TO DEVELOP HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES THAT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE NATIONS OF THIS HEMISPHERE. WE SEE NO VALUE IN NOT DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES OPENLY AND IN A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL SPIRIT.

7. WHILE THE ABOVE SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED IN RESPONSE

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TO ALL INQUIRIES, SOME ADDITIONAL TAILORING TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS IS ALSO DESIRABLE. WHEN AN INQUIRY COMES FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS TURNED DOWN SOUTHERN CONE APPROACHES, YOU SHOULD STATE FRANKLY THAT WE ARE PLEASED THAT THEY ARE NOT JOINING WHAT APPEAR TO BE ILL-CONCEIVED EFFORTS TO FORM AN ORGANIZED FRONT AGAINST OUR COMMON EFFORTS. WHEN AN INQUIRY COMES FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT IS UNDECIDED OR FROM AN OFFICIAL WHO IS SUFFICIENTLY OPEN TO UNDERSTAND THE POINT, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE EMERGENCE OF BLOC POLITICS CAN ONLY SERVE TO POLARIZE RELATIONS. THIS WOULD COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO TAILOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY TAKING FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR BILATERAL LEVERAGE AND DIFFERING NATIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. VANCE

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18.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, June 14, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. For the origins of this document, see Document 15.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Peacekeeping

In the President's speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, he signalled a new and more active approach by the United States to international disputes in the Western Hemisphere. He gave strong encouragement to the Andean countries to implement the Ayacucho Declaration, and he said that the United States would support the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS in finding solutions to longstanding disputes in the hemisphere.

Supporting the OAS Secretary General's initiative is only one option we might want to consider in choosing an appropriate strategy for the United States in dealing with disputes in the hemisphere. Please provide by July 7, 1977, a short paper discussing options which the President might want to consider in dealing with the following disputes:

- Belize - Guatemala.
- El Salvador - Honduras.
- The Andean countries (Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia).

The review need not be limited to these cases. The State Department should coordinate this review with the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

19.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, June 16, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30–6/13/77: 3/24/77–6/16/77. Confidential. Sent for information. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote, "To Zbig, Cy. C." Pastor sent this memorandum to Brzezinski under a June 16 covering memorandum in which he recommended that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter. (Ibid.)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 16, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*

SUBJECT: Follow-up of Mrs. Carter's Trip

Only for quick scanning because of your interest.

We have compiled a set of checklists on those specific items raised in each country which Mrs. Carter visited. I have sent follow-up memoranda on all those items with an asterisk beside them.

The Venezuela checklist (pages 10 and 11) is of particular importance because it represents a concise agenda of the items which Perez will want to discuss during his State Visit. I will send follow-up memoranda on all the items in the checklist, but if you could examine the list first and suggest some direction that we might take in providing you with a good response to these issues, we can ensure that your dialogue with Perez will be as productive as possible.

The discussions with Perez will be of great importance to our overall policy in the hemisphere since he is currently the most outstanding leader in the hemisphere, and more importantly, because his position on the major issues which we care about in the hemisphere - human rights, nonproliferation, and arms control -- are identical with our own. He wants to play a leadership role on these issues, and we should probably encourage him and provide some direction. Furthermore, we may need his help again on the Canal Treaty if we are going to be able to complete it this summer.

We are presently working on the drafts of letters for you to send to the seven countries which Mrs. Carter visited, but we thought we would wait until Secretary Vance returns from the OAS so as to take into account his follow-up efforts before we forward the letters to you. We have not yet heard from Colombian President Lopez Michelsen on when

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or whether he will meet with Peter Bourne or Mathea Falco, and we may not receive a response for a while. Perhaps, we should draft a letter from you to him to reiterate your interest in this and other matters, and later when Peter Bourne goes to Colombia, he could bring a separate letter.

*After DEA
mtg - I'll write
a personal ltr
to Lopez for Peter
to deliver - draft
same*

There were several issues which were discussed in almost every country Mrs. Carter visited. I have just asked State for a report which includes options for your consideration on ways the United States can effectively contribute to the peaceful resolution of both the Belizean problem and the problem of the Andes. Other multilateral issues which we are examining in the context of a report being prepared for you by State and NSC on the follow-up of your Pan American Day speech include: human rights, nonproliferation (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and political refugees.

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20.

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RPM 77-10168

Washington, June 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 June 1977

ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The OAS General Assembly and the Human Rights Issue


Delegates to last week's OAS General Assembly in Grenada returned home convinced of the depth of Washington's commitment to the defense of human rights. The conference, in fact, turned out to be a battleground for the US human rights policy and almost all of the discussions were devoted to it. Even though the delegates have been thoroughly sensitized to the issue, however, the outlook for progress in curbing human rights abuses is still mixed at best.

The thirteen nations voting for the US initiative on human rights were Panama, Jamaica, Barbados, Surinam, Grenada, Costa Rica, Trinidad, Mexico, and Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru. Seven of these countries are from the Caribbean. Five are countries visited by Mrs. Carter in early June. The southern cone countries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay abstained--a polite "no" vote--as did Guatemala, Colombia, and El Salvador. Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia did not vote.

It has been apparent for some time now that US spokesmen, including Mrs. Carter, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador Young, have been getting the human rights message across to the Latin Americans. The doubts about Washington's long-term seriousness on the issue have given way in many cases, in fact, to concrete action by several of the countries to curb the worst abuses. For example, Chile claims that it has freed its last political prisoner. While the OAS was in session the Chilean government also negotiated a settlement of a hunger strike, staged by families of missing persons, that had been in progress at the United Nations ECLA

RPM 77-10168

EO 13526 3.5(c)



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headquarters in Santiago. Argentina and Brazil have directed security forces to be more circumspect when arresting suspected terrorists. Paraguay is again talking about inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to make an on-site inspection in Asuncion.

These positive steps, however, do not mean that the OAS community will soon develop a unanimity of views on the human rights issue. Although no country would ever voice opposition to the defense of human rights intrinsically, the reasons for the negative votes continue to be fear of political and economic destabilization caused by communism and terrorism. The psychological and real factors are unlikely to go away in the near future. In fact, it is conceivable that some of the countries voting with the US on this issue may be faced in the future with a security problem which could lead to systematic violations of human rights. Haiti, for example, already has one of the worst records in the hemisphere on human rights. Politically-related violence is already common in Jamaica, always threatening in Panama, and never far from the surface in the Dominican Republic. Haiti's vote for the US resolution is difficult to understand except for Ambassador McGee's explanation that the Haitians had decided to vote yes on everything that came up at the meeting.

Although we do not have much hard evidence, the positive vote by Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela could well have been influenced by Mrs. Carter's visit to these countries. More than likely, however, other considerations were just as important. Even though Mrs. Carter reportedly was assured by Jamaican Prime Minister Manley that he would support the US on human rights, Manley was effusive in his praise for President Carter on the human rights issue well before Mrs. Carter's trip. Moreover, Jamaica sorely needs US financial assistance now. Costa Rica and Venezuela, two of the few practicing democracies in Latin America, would be expected to support the US, as would Mexico.

An Ecuadorean spokesman has said that his country's vote for the US resolution stemmed from a sincere belief in human rights. Another Ecuadorean said, however, that Quito has an ambivalent attitude toward the issue because it could be construed as interference in internal affairs. He added, however, that the government had decided to support the US

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policy before Mrs. Carter's visit and could not change its position even if it wanted to. Both denied that the possibility of acquiring arms from the US was a factor in their vote, but the Ecuadoreans are again inquiring about US aircraft. In the case of Peru, the positive vote was not out of character with the Morales Bermudez government. Peru has generally supported public declarations of human rights and it is believed that the US declaration on human rights will be incorporated into the new Peruvian constitution.

The support for the US position by Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Surinam, Grenada, and Trinidad-Tobago was not unexpected, but Jamaica had to put pressure on the Grenadans in order to get their vote. Progress in the canal negotiations certainly was a factor in winning Panama's vote.

In the final analysis, the Grenada meeting of the OAS may be remembered in the future as the beginning of a new era of understanding between the US and Latin America or it may do down as the final dissolution of the special relationship most Latin American countries have long assumed they enjoyed with Washington. Despite the US victory on the human rights issue, the voting pattern raises disturbing questions. The southern cone countries remain a solid intransigent bloc, with Brazil emerging as a leader of this faction and exerting its influence to a certain extent over Bolivia and Colombia. The US is thus left with solid support from Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic among the Spanish-speaking countries. Continued backing for US initiatives from the English speaking Caribbean appears to be tenuous at best and may, in the long run, be contingent on how forthcoming Washington is in providing economic assistance.

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21.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, July 19, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Box 25, Latin America, 2/68-12/78. Confidential. Pastor forwarded the memorandum and attachment under a July 20 covering memorandum to Thornton, Tuchman, Denend, Hormats, and Huberman. (Ibid.)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

3A

July 19, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Follow-up to President Carter's Pan American
Day Speech and Mrs. Carter's Trip.

The attached Memorandum was prepared on an inter-agency basis under the chairmanship of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in response to various National Security Council requests.

The Memorandum provides:

- an assessment of what we have accomplished so far;
- the approach we propose to further our objectives in major policy areas;
- the status of key program elements in each area; and
- certain issues on which we would particularly welcome the President's further guidance.

To make the report as manageable as possible, major issues are highlighted in the Memorandum itself, with additional detail in individual tabs.


Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

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3B

THE PRESIDENT'S LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVES:
Initial Assessment and Follow-up Strategy.

A precedent-setting OAS General Assembly and Mrs. Carter's success have confirmed the new directions the President set forth on Pan American Day.

We now have hard evidence that human rights concerns have genuine support in Latin America -- from a number of governments as well as from many ordinary citizens.

To consolidate that support will require sustained action and progress on some intractable underlying issues.

This memorandum reviews our evolving strategy to give practical effect to the President's statements, summarizes activities underway on major issues, and requests policy guidance on some key choices.

The OAS General Assembly

At Grenada in June:

- A new issue - human rights - dominated debate.
- After years of fighting alone on major issues against a united front of other members, this time half of Latin America, including the entire Caribbean, lined up with us.

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- Our key resolution, which commended the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and proposed steps to facilitate its work, passed undiluted with the backing of thirteen other governments.

The politics of success were delicate.

- Our coalition was difficult to assemble. The Secretary of State met with eighteen Foreign Ministers. Our USOAS delegation had to work well and hard to the last.
- Opposition was strong and concentrated. Led by Uruguay and Chile, and behind the scenes by Brazil, the Southern Cone was backed by most Central American states, and fell only two votes short of blocking our resolution.
- Mrs. Carter's trip was almost certainly decisive in obtaining the support from Peru and Ecuador that proved critical.

Latin American solidarity has broken over the human rights issue. But there are disadvantages as well as advantages:

- The unconvinced, Brazil and Argentina in particular, have the power to hamper us in important ways.
- Our human rights policy cannot be fully successful unless we succeed in reaching countries where major abuses exist. This will take time, skill, persistence and patience.

Our conclusion is that we have made a major step forward in obtaining regional support for human rights. The direction is set, and set well. But we still have a long way to go. We must now keep our coalition together and find ways of broadening it.

The Months Ahead

The support we received for the aspect of human rights we stress most -- individual freedom -- came from conviction. This conviction, however, included the expectation we would also support the aspect of human rights emphasized most in Latin culture -- socio-economic well being.

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-3-

The Grenada Assembly put us clearly on notice that we cannot escape the economic dimensions of human rights. Our resolution on protecting the sanctity of the person received one vote more than an absolute majority -- but a Colombian resolution calling for promotion of human rights through economic cooperation was carried by acclamation.

Giving substance to the President's new directions from now on will require action more than rhetoric. Progress on economic issues will be critical to allay fears that we are defining human rights narrowly to divert attention from basic North-South issues of growth and equity.

Starting from a far lower base than we do, and less able to cope with escalating oil and other import costs, many nations of Latin America face a cruel choice between cutting deeply into economic growth -- and thus the social change it facilitates -- and incurring increasingly heavy external debt to sustain more moderate growth levels. Like most other developing countries, they are not looking for handouts, but for ways to develop effectively and in an ultimately self-sustaining fashion.

In moving ahead, we cannot return to a "special relationship" with Latin America. Rather, we must apply global policies with the kind of attention, effort and individual sensitivity that will enable us to sustain our current hemispheric coalition and give us some meaningful chance for progress with the others.

Promoting Human Rights

The development and application of our global human rights policy, now under review in PRM-28, is a case in point. One of its major dilemmas is sharply defined in this hemisphere. It is:

achieve USA objectives with respect to
How can we best ~~promote~~ human rights
in those countries whose governments
have poor human rights records?

Attitudes toward this issue are as complex and sensitive as the issue itself. In fact, the issue presents a recurring dilemma more than a general policy choice, for country specific criteria and interests other than human rights have to be weighed each time we move from abstract premises to decisions on particular cases.

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The President should be aware, however, that two aspects of this issue have recently aroused considerable debate and have serious implications for how many Latin American governments will evaluate and react to our initiatives on human rights.

-- The first is how to help meet basic human needs without endorsing a government's repressive practices. We have to be careful not to appear to be so rigid on political rights that we appear to deny pressing socio-economic rights.

-- The second is how to use available executive discretion on military relationships, and specifically whether to reduce further our already declining military ties in countries where repressive military regimes are in power. The pivotal role of military officers and the uniformed services in the domestic and foreign affairs of most Latin American countries -- and our own interest in regional peace and cooperation -- make the necessary introduction of human rights concerns into our military relationships a particularly sensitive issue.

In sum, just as we must seek to balance political and socio-economic human rights, so we must weigh the appearance of implicit support for repressive military acts against the possibility of influencing military institutions on a wide range of matters, perhaps including human rights as well as regional tensions.

These two issues highlight a more general problem. We have found it easier thus far to deny assistance on human rights grounds than to provide it. Clearly, we increasingly need to find ways of engaging individual countries, including both governments and private groups, in positive activities that recognize good performance and stimulate improvements in human rights conditions.

In the weeks and months ahead we intend to explore ways in which all available policy instruments can be used, in all countries, to actively promote our fundamental commitment to human rights and peace. We need carrots as well as sticks for the long haul ahead.

We believe this approach is the surest way to achieve our objectives and would welcome the President's thoughts on this matter as we move into a more active phase.

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Action Areas

Tabs 1 through 10, prepared on the basis of extensive inter-agency deliberations, summarize our approach and action program by issue.

In addition to specific comments the President may wish to make on individual items in the tabs, his sense of priorities -- and in some cases guidance -- would be particularly useful to us on the following:

I. Consultations (Tab 1)

In this critical area, we are acting to:

- A. Embark upon a major program of visits by senior officials to Latin America; and
- B. Establish an inter-agency coordinating procedure, under the Department of State, to assure that these visits and contacts are mutually supportive of overall Administration policy objectives.

II. Human Rights (Tab 2)

Assistant Secretary Todman cabled basic guidance to all our Embassies in Latin America on June 17. Human Rights Evaluation Reports, spelling out short and long term strategies for every Latin American country, are in preparation.

We are acting now to:

- A. Use our voice and vote in the international financial institutions in support of human rights objectives.
- B. Strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, possibly including visits to Paraguay, Haiti, and other countries -- and to the U.S.
- C. Intensify consultations with like-minded hemispheric states on means to improve compliance in offending states.
- D. Explain, and mobilize support for, our human rights policy among religious, business, professional and ethnic communities in the U.S.

III. Economic Issues (Tab 3)

In this key area, we plan to:

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- A. Urge agencies to continue to use every appropriate occasion to press both developed and developing countries to adopt forthcoming postures on trade issues in the MTN.
- B. Assure that Administration studies now underway on assistance policy, IMF facilities and international financial institutions clearly focus on two questions essential to our relations with the LDCs:
 - the extent to which the U.S. should provide, or support, more "fast disbursing, balance of payments assistance" and which bilateral or multilateral instruments we should use for this purpose.
 - the desirability of more flexible criteria and conditions on the part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in using its facilities, particularly the anticipated \$10 billion new Witteveen facility, in assisting developing and other countries with balance of payments difficulties.

IV. Cultural Affairs (Tab 4)

We strongly recommend that the President approve in principle the development of a significantly expanded high-visibility cultural exchange program reflecting our emphases on human rights and on the role of the individual citizen in foreign affairs. This effort would require a supplemental appropriation for FY-78 (of \$6 to 7 million), and sustained increased funding in future years. If the President agrees, we would conduct further feasibility analyses and prepare submissions for OMB review.

V. Science and Technology (Tab 5)

We recommend that the President consider an expanded S&T program for Latin America. Some of the benefits are long range, possibly difficult to justify to the Congress and relatively expensive; nevertheless, they are of considerable interest and potential usefulness. Our top priorities, described in more detail in Tab 5, are:

- A Technology Cooperation Package (\$10-20 million per year)
- Remote Sensing Projects (\$15-20 million per year)

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-- Advance Communications Technology
(\$20-25 million per year)

The President's general guidance on priorities and possible funding would allow us to develop further feasibility analyses and prepare submissions for OMB review.

VI. Other Major Issues

Additional topics for review and guidance include:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation	Tab 6
Conventional Security Issues	Tab 7
Terrorism	Tab 8
Narcotics	Tab 9

Finally, Tab 10 gives a status report on those items raised with Mrs. Carter not covered elsewhere.

Follow-up Procedures

We have established inter-agency working groups to ensure that the initiatives taken in support of your April 14 speech are developed and implemented in a coordinated manner. We will when necessary provide reports on progress achieved and decisions required on individual issues. Reports already planned or requested are listed in the tabs.

We are also beginning reviews of policy toward two major subregional areas.

- (1) The Caribbean -- where sound development initiatives are required to promote human rights, sustain democracy, and help manage the mini-state problem; and
- (2) The Southern Cone -- whose countries are of fundamental importance to us on human rights and nuclear transfer issues and in the regional balance generally.

In summary, we have taken the initiative in Latin America. And the inter-agency participation in the follow-up process (listed in Tab 11) demonstrates that we are beginning to coordinate in ways that will sustain the momentum.

Attachments:

1 - Consultations

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- 2 - Human Rights
- 3 - Economic Issues
- 4 - Cultural Initiatives
- 5 - Science and Technology Initiatives
- 6 - Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- 7 - Conventional Security Issues
- 8 - Terrorism
- 9 - Narcotics
- 10 - Other items raised with Mrs. Carter
- 11 - Inter-agency Participation

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22.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 47, Latin America: Bilateral Meetings Decision Memoranda, 9/77. Confidential. On a different copy, the memorandum is dated August 31, 1977. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Territorial Disputes, 4/77-12/78)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Peace-Keeping

23

[Omitted here are sections on El Salvador-Honduras and Belize-Guatemala, which are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XV, Central America]

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3. The Andes

There are three distinct though closely related issues subsumed within State's paper on "Disputes in the Andes": (a) Bolivia's desire for access to the sea; (b) reducing tension and military expenditures in the region; and (c) Ecuador's quest for access to the Amazon. (T.A. 3)

(a) Access to the Sea

It is true, as State suggests, that Perez's support for Bolivia's desire for access to the sea as the only way to solve the security problem in the Andes is simplistic; there is more to the problem than that. But resolution of Bolivia's long-standing grievance would go a long way toward reducing tension in the area.

The key to this problem and to the other two is Peru, and that is why we have scheduled your bilateral with Morales Bermudez first among the major Andean countries. If Morales could be persuaded

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of the need for a mediation effort, and at the same time, learn of our deep interest in seeing this dispute and that of Ecuador (Amazon) resolved peacefully, then I think the probability of reaching such a settlement would have increased quite dramatically. Since Peru and most other Latin American countries have recognized the legitimacy, at least in principle, of Bolivia's claim, it would not hurt, and may be positively catalytic, if you told Morales that you too considered Bolivia's dream to be a fair and legitimate one.

You may also want to subtly explore his reaction to having Perez or his representative serve as mediator, and perhaps also explore Perez's proposal of developing and de-militarizing the border area. It's a sound approach which awaits someone's initiative, and the U.S. may want to take it. Most countries in the region are now very receptive to U.S. leadership. NSC therefore recommends a variation on Option #2.

(b) Reducing Tensions in the Area

Again, the key to this issue is Peru. If you could succeed in extracting a pledge of non-aggression from Peru or a statement that Peru will not purchase any major new military equipment, these actions would significantly contribute to reducing tensions.

Secondly, you might want to explore with Morales and with other Andean leaders, whether -- and if so, how -- the U.S. could contribute to the implementation of the Ayacucho Agreement to limit arms purchases by the eight Andean countries.

Thirdly, you might want to bring up the magic year - 1979 - the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific, in the context of mentioning your interest in the peace of the region. You might also want to hint of an interest in traveling to the region in 1979.

(c) Ecuador: An Amazon Nation

The question of whether Ecuador will ever gain an outlet to the Amazon can only be answered by Peru, and they're not talking. There is really little the U.S. can do here, other than encourage Peru to take Ecuador's claim more seriously.

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23.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America 9-12/77. Confidential. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 75.

SUBJECT: Nineteen Bilaterals: The Significance of the Treaty Signing for Inter-American Relations

Your decision to meet with all the Heads of State who would attend the signing ceremony was made to assure a good attendance. However, nineteen bilaterals provide not only a show of support, but also a unique opportunity to make genuine progress on a number of important issues.

Never before have so many American Heads of State journeyed at one time to Washington. (Coincidentally, about 20 Heads of State went to Panama in 1956 on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the First Panama Congress, and President Johnson met with 18 Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este in 1967 to discuss the Alliance for Progress.) In spite of the short notice and the problems each leader had in planning for his meeting, many of the Latin American leaders are rushing to use this unique opportunity to press certain multilateral problems closer to resolution. Intelligence reports indicate that:

- Chile is trying to set up separate meetings with Peru and Bolivia to discuss Bolivia's request for a corridor to the sea and other matters.
- Bolivian President Banzer has requested that you meet with him and with the Presidents of Peru and Chile to discuss the question of access to the sea for Bolivia. (While we have gently told him that such a quadri-lateral was not likely, we have scheduled your meetings in such a way that would permit it to occur if it looked as if it might be fruitful. Among the three, Peru is the key, and you will be meeting with Morales Bermudez first. If some progress is made with him, then the chances are good that Pinochet, whom you will be

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meeting with next, will accept that. Then you might want to consider inviting those two leaders to sit in on part of your meeting with Banzer on Thursday.

- Probably as part of a strategy to increase Chile's international contacts, Pinochet has also requested a meeting with Argentine President Videla to discuss the simmering border dispute in the Beagle Channel, and he is trying to solicit the support of Oduber and Perez for an inter-American conference of Latin Chiefs of State to increase their influence in international politics.
- Morales Bermudez has organized a meeting of the Presidents of the Andean Pact countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia) to try to resolve current problems (on allocation of industries), invigorate the organization, and express strong support for the importance of regional economic integration. (Our Ambassador in Lima suggests that you use the opportunity of the meeting to issue a strong statement supporting Latin American economic integration, and I agree that such a statement would be well received, particularly since Perez, for example, still believes that we are antagonistic to Latin American efforts at integration.)

The good atmosphere generated by the signing ceremony could conceivably transform the flurry of multilateral activity into some concrete results. Of course, the reason why so many leaders are attending is not so much because they want to help us on the Canal Treaty but because they want us to help them on one issue or another. This is particularly the case with the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, who will want to explain the "real situation of subversion" in their countries so that we can better understand the harsh measures which they have taken.

From the perspective of U.S. interests there are several objectives which can conceivably be achieved in the next few days and which would make the 19 bilaterals worth the effort. Our goals include:

(1) Peace-Keeping

(a) Bolivian Access. This is one of the most difficult and long-standing boundary disputes in the Hemisphere; it is also the most important since the problem of Bolivian access goes to

the heart of the question, how can tensions in the region be reduced? A strategy will be suggested below, but our goals should be to express our agreement with the principle $\frac{1}{M}$ accepted, in general, by all interested parties $\frac{1}{M}$ of gaining a corridor to the sea for Bolivia, and our interest in contributing to a resolution of the problem.

(b) El Salvador-Honduras. A clearly realizable goal is to try to obtain from Salvadorean President Romero a public assurance that his country would soon ratify the mediation agreement.

(c) Guatemala-Belize. If President Laugerud acknowledged that he had spoken to President Carter about the Belize issue and had agreed that a quick resolution of the dispute on terms agreeable to both Guatemala, Great Britain and Belize, was a shared goal of the U.S. and Guatemala, that would be a significant advance.

(2) Human Rights

The Southern Cone leaders will need to hear directly from you of your commitment to human rights, your willingness to recognize real improvements (as opposed to announcement of intention), and your preference for pursuing U.S. policy through a multilateral mechanism (e.g., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).

(3) Caribbean Cooperation

If you could reach a consensus with the leaders of the Caribbean basin on the following points, then we could develop the policy in greater detail:

- The need to approach the problems of the region on a comprehensive basis, involving multilateral cooperation on both the donor and the recipient ends.
- The comprehensive approach should involve the sharing of the burden of assistance. The burden-sharing formula and the balance between bilateral and multilateral programs should be worked out in consultations between donors and recipients.
- The overall objectives of the program should be to promote more economic integration among the English-speaking countries, closer collaboration between them and such

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other countries as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and closer cooperation between them and countries such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, the U.S., and Canada.

- A meeting held at the World Bank, co-sponsored by the Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank, and involving selected representatives from the area, should be held to decide how best to proceed in this comprehensive development effort.

Strategy for Day 1: Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, and Chile

Rather than duplicate the points made in the briefing papers, let me just focus on one issue -- Bolivian access to the sea ¹ and suggest a strategy for the first day for pursuing our objectives in this issue. Our objectives include: (1) reducing tensions in the area; (2) helping Bolivia get access to the sea -- a very popular international cause; (3) using the resulting corridor as a kind of "cordon sanitaire" to deter Peru from any possible aggression; and (4) encouraging cooperation among the three countries in the area.

In December 1975, the Chileans made a secret offer to Bolivia of a 10 km. strip of land, which gave Bolivia access to the sea but did not include an area for a possible seaport (see Tab A). In exchange, Chile asked for some water rights and a similar amount of Bolivian territory. It is obvious that Chile's major goal was to cultivate an alliance with Bolivia against Peru and improve her security by constructing a "cordon sanitaire." Bolivia, however, wants the corridor to include the port of Arica and is opposed to giving any territory to Chile or to Peru.

By the Treaty of 1929, Chile cannot dispose of territory formerly owned by Peru without Peru's consent. When confronted with the Chilean offer,

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Peru counter-proposed that Chile give the strip of land with a joint Peruvian-Chilean-Bolivian condominium zone at the Pacific end of the corridor as well as a trinational port authority in Arica. Chile immediately rejected the proposal, as Peru had probably guessed it would.

The key to a settlement is Peru, which probably has not yet given up its hopes of reconquering the territory it lost in the War of the Pacific 100 years ago. Peru publicly supports Bolivia's claim, but its proposal was so unrealistic that one can infer that it is not eager to settle.

A respectable compromise proposal might include the 10 km. corridor which leads into a neutral free port at Arica. But we probably want to avoid suggesting a proposal as specific as that.

We are, however, in a position to exercise considerable influence. Morales Bermudez sent you a long letter on August 27th with a rather detailed analysis of the Peruvian economy and description of a proposed fiscal program. He has said that he considers your meeting of "great significance" and contrasts that with your other meetings, which he described as "protocolary." He has come to ask for your support in getting an IMF stand-by loan, and believes U.S. support is determining since in his mind we totally dominate the IMF. You might tell him that his observation is incorrect; the IMF is an international organization, and we are only one -- albeit, a most powerful one, member. Since Morales' economic program is quite sound, and he will probably obtain the kind of support he needs even without our help, you might want to subtly link the IMF issue to our concern over the corridor.

On the IMF issue, you might want to say that you understand that Secretary Blumenthal will be meeting with President Morales Bermudez, that you look sympathetically on Peru's great concern, and that you will ask our representative to the IMF to convey our assessment of the situation and our concerns for Peru. On the other hand, the IMF is not our organization, but an international one. On the Bolivian access issue, you might want to offer our good offices alone or with Venezuela.

If the Peruvians respond positively, you will want to discuss this issue with Pinochet, although you will probably want to devote much of the time to human rights.

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24.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, October 28, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 9-12/77. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote, "Zbig—ok—except Bolivia—The verbiage is excessive. Did Fallows ok them? (3 or 4 'I was pleased' in Suárez letter) JC."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

October 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals
With Latin American Leaders

The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed. For a number of your bilaterals, State and NSC felt it would be very useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which confirm the commitments made during the meeting and underscore areas where we have a continuing interest.

In certain cases -- for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- our intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet, Stroessner, and Mendez felt that you were in agreement with them that their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate propaganda, and that the human rights policy which is being implemented in your name does not really reflect your views. No doubt this may be a result of wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors in the field, State, and NSC believe it would be useful for you to re-state clearly your continuing commitment in this area.

Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters from the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and we have included references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was delivered directly to the White House on October 18, and it refers to the Deutsch case which you raised with him.

There are a number of specific commitments made or repeated in the letters. Let me outline them briefly for you here, and flag any potentially controversial sections:

Handwritten notes:
Pinochet - *write 2 unit*
obscure -
Videla - *approve*
Harris -

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2

Issues Or Points Which Are Noted In The Letters

Argentina

1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such visits. Your letter repeats that point.
2. Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations ^L/_M particularly human rights groups ^L/_M at the United Nations.
3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it.
4. With regard to Videla's statement that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation. The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would "consider" the possibility of ratification at the proper time. Nonetheless, we believe that it would be helpful to re-state our interpretation of his statement so as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that issue.

Bolivia

1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U. S. in the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia's desire to achieve access to the sea.
2. It states U. S. continued support for integration in Latin America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the automotive industry.
3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given the Bolivians the list of names.

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Chile

1. The letter states that "friendly and close relations" between the U. S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of improvements in the human rights situation in Chile.

2. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the procedures which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so "without publicity" and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN. The Chileans (would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only "under certain circumstances," which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with the UN on providing a report on the people who "disappeared," but his report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in both matters should help.

3. Finally, you note Pinochet's pledge to bring Tlatololco into effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty.

Paraguay

1. Stroessner's pledge to receive the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is noted, and you add that U. S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials "should that be helpful."

On the loans from the Inter-American Bank and A.I.D., you re-state decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee to approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay's decision to permit a visit of the IACHR, but others are withheld until the visit, in fact, occurs.

Peru

1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the Ecuadorean-Amazon issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to

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hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the fourth.

2. You reiterate U. S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties, and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance. This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able to give \$5-10 million of food assistance.

Uruguay

1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of having close relations with Uruguay.

2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority" and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in the letter.

3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights commission.

* * * * *

These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared by Jim Fallows.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

✓
signed
12/31
12/30/80
12/20/80

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25.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 30, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 11, President, Latin America and Africa, 3/28/78-4/3/78: 10/7/77-1/31/78. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "RP, give me a revised memo to Jim Schl (copy to Vance) urging once more the Ven. talks. If he doesn't react (and pt. out that I wrote earlier) I will go to the P. ZB." Inderfurth also initialed the first page of the memorandum. In a January 24 memorandum to Pastor and Richardson, Brzezinski wrote, "With reference to the forthcoming trip, I think it is extremely important that we now develop plans for specific and concrete actions which could be associated with the trip: agreements to be signed, initiatives to announce, joint statements, etc. Please develop an initial scenario and consult with me within a week." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President's Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1-5/78)

MEMORANDUM

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RE.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 30, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RPB*

SUBJECT: *RP*
The President's Trip

RP
give me a
revised memo to
Jim Hall (copy to Vance)
w/pt. one more file
Ven. tells. If he
doesn't react (and
pt. out the
earlier)
I will
go to
the P.
27.

Countries Selected

Obviously, the first questions that need to be addressed in drawing up scenarios for the President's trip are: (1) Which countries will he visit? and (2) How much time will he spend in each country?

First of all, let me repeat the point that I think a stop in Trinidad and Tobago is very important

-- to show that we are not lumping the Caribbean into Latin America as we have done in the past,

-- to try to gain the cooperation of a very important leader in the Caribbean which has resources as a donor, and

-- to show a balance in our approach to the Caribbean between Manley on the one side and Williams of Trinidad on the other.

I understand that Secretary Vance agrees on the importance of putting a stop in Trinidad on the trip.

Of importance, but secondary compared to a stop in Trinidad, would be a second stop in Brazil to Sao Paulo, the center of Brazil's business and intellectual life and a city which symbolizes the ferment and political dynamism of Brazil in a most interesting period of transition.

In addition, you may want to resist two temptations as you consider the schedule. First, there may be an attempt to make a "Latin America only trip" and do Africa in the summer. I think this would be a mistake. Right now, we are trying to encourage Latin American leaders to get involved in

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

international politics, particularly African politics. A trip only to Latin America might tempt us into the rhetoric of the "special relationship" while a trip that includes Africa will give him the opportunity to make points about global interdependence, the North-South dialogue, and "constructive" links between Africa and Latin America.

I understand that some consideration is being given to doing the Africa portion after the Summit in the summer. I think that is the time for him to do his traveling in the U.S., campaigning for Congressmen, rather than abroad.

A second temptation might be to begin the trip in Panama to fulfill the President's pledge of exchanging the instruments of ratification there. I think such a trip is an easy and discreet one-day or weekend trip which should occur after ratification by the Senate. I think it would be a mistake to make the rest of the trip contingent on the quick and easy resolution of the Canal Treaties. I know that the Congressional people believe that we will finish the treaties in February, but I continue to believe that it will take March and perhaps part of April as well. I think the trip to Panama should be kept separate. With luck, he can do it in a day before the global trip. Otherwise, afterwards.

VENEZUELA

Events

→ As originally planned, the first major speech on North-South economic issues by the President should be made before the Venezuelan Congress. After meeting with Perez, the President also needs to meet separately with the two leading Presidential candidates -- Piñerua Ordaz of Perez' party, Acción Democratica; Herrera Campins of COPEI.

→ Finally, the President should meet briefly with the Venezuelan press, only one of two entirely free press corps in South America. When I was travelling with Secretary Vance in November, Pete Vaky took me to task on the issue of a press conference. He said the question we face in Caracas and Brasilia is not whether to have a press conference, but how it will be handled. Either the press will surround the President when he arrives or after meetings--as they did with Secretary Vance--or it is organized in a way so as to achieve maximum impact--i.e., questions on all the major issues, translation, orderliness, quiet, and a listening audience when the President answers. I continue to believe that a press conference in Brazil is essential and critical, whereas one in Caracas is just important. I would recommend both, however.

Issues and Decisions

There are two broad categories of issues for the Perez-Carter discussions: seeking cooperation from Perez on a variety of international issues and exploring modes for cooperating on research and development in alternative energy sources.

Consultations on Global Issues. As a result of the President's meeting with Perez in June and again in September, we have tasked our Embassy in Caracas to consult with Venezuela on Tlatelolco and non-proliferation, human rights, Belize, Bolivian corridor, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. In each of these areas, we need to clearly define our objectives between now and the trip and then decide how Venezuela can best contribute to those objectives. If you approve, I will organize a meeting with State and Treasury people to do that, and will send you a memo on it.



Approve

☐ Disapprove

Energy Cooperation. In June, the President suggested to Perez that we have Ministerial talks on energy. Since then, Schlesinger has shown little or no interest in meeting with the Venezuelans in spite of the fact that working-level groups have defined a full agenda. Provided that someone can persuade Schlesinger to meet with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hernandez, there will be much that the two Presidents can talk about in this area.

Though Schlesinger has postponed the meeting three times, Hernandez has come back again and asked for a meeting between February 20 and March 5 (see Tab A). That's already quite late if we want to use it as a preparatory meeting for the President's trip. But unless you or the President persuade Schlesinger to meet with Hernandez, I don't think it will ever come off, and we will have lost an important opportunity. I have prepared a memo for you to send to the President (Tab I), but you may prefer to use it as background and just talk directly with Schlesinger.

RECOMMENDATION:

In the light of Schlesinger's failure to respond to your memo to him of January 10 (Tab B), I would recommend that you send the memo to the President first (Tab I).

☐ Approve☐ Disapprove

or alternatively, phone Schlesinger directly.

☐ Approve☐ Disapprove

In addition, there are two other areas we may want to explore with the Venezuelans:

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC). An idea which has attracted a good deal of interest at the UN is to build scientific research centers in middle-income developing countries, like Venezuela and Brazil, to develop intermediate or "appropriate" technology for LDCs. In addition to helping develop technology which is more labor-intensive and thus better-suited to their needs, this program would help to create horizontal linkages among developing countries, permitting them to relate to one another directly rather than through industrialized countries. We could explore ways to develop such a program in Venezuela (and in Brazil).

Themes: A Common Responsibility to Help the Poor. One theme, which was in the President's Pan American Day speech, but has not yet been elaborated, is that "all of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries." The stop in Caracas, the capital of one of the "new rich," seems to be an appropriate place to restate the commitment, which OPEC must share with the industrialized countries, to help the poor countries and the poorest people. If you approve, I will develop this concept a little more fully in the speech.

Start on it - pretty
with Erb

☒ Approve

☐ Disapprove

BRAZIL

Scenario

The single most important event in Brasilia which the President could do is a press conference. Both Mrs. Carter and Secretary Vance have had receptions for a broad cross-section of Brazilians, including people who have criticized the government. The significance of these receptions was lost on the Brazilian people. On the other hand, Mrs. Carter's press conference was the event which made her stop in Brasilia so successful.

In addition to meeting with Geisel, the President should also meet briefly with General Figueiredo, Geisel's appointed successor, and also with Magalhaes Pinto, the first civilian of the post-1964 period to seek the Presidency. I think the meeting with Figueiredo would be important since he is likely to be the President from March 1979-1985. The meeting with Magalhaes will be of enormous symbolic importance, underlining our interest in continued liberalization without being unduly provocative.

The President may also want to give a short speech on the role of law in the Brazilian Congress.

I would also recommend a short stop in Sao Paulo to meet with Cardinal Arns and with representatives of business, labor, professionals, and academe. Given the traditional independence of "Paulistas", you may want to consider scheduling a small seminar of people like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Helio Jaguaribe to discuss Brazil's future. Even if the President didn't participate, I believe you and Secretary Vance could really profit and would definitely enjoy such a discussion.

Issues

I am currently working with S/P in State on a proposal for US-Brazilian cooperation in non-nuclear energy research and development, and we should have a draft by the end of the week. This is one area we may be able to make some progress.

State is currently trying to decide whether to issue a human rights report for Brazil because of OPIC. Given Brazil's open and strong distaste with these reports--leading to their renunciation of the US-Brazilian military agreement, I believe it would be a disaster to release such a report and would probably expose our investments to possible arbitrary action. I understand that Christopher is considering the decision at this time, and you may want to phone him on this.

Cuba's presence in Africa is another subject for discussion. I am tasking [redacted] [redacted] an update on Brazil's policy toward Africa as a way to probe for the best approach to them.

check

status and let
me know if to call.

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26.

Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman)

New York, February 14, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights. No classification marking. Todman spoke before members of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

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CJ
BMA

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY
PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS

ADDRESS BY
TERENCE A. TODMAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS
NEW YORK
February 14, 1978

I am pleased and honored to be here at the Center for Inter-American Relations, which plays such a unique and respected role in the life of this hemisphere. As analysts and in many cases participants in the policy process, you know that decisions are not made in a vacuum. In fact, the policy process at its best is based upon the creative interaction of public officials, outside intellectuals, businessmen, and other community members. Your contributions are invaluable; I greatly appreciate this opportunity to share my own thoughts with you.

This evening, I would like to discuss how I see the evolution of our relations with the peoples and governments of Latin America. My purpose, frankly, is to gain your support for what President Carter last April referred to as our need to "awake our institutions to a changing world".

A Restructuring of Basic Relationships

~~has~~ Since World War II, a succession of Administrations have acknowledged the importance of Latin America to the United States, and sought policies that would adequately reflect that importance. The results, however, have often been frustrating. Friends of the United States in Latin America, and serious students of U.S.-Latin American relations here, remain skeptical that American policy truly reflects either the region's importance or the many and varied interrelationships between our country and Latin America.

President Carter came to office convinced that, if our behavior toward Latin America and the Caribbean reflects the values and priorities of the American people, it would then be possible to look to a new era of cooperation in this hemisphere. This Administration has not yet

dispelled the skepticism of the past. Indeed, because the prevailing frustrations are frequently rooted in our societies themselves, they cannot be resolved by governments alone.

Clearly, however, the traditional environment of hemispheric relations has already changed fundamentally in recent years. Traditional security concerns have yielded to new human rights and trade issues. At the same time, what was once unchallenged U.S. dominance has evolved into a growing interdependence.

Latin American nations have grown in population, economic weight and political power. The trade among us provides a major market for U.S. exports and supplies us with key imports. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean bring leadership and voting strength to international forums.

In sum, the other countries of the hemisphere affect us increasingly -- and they know it. Having seen similar changes occur in Africa and Asia, I know that the new self-confidence of Third World leaders will require readjustments on our part. But I also believe it creates an opportunity for more mature and healthy relationships.

These shifts in global priorities and power have also brought foreign policy issues into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens, affecting their pocketbooks and their consciences. Increasingly, people are realizing that they are affected by foreign events, not just as citizens, but as workers and consumers -- as coffee drinkers and car drivers.

These shifts are healthy for our relations with Latin America. The importance of Latin America to the United States has begun to make sense to the average American. And I believe this growing public consciousness offers the best hope in decades for developing a consistent framework for addressing issues that really matter.

The new awareness challenges us to move beyond a preoccupation with government activities alone, and to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has both public support and community involvement.

What do we consider to be the nature of such a policy? First, it must speak to Americans where they live.

Events in Latin America and the Caribbean directly affect American communities. The strong ties between our peoples are growing. Black and Hispanic citizens in our communities are often linked by families and friendships to the Caribbean and Latin America. The Western Hemisphere, in fact, is unique in that the drama of its recent history has been played out not in the movement of armies or diplomats, but in the mass movements of ordinary people. Each year millions of U.S. citizens visit Mexico and the Caribbean nations, coming back with lasting impressions and leaving a profound imprint on the societies they visit. American communities in turn feel the influx of several million immigrants, most of whom come from Mexico and the Caribbean.

The importance of good hemispheric relations is also brought home by our growing energy needs. Latin America supplies 17% of our imported oil. Our dependence on our neighbors for energy, including natural gas, is likely to increase.

Even narcotics have become a major aspect of foreign affairs: the street value of narcotics from Latin America in the U.S. is said to be over \$4 billion a year; their traffic darkens millions of lives and erodes thousands of communities.

Second, our foreign policy must speak to Americans where they work.

In the last ten years, our exports to Latin America have more than tripled, from \$5 billion to almost \$18 billion annually. We now sell more machinery, consumer goods and chemical products to Latin America than to the rest of the Third World combined -- as much, in fact, as to the entire European Common Market, and more than to Japan. In addition to petroleum, Latin America, in turn, supplies us with copper, bauxite, other key minerals and a growing number of consumer products. U.S. private investment in the area is \$23 billion.

What these statistics mean is that the overall growth of the U.S. economy and of employment in the U.S. is, and I believe will increasingly be, influenced by similar growth in Latin America, and by our relations with its countries.

Requirements for Progress

Moving to a more community-based policy toward Latin America will require a major reorientation of national thinking. It cannot be accomplished overnight.

For too long the United States has assumed Latin America could be dealt with as a single, monolithic region. Too often, we have viewed internal social and political struggles through a lens that distorted Latin American realities and recast them in terms of our own East-West concerns. Too often, we have viewed Latin American efforts to reform their economies with suspicion. At our best moments, we have acted as champions of Latin American development. At our worst moments, our resort to military intervention has given credence to Latin American fears that their territorial integrity had less than our full respect.

Only rarely have we recognized Latin America for what it is: a grouping of nations with individual and distinct goals, aspirations and importance to the world community -- and to us.

During the Administration's first year, we have come far, I believe, in recognizing the individuality of the Latin and Caribbean countries. In an effort to get to know the countries better and to increase communication, I have visited every nation in the region and met with a broad cross section of leaders and citizens. Mrs. Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Secretary Blumenthal, Ambassador Young and other key Administration leaders have carried the dialogue to many parts of the hemisphere. We have approached each country with a readiness to listen and to cooperate whenever we can.

The most dramatic example of this direct approach was the individual meetings President Carter held with the hemispheric leaders who came to Washington last September to witness the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties. With each, he took the occasion to listen to their views and to convey in turn a strong sense both of our concerns and of our desire for cooperation.

I am convinced that, as a result of these many direct contacts, hemisphere leaders share a high degree of understanding of each other's concerns. The major

challenge facing them -- and all of us here tonight -- is to translate that understanding into practical activities that improve the lives and prospects of ordinary citizens.

The new Panama Canal Treaties are an important beginning. They secure the future of the Canal. They offer the opportunity to put behind us the kind of one-sided and archaic relationship which the 1903 treaty epitomized to the whole hemisphere.

U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, which I am confident, will take place in the very near future, will establish more than any words our willingness to deal with others as our sovereign equals, whatever their size or relative power.

Ratification will thus confirm a cardinal principle of the Carter Administration's foreign policy: that the United States recognizes and is determined to respect the national sovereignty and independence of every state.

But non-intervention alone is hardly a positive basis upon which to build effective foreign relationships. It is the first stage in a far more complex process. Having accepted the individuality and sovereignty of Latin American countries, we must follow through with the practical implications of that recognition in our bilateral relations.

During the past year, we have set in place a number of building blocks in addition to the new partnership with Panama. We have strengthened our working relationships with Mexico, Venezuela and many other countries. Recognizing the importance and needs of the individual island states of the Caribbean, we have participated in the creation of a new multilateral group to address the economic problems of the area and to foster cooperation within the entire Caribbean Basin.

We have accepted that governments will not go away just because we may not like them. Only governments can represent a nation's sovereignty in the international arena; only the people of a country have the right to determine the nature of their government. Outside powers have no choice but to deal with existing governments -- whether they approve of them or not.

With this in mind, this Administration has tried to place our policy toward Cuba in a more rational context. Our problems with Cuba remain, but we have exchanged inflexible hostility for a pragmatic willingness to negotiate issues which have some prospect of solution. This does not reduce our problems with many of the Castro Government's policies, especially in Africa. But, by talking, we have a reasonable framework for dealing with our differences.

Ultimately, the challenge is to develop a foreign policy that responds essentially to human, not just governmental, concerns. The basic dilemma is as straightforward to state as it is complex to resolve: how to encourage respect for the dignity and freedom of the individual, the development of democratic institutions, and the fulfillment of basic human needs without interfering in a nation's internal affairs, and while maintaining the constructive working relations necessary to advance all our many objectives.

Promoting human rights is a fundamental tenet and a cornerstone of this Administration's foreign policy. It is central to our relations with all nations. I know that this deep personal conviction of my own, is profoundly held by the President and the Secretary of State. Moreover, because this commitment reflects universally recognized values, it binds us rather than separates us from the other peoples of this planet. It calls on the conscience of all governments to live up to their sacred obligations. It gives all people hope for a better future knowing that we stand behind their aspirations to share in the fullness of life.

That is why we have made clear to all countries that the nature of our relations with them will depend on their practices in the human rights area. In doing so we are not interfering in their internal affairs, but determining our own behavior in response to what we see.

And it explains why President Carter's emphasis on human rights has struck such a responsive chord throughout this hemisphere and the world.

Our efforts, of course, have done more than spark people's hopes. They have provoked lively debates both here and abroad. For us, the central issue is not the direction of our policy or the strength of our commitment. That is unwavering. Rather, it is how our objectives can best be accomplished.

Our experiences over the past year have shown clearly that we must be careful in the actions we select if we are truly to help and not hinder the cause of promoting human rights and alleviating suffering.

- We must avoid speaking out before learning all the facts, or without calculating the likely reaction and responses to our initiatives.
- We must avoid expecting other governments to achieve overnight fundamental changes in their societies and practices in response to our bidding and without regard to historical circumstances.
- We must avoid assuming that we can deal with one issue in isolation without considering the consequences for other aspects of our relationships.
- We must avoid believing that only the opposition speaks the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, about conditions in their country.
- We must avoid presuming to know so much more about another society than its own citizens that we can prescribe actions for them without bearing any responsibility for the consequences.
- We must avoid punishing the poor and already victimized by denying them assistance to show our dissatisfaction with their governments.
- We must avoid pointing to some and not to others. Selective morality is a contradiction in terms.
- We must avoid condemning an entire government for every negative act by one of its officials.
- We must avoid holding entire countries up to public ridicule and embarrassment, trampling on their national dignity and pride.
- Finally, we must avoid being so concerned with declaring the rightness of our course that we lose sight of our true objective -- to alleviate individual suffering.

Tactical mistakes such as these do not promote human rights. They sacrifice communication and possibly influence, and resurrect old issues of sovereignty and intervention. And they can be avoided through good will, common sense, compassion and careful diplomacy.

While taking care to avoid such mistakes, we will not by any means retreat into silence or indifference.

We must proceed on the conviction that I consider to be the only basis for hope and optimism in our hemispheric relations: that it is possible to advance the rights and meet the basic needs of individual human beings while, at the same time, respecting the sovereignty of their governments.

We know we are not infallible. We know that we have faults to correct in our own society. But we will continue to attempt in every way to associate ourselves with the promotion of basic individual rights, the enhancement of political freedom, and the alleviation of those conditions of suffering that keep entire social groups at the margin of existence:

- we will weigh all of our relationships to ensure that they contribute, not to the restriction or denial, but to the promotion of human rights;
- we will use every possible means of public and private persuasion to bring an end to abuses of the person wherever they occur;
- we will work to increase support for internationally recognized human rights standards with all governments that will work with us;
- we will work with the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Human Rights Commission to strengthen regional cooperation to identify abuses and seek their remedy; and
- we will endeavor to promote the kinds of economic, social and political development required to enjoy all the rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This last goal, promoting development, poses a special challenge to our active support for human rights. Under present foreign assistance guidelines, for example, poor people in a generally impoverished country can be helped; equally poor people in a better off country cannot. If this pattern continues, by 1980 U.S. bilateral assistance will be unavailable to most of the countries of Latin America.

Vital human rights are at stake. Aggregate GNP figures fail to reflect the poverty of high infant mortality, disease, illiteracy and inferior housing. More than 100 million Latin Americans are forced to subsist on less than \$200 per year.

Assistance policies that cut off help to the poor because some of their fellow citizens live too well, like those that deny help to the poor because their governments are repressive, create an ironic paradox: if we decide to confine our assistance only to those developing nations that are at once desperately poor and models of enlightened democracy, we risk crippling our ability to contribute to socio-economic development in Latin America.

In the developing world, the predicament of the "middle-income" country is often very much like that of the middle-income American taxpayer. And Latin America is increasingly the region in the middle: too "rich" to receive aid, not strong enough to play a decisive role in shaping events.

Without some degree of outside support in times of financial difficulties, even the relatively advanced developing countries of Latin America will be hindered in carrying out reforms to narrow the gap between rich and poor and meet the needs of all their people.

In the long run, of course, the development issue is not properly one of assistance as it has been traditionally defined. At least in this hemisphere, both sides in the North-South dialogue agree that development hinges on trade, not outside aid. Both we and the Latin Americans need expanding markets for exports, stable prices, and a voice in international economic decisions. We have made realistic proposals to help stabilize commodity prices. We have encouraged greater utilization of the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries.

It is true that increased domestic demands for import protection have increased concern abroad that new trade restrictions may limit future growth. However, few petitions for import relief under the Trade Act have resulted in actions adversely affecting Latin American products. Moreover, to regain momentum toward increased

trade, we are vigorously supporting the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Tropical Products Agreement with Mexico, worked out in the context of the MTN this past year, is a model of mutual benefit.

In the last analysis, our ability to pursue a credible course on the whole range of developmental and economic issues will depend, not on the intentions of any one Administration, but on the commitment and priorities of the American people. The growing impact of foreign policy on local communities often means in the short term that domestic and foreign policy objectives will be perceived to be more sharply in conflict.

Increasing public understanding of the full implications of issues such as these is one area where all of you in this room can be particularly helpful.

This need to increase public understanding of how foreign policy affects local communities brings me to the last point I want to discuss with you tonight. It is the importance of making governmental relationships a coherent part of a much wider spectrum of cooperative private relations among our societies.

During the past year, we have, of course, continued to deal with many of the traditional problems of inter-American relations. For example, to preserve the peace, we have increased our support for the dispute settlement efforts of the Organization of American States in Central America and other potential trouble-spots. And we have made nuclear non-proliferation and conventional arms restraint key elements of our hemispheric policy. Our decision last spring to reverse past policies and support the Nuclear Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean gives us new credibility in seeking peaceful nuclear cooperation with other hemispheric nations.

It is nonetheless increasingly apparent that the new issues -- such as the flow of narcotics -- are ones in which many more citizens have a direct interest than in the past. To reduce the narcotics traffic that destroys so many young American lives, we have in recent years sought the cooperation of many Latin American governments. To ease the human costs of foreign imprisonment, we have implemented a prisoner exchange program with Mexico, and are developing similar programs elsewhere.

To resolve differences over migration, we are working with Mexico to relieve unemployment pressures on both sides of the border.

As these few examples demonstrate, our society and those of Latin America now interact in too many ways for government to monopolize the message. This trend is increasing. It is foolish to deny it and unnecessary to fear it.

The new challenges are ones that an open, multi-dimensional society like the United States is best equipped to meet. And they are challenges I am convinced most Latin Americans are prepared to meet with us.

Already we are seeing many U.S. companies and multinational enterprises respond to changing realities in Latin American societies, sometimes faster than either governments or intellectuals. Most American businesses abroad now maintain healthy and constructive relationships with their host countries, contributing to the development of the entrepreneurial skills and productive activities essential to our mutual well-being.

It has not been generally noticed, but in providing for a generation of partnership based on increasing Panamanian participation in the management of the Canal, the new Panama Canal Treaties reflect a practice that is already widely followed in the inter-American business community, where joint ventures and local managers are increasingly common.

The times call for similar creative and responsible problem-solving at all levels of our communities. They call for intellectual dialogue to strengthen common institutions and to encourage broad-based leadership in all our societies.

Drawing fully on the hemisphere's basic wealth -- its people -- is a major challenge to our press and our universities, and to institutions -- like this Center -- which already understand that writers like Borges of Argentina, Fuentes of Mexico and Vargas Llosa of Peru are also giants of our own culture.

As our own society changes, government too must awaken. Government can move far beyond present efforts in facilitating academic, technical and cultural exchanges, including in them minorities and other groups

not previously tapped for such programs. It can build on the many contacts that take place in the world of business. It can, in sum, help bring the many persons dedicated to improving hemispheric relations together with the even greater numbers dedicated to resolving local community problems. It is time they met.

I am encouraged to know that you will be an active partner in that effort.

Thank you very much.

27.

Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman's February 14, 1978, speech (see Document 26) engendered reaction and commentary from inside the Department of State, from governments abroad, and from the press.

In a February 17 memorandum for the files, Director of Policy Planning for Public and Congressional Affairs Luigi Einaudi wrote that the speech was followed by a question-and-answer (Q&A) session, which the memorandum for the files reconstructed. Questioners asked Todman about Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, Belize, the Beagle Channel, Panama, Cuba, and Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights) Einaudi's reconstruction of the Q&A session was transmitted to all American Republic diplomatic posts as telegram 44242, February 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078–0295)

The Embassies in Managua, Montevideo, Asunción, and Buenos Aires reported on local press and government reaction to the speech. The Embassy in Managua reported on February 15 that the "Somoza family newspaper *Novedades*" published a "banner headline 'Sandinistas Provoke Violence, Todman Says,'" and quoted the translation of Todman's answer to a question on Nicaragua as printed in the newspaper. The Embassy requested that the Department send "text of Todman comment (which, article indicates, was in response to question) and any clarification which we may use here ASAP." (Telegram 786 from Managua, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070–0397) The Department responded on February 16 that the quotes attributed to Todman "are incomplete and garbled, evidently intentionally. Todman did not enter into detail about who did what or how." In addition, the Department advised, "Embassy should avoid being drawn into polemics." (Telegram 41418 to Managua, February 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780072–0462)

On February 15, the Embassy in Montevideo reported: "All Montevideo media gave prominent, heavy play to Assistant Secretary Todman's speech at the Center of Inter-American Relations, stressing his advocacy of 'a more moderate, balanced, and realistic' U.S. campaign on human rights." The Embassy also noted, "Not surprisingly, the pro-government media has picked up and emphasized these and other aspects of the Todman statement which serve to prove the GOU's arguments on human rights and have been similarly selective in their use of human rights comments Todman made to the press following the formal address." (Telegram 533 from Montevideo, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070–0236)

The Embassy in Asunción reported on February 17: "The speech of Assistant Secretary Todman to the Center for Inter-American Relations has had a great impact here. A morning headline

reads 'Todman severely criticizes human rights policy of Carter.' The government is jubilant." Ambassador Robert E. White reported, "All government officials with whom we have spoken are unanimous in their praise of the Todman speech." In addition, he stated, "Those in Paraguay who have supported our position on human rights have expressed themselves in the strongest terms. An internationally known scientist said the speech was a 'tragic event.' An opposition leader who faces a prison term on a trumped up charge came to the Embassy and told us that 'if this is the new policy of the United States, there is no hope.'" White concluded, "If the Department has any guidance which would assist me in lessening the disastrous effects of the interpretations being placed on this speech, I could make instant use of them." (Telegram 679 from Asunción, February 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076-0674)

On February 24, the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported: "Assistant Secretary Todman's Latin America policy speech received wide coverage and editorial comment in the local press, with initial emphasis placed on ten points cautioning US response on human rights. Subsequent distribution and publication of full text largely cleared up misconceptions that speech meant other than firm commitment to existing human rights policy. Human rights groups were distressed that speech could be and was used to suggest US backing away on human rights." (Telegram 1406 from Buenos Aires, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780088-0064)

In telegram 45684 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 22, the Department advised: "In some areas press is distorting speech as change in criticism of President Carter's human rights policy. Distortion has occurred where listing of types of action we should avoid has been misinterpreted as criticism of the conduct of the policy. There has been no—repeat—no change in human rights policy," and "there is no basis for construing speech as criticism of the human rights policy." The Department instructed, "Where press, official or private opinion has picked up line that there is change in human rights policy or criticism of such policy you should move forcefully to counter it." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780082-0791)

On March 2, *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that the speech "has sparked controversy in the State Department over how the administration should pursue President Carter's human-rights policy," that "a number of State Department officials have criticized the speech," "arguing that it put too much emphasis on restraint and amounted to a brake on implementation of the rights policy," and that it "may have sent the wrong 'signal' to some Latin American countries." (Daniel Southerland, "Rights Policy Speech Highlights State Department Split," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 2, 1978, p. 3)

28.

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 26, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780046-0321. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Feinberg on February 24. A stamped notation indicates that Vance saw the memorandum.



[SADIXED]

7803543

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

P780 046-0321

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SS

~~SECRET/LINDIS~~

26 FEB 1978

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary ✓

From: S/P - Anthony Lake ✓

Country Priorities in Latin America

SUMMARY:

Six Latin American countries appear especially to warrant our attention over the next year: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Chile. The challenges and dilemmas of each relate to the global concerns the Administration stressed in the first year. The problems raised in this memo could provide for a lively discussion should you decide to attend an ARA staff meeting. *It might also be of interest for the ARA chiefs of mission conference next week.*

* * *

Our Latin American policy during the first year focused, as elsewhere, on issues such as human rights, non-proliferation and arms restraint. Our priorities in terms of issues were relatively well elaborated, but less clear was the importance we attached to the various countries of the hemisphere. Partly in reaction to the apparent crowning by the previous administration of Brazil as a "sub-hegemonic" power, we publically emphasized the individuality of each Latin state, and eschewed establishing priorities.

The internal setting of priorities -- as opposed to public signals -- need not imply that selected countries represent our interests in their geographical area; but it can help to clarify our thinking, place developments in context, and order our own time.

ADP Declassification Review

DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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BY S/S-I

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

- 2 -

Criteria

The criteria for deciding which countries deserve attention is somewhat arbitrary. If we consider, however, the extent of US interests; the pace of change (and the US ability to influence it); and the country's regional weight, six countries appear especially to warrant our attention over the next year: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Chile. Of course, Panama will remain the number one domestic issue. Cuba's African policy is of increasing concern, but Cuba's importance in a hemispheric context will depend on progress in normalizing relations.

Other countries will demand our attention from time to time:

-- We will want to encourage the democratization processes in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, and press for improvements in basic human rights practices in Uruguay and El Salvador;

-- Should the Peruvian financial crisis worsen, we may want to discourage the seizure of power by a severe "Pinochet-style" regime or the temptation to default;

-- Venezuela will be preoccupied by its presidential election, but its stance on NIEO and OPEC issues will be important. The President's trip will permit even greater cooperation and coordination on issues -- non-proliferation, human rights, arms restraint -- where perceptions are shared;

-- And we will want to monitor regional tensions, including Guatemala/Belize, Peru/Chile/Bolivia, and the Beagle Channel (Argentina/Chile).

Mexico

Two difficult issues -- immigration and energy -- are complicating the bilateral relationship. Perhaps 20% of Mexico's labor force works from time to time in the US, and the receipts from energy exports could double Mexico's foreign exchange earnings; while from the US perspective, immigrants from Mexico could reach 10% of our labor force and Mexican oil could support 30% of our import needs by 1985.

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Mexico is unhappy with the Administration's proposal on limiting illegal immigration, and our refusal to agree to pay \$2.60 per thousand cubic feet for their natural gas. Agreement on smaller issues -- tropical products, prisoner exchange -- cannot compensate for the deterioration in relations caused by these two central issues.

We are, however, talking to the Mexicans about reducing the immigrant flow by increasing rural development credit which goes to the root of the problem and serves the human rights of unemployed Mexicans: but we may need to go further. The Mexicans would like to see us reinstate a modified bracero program. The Mexicans also seek assurances that the US market will be open to an increasing quantity of Mexican manufactured goods.

The bargaining process on natural gas pricing may come to a friendly compromise: but if it does not, our energy relationship that holds great promise for substantially reducing our dependency on OPEC will have gotten off to a sour start. Should that occur, we ought to reconsider our "hands off" approach toward Mexican energy development, and, perhaps, design a program for bilateral cooperation on energy.

Lopez Portillo's first year has generally been successful largely because of the economy's fulfillment of IMF-recommended performance criteria but at the cost of a decline in industrial employment when 700,000 young Mexicans are entering the job market each year. Mexico's 65 million population will double in 20 years at current growth rates. The Mexican economy will have to sustain an impressive period of growth to avoid rising unemployment which could generate social and political tensions of great consequence to the U.S. Our long-term interest in Mexico's economic success may dictate a more forthcoming attitude on certain issues including trade, aid and energy, than our immediate economic interests would seem to warrant.

Brazil

The US will want to give Brazil top priority next year, as Geisel's successor defines himself on human rights, international economic issues and non-proliferation. The President will arrive in Brazil just when the official ARENA party will be choosing its candidate for the presidency. Geisel's choice, and therefore the almost certain winner, General Figueiredo, is a relative unknown. Nevertheless, he

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is under increasing pressure from the candidacy of Magalhaes Pinto, a civilian businessman, to commit himself to preserving and continuing the liberalizing reforms begun by Geisel. But hardline military elements continue to see threats from "internal subversion," and some fear losing their high-level jobs in government-run enterprises. Should they "capture" Figueiredo, or replace him by force with one of their own, repression could begin anew and the liberalization process be set back.

We should try to encourage the moderates in the military to see the reassertion of democratic traditions as aiding Brazil's rise to greatness, and entry into the "club" of industrial nations. A democratic Brazil could be a counterweight to the hardline Southern Cone regimes, at a time when our own leverage in the region appears to be on the decline.

The Brazilians are ambivalent about their status, demanding the concessions granted LDCs, while seeking the attention worthy of a nascent global power. Brazil finds itself bumping up against rules designed to regulate relations among developed countries -- despite being, in many respects, underdeveloped. Brazilian aspirations for "grandeza" center on rapid economic growth, which is linked to export expansion. The success of the MTN, especially in liberalizing trade in labor-intensive manufactures, is vitally important for Brazil. But if Brazil is to become a global power, it must accept the accompanying responsibilities; in the context of the GATT, this translates into a willingness to offer reciprocal tariff reductions, and to discuss such trade-distorting practices as export subsidies.

We are currently drawing up a plan for possible non-nuclear energy cooperation that would apply to LDCs generally, but which the President might announce in Brazil. The proposal is being conceived with Brazil first in mind, to refute the charge that our non-proliferation strategy is actually aimed at crippling Brazil's industrialization by depriving it of energy. Progress on non-proliferation itself, however, will probably have to wait until the rigid Geisel leaves office in early 1979.

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Argentina

Your presentation of the list of 7500 "disappeared" helped jolt the Argentine military into releasing series of lists of names of prisoners, and movement on the Deutsch case (although not on Timmerman) is anticipated. But a pattern of gross violations, including disappearances and torture, continue. Absent significant improvement in the human rights situation, congressional restrictions will prohibit sales of military equipment and training beginning next October 1. In the interim, we will want to leverage available military transfers (with non-lethal, non-internal security applications) to maximum advantage. The issue is whether the Argentine military will more likely respond to blunt, categorical sanctions, or to the gradual release of appropriate items in response to tangible human rights improvements. We are also examining how best to orchestrate our entire range of possible instruments of influence.

The dependence of the liberal economic model of ~~Finance Minister~~ Martinez de Hoz upon foreign capital makes it highly unlikely that the Argentine government would retaliate against US business interests. Of greater concern is the failure of the Argentines to follow through on their repeated indications that they will sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Their decision will ultimately hinge on their perceptions of their own national security and the threat posed by the Brazilian nuclear program. However, our nuclear interests in Argentina are the most powerful reasons for maintaining a working relationship with the Argentine government.

The Argentine political scene is showing the first signs of rebirth since the March, 1976 coup. The apparently ineffectual Videla is being openly challenged by junta member Massera, who is seeking to appeal to domestic and international opinion by calling for human rights improvements and more equitable social policies. The traditional political parties are beginning to regroup and pressure for more political "space." Many of these voices are unabashedly pro-American -- clear indication that our principled stance on human rights may have a handsome political payoff in the future.

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Jamaica

Jamaica is increasingly important to the US for several reasons. Manley's attempts to pursue a basic human needs development strategy within a democratic framework places Jamaica, almost uniquely among LDCs, exactly in tune with two central thrusts of our foreign policy. Jamaica will also be important to our Caribbean initiative. But Jamaica's preference for immediate balance-of-payments relief conflicts with our longer-term development assistance approach, and could interject a sharply discordant note into the Caribbean Group before it can get off the ground. And since Jamaica is the chairman of the G-77 this year, maintaining a working relationship with the Jamaicans will be central to our efforts to move the North-South dialogue in a more constructive direction.

We greatly improved our relations with the Manley government during 1977, but Manley is not convinced that we are planning to do enough for him to resolve his fundamental problems. Undoubtedly, his expectations are unrealistic and he has not been sufficiently willing to confront hard trade-offs at home. Nevertheless, we will need to convince Manley -- the leader in the Caribbean, after Castro, with the greatest regional and international image -- that the West can provide his struggling island with sufficient opportunities. We need to keep the broad range of our relationships with Jamaica under review, to see where and how, these opportunities can be enhanced.

Nicaragua

Because of our long association with the Somoza regime, the political changes underway pose a considerable challenge to the U.S.: a harsh outbreak of anti-Americanism is possible -- unless the US can demonstrate to Nicaraguans our absolute neutrality. Our human rights policy has begun to improve our image, but Congressional approval of FMS credits, the physical presence of American military advisers to Somoza's armed forces, and our ongoing AID mission (for basic human needs, a distinction difficult for Nicaraguans to grasp) has made the US position vis-a-vis the Somoza regime less clear than it is, say, in the case of Pinochet in Chile.

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In a recent policy review, we decided that we would try to avoid being seen to be propping up Somoza by remaining as aloof as possible from internal political maneuverings. At the same time, the opposition must comprehend that no deus ex machina (i.e., the U.S.) will find solutions for them. Our underlying assumption is that Nicaraguans can only build a viable and lasting democracy if they undertake and complete the task themselves. Continuing entreaties for support from the various political groupings will test our resolve to stick to our private and public policy of non-interventionism.

Chile

Our energetic human rights stance has gone a long way to undoing, in a remarkably short period of time, US identification with the Pinochet regime. During the last year, Pinochet may have gone as far as he felt was consistent with his regime's security, in reducing the worst forms of human rights abuses. Disappearances and torture are much less frequent now. Whether Pinochet will lift the state of seige and remove other decrees that impinge on the rule of law may be determined in the course of this year. Pinochet's banishment of twelve leading Christian Democrats indicates that he will not yet tolerate opposition political activity.

The dilemma we face is how to continue subtly to press the GOC to improve its human rights practices without jeopardizing the major points we've gained in domestic and international opinion by separating ourselves from the Pinochet regime. If the human rights situation actually deteriorates, as Pinochet's speeches following the plebesite suggested, we will have to find ways to show our displeasure without eliciting further repressive measures that would jeopardize dissenters within Chile.

Should the recent decisions by Exxon Minerals and Goodyear to invest in Chile be echoed by other US firms, a new domestic constituency favoring more sympathetic treatment for Chile would develop. Highly visible US

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- 8 -

investments may generate a second difficulty: Chileans will wonder at the apparently divergent concerns of private and official US citizens.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, these priority countries will not be easy to deal with in the coming year. Indeed, they become priorities because of the challenges they pose. In each case, the central issues involve global concerns: Mexico, energy; Brazil and Argentina, human rights and non-proliferation; Jamaica, balance-of-payments financing and other North-South issues; Nicaragua and Chile, human rights. This indicates that our general foreign policy priorities are right. Our ability to implement them in these concrete country cases will determine their ultimate success or failure.

One of your next meetings with bureau staffs might be with ARA. The problems raised in this memo would provide for a lively discussion.

Drafted: S/P:RFeinberg^{of}:rym
x20822: 2/24/78

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29.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 8, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 38, PRM–17 [2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erb, Mathews, and Denend. Inderfurth and Hunter initialed the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Good memo base PRC discussion. ZB.”

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1978

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29.

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT: Beyond Panama: A PRC on Latin America/
Caribbean?

The most difficult and important issue in inter-American relations--the Canal Treaty--is now behind us. Your question whether a PRC meeting on Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) would be a useful way to take stock of where we've come and chart a course for the next year(s) is timely. The President's trip to Panama provides us the perfect opportunity to set in motion the next steps in our policy.

In this memo, I propose to summarize what we have achieved in the last 16 months, analyze where we have failed, and suggest those areas where we should begin to work. In the final part, I will make some recommendations on the next steps we should take.

I. The First Sixteen Months: What Was Achieved

I think we can take great pride in the accomplishments of the Carter Administration in its policies to Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, it wouldn't hurt to get the President out talking about it since there are few regions where we have done more or been as successful. At Tab A is a brief summary which I prepared describing these accomplishments.

II. Our Failures

*Free!
24* There is no question that the major area of failure for the Carter Administration is in the economic area, and it threatens to undermine our success primarily because it is this area which is of highest priority to LAC. Though some might argue that our most serious problem is lack of progress in the North-South dialogue, I would disagree. We have been criticized most vigorously not for what we have failed to do, but for what we have done. Specifically, the decisions which hurt include: the doubling of the duty on sugar; the support of legislation to dispose of 50,000 tons of tin; the failure by Congress to appropriate funds for the International Development Banks as pledged by the USG; the failure to significantly increase the proportion of meat quotas for the Latin American meat producers (as opposed to Australia and New Zealand); and the decision to countervail

against export subsidies by Brazil. These decisions do not seem terribly important to us, but each has provoked a bitter response in Latin America, and they have a cumulative effect.

Previous administrations have, at times, analyzed similar decisions and established coordinating and monitoring devices to prevent such adverse decisions, but these mechanisms have proven ineffective and naive. The problem is that, at times, other interests--either domestic or diplomatic--do prevail and sometimes should prevail. Perhaps, all we can reach for is a deeper understanding and sensitivity to the likely impact of such decisions on LAC by people like yourself, Stu Eizenstat, Secretary Vance, Bob Strauss, etc. Perhaps the mechanism warrants another examination.

In the other North-South economic issues--the Common Fund, development bank replenishment, trade policy, etc.--progress has been slow and our position exceedingly cautious.

III. Opportunities Lost or Not Yet Taken

Let me suggest four areas where we should focus our attention:

(1) Consultations on Global Issues

In my opinion, the one achievement in the first 16 months with the greatest potential importance is the decision to view Latin America in a global as opposed to a regional context. But "globalism"--as a strategic approach to eliciting support and advice from the hemisphere's leaders in addressing global problems--has scarcely been explored, though there have recently been a few excursions into this new area. My memo on gaining Latin American support in the NAM as a way to pressure Cuba is one such excursion. Another example is the amount of time and effort the President spent with Perez and Geisel on issues like Africa and the Middle East.

The strategy of extensive consultations on a wide range of issues is based on the premise that we will increasingly need Latin America's support for a wide assortment of issues--not just North-South issues, but also East-West, African, non-proliferation, etc. To obtain support for positions we consider important, however, we need to be prepared to be forthcoming on issues which they deem important. One could distinguish between the input and the output parts of consultation:

- Input. We need to not only touch base, but to solicit reactions and be genuinely prepared to alter our position if a reasonable case is made.
- Output. Once our decision is made, we should be sensitive to informing the governments, to solicit their reaction, and if possible, their support.

Organizational Problems. State should be asked to prepare a paper explaining how it would organize itself internally to undertake a large number of consultations with a great many governments on a great many issues not always the responsibility of the area. ARA is not only unable to deal with this approach, but there seems little interest in exploring it. Of course, the strategy is as important as the organization, and I would recommend that the PRC discuss both within the context of the other issues considered below. In addition, a thorough review of the North-South economic issues of bilateral and multilateral concern to Latin America is an essential element in our overall review.

(2) A Fast-Disbursing Balance of Payment Support Fund

In the past 16 months, we have had to stand defenseless, unable to respond to a problem which keeps repeating and threatening to get worse. As a result of the leap in petroleum and food prices in 1973 and 1974 and a decline in concessional assistance to the LAC, the region is falling under a more and more severe debt burden. Peru, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Guyana are the worst cases now, but most of the countries in the region suffer from varying degrees of the problem.

We have found ourselves totally unable to respond since our aid instruments have been phased down and out. The problem becomes a doubly troublesome one when the governments are democratic or are trying to become democratic. Then, inevitably, people question the sincerity of our human rights policy--why we fail to follow our words with dollars.

There are several options available to us including: an expansion of security supporting assistance to the region; creation of a new fund for democratization, financed by aid re-flows (which currently exceed aid loans to the region); or an expansion of Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund.

(3) Arms Sales and Restraint

We have a two-edged problem in this area as well. On the one hand, we will not have any military relations with Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and Chile as of October 1978. In effect, we will have a total arms embargo with these countries, which is really unprecedented in relations between allies. Obviously, DOD is having fits about this prospect, and they have a point. Of course, any change in military relations with these countries would require new legislation, and that is not likely to be easy.

We need to simultaneously approach this problem from a different direction: we need to seek support for an arms restraint agreement in the region. We have held discussions with the Venezuelans, and they are extremely enthusiastic. Perez asked us for detailed papers,

and we have forwarded them to him. He, in turn, has asked that we undertake simultaneous discussions with arms suppliers. In another two weeks, we'll be in a position to evaluate the chances of moving towards a genuine arms restraint program for the region which would be as unique as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is for nuclear weapons.

(4) Caribbean

Since the December meeting at the World Bank establishing the Caribbean Group, the Bank has been preparing papers for the May 26 Donors Meeting and the June 20 meeting of the Group. The Bank's analysis of the economic problems of the region and its recommendations for ways to raise the level of structural and human development are excellent, and the USG will have to make some hard decisions between now and then. In particular, the Bank has drawn up two proposals:

(a) A Caribbean Development Facility for channelling \$125 million annually for three years to the region to serve as local counterpart costs for projects financed by the Development Banks. With rigorous stabilization programs, most countries have had to sharply curtail their investment programs, and this facility would enable them to continue these programs.

(b) A Caribbean Technical Assistance Fund (about \$12 million/per year) to develop regional project proposals.

In addition, it is necessary to develop a strategy of consultation with other governments to insure that our goals in the Caribbean are shared and the proposals can be implemented.

IV. Next Steps

I have focused on four issues not because I believe they are exhaustive, but because I think they represent areas worth pursuing at this time. In particular, each of these areas contain initiatives for the U.S. to take in tandem with the other leaders--particularly the democratic ones--in the hemisphere.

Torrijos has invited the Presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica to Panama for the ratification ceremony, and President Carter will have a 1-2 hour meeting with these Presidents there. That seems like a perfect opportunity to discuss these issues and try to obtain a common view.

If I had to circle a theme for the correct approach to Latin America in the next 16 months, it is that Latin American nations are important actors in the world. We need to demonstrate our respect and responsiveness to gain their cooperation in dealing with the global problems which face all of us.

The President should reiterate this theme in his speech in Panama. (The main thrust of the speech should be to place the Canal Treaties in the context of his other foreign policy accomplishments in the hemisphere. I will prepare a suggested outline for you this week.) But instead of just having the President state this theme and our position and goals on the four issues outlined above, it would be appropriate and extremely effective if we could translate our positions into a Declaration of Panama, which could be issued by the five democratic leaders at the ratification ceremony. That would embody in a document the theme of a multilateral, cooperative approach. For too long, the President of the U.S. has been asked to state his policy to Latin America. When President Carter stated his approach last year and explained why it no longer made sense for the U.S. to have a policy, few understood what he was saying. The way to get the message of multilateralism and globalism across is to issue a multilateral statement. And there is no more legitimate vehicle than the five Democratic Presidents invited to Panama. This idea also dovetails with Hamilton's desire to turn the Panama ceremony to our advantage, underscoring the new era which the Treaties will bring.

The PRC should consider policy options for each of the four issues described above. To permit us sufficient time to consult with the Five to gain their support for our positions and to negotiate a "Declaration of Panama", a PRC meeting should be held by the third week in May.

We may also want to consider at the PRC meeting whether the USG should support Panama's request that the O.A.S. move its headquarters to the area near the Canal. I think the idea is ripe, but I know there are many in State who prefer the status quo. Therefore, a position paper would be in order.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, I will draft a PRM which follows the outline of this memo, consult with ARA, and forward it to you for signature as soon as possible.

✓ APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

cc: Guy Erb
Jessica Mathews
Les Denend

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30.

Memorandum of Conversation

Panama City, June 16, 1978, 7:30–9:30 p.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 6–7/78. Confidential. The meeting was held in the El Panama Hotel.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary of First Multilateral Meeting
in Panama

PARTICIPANTS: President Jimmy Carter
Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State
William Jorden, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
Jody Powell, Press Secretary
Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member (note taker)

President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela
Simon Consalvi Bottaro, Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Venezuela

President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, Colombia
Virgilio Barco, Colombian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rica
Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier, Minister of
Foreign Relations for Costa Rica

Prime Minister Michael Manley, Jamaica
P. J. Patterson, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and Tourism for Jamaica

Omar Torrijos, Chief of Government, Panama
Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, Minister of Foreign
Relations for Panama

Other members of other governments' delegation
attended but are not identified.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 16, 1978; 7:30 - 9:30 p.m.
El Panama Hotel, Panama City, Panama

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Torrijos opened the meeting by noting that it was a timely and propitious occasion to exchange ideas frankly. There are problems which cannot be postponed. In discussions among the six countries' leaders, we should hope to find a design which will eventually lead to a solution to these problems.

Human Rights

Carazo said that all present had governments which aspired to a full application of the concept of human rights. Carazo referred to the San Jose Pact (the American Convention on Human Rights) which was signed on November 22, 1969 and would, when it enters into force, establish a supreme court on human rights matters. At his inauguration, he proposed to the whole hemisphere the need to complete ratification of the Convention and establish this body. He expressed concern that only eight nations have ratified the convention, with three more needed to bring it into effect. He suggested that there are three countries represented by their leaders around the table who had not ratified it. Finally, he proposed his country as the site of the future court.

Perez jokingly suggested that we look to the countries to the north of Costa Rica for future ratification of the Convention.

Carter said that we have signed the Convention, but not yet ratified it.

Manley said that Jamaica had signed and was preparing legislation that would secure its ratification.

Carter said that he would be delivering the opening address to the Organization of American States General Assembly, and he planned to ask other nations to expedite ratification. He promised to do the same but doubted that the US would ratify this year.

Perez suggested that we draw up a list of all those countries that have signed and ratified, as well as those that haven't.

Torrijos said Panama had already ratified it, but had not yet deposited the instrument of ratification.

Carter suggested that Torrijos help him to persuade U.S. Senators to ratify it since Torrijos knows the Senators better than Carter does. Carter also noted that Chile had invited the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to visit their country.

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Perez said that we would celebrate the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights this December. He suggested that December would be an ideal time for a ceremony to bring the American Convention into force, and the ideal place would be Costa Rica. He suggested again that we would do well to start the human rights activities on the northern border of Costa Rica. Perez then suggested that instead of issuing a formal declaration by Chiefs of State at the end of the two multilateral meetings, a press statement which summarized those points on which agreement was reached, could be issued. As the first point, he suggested that we should urge that all countries in the hemisphere ratify the Convention on Human Rights, that it should be on the 30th Anniversary of the universal declaration on human rights, and that San Jose should be the site of the next inter-American Court on Human Rights.

Carazo volunteered to prepare a draft for consideration.

Non-Proliferation

Carter suggested that another item to be considered in this press statement would be the completion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on non-proliferation. Argentina had promised to ratify the Treaty and should be pressed to do so. He said that making Latin America a nuclear free zone would be a perfect example for others, in other regions and in other areas. He had referred to it in his conversations with Indian Prime Minister Desai.✓

Perez suggested that one of the problems in bringing Tlatelolco into effect is that Brazil is afraid of Argentina. He then suggested that each of the Heads of State around the table address themselves separately and privately to President Videla and urge him to sign (sic) Tlatelolco.

Carter asked Prime Minister Manley whether he could induce the Cubans to sign the Treaties.

Manley said that he was unsure.

Perez said that he had read a statement that Castro had said Cuba did not feel obligated to sign, but if others did, they might.

Michelsen changed the subject and said they were talking about very sensitive matters and it was very important that certain things be kept secret. He argued that the right of information is a human right, just as not to give information is also a right. Confidential matters should not be publicly disseminated.

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We should all be extremely careful that this doesn't happen. He was very concerned about leaks that came from the U.S. Lopez said that he was particularly disturbed that the political campaign in his country was affected by the divulgence of confidential matters. He said that this case was not the only one and Colombia was not alone in this regard.

Perez jokingly interjected, "Don't look at me."

Michelsen said that diplomatic documents should not be within the reach of the press. This is extremely destructive of good inter-American relations. He offered this as a "last testament", since he will be leaving office shortly.

Lopez said he thought that the Soviet Union could induce Cuba to sign Tlatelolco. Lopez said that he would be in Cuba on July 26, the anniversary of Cuba's revolution, and that he would be happy to bring this issue to the attention of Castro at that time.

President Carter said that he didn't know the origin of the documents to which Lopez Michelsen referred. He explained that the press in the U.S. had absolute freedom, and we cannot have as much secrecy as we would like. He expressed his deepest apologies to President Lopez and also to President Perez for any embarrassment that the press may have caused them. He also thanked President Lopez for offering to convey the concerns of the others on Tlatelolco to Castro.

President Carter said that we now have communication with the Cuban government, and he will repeat the request for ratification of Tlatelolco through these channels. This is a very important message.

Arms Restraint and the Southern Cone

President Carter said another important issue is the sale and acquisition of conventional weapons. He explained the U.S. policy to try to reduce the total sales of arms. He complimented President Perez for his work and his initiatives in this area.

President Perez said that what Lopez Michelsen said is of great importance because we live constantly fearful of manipulation by the news. There are strange hands in the U.S. that go into the file cabinets and leak the secret information they find there. He said that, for example, someone from the State Department once came down to speak to him as well as to President Lopez, and to ask them not to hold a meeting that they were going to hold with Cuba. When the incident leaked to the press, Perez and Lopez had to hasten the meeting. This kind of leak is bad because it affects our relations with one another, makes one cautious about what is said, and also greatly affects our actions, often making us do things we would prefer not to do.

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He said that he was not hurt, but anguished.

Referring to conventional weapons sales, he said that it affected the economy of countries concerned. The problem of weapons sales has more to do oftentimes with the seller than with the buyer. He said he was astonished to hear President Giscard's representative had asked in a major speech at the United Nations for the countries of the world to shift their funds from arms to economic development, and then one week later he read in the paper that France had sold \$10 billion to Saudi Arabia.

It is not possible to wage this battle against arms sales alone. If we can get the right attitude from salesmen, that would be extremely helpful. He spoke of a respected Venezuelan industrialist, who had been visited in Puerto Rico by U.S. arms salesmen, asking him to be the arms representative in Venezuela. The Venezuelan was told that he would be given a 5 percent commission, 3 percent for himself, and 2 percent to use as he wished. Perez summed it up by saying that the LDC's are being manipulated in this business. A way must be found to put an end to the permanent stimulation of weapons sales, because whatever poor countries do, they will fail unless the sellers agree not to sell.

Perez said that at the OAS meeting, the members of the Ayacucho group will sign an agreement on arms control, and then try to expand this agreement to include all the countries of Latin America. But the efforts of the U.S. are needed with arms producers for if there is no agreement among the producers, then there is little that the buyers can do.

President Carter said that we have not only taken actions on our own, but also have talked with the USSR. The French have not been willing to participate up till now, as they are waiting to see how we do in our discussions with the Russians. But he is determined to hold down the sale of arms internationally. He explained the process by which arms are sold abroad, and said that permission must be obtained from the State Department first and that he is personally approving all sales. It is a slow process. He had hoped that the Special Session on Disarmament would be able to find a program that would work. To President Perez, Carter said that he would certainly follow up on his advice. However, he believes that the initiative should come from Latin America, because we do not want to appear as if we are preaching to the Latin Americans on this issue.

General Torrijos referred to two causes of this predicament. The apparent cause is that nations arm for expansionist or for defensive purposes. Why are they doing it? How much of their budget is being spent on defense matters? How much is being used to serve the people? We must also look for the

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real causes behind arms races. Certain armed forces magnify the problem in order to justify themselves. If the cause of war disappears, then the military government cannot justify its purchases to its own people or to the world. Could we impose certain kinds of sanctions or deny loans as an incentive to get military governments to stop their purchases of weapons? The real effect of arms sales is to negate development. Torrijos then commented on the fact that Panama is often the bridge through which many outside groups can travel. He has talked with leaders of such groups, and they complained about the excessive military burden of their governments.

President Lopez Michelsen said that it is very difficult to condemn the countries who deal with weapons because the arms business is part of their own defense system; arms exports are used as a way of subsidizing domestic defense. This won't be solved at this meeting. In inter-American relations, this is not a problem for the countries represented at this meeting. The problem is south of the equator, and that is because of the War of the Pacific, and of differences with regard to Bolivia's desire for access to the sea. Lopez suggested that they discuss ways to "cure the infection" by mediating specifically with regard to Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia. We should call for patient action, because that would eliminate all the problems.

President Perez said that he was in total agreement. The crisis in the Southern Cone is becoming more serious. He said that the problem of Bolivia is at the center of the problem of weapons purchases in the region. Peru has just bought some Soviet airplanes, and he had read of the severe criticism in the United States because they used U.S. airports for refueling. He said that Venezuela had encouraged Peru to stop purchasing weapons, and he had said the same to Chile as well. He said that we should offer not mediation, but cooperation. He proposed that representatives of the six governments around the table send confidential communications to the three nations--Bolivia, Peru, and Chile--telling them that we would be willing to offer cooperation to settle their dispute. In the case of the Ayacucho countries, all the parties accepted the fact that the problem existed, and that would be an advantage.

Perez suggested that all of the Presidents attempt the same approach with regard to Belize, so that independence would not have to be delayed. The problem, as he saw it, was to help Guatemala and Belize find a solution which would permit Belizean independence, while at the same time allowing some room for Guatemala to save face and accept independence. Perez was concerned that a solution to the Belizean problem was necessary to avoid severe repercussions in the Caribbean.

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President Carazo spoke as the leader of a country with no arms purchases. He was anguished to learn that since World War II, conventional weapons have caused more than a hundred wars. The purchase of weapons was disastrous on a country's economic development program. At the heart, he believed it was a problem of attitudes and of military governments. In other words, the demand factor. He was disturbed that illicit trade in arms had been found in Costa Rica. He proposed that regional agencies be established to wage an intense campaign to stop the purchasing of weapons. The only way not to do something, Carazo said, is not to do it at all. Don't buy any weapons. Thirty years ago, Costa Rica took this decision, and he would hope that other countries would do likewise.

President Carter referred to the problem of illicit payments which President Perez had noted. The United Nations is presently discussing this issue, and the U.S. would like support for negotiations for a new treaty. Carter thought Costa Rica had good luck in not purchasing weapons. This is an excellent example for other countries and regions and he congratulated Costa Rica. However, the U.S. has different responsibilities in the world. Yet the big objective of the United States is to prevent the spread of all weapons.

Prime Minister Manley noted that this was an enormous and complex problem, that Jamaica has tried to use its influence to dissuade buyers and sellers. He said moderation in arms purchases should be rewarded by the transfer of more economic resources. If there could be a significant shift of resources to development, then countries would see the real importance and benefits of slowing arms purchases.

President Carter said we would do all we could to support the Caribbean Group, which has 30 nations and 15 international institutions and will be meeting in Washington next week. We should do all we can to help it. To the extent that there is restraint on arms purchases, we would try to be helpful in the economic area. He noted that President Perez and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada had tried to be helpful. He hoped we could get the Federal Republic of Germany to do likewise. He felt that progress was being made in this area.

President Perez suggested that this would be another good subject for the press statement. He suggested that the leaders say that armamentism was of great concern to all the countries. An important effort was being made by the Ayacucho countries, and it was hoped that this effort could be broadened to include all of Latin America. He said that although not for the communique, the leaders should extend their cooperation not mediation to Peru, Bolivia, and Chile and to Belize and Guatemala. The idea of contributing to finding a point of agreement between Guatemala and Belize is an important one. If we offer our cooperation, we can find a solution. He thought something could be offered to Guatemala, which would not humiliate Belize.

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Caribbean

Perez referred to President Carter's mention of the Caribbean Group. He confessed that he was indignant to learn in the press that the West was planning to establish a Pan-African force and a \$2 billion Pan-African fund, while at the same time it was impossible to get money for the Caribbean Group. He warned that small nations in the Caribbean would fill the vacuum with political or economic mafias. He noted that Vesco was thinking of settling in Grenada. This could happen if we don't assume a responsibility to work for a Caribbean plan and to contribute our resources to it. He said that President Carter has taken this issue up with enthusiasm, and has been trying to gain support from other countries, but few have helped. If there are not enough funds contributed to this group, then it might be better not to have it at all. Perez said that he had offered \$30 million to this new fund, provided that it be 10 percent of the total value of the fund. He suggested that there be \$300 million per year over five years-- a total of \$1.5 billion. This would change the present conditions in the Caribbean. The only important thing is that the plan should point to the economic integration of the region. The problems are very serious, and all of us need to contribute. However, he was not optimistic.

Carter said that the press has erroneously reported that the United States was considering a Pan-African force. It was not true. All that the United States did was to transport soldiers, food and equipment to Zaire and help stabilize the situation in Shaba. We have not asked for a Pan-African force, and we would not participate in one which did more than just this effort.

In arms control, the United States has a firm policy. We do not introduce new types of weapons or permit an escalation of weapons sales. We sell a smaller percentage every year, and we hope others will join in our effort. We are now in fifth place in arms sales to the region. It is very important also that Tlatelolco be concluded. We think, furthermore, that the example should be expanded and extended to other areas.

Carazo said less investment in arms permits more investment for development. However, once a country advances, then the terms for securing loans and other assistance becomes harder than for those who invested in arms and did not advance. So a country is punished for focussing on development instead of on arms.

Michelsen complimented Carazo for his approach to the problem. He added, however, that conflicts often come from arms sales rather than purchases. Colombia supports the Caribbean Development Bank, but the problem is not of aid, but of market and price for commodities. What the Caribbean needs is the market for the sugar. Coffee producers have a similar problem. When the economic situation is not dealt with, we will not have a problem of arms purchases by governments; the problem will be

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one of smuggling in weapons to the peasants as a result of growing political instability. Take the case of coffee. If there is a frost in Brazil it will create an unprecedented rise in the price of coffee; if there is no frost, then there will be a severe drop in the prices. The price should not be allowed to depend on whether or not there is frost. Because of such violent swings in commodity prices, the situation in Latin America could become as bad as that of Africa. You don't have to be a Marxist to recognize the relationship between economic instability and weapons purchases. He had asked President Carter in September that we not wait until the economic situation grows so badly that a catastrophe occurs. Let's try to agree now to establish a fair price. The coffee agreement is temporarily suspended, but we should not wait. If the U.S. would implement the coffee legislation, and apply quotas and stabilize prices at a timely date, he was sure that if the group met again in one more year they would spend much less time discussing weapons and economic assistance. These agreements would restore this kind of stability. The situation in these countries, in Lopez's words, "is not correctable by just warm washcloths."

Perez said Lopez Michelsen had mentioned a most serious point. He referred again to the press statement, and suggested that another item to be included in it should be the Caribbean Group meeting which would be held on the 19th in Washington. We should state our full support for the Caribbean Group. He added two additional items which he believed should be in that press statement. First, the Coffee Agreement which was one of the few good things which began with the Alliance for Progress, has remained, and should not die. If the Senate does not ratify the Coffee Agreement soon, the whole agreement will die because over 50 percent of the coffee exports go to the United States. Perez said that the press statement should express our great concern over this Coffee Agreement. A second problem, of course, is the International Sugar Agreement and the extremely low price of sugar, and the signs of protectionism in the U.S. We should mention our concern about this as well.

Carter responded by saying that he would not be disturbed for the group to express its concern about the stabilization of market prices. He noted, however, that the U.S. is a large producer of sugar and U.S. producers had to be protected. He repeated his concern about the importance of the multilateral trade negotiations as an effective vehicle for reforming world trade; and noted that many of the countries represented around the table are not members of GATT.

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Responding to the more specific points made by President Perez, President Carter explained that we have intense feelings within the United States among the farmers of sugar and the ranchers of beef, and their Congressmen are deeply committed to protecting the cost of production. We have tried to get the International Sugar Agreement ratified, and the President has resisted efforts to raise the price of sugar. He concluded by saying that he has no objections to the expression of concern.

Manley noted that it would be very useful if the International Sugar Agreement could be ratified soon and asked what were the prospects.

Carter said that Senator Church, who is accompanying the President, is extremely active in sugar policy, and is a firm advocate of higher sugar prices, perhaps as much as 17 cents. He said that he would be meeting with Senator Long next week, and Senator Long represents sugar cane producers, which are not always the most efficient. He pledged, in conclusion, that he will do the best he can to get the International Sugar Agreement ratified and to keep sugar prices down. By the time of the O.A.S. meeting, he said that he might have a clear picture, and he would try to relay that to the nations. He said that the problem is that the Senate is far behind its schedule right now as the result of the Canal Treaties, and he is uncertain whether they will have time to look at these additional agreements. Nevertheless, he reiterated his complete commitment to ratification without delay.

Michelsen put the discussion on commodity price stabilization in a broader context. He said that producing countries hurt themselves in the long term by excessively high prices because housewives inevitably reduce their consumption or change to substitutes, for example, from coffee to soft drinks, from sugar to corn sugars. Therefore, it's important not to force too high a price; indeed, it is in both interests to try to establish fair and reasonable prices.

Perez agreed with President Lopez Michelsen. Since President Carazo would be leaving after this session, Perez suggested a few additional items to be included in the press statement so that Carazo could agree with it today. On the Dominican Republic, he said that we should express our satisfaction with the electoral process in a very discreet way which would make it easier for Balaguer to resist the pressure which he is feeling from those who would like to reverse the elections.

Carter interjected that he believed that the certification of the final election results would be coming in one day.

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Perez said that a discreet statement would help overcome any difficulties that might arise in the near future.

Carter agreed, saying that we should encourage the completion of the electoral process in the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere.

Manley said that the meeting they were holding presented the leaders with a historical opportunity to try to press along several outstanding disputes. He suggested that the group offer cooperation which might lead to a resolution of the Guatemala-Belize problem. He suggested that the leaders develop a simple plan to offer cooperation on this. This could be one concrete accomplishment of this meeting. It would be preferable not to publicize the means by which the group would cooperate to help resolve the dispute, but it would be useful to begin to do that.

Perez said the decisions on Belize and the Andean tensions should be kept confidential.

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31.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. Brzezinski wrote "6-20-78" and "10:19 pm" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

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back from the resident

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6.20-78

10A

10.19 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Your OAS Speech

Attached is your OAS speech which Jim Fallows and Bob Pastor worked on. It incorporates comments we received from the State Department today, and I think you will find it a useful description of the state of our relations with Latin America at this time.

Under Secretary of State Newsom has raised just one point in dissent, and I wanted to bring it to your attention. He is concerned, on pages 4 and 5, that we may be over-extending ourselves in the peacekeeping area, pledging our involvement in three extremely difficult disputes. He is concerned that we may be raising expectations that could not easily be satisfied.

Of course, you have made all of the points in those two pages either in private conversations with each country's leaders, or in letters to them. I believe there are several important reasons why you should publicly state your position:

- First of all, all of the countries in the region are looking for our leadership and have asked for our help.
- Secondly, for the first time, you make clear that the "hard decisions can only be made" by the parties concerned; we will only be helpful to that effort.
- Thirdly, these issues, particularly Bolivian access, are among the Hemisphere's most important since the Canal Treaties were ratified. Bolivia has obtained a seat on the United Nations Security Council and plans to take its case to the United Nations in every possible form, just as Panama had done. It would be to our interest to be put on the record at this time.

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- It would enhance your moral standing in the Hemisphere since everybody acknowledges the goal of Bolivia's getting access to the sea; they only disagree on how to do that.
- Lastly, the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific has been causing anxiety tremors throughout the region for the last two years, and this is likely to increase as we approach 1979. Your public statement of concern -- like Mrs. Carter's visit -- will be a sign of U.S. interest in stability in the region and peaceful resolution of that dispute.

State is concerned that our offer of help is open-ended, and is therefore reluctant to make it. I believe that the time is ripe for such a statement, and it would be viewed as perhaps the most important part of your statement. I therefore recommend that you keep the relevant passages in; if you find Newsom's concern warranted, you could accommodate it by merely deleting the final sentence on page 4 and the first full paragraph on page 5. I do hope, however, that you will retain that portion of the speech, since I think it is one of the most valuable parts of the speech.

32.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 22, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 7-10/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth, Bartholomew, and Denend initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand crossed out Aaron's name in the addressee line. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "v. interesting. ZB."

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 22, 1978

B3

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Conversations in Santo Domingo

V. interg.
28

With Andy Young and others, I had conversations in Santo Domingo with General Torrijos, Former President Oduber of Costa Rica, Foreign Minister Consalvi of Venezuela, and Armando Villanueva of the Peruvian APRA party. Copies of the memoranda of conversation are attached, but I thought I might summarize a few overall impressions.

In discussing individual country's political affairs and particularly return to democracy, the theme that kept recurring is the problem of polarization. In Peru the activities of the ultra left and ultra right are threatening the efforts of the Constituent Assembly. In Ecuador the outspoken leftist Bucaram threatens to alienate the military and provoke them into fixing the election to ensure that Bucaram's nephew, Roldos, cannot win. Oduber volunteered that leftist and rightist terrorist groups in El Salvador were both strong enough to make political accommodation impossible. Torrijos even opined that in Bolivia opposition leader Siles was as responsible for provoking the coup as Pereda was for making it. All of the people we talked with seemed aware of the need to help those who seek to develop the broad consensus necessary for functioning democracies: Consalvi is going to Peru at Perez' request to talk to leaders there; Oduber's party is rendering technical assistance to Torrijos' new party and to Samudio's liberal party.

Andy correctly observed that he sensed a new idealistic pragmatism among the leaders we met: an inner confidence that the direction of political change in Latin America was towards more democracy, and that the best guarantee of arriving there would be by small steps which reassure the military.

There is a different variation on this theme in Nicaragua, where efforts are directed to finding a democratic alternative to Somoza. Consalvi once again urged us to "twist arms" on behalf of change in Nicaragua.

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Other interesting items:

On Belize: Torrijos was very excited by President Carter's reference in the OAS speech, but there was general agreement that the new Guatemalan government would have to settle internal differences between the Vice President and the Foreign Minister and that the ball is in the Guatemalans' court.

On Africa: in response to Andy Young's briefing, Torrijos promised to provide troops for a UN peacekeeping force in Namibia.

On Colombia: Consalvi expressed concern that the U.S. had not given Colombia sufficient attention and that a special effort should be made since Lievano, their Foreign Minister, will be assuming the presidency of the UN General Assembly. Andy Young is considering a trip there, and I am following up on this issue.

cc: Jessica Mathews

Attachments:

- Tab A - Memcon with Torrijos
- Tab B - Memcon with Oduber, Consalvi et al.
- Tab C - Memcon with APRA Leader, et al.

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33.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 4, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8-12/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 4, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RP* ✓
SUBJECT: Impact of U.S. Human Rights
Policy in Latin America

Good. After our discussion at the staff meeting last week, I tasked the CIA to do an overall assessment of the impact of our human rights policy in the Southern Cone. No one questions that the sensitivities of certain government and military officials have been affected by the human rights policy; the important questions are whether our long-term relationships will be strengthened or harmed by the policy and whether the policy has led, and will continue to lead, to improvements in the human rights situations in those countries and in others.

While the human rights policy may be a good instrument of ideological diplomacy in other areas, I don't think that ought to be one of our purposes in this hemisphere. I was working under the impression that the goals of our human rights policy include: to contribute to a climate in which human rights are increasingly respected and the costs of repression have increased as well; to identify the United States with a universal cause, which you have described as "the increasing self-assertiveness of man on behalf of his own human rights"; and to project the U.S. as an idealistic, moral nation actively working toward a better world.

If our overall human rights policy is to be effective and credible, one aspect needs to be that we have warmer and closer relationships with those governments which share our ideals and cooler and more distant relationships with those governments that don't. This necessarily means that our relations with the military governments in the Southern Cone should range from being cordial and correct--as in the case of Brazil, where we have a wide range of consultative mechanisms--to being distant, as in the case of Chile, where the Letelier investigation currently prevents us from taking any other position.

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Another element of our policy should be a willingness, at appropriate times, to back up our rhetoric with actions, many of which are mandated by law anyway. At the same time, we need to continue to distinguish between the three different "baskets" of human rights in implementing our policy. For example, with respect to Argentina, we have informed the government that our concern with human rights there is focused on basket #1 (integrity of the person), and we recognize and accept the government's assessment that democratization is a long-term goal.

I am sending you a couple of articles that were in the New York Times in the past year, which deal with this subject. I would be very interested in your comments on these articles and on my perception of our human rights policy.

cc: Jessica Mathews

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34.

Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State

Asunción, October 13, 1978, 1905Z

4451

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción, 1969–1979. Confidential; Roger; Immediate. The Department repeated the cable to Santiago as telegram 265779, October 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago, 1963–1979)

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ASUNCION 4451

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, SHUM
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING WITH CHIEF OF STAFF RE LETELIER CASE

REF: ASUNCION 4375

1. ON OCTOBER 11 I CALLED AGAIN ON CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ALEJANDRO FRETES DAVALOS. AFTER PRELIMINARY COURTESIES, HE READ ME THE ACTA OR SUMMARY MINUTES RESULTING FROM THE VISIT OF GENERAL ORZCO, CHIEF OF CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE, TO ASUNCION. THE DOCUMENT ITSELF MAKES NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE LETELIER CASE. FRETES SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO BRIEF ME ON THE ACTA BUT HE PREFERRED TO READ IT VERBATIM.

2. THE DOCUMENT IS BASICALLY AN AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE ALL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO CONTROL AND ELIMINATE SUBVERSION. IT SPEAKS OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, PROMPT USE OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES, MONITORING OF SUBVERSIVES AND THEIR DETENTION AND INFORMAL HAND OVER FROM ONE COUNTRY TO THE OTHER. IT REPEATS OVER AND OVER THE NEED FOR FULL COOPERATION AND MUTUALLY FACILITATIVE ACTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIGHT TO THE DEATH AGAINST SUBVERSION.

3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS, FRETES DAVALOS GAVE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN CHILE AND PARAGUAY. IT WAS SIMPLY ANOTHER IN A REGULAR SERIES OF MEETING WHICH TAKE PLACE ANNUALLY AMONG THE CHIEFS OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN CONE. THIS SYSTEM OF CONSULTATIONS CAME INTO BEING MAINLY AS A DEFENSE AGAINST THE THREAT OF ARGENTINE SUBVERSION SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, CHILE, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY MAKE UP THE NET, ALTHOUGH URUGUAY IS NOW ALMOST ON THE INACTIVE LIST. FRETES DAVALOS SAID THE MEETINGS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY USEFUL ANYMORE, IN HIS JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THE MAIN THREAT (FROM ARGENTINA) HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. THEY KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER THROUGH A U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION IN THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE WHICH COVERS ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. THIS U.S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IS USED MAINLY BY STUDENT OFFICERS TO CALL HOME TO LATIN AMERICA BUT IT IS ALSO EMPLOYED TO CO-ORDINATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES. THEY MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THEIR COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE U.S. FACILITY IN PANAMA BY USING BILATERAL CODES. IN HIS VIEW THE WHOLE NETWORK IS PRACTICALLY USELESS AND SERVES MAINLY TO PERMIT CHIEFS OF INTELLIGENCE TO EXAGGERATE THEIR OWN DIMINISHING IMPORTANCE.

4. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THIS IS THE CONDOR NETWORK WHICH ALL OF US HAVE HEARD ABOUT OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. ALTHOUGH FRETES DAVALOS TOLD ME HE HAD ONLY MENTIONED TO PRESIDENT STROESSNER THAT WE WERE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THE MEETING, I SUSPECT THE PRESIDENT VETOED FRETES' STATED INTENTION OF PROVIDING ME WITH A COPY OF THE ACTA AND INSTEAD TOLD HIM TO READ IT TO ME. EITHER I MISUNDERSTOOD OR FRETES MISPOKE IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETING (REFTEL) WHEN HE SAID ARGENTINA HAD ALSO

ATTENDED. APPARENTLY TWO BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH CHILE AND ARGENTINA TOOK PLACE ONE AFTER THE OTHER AND SOME SESSIONS MAY EVEN HAVE OVERLAPPED.

5. RECOMMENDATION: THE TWO FBI AGENTS HERE TELL ME THERE IS LIKELIHOOD CONDOR WILL SURFACE DURING LETELIER TRIAL IN THE U.S. IF GENERAL FRETES DAVALOS IS ACCURATE IN DESCRIBING THE COMMUNICATIONS IT USES AS AN ENCRYPTED SYSTEM WITHIN U.S. COMMUNICATIONS NET (AND I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE WHETHER THIS IS TRUE), IT WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE TO REVIEW THIS ARRANGEMENT TO INSURE THAT ITS CONTINUATION IS IN U.S. INTEREST.
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ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35.

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RPM-78-10410

Washington, November 6, 1978

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A, Box 4, Folder 49, Southern Cone Perception of U.S. Policies. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Requested by Pastor.

49 5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
6 November 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SOUTHERN CONE PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICIES

Summary

The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view of US policies toward Latin America. Their perspective is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccupation since the mid 1960s with other parts of the world has left the US out of touch with Latin American realities. They view US policy toward their region as inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive. There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the US has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing its ability to lead the West.

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED

by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. It was requested by the NSC Staffer for Latin America.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

RPM-78-10410

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Many of the differences between the US and the Southern Cone nations have historical origins. At the present time, however, each country in the area has specific grievances against the US, with the most common problem being human rights. The military leaders of the region believe that security against leftist terrorism and international Communism takes precedence over personal well-being and individual freedom. Most of these leaders are convinced that intervention by the military prevented a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic development and a slow, incremental approach toward democratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated national weaknesses. For the countries that have experienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for national survival has been very real. All of the Southern Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion, and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights policies.

The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their poor image in the world press and in international forums, where their military leaders are commonly described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilian official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers that the Israelis were praised for staging a raid into Uganda against terrorists, while counterterrorist activities in Brazil were denounced by the US press.

Leaders in the Southern Cone believe that investigations by unofficial and official organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human Rights are overzealous and misguided, and that US policymakers accept these findings uncritically. They deplore the United States' selective attention to Latin America while it ignores human rights violations in Communist countries.

This does not mean that US human rights policy has had a completely negative impact on the area. On the

contrary, police and military officials in these countries are now sensitized to human rights considerations. Every chief of state in the area claims to have made clear to his subordinates that torture and arbitrary arrest will no longer be tolerated. All of these countries have shown general improvement during the past year in their treatment of prisoners.

From their perspective, however, these improvements go unacknowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent of criticism, adversary treatment, and antagonistic US legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the US is playing a game with them-using human rights as a way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed, return to "democratic government" is the real issue, their answer is that competitive politics is not possible in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable until the various military regimes are convinced that they have established economic progress and ensured the permanence of political changes they have brought about. Continued US pressure to speed up the process will probably only increase the bitterness and recrimination.

Public Views of US Policies

It is much more difficult to get an accurate reading of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most citizens seem to support the military governments; the rest are either unconcerned with politics or belong to a declared opposition. The Chilean Government probably enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the plebiscite vote held there earlier this year, even though rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this support.

Judging from newspaper commentary and personal conversations, US human rights policy has had little impact on the general populace. Some political groups that have long opposed the various governments and other groups representing civil and human rights causes have used the policy to air their own specific grievances.

Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar to their own programs.

Argentina

The human rights issue is the major point of contention between Argentina and the US. Senior Argentine officials view human rights abuses as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship. Current US policy is perceived by the Argentines as a sign that the US considers good bilateral relations to be expendable. They believe that this policy is selective and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for "punishment" regardless of their internal problems. Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it would also understand the government's tough measures.

Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating, the government is attempting to wind down its massive security operations and exert tighter controls over police and military units. It has ordered the release of many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal procedures, and the government has strengthened requirements for proper police identification. In an effort to appease its critics, the government has published several lists of those arrested or under detention and is making a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter-American Human Rights Committee has been invited to visit the country, possibly between March and May 1979.

The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of

foreign military sales, the reduction in the size of the US military mission, the nonappropriation of training funds, and the lack of authorization for Argentina to pay for military training in the US. Buenos Aires has been concerned about the recently implemented Humphrey-Kennedy amendment that prohibits foreign military purchases, export licenses, and training. The State Department's recent decision to authorize a small military training contract for noncombatants alleviated some of the tension, but Senator Kennedy's letter to President Carter protesting the decision is sure to rankle Buenos Aires.

Another problem is the Argentine plan for an "experimental" plutonium reprocessing plant, [REDACTED] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1). The decision runs counter to President Carter's desire to curb the spread of proliferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, contending that it discriminates against countries without nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and the US will have to relent in its current policy. Meanwhile, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can independently decide whether or not to reprocess.

The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet expansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more active role in the nonaligned movement to counter Cuban activities. The hardline attitude is taken by Army General Agosti, who commented earlier this year that Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead without anybody's help or advice" and that something should be done about Africa.

There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos Aires against the US over the Export-Import Bank decision not to finance equipment exports for the Yacreta Dam project. The Export-Import Bank's change of mind on this issue has lessened the hue and cry, but many military men

think that the financing turnaround is somehow linked to the visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Linking the Export-Import Bank financing with other problems with the US, many Argentine leaders seem determined to begin redirecting their country's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Montes, for example, played up Argentina's potential as a nuclear supplier during his recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers, meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abrogating the Rio defense pact and expelling the US military group.

Brazil

Brazil's foreign policy reflects its very real great power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is working to achieve and demonstrate independence of the US in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but resentment of US human rights and nuclear proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance last year of military ties with Washington.

Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted intrusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic demands for basic changes. While President Geisel and President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberalization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring habeas corpus in many political and national security cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime sweeping dictatorial powers.

Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that the country's economic well-being is still fragile and

vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend to view certain US trade positions--such as countervailing duties--as harmful to their development drive, fueled as it is by ever-expanding exports. This is especially true this year because poor agricultural performance has forced the government to concentrate on alleviating the balance of payments problem by promoting more exports of manufactured goods to developed nations. One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to basic Brazilian interests.

The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation concerns in a similar context, often saying that US opposition to the Brazil-West German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth. They point out the critical importance to them of non-fossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high cost of imported oil. Argentina's decision to develop reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt Brazil to follow suit.

Added to these specific problems with the US is the growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and the aftermath of its experience in Vietnam. The situation in Africa is perceived as the best current example of this development.

The US is viewed from an environment in which there is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses. At present the government is controlled and supported by a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the international Communist movement.

The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist activity in the country and the growing civil rights movement among the black population. The Brazilian church has also been a factor through its long championing of the human rights cause and its protests against government policies. Nevertheless, like other Latin American countries, Brazilians in general adhere to authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service rhetorically questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil--the US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil's problems and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward democratic government rather than engage in constant and unproductive criticism.

Chile

Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by this because it believes that it has made substantial progress in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to hear any favorable comment from Washington. President Pinochet EO 13526 is EO 13526 disappointed by the lack of US recognition of the improving situation in Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the same intensity as before he tried to make improvements. The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN Human Rights Committee's attempt to provide funds to "victims" of Chilean human rights violations.

Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for political prisoners and official consent for most exiles to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the

intelligence service, which had been responsible for much of the abuse of human rights; civilian appointments to the cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the intelligence service; accelerated completion of a new constitution and advancement in the timetable for an elected government; preparation of a new labor code with plans to reinstitute collective bargaining next year; and the visit of the UN Human Rights Committee delegation.

The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional ally of the US and believes that Washington "encouraged" the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown, however, the military believes that the US was forced by domestic political concerns to become strongly critical of the new government and to deny any part in the coup.

The Chileans are now convinced that US-Chilean relations will never be the same. They believe that there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist Allende regime. They also think that the US is being overzealous in its prosecution of the Letelier case; the Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the "truth" in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nationalism is easily aroused. For example, a Washington Post editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be replaced by a Christian Democratic government was denounced in a series of man-in-the-street interviews and was described by nearly everyone as an unwarranted intrusion in Chilean affairs.

The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US human rights policy as made to order for their own campaign against the government. The Christian Democrats, in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier case will bring down Pinochet.

While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly treated by Washington, there is still a strong pro-US feeling in the country. Military officers and civilian officials alike admire the US and would like their country eventually to evolve along US lines. Despite a current perception distrust of the US, the Chileans' great concern is that the poor relations between the two countries will deteriorate even further. The Chileans appear determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement against the US and continue to hope for better treatment. For example, Foreign Minister Cubillos recently devoted most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth the Chilean position in the Beagle Channel negotiations with Argentina. Despite the poor relations with the US, Cubillos clearly hoped that Washington would use its influence to soften Argentina's position in the dispute.

Cubillos went on to explain the evolutionary process of the return to democratic government in Chile. He acknowledged the Chilean belief that civilian government is impossible now, but pointed out that political institutionalization is under way. Cubillos' remarks and the general atmosphere in Santiago suggest that even though there are strong feelings in Chile favoring an accommodation with the US, there is little chance of a quick return to civilian rule. Not only has the government been successful in solving the country's chronic economic problems, there are strong memories of the political and economic chaos of the Allende years--in sum there is little desire to return the country to the politicians.

Paraguay

President Stroessner has been in power since 1954, and there appears to be little chance for any change in the policies that, in his view and in the view of many Paraguayans, have brought the country internal peace, stability, and economic progress. The Stroessner regime has a poor human rights record, but there is some evidence that improvements are being made and indications

that combined Western diplomatic pressure is beginning to have an effect, however slight.

One recent example is the case of arrested human rights activist, Domingo Laino, in which the combined efforts of the US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France resulted in Laino's release from prison. Indeed, largely as a result of US pressure, Paraguay has released almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem because of the subservience of the judiciary to presidential authority and the lack of control over police interrogation methods.

The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last May that the Paraguayans were improving their human rights performance. He called the move by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits and the military training program for Paraguay from the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence.

The Paraguayan Government's public response to the US human rights policy has been negative. President Stroessner often cites his staunch anti-Communism as well as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan political elite are plainly worried by what they see as the US failure to meet the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa. They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They regard US criticism of their country as naive and an invasion of their domestic affairs.

Because of the extent of media censorship in the country, it is difficult to determine what the populace thinks of the Stroessner regime. The President appears to be personally popular, however, and his travels about the country are enthusiastically received by the citizens.

A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely.

Uruguay

Uruguay has taken some steps during the past year to improve human rights conditions, although the overall situation remains poor. The government retains extensive statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give up. On the average, fewer political arrests have been made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners. Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive controls and is far from independent, military courts are reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases and are ordering the release of increasing numbers of detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more freely--if cautiously--an expeditious return to civilian government.

Among the positive measures taken by the government are: permission for an American Bar Association visit in April; plans to publish a list of prisoners released since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the International Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground rules for a visit; and curtailment of prisoner detentions under emergency powers. Most indications are that the regime would like to improve its image abroad and will move steadily to change its human rights practices.

Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay may now be the region's most highly controlled society. To explain this, Uruguayan leaders point out that Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan military sees this battle as a defense of its national moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and has attempted to discredit the US through a well-managed media campaign.


Many rightist military officers oppose the US and want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the other hand, General Gregorio Alvarez, the commander in chief of the Army who wants to be President some day, supports a new evaluation of the human rights situation and is moving cautiously to compel military officers to accept his reform measures. The strength of the rightist officers, however, should not be underestimated, however. Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive.

Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of ending its control of the government until 1986. Meanwhile, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together with US legislative and policy restrictions on economic and military assistance, are impediments to better relations. Uruguayans hope that a new, more positive attitude toward human rights will result in better relations with the US, but they insist that Washington should have no illusions about the prospects for an early return to civilian government.

Distribution List:

Original - Robert Pastor, NSC Staff Chief, Executive Office Bldg.

EO 13526 3.5(c)



36.

Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

GC 78-10220

Washington, November 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 11, Beagle Channel. Confidential. An unknown hand wrote "Country File 11/29/78" in the right-hand margin of the first page of the paper. A December 1978 version of this paper, with document number GC 78-10224, is identical except for a corrected map detailing the Antarctic claims of Chile and Argentina. (Central Intelligence Agency, [*text not declassified*], Job 79T01050A, Box 2, Folder 6, Argentina-Chile Dispute at the End of the Earth GC 78-1 0224)



National
Foreign
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Argentina-Chile: Dispute at the End of the Earth

A Research Paper

Country File

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

~~Confidential~~

GC 78-10220
November 1978

11/29/78

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Argentina-Chile: Dispute at the End of the Earth

Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center

November 1978

The current dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel and related territorial claims has a long and complex history. It is typical of many other South American boundary problems that stem from early, ambiguously worded agreements and treaties that were formulated before accurate maps were available. This paper addresses the major issues in the Argentina-Chile dispute.

The Beagle Channel lies near the southern tip of South America and serves as an alternate route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Strait of Magellan and to the course around Cape Horn. A treaty negotiated in 1881 stipulates that the boundary between Argentina and Chile should run north-south through Tierra del Fuego, dividing Isla Grande into two parts, with Argentina getting the eastern part and Chile the western part. All islands along the Atlantic coast were to belong to Argentina; those south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn and all along the Pacific coast were to belong to Chile.

Differing interpretations of the treaty soon arose. The Chileans claimed that the north-south line dividing Isla Grande was to stop at the northern shore of the Beagle Channel, so that the channel itself as well as all territory to the south belonged to Chile. The Argentines countered that the north-south line reached midchannel and that a portion of the channel belonged to them. The Chileans also held that the channel extends eastward as far as Cabo San Pio, making the small islands of Picton, Lennox, and

Nueva theirs; whereas the Argentines claimed that the channel turns southward to the west of Picton and Lennox, and the islands are therefore Argentine.

Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, ownership of which has become a matter of national pride to both countries, have no more than a dozen or so permanent or seasonal Chilean residents and no Argentines; gold placers once exploited on them have long since played out, and with the possible exception of some nitrate deposits, they contain no known mineral or other resources of significance. In recent years, however, the importance of Tierra del Fuego as a whole has grown, both economically and strategically. Oilfields and enormous sheep ranches occupy the northern part of the region. In the south, Ushuaia, Argentina, has grown from a mere outpost to a town of 6,000 inhabitants. It has an airfield, a naval base, port and petroleum storage facilities, a radio station, a hydroelectric plant, and a road that allows overland communication with the north. Chile maintains a small naval base at Puerto Williams, south of the Beagle Channel on Isla Navarino. Puerto Williams has an airstrip, a radio station, a hotel, and a civilian population of about 700.

A series of incidents, including one in which a Chilean PT boat entered Ushuaia Bay and was fired at by an Argentine patrol ship in 1967, led Chile to unilaterally seek British arbitration. Argentina rejected the idea at the time, but signed a treaty in 1972 whereby the International Court of Justice would study the problem and submit its verdict to

Note: This paper was prepared by [REDACTED]

EO 13526 3.5(c) [REDACTED] Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research. [REDACTED]

EO 13526 3.5(c) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Omitted are maps and photographs of the Beagle Channel and its islands.]

the British Crown for approval or disapproval. In May 1977 the Court decided that the Beagle Channel should be divided between the two countries and the disputed islands awarded to Chile; implementation of the decision, which was accepted by the British, was set for 2 February of the following year. But in December 1977, Argentina, which had already indicated it would not accept the Court's ruling, began a press campaign and a number of economic and military moves to prompt concessions from Chile. Presidents Videla of Argentina and Pinochet of Chile met in Mendoza, Argentina, in January 1978, and in Puerto Montt, Chile, in February, and signed agreements creating a joint commission and outlining a phased negotiation process. The first phase ended in April without any significant progress.

As the second phase of negotiations proceeded, the focus of attention shifted away from the islands in the mouth of the Beagle Channel to a number of smaller islands to the south, including Evout, Barnevelt, and Homos. Argentina wants a boundary that would link these islands before it turns south along the Cape Horn meridian, or, better yet, an alignment that would place one or more of the islands entirely in Argentine territory. Intrusion of the Chileans into the Atlantic is resented by the Argentines, who feel that it breaks a gentleman's agreement between the two countries that Argentina

should be an Atlantic power and Chile exclusively a Pacific power.

Argentina is also concerned about the affect the Court's awards to Chile might have on control of ocean resources; both countries claim sovereignty over resources within 200 miles of the coast. Ownership of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva may bear on the location of the boundary between the two respective 200-mile zones and could give Chile a sizable slice of the South Atlantic. Continental shelf petroleum and coastal fisheries are the resources of greatest interest, but the value and the extent of these in the area are unknown. The shelf east of Nueva Island, however, is quite narrow, about 15 miles wide, beyond which the bottom drops rapidly to abyssal depths. It is, therefore, much less attractive for development than Argentina's broad shelf on the northeastern side of Tierra del Fuego, which has rich, relatively untapped fish resources and potential oil deposits that may rival those of the North Sea—although the latter will take many years of exploration to determine.

An additional Argentine concern is that the International Court ruling will adversely affect their Antarctic claim which overlaps that of Chile. Presumably, they fear that any extension of Chilean territory eastward into the Atlantic will lend weight to Chilean claims to territory directly to the south on the Antarctic Peninsula.

UNCLASSIFIED

37.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 27, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8-12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

November 27, 1978

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: → ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT: Beagle Channel Update

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Since November 2 when the special Argentine-Chilean commission adjourned without having reached an agreement on the jurisdictional dispute in the Beagle Channel, several diplomatic messages between the two countries' Presidents have been exchanged. The Argentines agreed to a Chilean proposal that a mediator be chosen to resolve the dispute only if boundary questions could be discussed first. The Argentines want exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and three islands in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threaten these claims. The Chileans have resisted the idea of setting such terms of reference for a mediator.

Intelligence reports indicate that the GOA has been hastily purchasing arms: patrol boats from Israel, France, West Germany, and South Korea; aircraft from Israel (30 Mirage III jets) and France (parts for Alouette helicopters); ammunition from France (the Exocet naval missile), U.K., West Germany, Belgium, Italy; and communication equipment from France and Israel. Hardliners in the Argentine military believe the time has come for a show of force. One of the leaders of this group, the commanding general of Argentina's I Corps, told our Ambassador that if the dispute is not resolved by the first two weeks in December, Argentina would take the initiative and fight Chile. Reinforcing this message, the admiral who commands the Argentine Coast Guard told an American Embassy officer last Friday (November 24) that Argentina will occupy the disputed territory and will break diplomatic and trade ties with Chile unless negotiations are resumed in ten days.

We have just learned from the Chilean Foreign Minister that he is pleased by the conciliatory nature of Argentina's latest note, which is reported to have recommended the modalities of the December 11 Foreign Minister's meeting in Buenos Aires, and he will recommend that Pinochet accept it. It's not clear yet whether this means that the Chileans have accepted Argentina's definition of the issue.

Our position has remained one of talking to both sides (and others--e.g., the Brazilians) without getting in between. I continue to believe that is the best course. Trying to mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans would make Camp David look easy, and we just don't have the same kind of stake in the Beagle Channel that we have in the Middle East.

UNCLASSIFIED

38.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

Washington, December 8, 1978, 2343Z

310384

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507-0584. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogotá, Brasília, Caracas, Montevideo, Mexico City, and Lima. Drafted by Ruser and Bumpus; cleared by Guzman and in EUR, IO/UNP, and S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

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ARA:RGUZMAN
EUR:WE :VBROD
IO/UNP -EESVENDSEN
S/S-O:JETHYDEN

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AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 310384

EXDIS ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE FOR AMBASSADOR WAGNER

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/08/82 (CWRUSER)

TAGS: AR, CI, PDIP

SUBJECT: BEAGLE CHANNEL.
REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 09558 (B)

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. DEPARTMENT IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT

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PAGE 02 STATE 310384

HOSTILITIES MAY BE IMMINENT IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE OVER THE ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AND THE RESULTING CLAIMS TO MARITIME ZONES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. MEDIATION BY THE POPE -- A POSSIBILITY IN WHICH ARGENTINA IS INTERESTED -- MAY BE ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING POSSIBILITIES OF AVOIDING BLOODSHED. AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH VATICAN, EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA MAY RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION IF THE DECEMBER 12 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IS NOT SUCCESSFUL AND ENCOURAGE VATICAN MAKE A FIRM OFFER TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. ARGENTINA AND CHILE HAVE CARRIED ON AN INCREASINGLY ACRIMONIOUS DISPUTE OVER TERRITORIAL RIGHTS TO ISLANDS

AND ISLETS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL FOR NEARLY 100 YEARS. THE DISPUTE WAS SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION IN 1971 AND THE AWARD WHICH WAS HANDED DOWN BY THE BRITISH CROWN FOR THE THREE MAJOR INHABITED ISLANDS PRINCIPALLY FAVORED CHILE. ARGENTINA DECLARED THE AWARD VOID IN JANUARY 1978. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE THAT TIME HAVE BEEN LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND

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EVEN BEFORE FORMAL TALKS ENDED ON NOVEMBER 2, ARGENTINA BEGAN SABRE RATTLING EXERCISES INTENDED TO CONVINCE THE CHILEANS THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD RESULT IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE AGREED UPON. CHANGING POLITICAL REALITIES IN ARGENTINA HAVE PROJECTED HARD-LINERS WHO FAVOR A WAR WITH CHILE INTO INCREASINGLY POWERFUL POSITIONS.

4. OUR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES HAS HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH PAPAL NUNCIO TO ARGENTINA, LAGHI, WHO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 03 STATE 310384

HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE POPE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE IF HE FELT THAT SITUATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CRITICAL AND THAT FURTHER BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE (REFTEL A).

5. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT CRITICAL POINT IN THE DISPUTE MAY HAVE BEEN REACHED (REFTEL B).⁴ IN FACT, LATEST INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE SITUATION MAY BE EVEN MORE CRITICAL THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT.

6. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HIGHEST RANKING CURIA OFFICIAL AVAILABLE AND MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- USG BELIEVES THAT POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE IS IMMINENT.

-- DEMARCHES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA BY THE US, THE EC-9 AND NUMEROUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT DIMINISHED THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR; THE TWO COUNTRIES MAINTAIN THEIR APPARENT COLLISION COURSE.

-- IF THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS DOES NOT REACH SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, AND THIS APPEARS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE CHILEAN INSISTENCE ON LIMITING THE QUESTION TO MARITIME BOUNDARIES WHILE ARGENTINA DEMANDS THAT ALL TERRITORY IN THE FAR SOUTH BE CONSIDERED, WAR SEEMS LIKELY.

-- HOWEVER, IF THE POPE WERE TO IMMEDIATELY OFFER HIS GOOD OFFICES TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT, THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY AVERT CONFLICT. ONLY THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE POPE MAY BE ABLE TO AVERT WHAT APPEARS TO BE A SLIDE INTO WAR.

-- PAPAL EFFORTS COULD BE EXPRESSED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING: PERSONAL MESSAGES TO BOTH PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 04 STATE 310384

STATEMENT URGING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND/OR AN INVITATION TO PRESIDENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO MEET WITH HIM TO REVIEW SITUATION IF THIS IS APPROPRIATE.

-- IF THE S,TUATION IS DETERIORATING AS IT APPEAR- TO US THAT IT IS, WHATEVER IS DONE MUST BE DRAMATIC ENOUGH TO GIVE ARGENTINA SERIOUS PAUSE. VANCE

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39.

Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 8, 1978

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Box 15, Folder 41, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, August–December 1978. Secret.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Executive Registry
78-6858

8 December 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Vance,
Secretary Brown and Mr. Aaron, 8 December 1978, on
Covert Action Finding (U)

1. I raised the issue of a possible covert action finding on the Beagle Channel in order to let us use our influence to keep the situation calm. There was instant and vehement rejection of this in view of the fact that the United States has overtly supported keeping the sides from going to combat. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)




2. I think we should send a cable EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) that it is the US open position to oppose military conflict over the Beagle Channel issue and that they can support that position EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)


STANSFIELD TURNER
Director



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EO 13526 3.5(c)



~~SECRET~~

40.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, December 13, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem December 9-15.

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#11

C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.

Beagle Channel. The meetings in Buenos Aires between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile on the Beagle Channel dispute were not successful. The Argentines rejected a Chilean compromise package, including Papal mediation, by insisting that the two countries first resolve the issue of sovereignty over the islands. The Chilean Foreign Minister returned to Santiago this afternoon. Senior Argentine military commanders are expected to meet tomorrow morning to consider further steps. Chile put its military forces on full alert early this morning, matching actions taken by Argentina several weeks ago.

Yesterday I called in the Argentine and Chilean Ambassadors to warn them against using force to resolve the dispute. Both recognize that it is a dangerous situation, but I am not at all confident that their countries will show the restraint I urged on them. Right now, the risk of armed conflict seems high.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Latin America]

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[Omitted here are items unrelated to Latin America.]

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41.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and Chile

Washington, December 15, 1978, 0118Z

315625

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139-1813. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to USUN. Drafted by Bushnell; cleared in ARA, IO, and S/S-O and by Brzezinski; approved by Christopher.

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APPROVED BY D - MR. CHRISTOPHER
ARA:RGUZMAN
NSC:DR. BRZEZINSKI
IO:GHELMAN
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NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/14/84 (BUSHNELL, JOHN)

TAGS: PDIP, PHOR, AR, CI

SUBJECT: BEAGLE CHANNEL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES: YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE SOONEST TO PRESIDENT VIDELA FROM PRESIDENT CARTER
(EMBASSY SANTIAGO: THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN MAKING
SIMILAR APPROACH SET FORTH IN SEPTTEL):

BEGIN TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 315625

AS YOU KNOW, FOR SOME DECADES ONE OF THE GREAT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE IS
THAT DISPUTES HAVE BEEN MANAGED PEACEFULLY. IN THIS
SPIRIT, MY COUNTRY NEGOTIATED WITH PANAMA A NEW TREATY
ON THE CANAL TO DEAL WITH A LONGSTANDING SOURCE OF TENSION
BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT
MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN ARGENTINA COULD RESULT IN EVENTS
GETTING OUT OF CONTROL WITH HOSTILITIES COMMENCING AND
ESCALATING. I KNOW THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED BY MANY OF
OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE HEMISPHERE AND IN THE WORLD. WE
ARE WORKING FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
FORTHRIGHT AND CLEAR IN QUICKLY CONDEMNING AGGRESSION.
IF AGGRESSION WERE TO OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL
DISPUTE, WE WOULD SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AGAINST IT.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO INJECT ITSELF INTO
THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS COMPLICATED MATTER AND WE HOPE EARLY
PROGRESS CAN BE MADE BUILDING ON YOUR TALKS THIS WEEK,
PERHAPS INCLUDING A MUTUAL MILITARY STANDDOWN. HOWEVER,
WE WOULD BE PREPARED, IF BOTH PARTIES WISHED, TO CONSULT
WITH OTHERS TO HELP DEVELOP A PROMPT MEDIATION BY SOME
OTHER PARTY.

GIVEN THE PEACEFUL TRADITION OF OUR HEMISPHERE,
I BELIEVE OPEN AND CLEAR COMMUNICATION OF OUR POSITIONS

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IS CRITICAL FOR ALL OUR EFFORTS TOWARD A PEACEFUL WORLD.
PLEASE ACCEPT MY MESSAGE IN THIS SPIRIT.

I AM ALSO INDICATING MY CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHILE.

END TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 STATE 315625

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT AND WOULD
PREFER GOA FOLLOW SAME PRACTICE.

4. FOR USUN: YOU MAY INFORM WALDHEIM THAT THE PRESIDENT
HAS ENCOURAGED THE PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

5. PLEASE DELIVER TEXT IN ENGLISH, SINCE WE WISH TO AVOID
ANY DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION NUANCES.

CHRISTOPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

42.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, December 21, 1978, 1754Z

321148

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-0313. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Santiago and Rome. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared in ARA/ECA and S/S-O and by Guzman; approved by Vaky.

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APPROVED BY ARA:VFPVAKY
ARA/ECA:CANORRED
S/S-O:SVALERGA
ARA:RGUZMAN

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 321148

EXDIS, ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE

E.O. 12065:GDS 12/21/84 (CANORRED)

TAGS: PDIP, AR, CI

SUBJECT: BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE

REF: BA 9958.

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)2. FOR AMBASSADOR CASTRO: YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE INTER-
VIEW WITH GENERAL VIOLA TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE.-- ESSENCE OF HIS MORNING CONVERSATION WAS REPORTED TO USG,
WHERE IT CAUSED DEEPEST CONCERN.

-- USG DOES NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT SITUATION IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 321148

ANY WAY JUSTIFIES MILITARY ACTION BY ARGENTINA AGAINST
CHILE.-- WAR IS DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT THE ONLY OPTION AVAILABLE
TO ARGENTINA. THERE IS THE REASONABLE OPTION OF
AVOIDING HOSTILE ACTION.-- IF ARGENTINA WERE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, AND WE
WOULD UNDERSTAND OCCUPATION OF UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN
DISPUTE TO CONSTITUTE MILITARY ACTION, THE USG AND THEWORLD COMMUNITY WOULD BE FORCED TO VIEW SUCH A MOVE AS
AGGRESSION.-- IF SUCH AGGRESSION TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE
BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES.-- THE USG WISHES ONCE AGAIN, IN THE STRONGEST TERMS,
URGE THAT ARGENTINA SETTLE THIS TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WITH
CHILE IN A PEACEFUL MANNER. CHRISTOPHERADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

43.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, December 21, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in Geneva meeting with Gromyko concerning SALT. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

#17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting *W.C.*

1. Beagle Channel. The Pope today decided to send a special emissary to Argentina and Chile to assist them in reaching a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Argentina has accepted the emissary, and we expect Chile will do the same. Danger of conflict is still present. Basic differences over boundary lines remain. Hardline Argentine military officers who pushed Videla toward war retain their commands and could undermine the peace effort at any time.

Late this evening (December 21), Chile has called for a special OAS meeting tomorrow under the RIO pact. We hope this will not derail the Pope's effort.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute]

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RDS-2/3 12/21/78

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[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute.]

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44.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 25, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46,
Latin America, 2-5/80. Confidential.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
April 25, 1979

200 9E
Pastor: 641

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Consultations with Latin American and
Caribbean Governments on Global Issues (C)

An important new direction which the President set in his Pan American Day speech of 1977 was his pledge to consult more fully with Latin American and Caribbean governments on global issues. This new policy direction rested on three premises: (1) that the cooperation and support of Latin American and Caribbean governments are necessary to deal effectively with a wide range of global issues; (2) that Latin American governments view world affairs from a combined western and Third World perspective, and thus their advice could be useful to us as we formulate our policies; and (3) that regular consultations on global as well as bilateral issues will demonstrate our trust and attention to these countries and help us achieve more balanced and mutually respectful relationships. (C)

There is a great need today for such global consultations. Many of the governments in the area play important roles in global fora yet they often lack the information with which to make reasoned judgments. Other governments sometimes fill the information gap and gain the kind of trust which genuine consultations can bring. We risk too much by remaining idle in this area. (C)

Let me suggest that we begin to implement a comprehensive plan for consulting on a wide range of global issues on a regular basis with selected governments in the region. Obviously, one wants to tailor the briefings to the particular country, and one wants to allow the Ambassador discretion as to timing, audience (Foreign Minister or President), and even whether a particular briefing should be given. (C)


With respect to Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, we should try to be sensitive to consulting on virtually all important issues or informing these governments of decisions, very much like we do with NATO countries. In addition, our Ambassadors should consult with the Foreign Ministers (or perhaps Heads of State) of other countries in the area with influence in international affairs,

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CLASSIFIED BY Z. Brzezinski
DATE X REF ID April 10, 1985

ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

including Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad, Barbados, and Costa Rica. Issues for routine consultations could include: Southern Africa, the Middle East, Cuba, international economic issues of particular concern to the developing world, energy, and SALT. (C)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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45.


Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 10, 1979

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, Box 6, Folder 12, B-303 President 1 Jul-31 Dec 1979. Secret.

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10 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

SUBJECT: Conversation, 9 May 1979

1. I discussed the briefings ~~3.3(b)(1)~~ our respective Ambassadors conducted for the Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela. ~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~

2. A brief discussion took place on Herrera ~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~


~~EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)~~ The Vice President endorsed that Herrera was a likable personality, and said he thought the President would enjoy working with him.

3. I mentioned Argentina and briefly noted that the war against terrorism had been won, but in the process a number of innocent people had been killed. Nevertheless, Argentina's human rights performance is now improving.

4. In connection with human rights, I recalled the President's statement to the Cabinet a year ago that while we must continue to press our human rights policy, we also needed to understand that many of these countries are our friends and that they have real problems. I said I didn't think Argentina and Brazil perceived our policies as being implemented in that sense. In particular, I found three areas of concern:

a. The public report card aspect. This is particularly grating to the Brazilians who consider themselves a great power.

b. A lack of flexibility in our policy when a country does improve its performance. We seem to be unable to provide incentives.



~~EO 13526 3.5(c)~~


~~SECRET~~

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c. The training of military people in the United States. Much of the merit of these training programs has been in exposing them to U.S. values, including our human rights values. Yet, in the name of human rights we are cutting them off from this exposure. In addition, we are creating a new generation of military people in key countries who will be oriented in other directions, and may possibly even be bitter toward the U.S.

5. The comment was made that most of these are statutory provisions. I said yes, but I thought some flexibility existed. The comment was also made that these were all good points, which should be conveyed to the Congress.



6. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)



7. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)



8. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)



Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

46.

Aide-Memoire Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, August 9, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17, Ecuador, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the aide-memoire.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Chen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 9, 1979

Aide-Memoire

SUBJECT: Secretary Vance's Trip to Ecuador, August 10, 1979

The Secretary's trip to Quito comes at a portentous moment in inter-American relations. The approach to Latin America which the Carter Administration has articulated over the last two and one-half years represents a significant and positive departure from that of previous administrations, but it is seriously threatened at this time. The Secretary's trip presents us with a unique opportunity to not only preserve the integrity of our approach but to enhance it. (c)

The Carter Administration has approached Latin America, guided by three fundamental principles: (c)

-- A commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. (c)

-- A pledge of support for democratization, human rights, and social justice. (c)

-- A commitment to multilateral consultation, and to the extent possible, action. (c)

In practice, our policies have distanced the U.S. from the status quo and from authoritarian regimes of the right. (We had already found ourselves at such a distance from the one leftist dictator in the hemisphere that the impulse for communication necessarily led us towards him.) Our commitment to human rights and social reform not only led us to withdraw support from historical "friends" like Somoza, but it also changed the power equation in many countries -- increasing the cost of repression, encouraging opposition groups, and in a sense delegitimizing the arbitrary use of power. Our pledge of non-intervention prevented us from direct involvement when our interests were jeopardized, but it didn't stop the Cubans and others from intervening. Our preference for multilateral consultations often meant that we would lose critical moments seeking support from others when independent action could have been decisive. (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on August 9, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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These are the drawbacks of our approach. Critics claim that we have de-stabilized Latin America without providing an alternative. This is a weak argument, attributing too much importance to U.S. influence and too little to indigenous factors, but it is one that has been made. Nonetheless, there have been important and to a great extent unanticipated changes in inter-American relations these past two and one-half years, and unless we take them into account and make some basic changes in our approach, we may find ourselves trailing in the wake of the Cubans. (C)

The Heads of State and/or the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, and Panama will be in Quito. These countries and a few like-minded countries from the Caribbean like Barbados, Dominican Republic, and perhaps Trinidad could form a nucleus of a working group to deal with the problems gripping Central America and the Caribbean. There are three objectives which could be set for the Secretary's talks: (C)

(1) To seek a common perception of the problems facing Central America and the Caribbean. The problems in Central America are different than those of the Caribbean; the only thread that connects these divergent problems is Cuban policy which seeks to aggravate and exploit local situations for their purposes, as they serve the broader geo-political aims of the Soviet Union. In Central America, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are all troubled, though to varying degrees, by gross inequalities and a rigid and closed socio-political system. The masses are increasingly alienated from the governments; political polarization is growing worse. In the Caribbean, a new and young generation of leaders are looking to Cuba for answers to the economic dilemma posed by non-viable mini-states. (C)

(2) To seek common action among as many of the leaders as possible. In Central America (including Nicaragua) we must actively seek to strengthen the moderate democratic process. In the Caribbean, we must make the Caribbean Group work, and demonstrate to the new leaders that a moderate democratic path can be more just and successful than a radical Cuban model. We must also seek to contain Cuba as a source of revolutionary change, and try to deny Cuba the legitimacy it desperately seeks -- from Latin America, perhaps as much as from the U.S. (C)

(3) To develop a mechanism to insure good coordination and immediate action on the problems that face us. We should not look to the O.A.S. at the beginning because it is too slow and too open. We need to develop an ad hoc mechanism to deal with the crisis that stands in front of us. Turbay of Colombia may want to deal in abstractions, searching for the "new dimension" in inter-American relations, but he, like Herrera, is also a problem-solver, and they are beginning to sense a problem. They need to be encouraged to act. (C)

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The success of the Cubans in Nicaragua has had a paradoxical impact on Latin America. On the one hand, it has raised the level of concern about Cuban motives and capabilities. On the other hand, it has raised the level of respect by Latin America for Cuba as a political force of global importance. Undoubtedly, there are probably some leaders in Latin America who are questioning our strength and resolve as well, and it will be important to make clear that our policy in Nicaragua was not a reflection of weakness, but of strength. At the same time, we should make clear to them that the Cubans are pushing us to the limits of our tolerance. (C)

These Latin American leaders have a stake in the Carter Administration's policies for four reasons, which could be used as instruments to weld a new coalition of like-minded American democracies. (C)

-- First, the principles which guide our policies are Latin America's, particularly non-intervention and multilateral consultation. (C)

-- Secondly, events in Central America and the Caribbean will affect them as much, if not more, than they will affect the U.S. (C)

-- Third, the U.S. made good on its pledge to replace Somoza; our credibility with these countries ought to be high. (C)

-- Fourth, Cuban expansion and Cuba's military build-up should be sources of growing concern for Latin American leaders. Cuba now has one of the largest, if not the largest, Latin American military forces; it has submarines; it has an offensive capability. It has recently increased its subversive political activities through legitimate (Caribbean) groups and illegitimate guerrilla (Central American) groups. (C)

What specifically should be done? A lot, of course, depends on the extent to which agreement can be reached on the three objectives described above; and a lot will depend on what the Latins have to say. The Cubans have set us and our democratic colleagues off-balance, if not on the defensive, and I suspect this will be evident in the conversations. The Venezuelans, Costa Ricans, Panamanians, and others are all afraid that the child -- Nicaragua -- that they thought they had fathered may actually be Fidel's. They need to stand together now. We should encourage them to raise their voices in praise of Ecuador and the democratic process and in condemnation of Cuba and the violent revolutionary path. We should share intelligence information more and consult regularly. (The Panamanians, for example, have a lot more information on the Cubans in Nicaragua than we do.) We should all agree to help El Salvador,

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Honduras, and Guatemala by the formula we have agreed to: reforms for assistance. If the conversations are productive, we may want to consider a summit meeting along the lines suggested by Colombian President Turbay, only much more specific and only after full staff preparation. We may want to try to develop the idea of a multilateral military assistance program for Nicaragua and for other Central American countries. (c)

The Quito meetings have certain similarities with the Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka. If we can emerge with a unified perception and approach, we will have succeeded in enhancing our policies and retrieving the initiative from the Cubans. (c)

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47.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2221Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts except addressees. Drafted by Barnebey; cleared by Pastor and Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065 GDS-8/13/85 (BARNEY, MALCOLM R.)

TAGS: MASS, XR,

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ANDEAN FOREIGN
MINISTERS: 11. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA

1. ENTIRE CONTENTS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

2. SUMMARY. DURING HIS AUGUST 11 MEETING IN QUITO
WITH THE FIVE ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, SECRETARY VANCE
ASKED FOR VIEWS ON POSSIBLE MILITARY AND POLICE ASSISTANCE
TO NICARAGUA. THE SAIDUS HAS BEEN APPROACHED INFORMALLY
BY GNR TO PROVIDE SUCH AID AND WE ARE CONSIDERING HOW TO
RESPOND. ECUADOREAN FORMIN PAREJA AND OTHERS SAID THEY
HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH AID, AND BELIEVED ANDEAN
EFFORTS AT THIS STAGE SHOULD INSTEAD BE FOCUSED ON
HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION AID. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SECRETARY, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
VAKY AND ROBERT PASTOR, CONTINUED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (SEE SEPTCL) IN A DISCUSSION OF
POSSIBLE MILITARY AND/OR POLICE ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA.
THE SAME ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MENTIONED IN SEPTCL
PARTICIPATED.

4. THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, EXPLAINING THAT USG HAD
BEEN APPROACHED INFORMALLY TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.
ECUADOREAN FORMIN PAREJA SAID THAT THE ANDEAN GROUP HAD
NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY THE GNR FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE, AND
ASKED IF OTHER LA COUNTRIES HAD BEEN APPROACHED. THE
SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PANAMA HAD BEEN ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE
AND HAD RESPONDED WITH A MODEST PROGRAM. HE SAID USG HAD
COME TO NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR RESPONSE TO THIS
NICARAGUAN INQUIRY. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES THERE ARE
GOOD REASONS TO BE RESPONSIVE, AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD
CONSIDER PROVIDING WHAT THEY CAN (JEeps OR BULLDOZERS,
ARMS OR WHATEVER A DONOR COUNTRY MIGHT DECIDE UPON). HE
SAID USG CONSIDERS THIS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND HE WOULD WEL-

COME VIEWS OF THE ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY SAID THAT THE PROBLEM HAS A
DEEPER DIMENSION; THE GNR MUST REFORM ITS MILITARY FORCES
AND POLICE, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED IS
OF INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE. VAKY SAID THAT THIS
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD MEET A LEGITIMATE NEED, AND IN
THE CASE OF POLICE ASSISTANCE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR USG
IN VIEW OF OUR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER,
SINCE USG IS THUS IMPEDED FROM CERTAIN KINDS OF ASSISTANCE,
WOULD IT NOT STILL BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF HEMISPHERE
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES TO HELP, SO THAT GNR NEED NOT RESORT
TO SOVIET AND CUBAN SOURCES.

6. ECUADOREAN FORMIN PAREJA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFI-
CULT TO GIVE AN IMMEDIATE ANSWER. HE COMMENTED THAT TO
AID AN ARMY IS A POLITICAL ACT, IN THIS CASE RECALLING
ASSISTANCE IN THE CREATION OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL
GUARD. HE SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOULD RECALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FORMATION OF THE GNR (READ THE USG ROLE).
HE SAID THE MATTER IS A SERIOUS ONE WHICH SHOULD BE STUDIED
BY THE ANDEAN GROUP, BUT HE DID NOT SEE ANY WAY IN WHICH
THE GOE FOR ITS PART COULD RENDER SUCH ASSISTANCE.

7. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT
SUGGESTING FORCING ANY AID UPON NICARAGUA, BUT RATHER
ASKED HOW LA COUNTRIES MIGHT RESPOND TO THE GNR'S OWN FELT
NEEDS. PERUVIAN FORMIN GARCIA BEDOYA REPLIED THAT GNR
MUST EVENTUALLY RE-EQUIP ITS ARMED FORCES IN ORDER TO HAVE
A STABLE ARMY, AND WILL ORGANIZE ITS MILITARY FORCES TO
THAT END. HE SAID THAT TO MEET THESE NEEDS, IF DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES CANNOT PROVIDE THEM, GNR "MIGHT HAVE TO GO ELSE-
WHERE." GARCIA BEDOYA LISTED VARIOUS UNKNOWN: WHETHER THE
FSLN WILL BECOME A REGULAR ARMY, WHETHER NEW UNITS WILL BE
FORMED, WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT THEY WOULD NEED, AND WHETHER
THEY WOULD SEEK EQUIPMENT FROM USG OR OTHER SOURCES. HE
ASKED IF NICARAGUA'S ARMED FORCES WOULD ONLY COMPRISE THE

GUERRILLAS AS AT PRESENT, OR THAT GROUP PLUS OTHERS IN
SOME NEW INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEM. HE ASKED IF USG HAD
INFORMATION ON THIS POINT. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE NO
CLEAR INDICATION, BUT RATHER ONLY A REQUEST IN THE MOST
GENERAL TERMS FOR USG ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED
THAT A USG DECISION IS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, BUT SUCH A
DECISION AFFECTS THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE AND THE VIEWS OF
OTHERS ARE IMPORTANT TO US. FINALLY HE ASKED IF A MULTI-
LATERAL EFFORT MIGHT BE MADE TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT, IF THAT
WERE FOUND TO BE NICARAGUA'S PRINCIPAL NEED.

8. AT THIS POINT COLOMBIA FORMIN URIBE DWELT ON A LIST OF
DIFFICULTIES IN HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT
DEMOCRACIES ARE IN DANGER DUE TO EXCESSIVE ARMS INVENTORIES.
HE SAID THAT ARMS PROCUREMENT WAS CAUSING PROBLEMS, AS IN
THE CASE OF THE HIGH PRICES COUNTRIES HAVE TO PAY FOR THEIR
ESSENTIAL ARMS. HE SAID THAT TO OFFER ARMS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA WOULD GO DIRECTLY ATWART HEMISPHERIC AND WORLD
INITIATIVES FOR DISARMAMENT. HE SAID THAT LA DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES CANNOT BECOME POLICEMEN, BUT SHOULD STRESS
SOCIAL MEASURES IN SUPPRT OF THEIR DEMOCRACIES. HE SAID
IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR LA DEMOCRACIES TO MOUNT
A MILITARY ACTION WHEN IT IS PRECISELY THIS WHICH THE
DEMOCRACIES HAVE OPPOSED FOR SO MANY YEARS. HE SAID THAT
THIS IS THE GOC POSITION, BUT EACH COUNTRY IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF ON
THE SUBJECT. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HEMISPHERE SHOULD
NOT OVEREMPHASIZE "TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS" IN NICARAGUA BUT THE
LARGER SOCIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE HEMISPHERE.

9. ECUADOREAN FORMIN PAREJA COUNTERED THAT HE HAS SOME-

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TIMES "HAD TO WALK WITH THE DEVIL." HE SAID THAT A CASE MIGHT ARISE, SAY IN AN UNNAMED NEIGHBOR OF NICARAGUA, WHERE FORMER GNR PERSONNEL MIGHT TRY TO INVADE NICARAGUA, AND THEREBY THE GNR MAY NEED HELP FOR ITS DEFENSE. HE SAID ANDEAN GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH GNR IN THAT EVENT. HE SAID NO DECISION COULD BE TAKEN TODAY AND THE MATTER IS NOT PRESSING, AND THAT INSTEAD HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE RELIED UPON TO HELP ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA. WHEN GNR SEES HUMANITARIAN AID PROVIDED WITHOUT CONDITIONS, PAREJA SAID, THE GNR REACTION WILL BE FAVORABLE, AND DECISIONS ON ARMS CAN BE DELAYED UNTIL MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE. PAREJA THEN SUGGESTED A HIGH-LEVEL COMMISSION, POSSIBLY TO BE SET UP IN SAN JOSE WITH ANDEAN GROUP AND USG PARTICIPATING, TO ANALYZE DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA. HE SAID THAT THIS IS MERELY AN IDEA WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ELABORATED.

10. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A GROUP

WOULD BE. PAREJA REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT THAT A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE AID NEEDS OF NICARAGUA MIGHT BE USEFUL. BOLIVIAN FOMIN FERNANDES SPOKE UP, INSISTING THAT ALL ACTIONS REGARDING NICARAGUA SHOULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE ANDEAN GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND ANY SUCH COMMITTEE AS SUGGESTED BY PAREJA WOULD BE "MISINTERPRETED" IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES. PERUVIAN FOMIN GARCIA BEDOYA AGREED, ASKING WHY SUCH A GROUP SHOULD BE IN SAN JOSE, WHAT ATTRIBUTES WOULD IT HAVE, WHY COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT INVOLVED, ETC. PAREJA PERSISTED THAT HIS SUGGESTED COMMISSION WOULD AVOID DELAYS IN ANDEAN GROUP CONSULTATION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN ANDEAN GROUP DEALINGS WITH THE GNR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COORDINATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL.

10. BOLIVIAN FOMIN FERNANDES STRESSED THAT THE ANDEAN GROUP PRESIDENTS' RECENT AGREEMENT AT CARTAGENA PROVIDES THAT ONLY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CAN CONSULT ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT AS THERE IS A NEED FOR DAILY INFORMATION ON THE "EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION" IN NICARAGUA, ANDEAN TECHNICAL ORGANS COULD PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION. PAREJA SAID HE DISAGREED "A LITTLE" IN THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD ALSO DEAL WITH POLITICAL SUBJECTS. FERNANDES REPLIED THAT SUCH A COMMISSION OBVIOUSLY INVOLVES AN ANDEAN GROUP DECISION, BUT THAT HE THOUGHT THIS IS AN INTERESTING IDEA AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW IT UP IF THE ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS GO THIS ROUTE.

11. VENEZUELAN FOMIN ZAMBRANO URGED THAT THIS IMPROVED LIAISON COULD BE OBTAINED BY ASSIGNING -- AS VENEZUELA IS DOING -- HIGH-LEVEL, EXPERIENCED AMBASSADORS TO MANAGUA TO ENSURE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GNR AND A FLOW OF INFORMATION BACK TO THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES.

12. PAREJA THEN CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY URGING HIS COLLEAGUES TO KEEP TALKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM OF COORDINATION. HE SAID THAT THE ANDEAN GROUP COUNTRIES' AMBASSADORS MIGHT BE A WORKABLE SUBSTITUTE. HE THEN THANKED THE SECRETARY AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR ATTENDING THIS MEETING. WITH THE SECRETARY'S IN TURN THANKING THE CHAIRMAN, THE MEETING ADJOURNED. VANCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

48.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, August 13, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry 1979. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In an August 9 memorandum to Vance, Tarnoff and Lake indicated that they had solicited input on Vance's goals and objectives for the next 18 months. The memorandum is printed in Document 123, *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Copies of the other bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 13, 1979

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MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary
FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky *[initials]*
SUBJECT: Goals for Latin America

As requested, the following are the goals and objectives I see for Latin America during the next eighteen months.

401 As an overall preliminary comment, let me underline the point made to you during the Quito consultations: we need to refurbish our relationship and improve the region's perception of us. Essentially, this will mean being seen by these countries as relevant to their problems and interests. Trade, development, economics, security--these are all major parts of our total relationship. We cannot be effective in them, however, without a) attention; b) resolution of conflicts with domestic interests to the extent possible and, c) applying reasonable resource inputs.

agree |

Goals and Objectives

1. Central America

Deal with the regional crisis in ways that will a) prevent the consolidation of extreme left regimes in the region; b) contain Cuban/Soviet influence and control; c) prevent armed conflict within or among countries in the region; and d) promote broader political systems, equitable economic and social development and observance of human rights. The uniqueness of the Nicaraguan situation is the key to this area, but this in turn can probably only be managed in a context of stability in Honduras and controlled change in El Salvador and Guatemala. Specifically, we should:

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- OK -- Seek non-communist political development in Nicaragua as well as (and through) economic recovery from great devastation.
- OK -- Seek to reduce the potential for violent confrontation in El Salvador and Guatemala by promoting freer political processes, development and elimination of repression.
- OK -- Support Honduras' scenario of return to constitutional government and economic/social development.
- OK -- Help Costa Rica sustain its democratic system.

2. Caribbean

Improve political and economic stability in the region and reduce vulnerabilities to Cuban expansion. Specifically,

- OK -- provide appropriate economic and security assistance to the Eastern Caribbean to reduce vulnerabilities; encourage sub-regional cooperation among the min-states; and create a sense of U.S. interest and concern that affords a stable diplomatic framework for our on-going relations.
- OK -- wean Jamaica and Guyana away from radical international line; and
- OK -- preserve recent democratizing gains in the Dominican Republic.

3. Cuba

Seek to:

- OK -- mute or counter Cuba's aggressive revolutionary drives; discourage Soviet/Cuban military ties;
- OK -- contain Cuban power and influence in the NAM; and
- reexamine and probe for ways to ease US-Cuban tensions and find a modus vivendi that might promise a way to affect and moderate Cuban objectives and intentions toward us.

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- 3 -

4. Mexico*Easier
said than
done -*

Establish a constructive, effective working relationship to handle the complex, difficult set of issues that comprise that relationship. Specifically:

- ok* -- confirm and implement purchase agreement on gas;
- ok* -- resolve tomato and winter vegetable problems;
- ok* -- secure Mexican accession to GATT and bilateral agreement within MTN framework;
- ok* -- resolve tuna issue; and
- ok* -- strengthen working relationship, understanding and exchange on migration and border issues.

5. Brazil*ok*

Develop a closer cooperative relationship with this largest and significant Latin American country, drawing it into closer association with our hemisphere and global policies. To do this, we will need to reach a modus vivendi on a myriad of trade problems and nuclear policy.

6. Andean Region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia)*agree*

The Andean region is becoming an economic (Andean Pact) and political force (through coordinated foreign policy actions). It is also an area where democratization is well underway. We should recognize both its specific gravity as a useful force and the trends toward democracy. This will involve:

- ok* -- cooperation with the Andean Pact Common Market including resource assistance, and dealing with it as a multilateral institution;
- ok* -- extending assistance and supportive bilateral relations with each of the countries, e.g., economic aid to Peru, trade policy issues such as tin with Bolivia; narcotics aid to Colombia, etc.; and
- ok* -- developing a systematic consultative procedure with these countries on multilateral political issues, e.g. Central American cooperation.

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- 4 -

7. Argentina

ok Find ways to deal with (and hopefully improve) the human rights situation, without at the same time cutting ourselves off from a large and important country whose role and weight can affect our global policies.

8. Chile

612 Seek to handle the unique problem of the Letelier extradition and our anti-terrorism policy in a politically charged situation, without at the same time acting so severely that we endanger peace in the area by indirectly encouraging Argentina, Peru or Bolivia to pursue territorial demands against what they may perceive as an isolated Chile. Nor do we wish to destroy the basis for some future relationship with the Chilean nation (as distinct from the Pinochet government).

9. Panama Canal

ok Implement the treaties beginning October 1 in a peaceful, constructive way and use the period to reaffirm strengthened joint Canal defense posture.

10. As an overlay to our country-specific policies we need to pursue certain regional policies:

yes -- Conventional arms restraint--stimulating multi-lateral efforts such as Mexican CAT talks.

yes -- Strengthening the regional institutions--OAS, IDB, Human Rights Commission--by improved consultations with appropriate resource support.

yes
regional
planning -- Pursue reasonable economic and trade policies to respond to widespread--and largely legitimate--demands for open markets and international cooperation in commodities. In particular, to find ways to deal with the disproportionate, severe impact on one country of broad policies such as sugar and the Dominican Republic.

yes -- Strengthen our human rights approaches, seeking to reduce sanctions as human rights improvement and rewarding good performance in addition to sanctioning bad performance.

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- 5 -

*work with
Lucy on this*

-- Reconceptualize our military assistance program to relate it more to objectives, to the role it can uniquely perform in our policy and to reasonable levels of effectiveness. Our program now is the result of accretions and amendments over several years responding to ad hoc stimuli, and has lost much coherence and intrinsic logic.

yes

-- Continue cooperation in narcotics interdiction programs.

ARA:VPVaky:lif

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49.

Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the White House

Panama City, October 4, 1979, 2239Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790456-0061. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

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HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE ANDEAN PACT, A GROUP WITH WHICH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A HIGH-LEVEL AND SIGNIFICANT DIALOGUE. IT WAS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY THAT THIS MEETING SHOULD OCCUR ON THE OCCASION OF THE ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, AN HISTORIC EVENT FOR ALL OF LATIN AMERICA.

6. AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESS, THE VICE PRESIDENT INFORMED THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS OF THE RECEIPT JUST

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PAGE 03 PANAMA 08114 01 OF 03 042257Z

MINUTES EARLIER OF A LETTER TO THEM FROM PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINING THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT EVENING ON THE SUBJECT OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN CUBA. THE VICE PRESIDENT RECALLED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD LABELED THIS A SERIOUS MATTER AND STATED THAT THE STATUS QUO WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN REVIEWED THE FACTS OF SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH CUBA, ITS ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES AND ITS SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CUBA'S WIDE-SPREAD FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS. HE ENDED HIS REMARKS TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

7. BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT GUEVARA ARCE RAISED THE PROPOSED SALE OF 35,000 TONS OF TIN FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC RESERVES. HE SAID THE U.S. ACTION COULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE IMPACT SUCH A SALE WOULD HAVE ON BOLIVIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS DIRECTLY WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER AT THE STATE CEREMONY THAT MORNING, BUT WISHED TO EXPRESS THIS CONCERN WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE ANDEAN PACT MEMBERS.

8. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD FULLY REPORT THIS CONCERN OF BOLIVIA AND THE OTHER ANDEAN COUNTRIES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS VERY SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERN AND DID NOT WISH TO PLACE A BURDEN ON BOLIVIAN SOCIETY AS IT PURSUED AN OBJECTIVE WHICH HAD FULL U.S. SUPPORT. HE REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT INTENDED TO CONSULT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TIN AUTHORITY IN CARRYING OUT LEGISLATION FOR TIN SALES,

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DEPARTMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY

WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC/PASTOR AND FOR DENIS CLIFT

AND WOULD MAKE THE SALES PRUDENTLY AND IN AN ORDERLY MANNER IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH BOLIVIA. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE APPRECIATED THAT THIS ANSWER, WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT BEFORE, WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO IT, AND WOULD MAKE THAT POINT TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

9. GUEVARA RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR POSITION ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS WHEN TIN SALES WERE MADE. WHILE HE DID NOT ATTRIBUTE ILL WILL TO THE USG, EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT PAST SALES HAD BEEN HARMFUL. HE ASKED THAT THE MESSAGE BE TAKEN NOT ONLY TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT ALSO TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS.

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO DO SO AND WOULD REMEMBER THE FIGURE GIVEN BY GUEVARA THAT EVERY ONE-CENT DROP IN THE PRICE OF TIN COST BOLIVIA ABOUT ONE MILLION DOLLARS.

11. PRESIDENT HERRERA OF VENEZUELA BEGAN HIS REMARKS

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PAGE 02 PANAMA 08114 02 OF 03 042305Z

BY CALLING ATTENTION TO THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF POOR MARKET SITUATIONS OF A WHOLE SERIES OF RAW MATERIALS OF INTEREST TO THE HEMISPHERE. HE THEN MADE TWO PRINCIPAL POINTS IN HIS PRESENTATION: THE FIRST CONCERNED THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING DEMOCRATIC FORMS OF GOVERNMENT IN POOR COUNTRIES. ECONOMIC PRESSURES, HE SAID, FORCED THOSE COUNTRIES TO TURN TO GOVERNMENTS OF FORCE. THESE PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY AFFECTED THE CARIBBEAN WHERE PROSPECTIVES WERE POOR. GOVERNMENTS THERE NEEDED SUPPORT AND VENEZUELA WISHED TO HELP THEM. HERRERA TURNED SECONDLY TO THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET TROOPS. HE SAID THE PANAMA TREATY CEREMONIES HAD BEEN A CAUSE OF REAL JOY AND SATISFACTION. THE NEWS OF THE EVENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DISPLACED BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON CUBA. WHILE RECOGNIZING U.S. INTERESTS, HE WISHED TO EXPRESS THE PREOCCUPATION, EVEN ANGUISH HE FELT THAT THE IMPACT OF THE SUCCESS OF THE TREATY WOULD BE MARRED. HE ASKED THAT HIS REMARK BE ACCEPTED AS THE PERSONAL CONCERN OF A GOOD FRIEND.

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH HERRERA'S ANALYSIS THAT THE SUCCESS OF DEMOCRACY WAS AFFECTED BY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. THE U.S. HAD TRIED TO BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD IN MANY WAYS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF NEW DEMOCRACIES. TURNING TO HERRERA'S SECOND POINT, HE SAID THAT THE TREATIES WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND WERE A VIVID EXPRESSION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO A FOREIGN POLICY "BASED ON FAIRNESS, NOT FORCE." IT WAS NONETHELESS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOP SITUATION. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND THE HORN HAD BEEN VERY DESTABILIZING: THE CUBANS HAD CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED

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THE CAUSE OF VIOLENCE AND BLOCKED MODERATION. IT WAS THE TREND OF CUBAN-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS WHICH CAUSED CONCERN. FURTHER, THE MATTER HAD NOW BECOME CAUGHT UP WITH THE SALT II RATIFICATION. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT FAILURE TO RATIFY TREATY COULD INTRODUCE A DANGEROUS PHASE IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE

SOVIET UNION. TO AVOID THIS, THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED MANY THINGS BUT THE SOVIETS DID NOT COOPERATE; THEY HAD MADE CONCESSIONS, BUT NONE WERE SIGNIFICANT. VICE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WAS MOVING, IN HIS ADDRESS THIS EVENING, IN A RESTRAINED WAY. HIS ADDRESS REFLECTED OUR DEEP OBJECTIONS BUT SOUGHT TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION BY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS NO THREAT TO THE U.S. AND THAT THE TROOP PRESENCE SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO SALT RATIFICATION. (AT THIS POINT PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER WAS DISTRIBUTED.)

13. COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT TURBAY AYALA BEGAN A DISCURSIVE PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING HIS SUPPORT FOR BOLIVIA WITH REGARD TO U.S. TIN SALES, BUT THEN NOTED THAT COLOMBIA HAD MANY PROBLEMS, NOT JUST ONE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA WAS A MATTER FOR CONCERN, HE FELT THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF WORLD ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND. WORLD PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING, HE FELT.

14. TURBAY IDENTIFIED INFLATION AS THE FIRST OF THESE PROBLEMS, A COMMON ENEMY. LIKE OTHER WORLD ISSUES, IT COULD NOT BE TACKLED BY NATIONS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY; RATHER, A JOINT EFFORT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES WAS NEEDED. SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE CREATING SOCIAL PRESSURES ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA, INCLUDING THE CARIBBEAN. THESE PRESSURES WERE DIRECTED AGAINST LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. ANTI-AMERICANISM COULD GROW IN A SOIL OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES PROMPTED BY THE PRICE OF OIL, UNEMPLOYMENT,

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DEPARTMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY

WHITEHOUSE FOR NSC/PASTOR AND FOR DENIS CLIFT

ETC. THE USG FACED SIMILAR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TENSIONS, BUT THERE THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A DEMOCRATIC ONE. IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES THE ALTERNATIVE WAS THE LOSS OF DEMOCRACY.

15. TURBAY CONTINUED THAT A JOINT EFFORT WAS NECESSARY WHICH COVERED NOT ONLY THE CARIBBEAN BUT ALL OF THE HEMISPHERE. IT SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON THE U.S.

ALONE, BUT RATHER "WE ALL HAVE TO HELP." HE PROPOSED FOR CONSIDERATION A "FUND FOR PEACE" OR "FUND FOR DEMOCRACY" WHICH WOULD BE USED TO FIGHT "DIFFICULT SITUATIONS". IF THE DEMOCRACIES OF LATIN AMERICA COULD BECOME PARTNERS, HE ARGUED, OTHERS WOULD BE STIMULATED TO JOIN THE FUND OR TO TAKE DRAMATIC ACTIONS. IN CONCLUSION, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT SEE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA AS MAKING THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN MORE SERIOUS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE EXTENSION OF "THESE MOVEMENTS" IN THE CARIBBEAN AFFECTED THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE.

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PAGE 02 PANAMA 08114 03 OF 03 042310Z

16. THE VICE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS INFLATION. THE U.S. WAS WORKING VERY HARD ON ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEM, AWARE THAT, AS A LARGE ECONOMY, IT AFFECTED THE WELFARE OF OTHERS. HE SAID TURBAY'S APPEAL FOR JOINT CONSIDERATION OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS SHOULD BE PURSUED.

17. IN CLOSING, PRESIDENT MORALES BERMUDEZ OF PERU THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR INDIVIDUAL THOUGHTS AND PREOCCUPATIONS AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. IN SUMMARY, HE STATED THAT, WHILE APPRECIATING U.S. INTERESTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORLD PROBLEMS, THE ANDEAN PACT MEMBERS FELT THAT THEIR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT A HEMISPHERIC APPROACH. TO A GREAT EXTENT, THE HEMISPHERE SHARED IN GLOBAL CONCERNS. IN URGING A HEMISPHERIC APPROACH, THE ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES DID NOT SEEK A RETURN TO PATERNALISM BUT RATHER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HE THEN ASKED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TOLLS OF THE PANAMA CANAL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT A LARGE PORTION OF PERUVIAN TERRITORY CARRIES OUT ITS TRADE THROUGH THE AMAZON IN ADDITION TO THE PRINCIPAL COMMERCE OF THE PACIFIC COAST.

18. NOTE: ECUADOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAREJA DID NOT SPEAK.
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50.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 29, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 27, Latin America, 1-12/80. No classification marking. Sent for action.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 29, 1980

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *BP*

SUBJECT: The Carter Administration and Latin America:
An Assessment of the First Term and an Agenda
for the Second

Attached at Tab A is the first installment on the papers which I promised you. *V* I have tried to keep it brief, but we have covered a lot of territory in a short time. The third section identifies the new agenda which we will need to face in the second term. My next paper will provide some proposals for answering the questions on that agenda.

I also recommend that you send a copy of the assessment to Secretary Muskie, as he will be undertaking his trip to Latin America without much of an idea of what we have tried to do in the last four years. *V* While I have some reservations about the timing and the itinerary of his trip, nonetheless there is no question that his conversations could be extremely useful in sounding out some of the most important leaders in the hemisphere on the central issues which we will try to address in a second term. I have checked with ARA, and they are also a bit confused on the trip, and have not provided him much focus. I think the assessment at Tab A could help, I would also like if you could ask him whether I would be able to accompany him and sit in on the meetings. It would be enormously useful to try to develop some ideas on what we should do in a second term, and I also expect that I would be of help to Muskie as the "historical memory" of the Carter Administration's approach to Latin America. (Since 1977, there have been three Assistant Secretaries of ARA and about fifteen Deputy Assistant Secretaries.)

RECOMMENDATION: I look forward to discussing this assessment with you to see if you would like me to modify it in any way for the President. I have provided a memo at Tab I, if you should decide to send it as is.

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove ✓

That you speak to Muskie about my accompanying him on his trip.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

*Too long by far. Denker -
brief, more
concentrated
report.
It does
distinguish
between the two
of the present
10.*

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Tab A

Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, October 28, 1980

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25D
October 28, 1980
Lah
AnuraTHE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN AMERICA: AN ASSESSMENTI. Introduction: A Brief Summary of Four Years

During the last four years, your Administration gave more time to Latin America and the Caribbean and pursued a more active, coherent, and consistent approach to Latin America than any previous Administration.

-- In 1977, you gave a new direction to U.S. policies to the region. The foundation was set by your decision to give a high priority to negotiating new Canal treaties. After a sometimes difficult interagency review (PRM-17), you enunciated a unique new approach to Latin America in your Pan American Day speech to the O.A.S., which described the three central principles that have guided our policies: a recognition of the individuality and a respect for the sovereignty (principle of non-intervention) of each nation, a commitment to try to improve respect for human rights and extend democracy, and a willingness to consult on the global economic issues of central concern to the area. Rather than a slogan to mask the diversity of the region, you suggested a flexible approach more attuned to the important changes that have occurred in the Americas in the last two decades, specifically to the self-assertiveness of nations interested in shaping a new world rather than being satisfied as just members of an inter-American system. Through Mrs. Carter's trip and your personal meetings in 1977, you personally engaged twenty heads of state in the region, explaining your approach, especially your personal commitment to human rights and democratization, and becoming conversant in the gamut of bilateral, regional, and global issues of concern to our countries. We began a dialogue with Cuba and opened Interest Sections to permit regular communication. You began to define a special approach to the Caribbean, and initiated what has since become known as the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, led now by the World Bank with 31 nations and fifteen international institutions involved. You signed the American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; both still await ratification in the Senate. The amount and the quality of attention which you and your Administration gave to Latin America in 1977 probably exceeded that of any other Administration's first year, including that of Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress.

-- 1978 was largely spent implementing the initiatives taken in 1977. The Canal Treaties were ratified and exchanged during your trip to Panama. You travelled to Venezuela, where you gave an important speech on North-South relations (calling for shared responsibility to implement a new economic order) and announced the Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program, and to Brazil where you lent additional credibility to your human rights policy. Also, we moved to strengthen U.S.-Mexican relations through the Consultative Mechanism. In consultations with Mexico and the Ayacucho countries, arms control

initiatives began to be seriously considered. The Caribbean Group took shape.

-- In 1979, we faced our most serious crises and challenges -- Nicaragua, Grenada, and the Cuban brigade -- and we distinguished ourselves only in that we didn't veer too far from our original objectives. All three forced us to focus on the security dimension of inter-American relations in a not always constructive way. At the same time we were wrestling with these three issues, we also were strengthening our relationships with the Andean Pact as a group (particularly because of the trend toward democracy in Ecuador and Peru) and with Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil. Your two meetings with Lopez Portillo, the strengthening of the Consultative Mechanism, the appointment of a Special Ambassador to coordinate U.S.-Mexican relations within the U.S. governments and to ensure that it be given the deserved priority, the conclusion of a gas agreement and an extensive science and technology pact as a result of Frank Press's efforts -- all those led to more attention and results than the relationship has seen for a long time. Vice President Mondale's trip to Venezuela and Brazil and Frank Press's follow-up trip also served to deepen our relationship with the two key countries in South America. The Brazilian Foreign Minister was moved to say in April 1979 that U.S.-Brazilian relations were "excellent."

-- In 1980, your attention has largely been focused on the hostages, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the economy, and the campaign. The Administration's attention to Latin America has been focused on the Caribbean basin -- instability in Central America and the Caribbean, Cuban and Haitian refugees, and Cuban subversion. After Grenada, we have managed to turn the tide back in favor of democracy in the Eastern Caribbean and to halt the revolution in Central America by fostering moderate change in El Salvador and Honduras and by trying to play a positive role in Nicaragua. Through your personal initiative, "Caribbean/Central American Action," a unique experiment in people-to-people diplomacy, was launched to improve the quality of our peoples' relationships in the area. We have done a good deal, but hardly enough. The Caribbean Basin is one area in need of your attention in 1981.

In summary, you have set a course in 1977 and kept to it even through the trying times in 1979. We have made remarkable progress toward our goals. Still, there is much that remains to be completed, and many new issues that remain to be confronted. Let me discuss these within the context of an assessment.

II. An Assessment

This assessment will proceed by examining the goals associated with each of the three basic principles.

(1) Peace. Recognition of the individuality of each relationship. Respect for non-intervention.

A. Overall Approach -- Slogans, Global Consultations.

The Carter Administration has avoided the temptation to reduce its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to a slogan, but that has a downside: our flexible, global approach is not easily grasped; our approach has therefore become known not by its principles but by its most salient features: human rights and democracy by those who like our policies; Nicaragua, Grenada, and Cuban refugees by those who don't.

Recognizing the increasing international role of many of the region's governments, we set a clear objective of consulting on a regular basis on global and regional political and economic issues. We have probably done more of this than any previous Administration, but we haven't done enough, and we have not yet built a systematic mechanism for ensuring such consultations on a regular basis. Given the region's increasing importance in the UN, the NAM and Socialist International (SI), it is essential that we consult regularly on US policies and on developments in controversial areas like Southern Africa, Middle East, East-West relations -- issues where our briefings and consultations are likely to produce a confluence of perspectives.

Despite many efforts to forge a coalition of like-minded democracies (especially Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil) to pursue a common policy to Central America and the Caribbean, we have not been successful. Mexico views the region's turmoil from a totally different perspective. Brazil is focusing on its borders and believes the Caribbean is our problem, not theirs. Colombia is preoccupied. And Venezuela, which is playing the most constructive role in the area, enjoys consultation, but prefers parallel rather than a common policy.

During the Nicaraguan crisis, we were pulled into playing a more direct role in an internal matter than what we had originally preferred, but we have still clearly maintained the integrity of our pledge of non-intervention during the past four years, unlike many other in Latin nations.

B. Non-Proliferation. The Senate has not yet ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is not clear whether our efforts to discourage Brazil and Argentina from obtaining a full fuel cycle without full scope safeguards has had much effect, but it is clear that both governments have scaled down their initial nuclear programs considerably. At the same time, both nations established a cooperative program in nuclear power. This is just one more indication that the longstanding rivalry between Argentina and Brazil may have passed into history, thereby reducing our concerns about the explosive implications of a possible nuclear arms race.

C. Arms Control. We lent strong support to two regional arms control initiatives (by Mexico and by Venezuela), and we made a preliminary effort to discuss the issue with the Soviets; all three initiatives got nowhere. Nonetheless, we have exercised unilateral restraint, and this conceivably could have helped restrain overall arms expenditures in the hemisphere. At the same time, the US was overtaken by five other nations in arms sales to the region. Despite your explicit decision (in PD-52) to reverse the decline of the amount of FMS allocated to Latin America as a percentage of the global amount (from 2% to 4%), this has not been done. State is once again recommending a level of 2% for Latin America in FY 82. We need to take a hard look at this issue again; perhaps the Secretary of State can initiate consultations on this issue during his trip.

D. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Before your Pan American Day speech, the US had refused to play much of a role in settling the many territorial disputes in the hemisphere. Since then, we have played a very active role, trying to stimulate the negotiating process from the side while keeping a mediator in front -- the Pope on the Beagle Channel, a former Peruvian President on the Honduran-Salvadoran dispute, and the British on Belize. We have already raised other disputes, including Ecuador's desire for access to the Amazon, Bolivian access to the Sea, and we have encouraged dialogue where only silent confrontation had existed before.

E. Central America. We tried to find a peaceful path through mediation in Nicaragua, but failed for several reasons: Somoza was too intransigent; the middle class too ready to accept the promises of the Marxist left; and most importantly, our friends, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama, were so obsessed in getting rid of Somoza and pre-empting Castro that they unwittingly played Castro's game, successfully insulating him from us. We are having a little more success in El Salvador, but it's by no means clear that the middle will prevail there. Honduras is making the transition from military to civilian governments, but the pettiness of the politicians, the arrogance of the military, and the machinations of an emerging left could derail that. Guatemala is polarizing very rapidly as the rightists assassinate anyone who suggests there is a middle way. We are pursuing a delicate experiment by encouraging peaceful democratic reform in a region of violence, obsolete socio-political structures, and gross inequalities. The Marxist left have dressed themselves in our human rights banners, and Fidel Castro has concentrated his energies on helping them seize power. We are still intransigent. The problem of helping to maintain democracy in the Caribbean has proved easier than creating it in Central America. The Cubans succeeded in subverting Grenada, but the same strategy failed in Suriname; and more importantly, Cuba's radical allies were decisively beaten in free elections by moderate, pro-US groups in St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, and St. Kitts. The Caribbean Group has added stability to the region. Still, we haven't done nearly enough to enhance the security of the region or

to assist its development. Despite your promise to increase aid to the area in your October 1, 1979 Soviet brigade speech, we maintained aid at the same level as the previous year. We need an imaginative new approach to the area which takes into account its special importance in security as well as in immigration matters.

F. Cuba. While we have had great success in the human rights area in Cuba, we are further away from our geopolitical goals than in 1977. Cuba has more troops in more countries and is more actively pursuing its revolutionary goals today than in 1977. This is another area in need of a new look.

G. Summary. With the exception of Central America, LAC is, by and large, a more peaceful and less militarized place than in 1976. The Panama Canal is safer; the border areas in dispute are subject to heated negotiations; South America is focused on development rather than internal security.

(2) Human Rights and Democracy

A. Overall Approach. The effective pursuit of human rights is clearly the most successful achievement of your Administration. You have finally, and with some cost, imprinted your commitment to human rights on the consciousness of all the leaders in the hemisphere. Repression is now much more costly, and there are fewer disappearances and political prisoners and less torture. You have restored the image of the US as a nation that stands for human rights, social justice, and democracy.

B. Regional Norms and Institutions. When you signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977, while Mrs. Carter was in San Jose, only two nations had ratified it. Even though the Senate still hasn't acted, at our urging, 14 nations have ratified the Convention, bringing it into force, and establishing a new institution, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In addition, we have significantly strengthened the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which has done five important country reports.

C. Refugees. We have born the burden of the refugee problem largely on our own. We have not been successful in getting other nations or the OAS to play an important role. This is one of the "new" set of issues which we will have to address early in the second term.

D. Democratization. We have tried to use every opportunity to show that democracy pays, and the trend is clearly in a positive direction -- the first time in at least two decades. Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Dominican Republic -- all have made the transition. We have also engaged the Andean Pact in trying to help facilitate this democratic process. Our success is due to

letting people know where the U.S. stands rather than from helping to build political parties or train young leaders or fund private initiatives. However, when a young political leader in Nicaragua asked us to help him organize a political party, we lack means to help. Our approach is strict neutrality with respect to political parties and candidates, but we are partial to free elections, yet we have no mechanism for either training people to conduct free elections or observing them, and the OAS has shown no interest in this. This is another area worth pursuing.

E. New Forces. New international political forces have emerged recently and are having an impact on the region, though not very favorably from the perspective of our interests. The Socialist International, the Conference of Latin American Political Parties (COPPAL -- Mexico in the lead), the German SPD and CDU Foundations, the Non-Aligned Movement -- all these organizations seem to have accepted as their working premise that the U.S. is the problem; some of them think Cuba may be the solution. We have tried dialogue with them and should continue, but we also should reassess our approach to each of these organizations to see whether they will listen, or just speak, and to try to comprehend why we are so often the whipping boy.

(3) Economic Cooperation

A. Aid. You promised to double foreign aid, but Congress and your intention to balance the budget prevented you from fulfilling that promise. During the 1970's, we have been gradually phasing out our bilateral aid programs to the middle-income developing countries (most of LAC), and with increased priority to Africa, Egypt, and Israel, the overall levels to LAC have declined markedly. At the same time, we have been reasonably successful in shifting these declining resources to the sub-region of highest political priority, Central America and the Caribbean, although, even there, we are talking about funding levels which were much smaller than during the Alliance. We have improvised by eliciting additional support from the IFI's and from other Western donors.

B. Trade. The MTN in Geneva was primarily a negotiation among industrialized countries and last minute efforts to encourage the LDC's to participate did not disguise that fact. The overall reduction of trade barriers will certainly help all nations, but not as much as a set of arrangements designed to specifically assist the LDC's. We consulted, but frankly did not take them too seriously.

C. Commodities. We have been able to negotiate agreements on coffee, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and a Common Fund, but in almost all cases we were the most conservative and inflexible. More importantly, none of the agreements seem to be working.

D. Science and Technology. Frank Press's efforts have been exceptional, particularly when one realizes he had so little to offer in aid. He has helped to establish a framework and to build linkages which will serve our interests in collaborative relationships in this field very well for years to come.

E. North-South Relations: A Summit. The resurgence of East-West relations combined with Congressional constraints placed the North-South dialogue on the back burner. Unfortunately, we have little economic aid to offer and so we should begin to examine political and symbolic options, particularly because these often have a greater importance than we think and perhaps than they should. A North-South Summit is definitely one way to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in a dialogue; it would be a terrible mistake if we were to sit that out.

III. Second Term Agenda

I believe the objectives and the course we set to LAC in the last four years is the correct one, and we have made great progress. We have consulted often with the nations in the region and encouraged them to play a more active role in international affairs, and while their policies have often diverged from our own, we are generally well served by this new assertiveness.

Your re-election will, in and of itself, strengthen our ability to enhance human rights and extend democracy in the hemisphere as leaders who had hoped our commitment would dissipate will find themselves having to adjust to its institutionalization. Secretary Muskie's trip and the OAS General Assembly (opening in Washington on November 19) offers an opportunity to begin a major new effort to enhance human rights and facilitate the extension of democracy in the hemisphere. We should try to develop a number of specific ideas for the Secretary to suggest in his consultations, and if the response is positive, perhaps you could develop them in a speech to open the OAS General Assembly. In that forum, you could also announce a renewed effort to obtain Senate ratification of the human rights conventions (and also Protocol I).

A major new initiative to Central America and the Caribbean is urgently needed, and we have a number of opportunities to enunciate such an approach: the signing ceremony on November 19 of the Honduran-Salvadoran Peace Treaty, which could initiate a new effort toward Central American integration and Caribbean/Central American Action's important conference on November 23 in Miami which a large number of heads of state from the region will attend. We will send you a paper on this soon.

Another "now issue" which we need to address concerns the flow of people for economic and political reasons, most of it illegal, to the US. Other areas in need of work include: Mexico, Cuba, a new approach to the military regimes in the region, and North-South relations.

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South America; Latin America Region, 1977-1980

South American Regional Compilation

Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV

Argentina

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51.

Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 12, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 2/11–2/28/77. Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote, “To Cy. J.”

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance *CV*

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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2. Human Rights in Argentina: The Argentine Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires, where the government is currently reviewing U.S.-Argentine relations. To insure that our concern over deterioration of human rights in Argentina is fully appreciated in Buenos Aires, Warren called in the Argentine Charge d'Affaires this morning. He told the Charge that although we recognize Argentina's serious terrorist problem, we are deeply concerned about torture, witch hunts and other gross violations of human rights. Warren stressed that a continuation of such abuses would have an adverse effect on our relations with Argentina. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires conveyed a similar message at high levels last week.

*Keep me
informed*

The Argentine Charge argued that "barbaric terrorism" was rampant in his country before last year's coup. Violence is now decreasing and prisoners are being released from jail. He pleaded for American understanding of Argentina's "special case" and promised to report our views to his government.

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[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

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52.

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

RPM 77-10030

Washington, February 22, 1977

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 17, Argentina: Prospects for the Junta. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated by the Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of Operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1977

ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA

Argentina's ruling generals have made substantial progress in dealing with the problems of leftist subversion and economic disarray that led to their takeover nearly a year ago. Terrorist capabilities have clearly declined and economic signs, such as a reduction of the inflation rate and last year's reversal of the trade deficit are encouraging. Although the initial crisis is over, the divisive forces that have complicated life for both military and civilian governments in the past are rapidly reemerging. Ultimately, the success of the junta is at stake; the regime will find it increasingly difficult to govern unless it can restore unity or at least stave off widespread disaffection. There are already signs of restiveness in civilian ranks, especially in the pivotal labor movement. Moreover, tensions within the junta itself have developed because of personal rivalries and differences over how to proceed.

Background

In theory, the regime has virtually unlimited powers and can enforce its dictates by exercising tight military control over the government at the national and local levels. In reality, however, the situation is much more

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was coordinated by the Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of Operations.

E.O. 13526 3.5(c)

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complex and the military's control is far from complete as a result of Argentine political practices and behavior of the military.

Argentina's politics are marked by intense competition among political sectors, who are extraordinarily jealous of their prerogatives, even by Latin American standards. Although competition is keen, the interested parties--including the military--are bound together by a complex set of interrelationships.

Key sectors compete directly with each other largely unfettered by formal institutions that smooth over differences in other societies. The legislature and the courts, for example, are viewed as entities that are unable to mediate impartially the competition for power. In Argentine society political parties serve more to advance personal ambitions than to promote ideologies or philosophies. The limits of political activity are set by how much an individual or group can get away with before an opponent reacts.

The key political sectors are acutely aware of each other's every move. Each group nearly always interprets any gain by another as an automatic loss for itself. Compromise is not valued; instead, it is considered as a sign of weakness. A certain amount of violence, while not formally condoned, is regarded as within the rules of the game.

No sector has ever completely dominated the others for any length of time. Alliances and loyalties tend to shift too readily for any group to maintain its hold indefinitely. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to envision a durable totalitarian regime in Argentina, even though the executive branch traditionally is granted extensive putative powers. Only with the greatest difficulty can a particular approach to a problem gather the necessary consensus to become firmly established.

Civilian Pressures

The chief source of potential trouble for the junta is the labor movement, the most formidable civilian grouping since it achieved political maturity under the tutelage of Juan Peron in the 1940s. There is considerable hostility between labor and the military, much of it stemming from the

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days of Peron. The military, first spawned, but ultimately rejected Peron. Workers, however, still retain a strong loyalty to the man who for decades dominated Argentine politics. They see the military as unalterably opposed to Peron's populism and to the gains they perceive he made for them. For example, every attempt to limit wage increases or rein in the activities of unions is interpreted in this light. Many officers, on the other hand, blame the Peronists for virtually all the ills Argentina has suffered for more than a generation and consider it their duty to extirpate all vestiges of Peronist influence. Many generals believe labor's ascendancy under the former government nearly destroyed the nation's economy.

The military are no less politicized than their civilian counterparts. Disputes and rivalries abound, but most officers prefer not to risk a breakdown of military unity by pressing their differences too far. The safeguarding of military unity frequently means that crucial decisions are deferred and important policies watered down.

Ironically, disputatious officers often seek the backing of civilian groups in an effort to outmaneuver fellow military men. Thus officers regularly scheme with representatives of various groups, even the unions. Civilians do their best to exploit the officers' differences by joining whatever side has the most to offer them. The lineups change often, at times inexplicably.

Further complicating the political scene is the propensity of the regime to undermine its own claims of authority by failing to act promptly on policy matters. Whether or not because of internal divisions, the government has acted inconsistently on several major issues, displayed serious lack of coordination on others, and failed to act at all on still others.

Under these circumstances, civilians feel more or less obliged to test the government at every opportunity. This testing process is in full swing and manifesting itself in a number of ways. The unions are at the forefront of the activity because they have so far been the most affected by junta restrictions to date. Despite the government's takeover of major unions and confederations and the ban on all strikes, workers have repeatedly challenged the junta by staying off the job, staging slowdowns and committing sabotage.

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Labor's defiance reflects a mix of economic and political concerns. Workers have in fact lost considerable purchasing power due as a result of inflation, while pay raises have been limited in the name of austerity. At the same time, labor leaders bridle at the continuing limits placed on their authority and activity. Union leaders are in a particularly difficult situation. Stripped of their ability to demand benefits for workers, there is little they can do to retain the already waning loyalty of the rank and file. They must try to deliver something tangible for union members, if they are to rebuild their support.

We believe that the labor bosses will continue to press the government by encouraging labor protests but only those that stop short of provoking serious retaliation. Only in this way can the leaders strengthen their credibility among those they purport to represent. The junta's relatively mild reaction thus far to labor protests probably has encouraged union leaders to pursue this tactic.

Other civilian sectors bring pressure to bear in whatever way they can. Currently, a vigorous debate is going on regarding restructuring the executive authority. The question revolves on whether the presidency should continue to be held by a member of the junta or should go to a "fourth man." Most of the arguments suggest that the present government setup worked well during the initial crisis and subsequent consolidation of the junta's authority, but that it does not give the presidency enough authority to direct longer term policies and plans. Some commentators contend that to leave the presidency within the military junta increases rather than reduces the potential for crippling military rivalries.

The debate not only raises substantive issues but also presents another opportunity for Argentines to put pressure on the regime. It is difficult for President Videla to ignore the debate, which is at least tacitly approved by some potential military rivals eager to advance their own ambitions. He clearly will need to devote an increasing amount of his time to protecting himself politically. As a result, it will be hard for him to address the policy issues he is expected to deal with as chief executive.

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How far civilians can go in pressing the government depends on their tenacity and on the tolerance of key generals. The outcome hinges on a complicated series of relationships between Videla and other officers as well as between civilians and the military. The efforts of civilians could be counterproductive.

Military Opposition

Videla is committed to a form of military rule that is moderate in all areas except counterinsurgency, and he seems to value open dialogue with a wide variety of military and civilian groups. Videla's conciliatory approach has caused him problems, however, particularly from rival officers. E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1)

A sizable number of officers reject Videla's policy of conciliation and have called for greater restrictions on civilians and an even more ruthless campaign against the terrorists. Videla and his military supporters have spent a good deal of time working to block this concept.

Navy chief and fellow junta member Admiral Massera has been especially strident in his criticism of the President, apparently in order to gain the support of officers opposed to Videla's moderate ways. Massera's tactics are brazenly opportunistic and self-serving; he is reported to be in contact with certain civilians interested in seeing him move up.

The planning minister, General Ramon Diaz Bessone, could pose a more serious threat to Videla. Last year Diaz Bessone engineered the establishment of the post he now occupies, and he is now next to Videla in the line of succession. This was accomplished over the President's objections. Diaz Bessone, who enjoys a reputation as a hard liner, obviously has his eyes on the presidency.

At some point, Videla's military critics may muster enough support to force him to abandon his moderate approach or step aside. The arguments of such officers would take on increased importance if in the interim, under the leadership of Videla, the government should suffer a major reverse either in the anti-terrorist fight or on the economic front.

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Outlook

The military clearly do not intend to give up power in the near future. The problems they intervened to tackle are not subject to short-term solutions, and the officers are committed to their solution. As a practical matter, moreover, there is no alternative to military rule in sight.

The eradication of subversion will continue to preoccupy the regime. The military are encouraged by the very real losses they have inflicted on the terrorists, but they know that the war is still not won. Many believe the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been all but destroyed, but there is less optimism regarding the urban-based Montoneros. Although the Montoneros have been hurt by the counterinsurgency campaign, they retain the ability--and the will--to carry out attacks on businessmen, police, and others. It is possible that changes at the top will take place within the next month or so. Rumors to this effect are rampant in Buenos Aires. Should Videla lose either the presidency or his position in the junta, it will be taken as a decisive defeat for his moderate policies and a corresponding gain for his hard-line opponents.

Real or perceived pressures from the US on human rights may have an important influence on Videla's ability to retain the upper hand. If he is seen as caving in to the US, the hard-liners can hope to use nationalistic arguments to strengthen their case against him. Videla must, therefore, make it clear to his detractors that he is willing to stand up to Washington.

Whether or not Videla remains in office the human rights problem will persist in Argentina. It will continue to be a troublesome factor--and a potential cause of friction with the US--as long as the Argentine military believes it faces a serious subversive threat.

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53.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, March 4, 1977, 0126Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-0443. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Zimmerman; cleared by Luers and in S/S; approved by Christopher. Repeated to Santiago, Brasília, and Montevideo.

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APPROVED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PFOR, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY BY ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER RECEIVED ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL MARCH 3.
2. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTING HE HAD EARLIER TALKED WITH THE ARGENTINE CHARGE. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THE AMBASSADOR HAD COME IN AS THE USG IS ANXIOUS THAT THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BE KEPT OPEN.
3. AJA ESPIL REFERRED TO THE LONG HISTORY OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. BASED ON MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT. ARGENTINA ASSUMED THAT THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION WOULD TAKE THE SAME VIEW. BUT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA WAS NOTIFIED OF THE DECISION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO REDUCE FMS CREDITS THROUGH THE PRESS

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WHICH QUOTED THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY AND INOUE'S REMARKS DURING THE HEARING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS OF SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. THAT IS NOT, HE SAID, THE REAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER. THE PROBLEM IS THAT BY THIS DECISION ARGENTINA IS ACCUSED OF PERPETRATING GROSS

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS - A CHARGE THE GOA REJECTS. THEREFORE HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT A NOTE STATING THE DECISION OF THE GOA NOT TO USE 1978 FMS CREDITS.

4. AJA ESPIL THEN PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FIRST PERSON NOTE: BEGIN TEXT: MR. SECRETARY: I HAVE THE HONOR TO INFORM YOU, ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM MY GOVERNMENT, THAT THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC WILL NOT MAKE USE OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978.

ACCEPT MR. SECRETARY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. END TEXT.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY ACCEPTED THE NOTE ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY. HE SAID THAT THE US RECOGNIZES THAT THE DECISION NOT TO MAKE USE OF FY 78 MILITARY CREDITS WAS ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF THE GOA, JUST AS THE DECISION TO

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

REDUCE THE FIGURE WAS APPROPRIATELY A DECISION FOR THE U.S. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT AS IN THE PAST. THE U.S. IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING THE GOA BUT IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE POINT HAD BEEN REACHED IN REESTABLISHING CONTROL WHERE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMBINE FIRMNESS WITH RESTRAINT.

6. CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT HE HAD PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH SITUATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT FACING ARGENTINA, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY NOT AS SERIOUS. IT IS ESSENTIAL IN THESE
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CONDITIONS TO COMBINE FIRMNESS WITH RESTRAINT. OTHERWISE STABILITY WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED.

7. SAYING HE LIKED THE AMBASSADOR'S USE OF THE WORDS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, CHRISTOPHER AFFIRMED THE US DESIRE TO CONTINUE GOOD RELATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THE US BELIEF THAT THE FUTURE DEPENDS ON RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS AND IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS, CHRISTOPHER SAID, AND IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT HE WAS RECEIVING THE AMBASSADOR.

8. AJA ESPIL RESPONDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FULLY AGREED WITH THAT PORTION OF THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE NEED TO FOSTER A CLIMATE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE U.S. WOULD DO ITS BEST TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. WE WOULD ALSO, HE SAID, SEEK TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY OF STANDARDS

IN OUR APPROACH TO PROBLEMS. AJA ESPIL REPLIED THAT THE LAST POINT WAS VERY IMPORTANT.

9. ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THEY HOPED TO SEE ONE ANOTHER SOON UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
VANCE

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PAGE 01 STATE 048062
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AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 048062

FOL REPEAT STATE 048062 ACTION BUENOS AIRES DATED 04 MAR 77

54.

Telegram From Secretary of State Vance's Delegation to the Department of State

Grenada, June 19, 1977, 1830Z

52

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14-17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OASGA. In telegram 6019 from the Secretary's delegation in Port of Spain, June 17, summarized the conversation. (Ibid.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE #1 GRENAD 00052 191910Z
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GRENADA 0052

EXDIS

FOR S/S RUST OEMING FROM MARK DION

FROM USDEL OASGA

USOAS DEL 36

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGRT, OAS, OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH ARGENTINA (JUNE 16)

1. PARTICIPANTS: US: SECRETARY VANCE, AMBASSADOR TODMAN, UNDERSECRETARY HABIB, AMBASSADOR MCGEE, MRS VAN REIGERSBERG (INTERPRETER) MR S ROGERS (NOTETAKER). ARGENTINA: MINISTER MONTES, VICE MINISTER GUATTER OSCAR ALLARA, MINISTER JUAN CARLOS ARLIA, JOSE I GARCIA GHIRELLI, ATILIO NORBERTO MOTTENI.

2. SUBJECTS: BILATERAL AT OASGA WITH ARGENTINA; HUMAN RIGHTS; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

3. AFTER BRIEF REMARKS ABOUT FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER GUZZETTI'S MEDICAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER WILLIAMS IN TRIDID, THE CONVERSATION WENT DIRECTLY TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

4. THE SECRETARY INFORMED THE ARGENTINES THAT THE US WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE TWO LOANS TO ARGENTINA IN THE WORLD BANK BUT MAKE A REFERENCE TO THE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. MONTES NODDED BUT SAID NOTHING AT THAT POINT IN RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT MONTES THOUGHT WOULD COME OUT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. MONTES REFERRED TO HIS STATEMENT IN THE INFORMAL DIALOGUE. HE THEN DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AND VIEWS OF ARGENTIA AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH. THE 1976 ARMY TAKE-OVER WAS A NATIONAL REORGANIZATION, NOT A REVOLUTION. THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL PERSECUTION. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, FOR INSTANCE, REMAINS LEGAL AND PUBLISHES ITS NEWS-PAPER FREELY. THE PROBLEM IS TERRORISM, NOT POLITICAL RIGHTS. CERTAIN GUARANTEES ARE INDEED SUSPENDED BUT THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR SUSPENSION IN A STATE OF SIEGE. ARGENTINES ARE BEING GOVERNED BY THE LAW. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATE OF SIEGE APPLY ONLY TO TERRORIST CRIMINALS. HE COULD NOT SAY PRECISELY WHEN THE STATE OF SIEGE WOULD BE LIFTED, BUT SO MUCH IMPROVEMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE THAT TERRORISM MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE ENDED BY THE END OF 1977.

6. ALLARA DESCRIBED THE TERRORIST THREAT AT THE TIME THE ARMED FORCES TOOK OVER. MONTES THEN RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE WORLD BANK LOANS. HE SAID MARTINEZ DE HOZ HAD REPORTED ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL AND DR BRZEZINSKI. HE SAID ARGENTINA IS VERY CONCERNED THAT TECHNICAL MATTERS ARE BEING SUBORDINATED TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ HAD REPORTED THAT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES WERE NOT WELL-INFORMED FOR INSTANCE CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN RELEASED.

7. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DECIDE TO ABSTAIN INSTEAD OF VOTING AGAINST. HE WOULD WATCH FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TO SEE IF WE COULD SOON VOTE

IN FAVOR OF LOANS FOR ARGENTINA. ALLARA THEN PROPOSED A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO BEGIN WITH A PERMANENT, FRANK AND THOROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US AND ARGENTINA ON ALL MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN.

8. IN ANSWER TO UNDERSECRETARY HABIB'S QUESTION, MONTES DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S VULNERABILITY TO TRAFFICKING IN ARMS FOR GUERRILLAS. HABIB NOTED THE SENATE ACTION OF THE DAY BEFORE TO CUT OFF ALL ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA AFTER SEPTEMBER 30, 1978, IF NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY THEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INSTEAD OF AN IMMEDIATE CUT OFF AS PROPOSED BY SENATOR KENNEDY. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS CHANGE REFLECTED THE UNDOUBTED PROGRESS ARGENTINA HAD MADE.

9. COMING BACK TO THE PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION, MONTES SUGGESTED A GROUP OF US ARMY OFFICERS VISIT ARGENTINA TO SEE THE REAL SITUATION. ALLARA THEN EXPLAINED AT LENGTH WHY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FEEL THAT IT IS VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS. BETTER KNOWLEDGE WOULD SHOW THE US THAT ARGENTINA WAS MERELY DEFENDING THE WESTERN WAY OF LIFE.

10. ARLIA THEN NAMED FIVE "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVISTS" WHO HE SAID WERE PROVIDING THE MOST ABUNDANT INFORMATION ON ARGENTINA IN THE US: ROBERT GUEVARA (CHE'S BROTHER), LUCIO GARZON-MACEDO AND GUSTAVO ROCA, BOTH LAWYERS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY, PEDRO DUALDE, AND MRS LILY MAZZAFERRO. HE SAID GUEVARA AND ROCA HAD WORKED WITH BRADY TYSON ON THE US STATEMENT AT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE FREQUENTLY SEEN WITH FATHER DRINAN. ROCA, HE SAID, HAD JUST BEEN ARRESTED IN DENMARK FOR ROBBING SUPERMARKETS AND FOR HAVING FALSE IDENTIFICATION PAPERS. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH MS DERIAN.

11. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED MS DERIAN AS COMPLETELY DEDICATED AND VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE; MONTES AND ALLARA QUICKLY AGREED SHE HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL TO THE ARGENTINES IN HER VISIT TO THEIR COUNTRY. THEY ADDED, SHE MIGHT BE THE FIRST LINK IN THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT THAT ARGENTINA WANTS. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY'S QUESTION, ARLIA SAID ARGENTINA FAVORED STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BY GIVING IT MORE PRECISE TERMINOLOGICAL REFERENCE. ITS REAL JOB WAS TO COOPERATE IN THE PROMOTION OF RIGHTS GENERALLY, NOT JUST FOCUSING ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

12. AMBASSADOR TODMAN HAD EARLIER ASKED WHY ARGENTINA DID NOT ACCEDE TO THE TREATY OF TLAELOCO. ARLIA SAID ARGENTINA'S POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN - THAT TLAELOCO AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST COUNTRIES THAT NEEDED TO DEVELOP THEIR NUCLEAR ENERGY CAPACITY, SUCH AS ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA'S NEEDS ARE ENTIRELY PACIFIC. ARGENTINA NEEDS TO DOUBLE ITS ENERGY CAPACITY BY 1982. NUCLEAR POWER IS INDISPENSABLE.

13. THE SECRETARY ACCEPTED THAT ARGENTINA NEEDED NUCLEAR POWER BUT SAID THAT NOTHING IN THE TREATY INFRINGED ON THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT FOR ARGENTINA TO SIGN THE TLAELOCO TREATY. ALLARA SAID THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS CHANGING ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS TLAELOCO AND THE NPT, BUT SAFEGUARDS WERE A MORE LIKELY APPROACH. AMBASSADOR TODMAN STRESSED THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA'S SIGNING TO ENCOURAGE THE FEW REMAINING COUNTRIES TO DO SO.

14. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD ASK MS DERIAN TO CARRY ON HER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARGENTINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON OTHER MATTERS, HE WOULD WORK THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR AND SPECIALISTS. HE HOPED THAT HE AND MONTES COULD CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSION. MONTES AGREED. MCGEE

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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55.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 27, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File,
Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 27, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR

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
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

The President noted that the Argentines have recently announced a series of actions designed to improve their human rights image. These actions include:

- releasing of 342 persons from custody;
- processing in the courts the cases of nearly 1,000 persons awaiting trial on charges of subversion; and
- hinting at the reinstatement of the individuals' constitutional right to leave the country.

The President would like you to acknowledge this Argentine commitment to human rights.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

~~SECRET~~

56.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Pastor forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski under a July 7 covering memorandum and recommended that it be sent to Carter. A handwritten note indicates that Brzezinski discussed the memorandum with Carter on July 9. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2-12/77)

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION .

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *25*
SUBJECT: Your Remark That Argentine Improvements
in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps -- the release of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of the right of exile -- should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The State Department also requested further information on whether the announced steps have been taken.

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation of a democratic form of government.

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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57.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 9, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. This memorandum is also printed as Document 66 in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 9, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION (ARA&S/PRS)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Recognition of Improvements in
Human Rights

The following is based on a conversation I had with the President this morning:

1. As you know, the Argentine Government has stated its intention to release 342 political prisoners. The President would like you to acknowledge this and express his gratification to the Argentine Government when they have released the prisoners.
2. At the same time, the President would like the State Department, on background to the press, to acknowledge this action by the Argentine Government and express the President's gratification.
3. The President would like it to be a matter of policy to acknowledge and express gratification for improvements in human rights once it has been determined that these improvements are real rather than cosmetic. This should be done not only with the Government concerned but, on background, with the press.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

58.

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 22, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina I. Confidential. Sent through Benson and Habib. Drafted by Rondon, O. Jones, L. Brown, and Borek; Titus, Robinson, Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas concurred. Rondon initialed for Jones, Brown, and Borek. Keane initialed for Todman. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it. An unknown hand initialed for Derian. Rondon initialed for Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas. Titus initialed for himself and Robinson. Anderson initialed the first page of the memorandum.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

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D/HA
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Original to:
✓FADRC

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Copies to:

22 JUL 1977

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TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Habib
T - Mrs. Benson
FROM: ARA - Terence A. Todman
D/HA - Patricia M. Derian
PM - Leslie Gelb

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

SUBJECT: Restriction of Arms Sales to Argentina in the light of Human Rights Situation

ISSUES FOR DECISION

How restrictive should we be in denying pending commercial and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) under cash and financing procedures to the armed forces and police of Argentina, in light of the serious abuses of human rights in that country?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

In Argentina, there is no question that human rights are being violated including arbitrary detention, torture and summary executions. While there have been some recent signs which may be a cause for hope, the level of violations remains high. This led us to abstain in June on two World Bank loans.

~~Non-Proliferation is a major interest in Argentina.~~
As the second largest country in South America in population, area and per capita GNP, Argentina is and will remain an important political influence in the region. It has substantial uranium reserves and an ambitious nuclear power program. It has the most advanced nuclear capability of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for an autonomous fuel cycle. U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation in Brazil, and Latin America generally, depend critically on Argentina's acceptance of full-scope safeguards (which it has shown a conditional willingness to consider) and deferral of its fuel reprocessing program.

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- 2 -

Argentina is also important economically. The U.S. is Argentina's largest trading partner (we currently have a \$250 million trade surplus). U.S. banks hold \$3 billion of Argentina's debts and U.S. industry has some \$1.2 billion invested in the country. Argentina is a major food exporter and may have in its extensive continental shelf large reserves of oil. Although the country has recently suffered severe economic troubles, it is a generally self-sufficient industrial and economic leader in Latin America.

Over 40 applications for commercial arms exports to Argentina are pending. The most urgent of these cases is a \$15 million commercial order from Bell-Textron for eight armored helicopters, equipped with exterior gun mounts and wiring. Two of them are for Presidential use and the rest for Argentina's Antarctic activities. If we approve this "major" sale, routine Congressional notification is required. There are also two outstanding FMS cases (See Attachment).

The Department has been denying commercial export license applications for defense articles and services for police and other civil law enforcement use, and FMS purchase requests for articles and services which could be diverted to such use. The extension of FY 77 FMS financing is also being withheld. The conference report on the FY 78 security assistance authorization bill contains a provision prohibiting all FMS sales and financing, grant training, and licenses for the export of defense articles and services to the Government of Argentina, beginning, however, only in FY 1979.

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, expresses a policy of promoting human rights and of not providing security assistance to any country engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances. It is not necessary at any time to characterize expressly the human rights practices of a recipient government. Moreover, the annual human rights report required by that section has been submitted to the Congress with respect to Argentina. Nevertheless, the Congress may at any time request from you a supplementary report on Argentina. To continue such assistance it then would be necessary for you to state your opinion that extraordinary circumstances exist so that, on all the facts, the

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- 3 -

continuation of security assistance to Argentina is in the national interest. While no such report has been requested, the potential for subsequent legal problems exists if you are unable to conclude that such circumstances (sufficient to meet the requirements for continued assistance under Section 502B (c)) now exist.

THE OPTIONS

There is general agreement that we should not sell or license the export of defense articles and services of usefulness to police and other civil law enforcement organizations in Argentina. The present issue, then, is whether to extend such restrictions to cover other sales and exports to Argentina, and if so, which:

There are three options, all of which would be subject to review dependent upon the human rights situation:

1. Continue our present policy of denying internal security sales, allowing, on a case-by-case basis, FMS sales and commercial exports for the Argentine military. No new extensions of FMS financing would be contemplated, but disbursements against prior years' financing to meet payments for previously approved purchases would continue. Under this option, some of the pending 40 cases would be approved, including helicopters, armored vehicles, periscopes and torpedoes.

2. Deny all new FMS sales and licenses for commercial exports. This would deny pending requests.

3. With the exception of spare parts for equipment previously sold, we would deny all new FMS and commercial sales.

Option 1 - Current Policy

PROS

-- Does least damage to our other interests in Argentina, particularly those involving nuclear non-proliferation.

-- Preserves a minimal tie with the Argentine armed forces - a dominant institution in Argentina - in a period of political instability.

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- 4 -

-- Is consistent with our policy toward other countries with poor human rights records (e.g. Korea, Iran, Philippines).

-- Provides some incentive for the Government to improve its human rights practices before the anticipated legislative embargo takes effect.

CONS

-- Will mean that weapons and other equipment will be provided to the Argentine military forces which are directly involved in human rights violations:

-- Will be opposed by a significant number of Congressmen and by other influential groups as inconsistent with the spirit of Section 502B.

-- May encourage the Argentine Government to assume the U.S. Government's policy is hortatory only and that there is no cost involved in continued repression.

Option 2 - Temporary EmbargoPROS

-- Is consistent with the spirit of 502B.

-- Sends a clear message to the Argentine government that we cannot provide arms while human rights conditions remain as they are.

-- Will probably have wide public and Congressional support.

-- Other instruments can be used to foster U.S. interest.

CONS

-- Will antagonize the Government and the armed forces and seriously damage such leverage as we have, both on the important nuclear proliferation problems and on human rights.

-- Will force Argentina to look elsewhere for arms, possibly including the USSR, thus complicating U.S. efforts to develop

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- 5 -

~~regional arms transfer~~, pursuant to the new arms transfer policy.

-- Night undermine Argentine President Videla, ~~viewed~~ ~~generally~~ as a force for moderation.

Option 3 - Spares Only

PROS

-- Fulfills an implicit obligation to service previously supplied equipment.

-- Same as Option 2.

CONS

-- Similar to Option 2.

Recommendations

That you approve Option 1 which would limit denials of arms and exports to articles and services for police and civil law enforcement use, or which could be described as such (favored by ARA, PM and the Department of Defense),

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

JUL 25 1977

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 2 ~~to deny Argentine~~ ~~and the cash and commercial export licenses~~ for defense articles on the Munitions List (favored by D/RA).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~Alternatively, that you approve~~ ~~to spare parts and repair parts~~ for equipment previously sold or approved for export (favored by S/P).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

~~Submitting the cash sales and export license applications.~~

~~Submitted by: D/RA, Sonner, Tal Brown, L. Brown,~~

~~and others. Approved by: S/P, D/RA, Sonner, Tal Brown, L. Brown,~~

~~and others. Approved by: S/P, D/RA, Sonner, Tal Brown, L. Brown,~~

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59.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, July 27, 1977, 2151Z

5522

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770269-0610. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 05522 272232Z
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1518

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 5522

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, PDIP, AR
SUBJECT: US INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 162292, (B) BUENOS AIRES 5303

1. REF A INSTRUCTED THAT AN APPROACH BE MADE TO THE GOA AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL TO NOTE THE USG INTEREST IN RECENT GOA STEPS TO IMPROVE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THE INSTRUCTION ALSO PROVIDED THAT, IF THE STEPS ANNOUNCED BY THE GOA AND REPORTED IN B.A. 4638 WERE REAL RATHER THAN COSMETIC, THE ARGENTINES SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN THESE AND CONTINUING STEPS TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW.

2. REF B CONCLUDED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A DETECTABLE TREND TOWARD IMPROVEMENT IN RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE POINT OF WHETHER THE GOA MEASURES CITED WERE REAL OR COSMETIC. AFTER ATTEMPTS BY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 05522 272232Z

GOA ON JUNE 15, WE HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT THEY DO HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE, BUT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN ENTIRELY AT FACE VALUE. WE BELIEVE THAT SOME RESTRICTED FORM OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WILL BE FORMALLY REESTABLISHED (PERHAPS AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO "PETITION" TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AS NOW EXISTS IN PRACTICE IF NOT IN LAW.) THE SUPPRESSION OF CABILDO WAS NOT AS EXTENSIVE AS IT SEEMED, SINCE ONE OF THE TWO SUPPRESSED EDITIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN DISTRIBUTED. WE HAVE STILL BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE RELEASE OF ALL OF THE 342 PERSONS LISTED AS RELEASED BETWEEN MAY 27 AND JUNE 14. BOTH E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) SAY THAT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT MANY OF THESE PERSONS WERE RELEASED. WE HAVE CONFIRMED FOUR CASES ACTUALLY RELEASED AND ASSUME, AS HAS OCCURRED WITH OTHER RELEASE LISTS, THAT MANY OF THOSE LISTED AS NO LONGER BEING DETAINED UNDER EXECUTIVE POWERS HAVE BEEN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH SOME CRIME. (THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROVIDE A LIST OF PERSONS DETAINED DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE 342 RELEASES.)

3. IN THE APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS SINCE JUNE 14, THE GOA HAS ISSUED THREE LISTS OF DETAINEES AND RELEASEES UNDER THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THESE TOTAL 199 DETAINED AND

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

77 RELEASED. SOME OF THOSE RELEASED ON THE JULY 23 LIST WERE SHOWN AS HAVING BEEN APPREHENDED ON THE JULY 2 LIST. INQUIRIES OF THE PERMANENT ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ICRC AND THE NUNCIATURA ELICITED NEITHER REJECTION NOR CONFIRMATION OF THE LISTS. THEY OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THE PERSONS ON THE JUNE 14 LIST HAD BEEN IMPRISONED BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THERE WERE MANY NAMES ON THE LIST FROM OUTSIDE BUENOS AIRES. THE LISTS OF APPARENT RELEASES SINCE JUNE 15 DO NOT SHOW ANY

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 05522 272232Z

PARTICULAR TREND. THE LACK OF A CLEAR POSITIVE TREND ON PRISONER RELEASES, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF HIDALGO SOLA, AND THE HARASSMENT OF LABOR LEADERS COMBINE TO ARGUE AGAINST A CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER WITH ANY SPECIFIC FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT.

4. THE ECONOMY MINISTER, MARTINEZ DE HOZ, WAS THE OBVIOUS HIGH-LEVEL CHANNEL FOR EXPRESSION OF USG INTEREST. IN A MEETING WITH HIM ON JULY 22 THE CHARGE EXPRESSED OUR CONTINUING DEEP INTEREST IN STEPS TOWARD RESTORATION OF RULE OF LAW AND OUR INTEREST IN KNOWING ANY FURTHER DETAILS RELATING TO THE STEPS ANNOUNCED JUNE 15. THE MINISTER SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GO INTO DETAILS ABOUT NUMBERS OR NAMES. BUT THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE PROCEDURES ANNOUNCED ON JUNE 15 WERE GOING FORWARD. WHEN PRESSED FOR DETAILS, THE MINISTER SAID THE MATTER WAS OUTSIDE HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SPECIFICS. CHARGE NOTED THAT THE USG WAS PREPARED TO GIVE RECOGNITION TO FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA, AS WAS DONE BY OUR DIRECTOR AT THE WORLD BANK, AND WE HOPE THAT THE MINISTER MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE US WITH MORE SUCH INSTANCES. AS A FURTHER EVIDENCE OF OUR INTEREST AND WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS, CHARGE PROVIDED MINISTER WITH TELETYPE COPY OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT YAZOO CITY WHICH MENTIONED RELEASES OR ARGENTINE PRISONERS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ APPEARED INTERESTED BUT LIMITED HIS COMMENTS TO OBSERVING THAT IN ARGENTINA THOSE DETAINED ARE NOT CALLED POLITICAL PRISONERS.

5. THOUGH MARTINEZ DE HOZ WAS UNWILLING TO DEAL IN SPECIFICS, HE DID EXPAND ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND DO MORE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD WHICH WOULD FURTHER THAT END.

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PAGE 04 BUENOS 05522 272232Z

HE SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE SOMETHING SUITABLE FOR ANNOUNCEMENT PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING SPECIFIC ON THE RIGHT OF OPTION MIGHT BE READY SHORTLY, BUT WAS UNSURE. HE THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION OF A PUZZLING CABLE HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REGARDING THE STATUS OF THE RUSS AMENDMENT TO THE BILL PROVIDING FUNDING FOR IFI'S.

6. ON TWO OTHER OCCASIONS EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE RAISED WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENCY THE DEEP US INTEREST IN FURTHER SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW. THESE EXPLORATORY OBSERVATIONS WERE MET WITH LITTLE MORE THAN POLITE INTEREST.

7. COMMENT: THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE IN THESE INSTANCES IS NOT PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING. THE TACTIC OF EXPRESSING INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES DID NOT ELICIT POSITIVE RESPONSES, FOR THIS IS AN AREA WHERE FEW WISH TO TAKE THE BLAME OR SHARE CREDIT.
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60.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, August 15, 1977, 1758Z

192822

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294-0106. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Limdis. Drafted by Bova, approved by Derian. In telegram 6644 from Buenos Aires, September 7, the Embassy forwarded the corrected text of this cable for information to Asunción, Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770345-0462)

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, PFOR, AR

SUBJECT: DERIAN VISIT WITH ADMIRAL MASSERA

FOR CHARGE CHAPLIN

BEGIN SUMMARY

1. AT HIS REQUEST, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
PATT DERIAN MET WITH JUNTA MEMBER MASSERA ON MORNING OF
AUGUST 10. THE ADMIRAL STRESSED THAT ARGENTINA WAS IN
THE PROCESS OF RETURNING TO NORMAL LEGAL PROCEDURES AND
THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE SINCE MS. DERIAN'S LAST
VISIT. MRS. DERIAN EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT NORMALIZATION
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED SOON AND IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALL
LEVELS OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS WOULD UNDERSTAND IT.
END SUMMARY.

2. THE ADMIRAL STARTED THE CONVERSATION BY STRESSING THAT

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PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN CONTROLLING THE SITUATION.
WHILE NOTING THAT FALSE INFORMATION CIRCULATES, AND SOME
INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO OCCUR ("SOME GROUPS STILL ESCAPE
US") HE STRESSED THAT THE END WAS IN SIGHT. MRS. DERIAN
EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT THIS WAS THE CASE AND NOTED
TWO THINGS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE USG: (1) THE

LARGE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARED AND (2) THE CONDITIONS OF
BEING HELD INCOMUNICADO WHERE PEOPLE ARE TREATED TOO
HARSHLY. SHE SAID SHE HOPED NEW PROCEDURES WILL BE
INTRODUCED.

3. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT NUMBERS
PRESIDENT VIDELA OR ADMIRAL ALLARA HAD PROVIDED
REGARDING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CHARGED OR TAKEN
ILLEGALLY BUT HE SAID THE LAST FEW MONTHS SHOWED RAPID
PROGRESS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ARGENTINE ARMY WAS
SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM OTHERS IN THAT ITS ORGANIZATION
CONTAINED CORE COMMANDERS WHO HAD SOME INDEPENDENCE
IN ADMINISTERING INTERNAL SECURITY BUT SAID THAT THIS
DID NOT MEAN THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA WAS NOT IN CONTROL.
HE ADVISED THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
IMPRESSION RECEIVED OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

ACTUAL REALITY.

4. MRS. DERIAN EXPRESSED HER CONCERN OVER THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T KNOW IF MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILY ARE DEAD OR ALIVE. SHE MENTIONED THAT LABOR LEADERS AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN IN JAIL SINCE 1975. SHE SAID THAT THE SYSTEM SEEMS TO HAVE GROUND TO A HALT, E.G., PEOPLE WERE PICKED UP AND NEVER CHARGED, SOME WERE HELD WITH NO EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM, SOME WERE TRIED AND FOUND INNOCENT BUT STILL DETAINED. SHE EXPLAINED THAT AFTER A

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PERIOD OF TIME THE GOVERNMENT, HAVING WON THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, SHOULD SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY SAYING TO THE PEOPLE THAT IT HAS WON BUT IT NEEDS HELP IN THIS MOP-UP PHASE. SHE SAID THE TERRORISTS ACHIEVE THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE IF THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T ADMIT IT HAS WON THE WAR AND MUST NOW RETURN TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BY BRINGING THOSE DETAINED TO TRIAL. SHE CITED THE CASE OF JACOBO TIMMERMAN AS AN EXAMPLE, ADDING HE HAS BEEN MISTREATED WHILE UNDER DETENTION. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE DIDN'T BELIEVE TIMMERMAN HAD BEEN MISTREATED ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE SAID HE HAS BEEN.

5. RETURNING TO THE GENERAL SITUATION, MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD USG REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE NAVY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ABUSES WHICH OCCUR WHEN PEOPLE ARE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AND INTERROGATED BEFORE THEY ENTER THE SYSTEM. ADMIRAL MASSERA RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE DOESN'T WISH TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF "WASHING HIS HANDS OF THE MATTER," INTERNAL SECURITY IS NOT THE NAVY'S RESPONSIBILITY, THAT THE NAVY HAS NOT TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND WHEN IT DOES DO SOMETHING IN THIS AREA IT DOES SO WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARMY. HE SAID THAT THOSE WHO SAY OTHERWISE ARE TRYING TO DECEIVE. MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT ON HER PRIOR VISIT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ONE OF THE WORST INTERROGATION CENTERS WAS THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL IN BUENOS AIRES. THE ADMIRAL DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE NAVY'S ENTIRE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ROLE WAS CARRIED OUT BY NO MORE THAN THIRTY PEOPLE.

6. MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT WHEN SHE WAS IN ARGENTINA BEFORE THERE WAS A GENERAL ATTITUDE THAT THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM WAS COMING TO AN END BUT WAS NOT REALLY OVER. THIS TIME SHE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT EVERYONE CONCLUDES THE WAR IS NOW OVER AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW

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REACHED THE EQUALLY DIFFICULT PHASE OF GETTING BACK TO NORMAL DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES. SHE ADVISED THAT THE PEOPLE BECOME IMPATIENT IF THIS PHASE TAKES TOO LONG TO CARRY OUT. SHE MENTIONED THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND THAT HE GAVE HER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE, TOO, WAS WORRIED ABOUT TIME. SHE REFERRED TO THE LEGISLATION PASSED IN THE U.S. CONGRESS WHICH SETS A ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT ON CONTINUING CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WHICH WE HAVE WITH ARGENTINA. SHE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL OPINION WAS BECOMING MORE AND MORE CRITICAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA AND SAID IT WOULD BE DEVASTATING IF ARGENTINA BECAME THE NEXT CHILE IN THE EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. MRS. DERIAN EXPLAINED THAT SHE THINKS THERE ARE PEOPLE OF GREAT INTEGRITY IN THE

GOVERNMENT WHO HOLD THE SAME VALUES THAT BOTH OUR CONSTITUTIONS INSCRIBE FOR OUR CITIZENS AND THAT SHE FEELS VERY UNHAPPY THAT THERE IS SUCH A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE.

7. THE ADMIRAL RESPONDED THAT, WHILE HE COULDN'T TALK OF A TIME PERIOD, THAT HE HAD NO CRYSTAL BALL WITH WHICH TO PREDICT, ARGENTINA WAS ON THE ROAD TO NORMALIZATION. HE ADMITTED THAT IN THE ROUGH BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM SOME THINGS GOT OUT OF HAND, BUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN REAL IMPROVEMENT SINCE MARCH. HE REFERRED TO ONE OF HIS OFFICERS ESPECIALLY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE PEOPLE LOOKING FOR THEIR RELATIVES AND SAID HIS CASE LOAD HAS DROPPED MARKEDLY.

8. MRS. DERIAN REFERRED TO THE RECENT CASE OF THE LAWYERS AND THEIR WIVES WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED AND THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA. ADMIRAL MASSERA

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SAID THE AMBASSADOR'S CASE WAS CLEARLY POLITICAL, THAT HE KNEW SOME PEOPLE BLAMED THE NAVY FOR IT, BUT THAT SOMETHING ELSE WAS INVOLVED, PERHAPS, A LEFTIST GROUP TRYING TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FORCES OUT OF CONTROL IS RESPONSIBLE, AS THIS WOULD GO AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND DOESN'T MAKE SENSE.

9. MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE DISORDER SO MANY CAN OPERATE THINKING THEY HAVE THE APPROVAL OF EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OR THE PEOPLE, THAT THE LEFT WING HAS BEEN LICKED BUT A MONSTER CREATED. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE DIDN'T SEE IT THAT WAY. HE SAID THE RIGHT WING IS VERY SMALL IN ARGENTINA AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS, LIKE THE CLOSING OF THE MAGAZINE CABILDO. HE SAID THE RIGHT EXISTS ONLY AS A POLITICAL FORCE. MRS. DERIAN MENTIONED THAT THE INCIDENT AGAINST THE LAWYERS COULDN'T HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT SOME OFFICIAL SUPPORT. ADMIRAL MASSERA ASKED WHAT PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD TOLD HER ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND, WHEN SHE RESPONDED THAT THEY HADN'T DISCUSSED IT, HE SAID THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS IT COULD BE COUNTED ON THE FINGERS OF YOUR HAND.

10. MRS. DERIAN ASKED WHAT THE CHANCES WERE FOR EITHER A COMPLETE OR PARTIAL REINSTATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION. ADMIRAL MASSERA EXPLAINED THAT THIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT HAD BEEN SUSPENDED FOR SIX MONTHS, THAT THIS TIME WAS NEARLY UP, AND THAT THE THOUGHT WAS TO REINSTATE IT. HE EXPLAINED THAT IN THE BEGINNING MANY PEOPLE WERE UNDER EXECUTIVE JUDGMENT AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CLARIFY CASES. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO GET CASES MOVING AND BROUGHT TO TRIAL SO THAT THERE COULD BE RELEASES AND A RESTORATION OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION. HE ASKED MRS. DERIAN TO MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM REALIZING THAT WHILE THESE CASES WERE IMPORTANT, THEY WERE OLD AND FEW AND THE JUNTA WAS ON THE ROAD TO NORMALIZATION.

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11. MRS. DERIAN SAID SHE HAD THE SENSE BUT WAS WORRIED ABOUT UNCERTAINTY AMONG LOWER GRADE OFFICIALS AND WONDERED WHETHER WHEN THE CHANGES COME THEY WOULD BE DIRECT AND CLEAR SO THAT PEOPLE WON'T FEEL THEMSELVES IN JEOPARDY AND THE PROCESS OF LOCATING THE DISAPPEARED WILL BE ENHANCED RATHER THAN HURT. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID THE

GOVERNMENT COULD, AT LEAST, PUBLISH A LIST IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF ALL THE PEOPLE IT HAS STATING IT DOESN'T KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OTHERS. HE SAID THE LIST WOULDN'T BE LONG, THAT SOME LISTS ARE BEING PUBLISHED AND THAT WHILE MANY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL HE REALIZES THERE ARE SOME IN A GREY ZONE AND THAT THIS HURTS THE GOVERNMENT.

12. MRS. DERIAN ENDED BY REFERRING TO THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS SUBMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE BY THE SUPREME COURT SAYING IT WAS MUCH ON PEOPLES MINDS AND THAT SHE WOULD BE GLAD WHEN ALL THIS WAS OVER. SHE SAID THAT THE REINSTATEMENT OF LEGAL PROCEDURES WOULD CERTAINLY HELP RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND STRESSED THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO RETURN TO NORMAL GOOD RELATIONS.

13. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADD COMMENTS AND SUGGEST DISTRIBUTION.: VANCE

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61.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 24, 1977, 1545Z

6281

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770306-0198. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Asunción, Montevideo, and Santiago.

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDIP, SHUM, AR, US
SUBJECT: ASST SEC TODMAN'S MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT VIDELA

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6127

1. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY CALLED ON
PRESIDENT VIDELA AT 1030 AM AUGUST 15.

2. PRESIDENT VIDELA EXPRESSED HIS WARM
WELCOME TO ASSTSEC TODMAN AND ASKED IF HE
HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK WITH ALL THOSE WHOM
HE HAD HOPED TO SEE IN ARGENTINA. VIDELA
WANTED HIM TO BE AWARE OF THE VIEWS OF A
WIDE RANGE OF ARGENTINES. HE HOPED AND
BELIEVED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS FAITHFULLY
INTERPRETING THE DESIRES OF THIS LARGE GROUP.

3. AS A BACKDROP TO CURRENT EVENTS, THE
PRESIDENT SKETCHED OUT RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY--THE

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PROGRESSIVE DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN THE 1969-75 PERIOD. BY THE END OF
1975 THERE WAS A POWER VACUUM AT THE CENTER OF
GOVERNMENT, BUT THERE WAS ALSO GREAT RELUCTANCE BY THE
ARMED FORCES TO INTERVENE IN VIEW OF THEIR PREVIOUS
EXPERIENCE. FINALLY, FACED WITH IMMINENT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
OF THE COUNTRY WHICH WOULD HAVE THROWN THOUSANDS OF
WORKERS ON THE STREETS, PREY TO PREVIOUSLY UNSUCCESSFUL
RECRUITING EFFORTS OF THE TERRORISTS, THE MILITARY HAD
TO TAKE OVER WHEN THE POLITICAL PARTIES ADMITTED THEY
WERE INCAPABLE OF RESOLVING THE SITUATION.

4. THE ARMED FORCES TAKEOVER WAS NOT JUST ANOTHER
PALACE COUP. IT WAS THE ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY THE
ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION. THEY DID SO RELUCTANTLY,
AND THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS EXCLUSIVELY TO GET THE COUNTRY
BACK ON THE TRACK. THEY HAD NO SECTARIAN OR PERSONAL
AMBITIONS. THEY WERE COMMITTED TO RETURNING THE
COUNTRY TO A THOROUGHLY REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. THEY
HAD MADE MUCH PROGRESS IN THE INTERVENING 16 MONTHS AND
HOPED WITHIN A SHORT TIME TO MAKE MORE AND TO DEMONSTRATE
SPECIFICALLY WHAT THIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO ACHIEVE.

5. ASSTSEC TODMAN NOTED THE PROGRESS MADE, THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

TERRORISM--GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS. HE STATED THAT THE BASIS OF THE TENSION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WAS THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION'S CONVICTION THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF A GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE--INDEED ITS SOLE PURPOSE--WAS HOW IT TREATED ITS OWN PEOPLE. WHERE IT APPEARED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED, WE FELT IMPELLED TO SPEAK UP. WE HAD RECEIVED MANY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GOA'S

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS WERE STRONGLY MOTIVATED TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST ANY SUCH ABUSES. THE USG APPRECIATED THE CRUCIAL SITUATION WHICH THE GOA FELT ITSELF TO BE IN BUT COULD NOT BE SUPPORTIVE WHEN SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT. HE SAID THAT THE POLITICIANS HE SAW SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO DO WHAT IT DID TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND THEY GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT AND FELT THE SITUATION IS GREATLY IMPROVING. THEY CONTEND THAT THE IMPROVEMENT IS SUCH THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOW RELAX RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

6. PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID HE WOULD NOT BE PICTURED AS ONE WHO IS UNCONCERNED ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF HIS CITIZENS. HE FELT THAT MAN, AS GOD'S WORK, MUST BE RESPECTED AND VIEWED AS THE PURPOSE OF SOCIETY. HE ARGUED THE GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATER NUMBER AND CHALLENGED ASSTSEC TODMAN TO FIND AN ARGENTINE WHO DISAGREED WITH

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
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TRSE-00 MCT-01 ERDA-05 OES-07 IO-13 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6281

HIM. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT PRETEND THAT THERE WERE NO EXCESSES BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN THEIR FIGHT AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME SCORE-SETTLING. HE SAID THAT WHAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE: PEACE UNDER THE LAW AND A MONOPOLY OF FORCE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT SEVERAL RECENT DRAMATIC DISAPPEARANCES, HE FREELY ADMITTED THAT AT THIS STAGE OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM THE PROBLEM WAS OF ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHICH--FRANKLY--WERE BEYOND THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL. THEY WERE WORKING HARD ON THIS AND SUCCESS WAS INDISPENSABLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES, BUT SO FAR THEY HAD NOT

SOLVED THE PROBLEM.

7. ASSTSEC TODMAN SAID THE GOA CANNOT EXPECT INTERNATIONAL RESPECT AND SUPPORT UNTIL INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED RULES OF BEHAVIOR ARE OBSERVED. HE HOPED WE COULD WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE GOA TO THIS END, BUT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD UNDERMINE ANY EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE GOA HAD MADE SUCH IMPRESSIVE STRIDES IN DEALING WITH

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TERRORISM THAT IT WOULD NOW BE SEEN AS A DEMONSTRATION OF STRENGTH IF THE GOA TOOK MEASURES WITH PRISONERS AND OTHER DETAINED PERSONS WHICH REFLECTED THAT STRENGTH. SUCH MEASURES MIGHT INCLUDE LISTS OF ALL PRISONERS NOW HELD, REINSTATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY OF REINSTITUTION OF THE RIGHT OF HABEAS CORPUS. THERE WERE SOME CASES IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL OPINION BECAME ESPECIALLY CONCERNED. HE CITED THE DETENTION OF JACOBO TIMERMAN WHICH HAD AWAKENED MUCH CONCERN BECAUSE IT INVOLVED PRESUMED ANTI-SEMITISM.

8. PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID HE THOROUGHLY REJECTED ANY IMPUTATION OF RACISM TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND SAID HE WAS THOROUGHLY DEDICATED TO PRINCIPLES WHICH DID NOT TOLERATE IT. TIMERMAN WAS NOT A VICTIM OF RACISM; HE IS SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT OF ECONOMIC CRIMES WITH GRAIVER, WHO IN TURN WAS INVOLVED WITH TERRORISTS. TIMERMAN WILL BE DEALT WITH BY JUSTICE, BUT THIS DOES NOT INVOLVE ANTI-SEMITISM.

9. ASSTSEC TODMAN EXPLAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S CONCERN ABOUT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND ASKED IF PRESIDENT VIDELA MIGHT GIVE HIS MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GOA REATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. SUCH ACTION WOULD BE AN EXAMPLE FOR THE HEMISPHERE.

10. PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID THAT THE GOA HAS ACCEPTED NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, WHICH IN PRACTICAL TERMS ARE MORE EXTENSIVE CONTROLS THAN THOSE OF THE NFZ TREATY WHICH HAS POLITICAL LIABILITIES FOR THE GOA. HE SAID QUOTE WE WILL LOOK AT THE SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND SEE IF ACCEPTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. END QUOTE

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11. ASSTSEC TODMAN NOTED THAT THE GOA HAS EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN A VARIETY OF DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED THAT THE GOA MIGHT DO SO AGAIN BY SIGNING THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS, TOO, WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO THE HEMISPHERIC CONCERN WITH THE ISSUE. PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID THAT RATIFICATION WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND HE WOULD SEE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE.

12. FOLLOWING AN EXCHANGE OF EXPRESSIONS OF FRIENDSHIP THE 65-MINUTE CONVERSATION ENDED.
CHAPLIN

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62.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, August 31, 1977

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand corner.

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5601

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

August 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*
SUBJECT: An Update of Human Rights
Developments in Argentina

I. Hopeful Developments

- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.
- Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.
- Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted Argentina's oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

II. Negative Developments

- Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems likely that the security forces were responsible.

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- In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military resentment against President Videla, who made a very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.
- The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of human rights, is being held by the government on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.
- At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

III. Conclusion

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy Buenos Aires recommends that we should await developments before further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully informed as events unfold.

ok
J

63.

Draft Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1977, 9 a.m.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina I. The meeting took place at the White House. Drafted by Chaplin. A typed note at the top of the memorandum reads, “Text has not been revised by the NSC.” No other record of this meeting has been found.

THIS HAS NOT BEEN REVISED BY THE NSC

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 9, 1977
TIME: 9:00 am
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: President Carter/President Videla Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS:

ARGENTINA

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla
President of Argentina
Oscar A. Montes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship
Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador
to the United States
Julio Cesar Carasales,
Ambassador to OAS
Enrique Quintana,
Chief of Protocol
Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid,
Aide-de-camp

US

President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have conversations about issues of common concern.

President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the opportunity to witness an event of such major importance as the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed that

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the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of one era but opens a new one in which the United States has demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America. He added that the Argentine presence was his government's effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which impeded close relations have always been overcome by the basic identity of interests of the two nations.

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest to understand he had ever heard - the President either chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of expressing himself. He found this typical of the Argentina which he and his wife had visited some years previously. President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina.

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion of two major issues with the objective of optimizing relations between the two nations.

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Non-Proliferation

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear technology - which is a great credit to Argentina - he hoped that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unrestricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction of nuclear explosives.

President Carter said that the United States, the European community, Canada and Australia were now evolving a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safeguards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology, heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation effort.

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President Carter said he understood that Argentina was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards but stressed the importance the United States places on the NFZ and the NPT.

President Videla responded by observing that the two countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power reactor is currently in use, a second under construction and a third in the planning phase. He understood President Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those which were really needed. However, he understood that even this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and the world.

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter must be aware of the great need for proper political timing of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from its gravest national crisis, so the government must be particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions permit

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- perhaps before the end of the year - he would give proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this reassured President Carter.

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference, it would be particularly exciting if it would be possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising this issue with the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification would also remove our concerns about technology and heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the interest of establishing a common export policy.

Human Rights

The political changes in Argentina have been given careful study by the American government, and recent developments there said President Carter, have impressed me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and the reconstruction of the

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Argentine economy. He said the study of the achievements of President Videla's government led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the security and the strength of the government would lead to the alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the observation of human rights in Argentina. The President stated he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human rights violations and noted the particularly high press interest in this subject in the United States. Certain cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that of editor Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have many relatives in the California area. He said that a Washington group concerned with the subject of human rights had provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina without public notice of their arrest or charges against them. The President acknowledged that some of these allegations may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list available so the State Department could provide it to President Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt that the friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue could come between the two countries. He felt that more progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said he personally admires and approves of what President Videla has been able to do for his country and asks what can be done to alleviate the concern in the

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United States (which, indeed, may have been exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina.

President Videla recounted the situation in which Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic, political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring values and human rights of which President Carter spoke. Those who recognized that man was created in God's image must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these misfortunes of war.

President Videla said that the war, while virtually over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla said there were incidents for which

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the government was responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He said, however, that he could not accept the image of a brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate his country from those other nations which shared its basic values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural friends such as the United States.

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within a short period the negative consequences of the repression would be eliminated.

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with dealing with subversive elements. He was not detained because of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been detained under the national executive power in the first year of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months.

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Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding.

President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent institutions and operated beyond the control of the executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated, it was turned over to the military or civilian courts or the individual was released. While for security reasons it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged with providing information to relatives about the possible detention and charges against family members.

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President Carter expressed his desire to help restore world appreciation of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped that President Videla would give the United States the opportunity to do so. As President, he said he knew how much opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the UN to visit Argentina, not in the sense of investigating events there, but to confirm the progress made by the GOA.

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed that facts were infinitely more important than words. The visits of Mr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and the Senators is the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the subversive underground, second, when a terrorist is killed by his associates who may suspect betrayal, third, terrorists were killed in battle and fourth, people were killed by excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility to eliminate it. He said he was not concerned about

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visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which can testify to the facts in Argentina.

President Videla regretted that it was necesesary to to devote the short time available to discussion of the two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number of important remaining bilateral issues which should be covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the consultations.

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the invitation for Secretary Vance to visit Argentina. President Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated this discussion, which would have to be ended because the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented President Videla with his book and a collection of satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated with expressions of mutual goodwill.

Drafted: Amembassy Buenos Aires - Charge Maxwell Chaplin:jc

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64.

Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to
Secretary of State Vance

Washington, September 15, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. Confidential. Sent through Benson. Drafted by Titus on September 8. Cleared in ARA/RPP/PM, PM, ACDA/WEC/ATE, and PM/MC and by Bumpus, L. Brown, and Lake. O. Jones was informed.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

7723639

S/S

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TO: The Secretary September 15, 1977
THROUGH: T - Lucy Wilson Benson LWB
FROM: PM - Leslie H. Gelb LHG

Arms Transfers to Argentina

Issue for Decision

Whether to authorize the sale to Argentina of MK-44 torpedoes, submarine periscopes, 3 Boeing CH-47C "Chinook" helicopters, 2 Lockheed KC-130 aerial tanker aircraft and various types of ammunition.

Essential Factors

On July 25 you approved a recommendation to limit denials of arms transfers to Argentina to those articles and services which could be used by police and other civil law enforcement agencies. You added, however, that you would review all proposals on a case by case basis.

We are submitting for your decision several sales proposals by U.S. firms and requests to purchase by Argentine military organizations. With the possible exception of light mortars, none of the items listed is known to have been used against urban or rural guerrillas, to have been otherwise involved in human rights violations in Argentina or to be potentially effective instruments of repression against individuals or small groups. Nonetheless, D/HA objects to the approval of most of these cases because there has been no improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina. D/HA is sending you a separate memorandum concerning its views on these proposed arms transfers. A legal brief is attached.

Cases to be Decided

No objections have been raised to approval of the following cases by PM, ARA, or ACDA.

1. Periscopes -- A Munitions List license application

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by Kollmorgen Corporation to export six sets of attack and search periscopes (12 periscopes in all) valued at \$4.4 million for installation in six new West German-built submarines.

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of the license.

Approve WC

Disapprove _____

2. Lockheed KC-130 Tanker Aircraft -- Lockheed has applied to the Office of Munitions Control for an advisory opinion on eventual approval of the sale of two aircraft if present Argentine Government interest in them results in a contract. Although an advisory opinion is not binding, its issuance anticipates eventual approval of any sale which might materialize. These planes would most likely be used to refuel aircraft involved in search and rescue operations and in Antarctic activities.

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of a favorable advisory opinion.

Approve WC, if delivery favorable before 12-1-75

Disapprove _____

3. Helicopters -- Responding to an Argentine Army request for a proposal, Boeing Vertol Division has applied to the Office of Munitions Control for an advisory opinion about the possible sale of 3 CH-47C Chinook logistic transport helicopters. Although an advisory opinion is not binding, its issuance anticipates eventual approval of any sale which might materialize. These aircraft, which are variously configured to carry 33-44 persons and equipment, are limited to transport functions. They cannot be used as "gunships".

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of a favorable advisory opinion.

Approve WC

Disapprove _____

4. Torpedoes -- An Argentine Navy request for cost and availability data for 18 Mark 44 torpedoes. These are acoustically guided anti-submarine torpedoes, which

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are being replaced in the USN inventory by more modern models.

Recommendation: That you approve the Argentine Navy request. *

Approve _____

Disapprove ~~_____~~ *Hold* ✓

5. Bombs and Artillery Ammunition -- Argentine Army, Navy and Air Force requests to purchase ammunition and ammunition components as follows:

- a. 15 projectiles, 5" 38mm-illuminating (for naval guns)
- b. 150 projectiles, 155mm-high explosive artillery
- c. 50 projectiles, 155mm-illuminating artillery
- d. 250 propelling charges for 155mm artillery projectiles
- e. 762 artillery fuses
- f. 750 artillery percussion primers
- g. 10,000 cartridges, 20mm electric (used to ignite charges in naval artillery)
- h. 10 bombs, 500lb. general purpose, MK-82, with retarding fins.

Recommendation: That you approve the sale of the medium artillery ammunition and bombs.

Approve _____

Disapprove ~~_____~~ *Hold* ✓

6. Cartridges -- The Argentine Navy wishes to buy the following:

- a. 50,000 cartridges, cal..50 ball (standard bullet), aircraft grade
- b. 30,000 cartridges, cal..50 tracer, aircraft grade
(above are probably for use in the A-4 aircraft)

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* for Coordination with other requests now pending.

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Recommendation: That you approve the sale of these cartridges.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____ ✓

7. Shells -- The Argentine Army wishes to buy the following:

- a. 550 shells, 4.2", 107mm-high explosive, for mortars
- b. 40 shells, 4.2". 107mm-illuminating, for mortars

Recommendation: That you approve the sale.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____ ~~Disapprove~~ Hold * ✓

Attachment: As stated.

Drafted: PM/SAS ^{for PM} Titus:rf
9/8/77 ext. 23876

Clearances: ARA/RPF/PM - LTC. Quigg ^{AMG}
ARA/ECA - JBumpus ^{AMG}
PM - Swinship ^{AMG}
ACDA/WEC/ATE - Watson ^{AMG}
D/HA - OJones (informed) ^{AMG}
T - LBrown ^{AMG}
PM/MC - BFeminella ^{AMG}
S/P - ALake ^{AMG}

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* See prior page.

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65.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, November 3, 1977, 1643Z

262832

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770405-0653. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Bumpus and in S/S-O, and approved by Zimmermann.

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DRAFTED BY TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:LK
APPROVED BY ARA:ECA:RWZIMMERMANN
ARA:ECA:JNBUMPUS
S/S-O:JETHYDEN

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PN, AR

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDELA FROM PRESIDENT CARTER

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIDELA ASAP.

BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: LET ME SAY AGAIN HOW
PLEASED I WAS TO MEET WITH YOU DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASH-
INGTON FOR THE SIGNING OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.
OUR CONVERSATION GAVE ME A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR
CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, WITH WHOM WE
WISH TO HAVE THE BEST OF RELATIONS.

2. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR COMMENT THAT WE
BOTH HAD THE SAME ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION -- AND THAT YOU SAW OPPORTUNITY FOR
PROGRESS ON BOTH. I SHARE THE SAME HOPES.

3. WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT ARGENTINA IS FREQUENTLY
CHARGED WITH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU WERE
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CERTAINLY CORRECT IN STATING THAT TERRORISTS HAVE SOUGHT
TO ISOLATE ARGENTINA IN THEIR PROPAGANDA. HOWEVER, I AM
CONFIDENT THAT SUCH PROPAGANDA WILL LOSE ITS FORCE IN THE
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS YOUR GOVERNMENT

DEMONSTRATES PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO
ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH IMPROVEMENTS.

4. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO VISITS BY HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIALISTS FROM RESPECTED
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH VISITS WILL BE AN
IMPORTANT MEANS OF EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION
ON IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA.

5. IN THIS REGARD, LET ME MENTION THE VERY IMPORTANT
ROLE PLAYED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS,
AND MY HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MY FIRM BELIEF THAT THEY
SHOULD RETAIN THEIR CONSULTATIVE STATUS AT THE UNITED
NATIONS.

6. I WELCOME YOUR EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE DETAINEE
PROBLEM MIGHT BE RESOLVED BY CHRISTMAS THIS YEAR. AS I
TOLD YOU, THERE IS GREAT INTEREST AND CONCERN IN THE

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNITED STATES OVER THE FATE OF PEOPLE DETAINED IN ARGENTINA UNDER THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER. THE CLARIFICATION OF THEIR STATUS WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, I BELIEVE, THROUGHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. LIKE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESTORATION OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION AND A PAROLE FOR DETAINEES, SUCH A CLARIFICATION WOULD BE ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP IN DEMONSTRATING ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

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7. I WAS MOST GRATIFIED AND PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. I REALIZE THAT THE TIMING OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION IS DEPENDENT UPON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE TREATY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ARGENTINA'S FULL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY WOULD HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE. IT WOULD NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATE ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY; IT WOULD ALSO, I AM CONVINCED, GIVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPETUS TO WORLD-WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY AS AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF AVOIDING WAR.

8. I WAS VERY PLEASED THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATED IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON. I BELIEVE IT WILL PROVIDE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR OUR NATIONS TO WORK WITH OTHERS IN MAKING NUCLEAR ENERGY AN IMPORTANT AND SAFE MEANS OF MEETING OUR ENERGY REQUIREMENTS.

9. MR. PRESIDENT, THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE ESTABLISHED IN WASHINGTON PROVIDED ME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE YOU. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH FRANKNESS AND CANDOR SO AS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GREAT PEOPLES.

10. IN THIS REGARD, I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE YOUR LETTERS OF SEPTEMBER 28 AND OCTOBER 11, 1977, AND THE INFORMATION WHICH YOU RELATED IN THE SECOND LETTER CONCERNING THE DEUTSCH FAMILY. AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE AND CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERN ON THIS MATTER IN MY COUNTRY.

11. IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER, SECRETARY VANCE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE.

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12. I WANT TO THANK YOU AND MRS. VIDELA FOR THE VERY KIND INVITATION TO ATTEND YOUR SON'S WEDDING, AND REGRET THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO ATTEND. PLEASE GIVE OUR CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES TO YOUR SON AND HIS BRIDE. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. END QUOTE. VANCE

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66.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, November 11, 1977, 2212Z

270937

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770419-1318. Confidential.
Drafted by Bumpus, cleared by McNeil and Oxman and in S/S, approved by Christopher.

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APPROVED BY D-MR. CHRISTOPHER
ARA:FJMCNEIL
D:SOXMAN
S/S:SRPVALERGA
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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLARA MEETING WITH DEPUTY
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

1. ARGENTINE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GUALTER ALLARA
ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL AND MINISTERS JUAN
CARLOS ARLIA AND MIGUEL ANGEL ESPECHE GIL CALLED ON DEPUTY
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ON NOVEMBER 4, 1977. AMBASSADOR
CASTRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCNEIL, SPECIAL ASST.
OXMAN, DESK OFFICER BUMPUS, AND INTERPRETER HERVAS ALSO
ATTENDED.

2. SUBSEQUENT TO INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, THE QUESTION OF THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT WAS DISCUSSED. MR. CHRISTOPHER POINTED
OUT THAT THE SECRETARY VERY MUCH WISHED TO MAKE HIS VISIT AS

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SCHEDULED BUT THAT SOME UNCERTAINTY OVER THE PRESIDENT'S
WORLD TRIP MIGHT CALL FOR SOME ADJUSTMENTS. HOWEVER, THE
ARGENTINES SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE, ASWE
ARE DOING, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY WILL VISIT
ARGENTINA ON NOVEMBER 21, 1977.

3. ALLARA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTY IN THE
SCHEDULING, BUT WISHED TO MAKE THE U.S. AWARE THAT THE

SECRETARY'S VISIT HAD CREATED GREAT ANTICIPATION IN
ARGENTINA. CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT WOULD CAUSE REAL
DIFFICULTIES AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON
THE VISIT. MR. CHRISTOPHER ASSURED THE ARGENTINES THAT THE
ARGENTINE CONCERNS WOULD BE STRONG FACTORS WHICH WOULD
MOTIVATE THE SECRETARY TO MAKE THE VISIT.

4. AT MR. CHRISTOPHER'S INVITATION, ALLARA DISCUSSED THE
SECRETARY'S AGENDA WHILE HE IS IN ARGENTINA. TERRORISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED ALONG WITH
A NUMBER OF OTHER TOPICS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER
WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN.

5. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS
FURTHER. DURING THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY
CONVERSATIONS WE HAD BEEN QUITE IMPRESSED WITH PRESIDENT

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VIDELA'S COMMITMENT TO CHANGE AND REFORM IN ARGENTINA. WE UNDERSTAND HIM TO BE DEDICATED TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WERE SORRY TO HEAR OF THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA BUT HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE WILL BE CONFINED TO THE LEGAL PROCESS. THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

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6. ALLARA POINTED OUT THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD SUFFERED TERRORIST AGGRESSION AND HAD BEEN FORCED TO RESORT TO EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE, BUT DESPITE THESE THE GOVERNMENT IS PLEDGED TO RETURN THE COUNTRY TO NORMALITY. THE U.S. SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA'S COMMITMENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO RETURN ARGENTINA FULLY TO THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SHORTEST PERIOD OF TIME REMAINS VALID.

7. MR. CHRISTOPHER STATED THAT SOME ACTIONS BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA DO STAND IN THE WAY OF BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED DISAPPEARANCES, DETAINEES AND THE DEUTSCH FAMILY. WE CONTINUE TO HEAR OF DISAPPEARANCES; WE HAD HOPED THAT INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE PROBLEM, BUT THEY APPARENTLY HAVE NOT. THE LARGE NUMBER OF DETAINEES, PRESIDENT VIDELA SAID SOME 4,000, IS ALSO A CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THE DEUTSCH CASE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST WHICH IS BEING CONCENTRATED ON ARGENTINA. THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY HAS BEEN VERY INTERESTED IN THE FATE OF THE FAMILY. IT WOULD BE A VERY GOOD CASE TO RESOLVE.

8. ALLARA RESPONDED THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE AWARE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSED DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT PROBABLY CREATED MORE PROBLEMS THAN WERE MERITED. THE ARGENTINES HAVE TRIED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO REACH A CONCLUSION. SOME PEOPLE GO UNDERGROUND TO JOIN THE TERRORISTS, OTHERS TO ILLEGALLY LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND SOME "DISAPPEAR" TO ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMON CRIMES. MOREOVER, ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WHO HAVE COMMITTED EXCESSES ARE BEING PUNISHED AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS INVESTIGATING ALL ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCES. EIGHTY PER CENT OF THE REPORTED DISAPPEARANCES HAD OCCURRED BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN

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1976.

9. CONCERNING THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, ALLARA SAID THAT THREE OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD BEEN RELEASED BUT TWO WOULD BE TRIED BECAUSE THEY WERE SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY TIES TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AS WAS THE BROTHER, DANIEL, WHO HAD LEFT ARGENTINA. ALLARA USED THE DEUTSCH CASE TO DENY ACCUSATIONS THAT ANTI-SEMITISM EXISTED IN ARGENTINA. THE GOVERNMENT REPRESSED ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE AND HAD MADE IT A CRIME TO INCITE RACIAL HATRED. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH LEADING JEWISH CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS. JEWS WHO ARE PROSECUTED IN ARGENTINA ARE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURTS BECAUSE THEY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE JEWS.

10. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WANTED THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TO KNOW

THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUT THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC WHO WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF ACTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WANTED ALLARA TO KNOW THE GREAT SYMBOLIC VALUE THE CASE HAD IN THE U.S.

11. ALLARA SAID THE ARGENTINES WERE VERY AWARE OF THE SYMBOLIC VALUE; PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD WRITTEN PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT THE FAMILY. ARGENTINA UNDERSTOOD U.S. CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HAS DONE MUCH TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION THERE. HOWEVER, NOT ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS BUT ALSO TERRORISM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. TERRORISM HAS SPANNED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS; PLANE HIJACKINGS VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE PASSENGERS. THE UN RECENTLY PASSED A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING HIJACKING, BUT WE NEED MORE SUCH MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM. DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE

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AGREED FULLY WITH THE MINISTER'S CONCERN WITH HIJACKING. WE MUST WORK TO GET ALL STATES TO RATIFY THE ANTI-HIJACKING CONVENTION.

12. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE WISHED TO INTRODUCE A HAPPIER NOTE; HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ADVISE SECRETARY VANCE THAT WE SHOULD ISSUE A LICENSE FOR THE EXPORT OF PERISCOPES TO ARGENTINA. FAVORABLE ADVISORY OPINIONS ON THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT OF CHINOOK HELICOPTERS AND LOCKHEED C-130S HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN. THESE ACTIONS WERE AN INDICATION OF OUR FAITH IN PRESIDENT VIDELA'S MODERATION AND OUR HOPE THAT THE ROCKY RELATIONS WE HAVE HAD ARE NOW IMPROVING.

13. ALLARA SPOKE OF HIS CONCERN OVER THE LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT--ESPECIALLY SPARE PARTS AND FMS ITEMS FOR WHICH ARGENTINA HAD ALREADY PAID. THESE LIMITATIONS WERE CAUSING REAL DIFFICULTIES. THE ARGENTINES HAD HOPED THAT THE SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL U.S. OFFICIAL VISITS WHICH HAD BEGUN IN MARCH WOULD HAVE CONVINCED THE U.S. THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT.

14. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO SEE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ON THE ARGENTINE AGENDA FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. PRESIDENT CARTER PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. THE U.S. DOES NOT WISH TO KEEP COUNTRIES FROM EXPLOITING NUCLEAR ENERGY, BUT WE DO WANT TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PRESENT A GRAVE DANGER FOR THE WORLD. WE WANT TO SEE ARGENTINA USING NUCLEAR POWER, BUT AVOIDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND REPROCESSING. THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS FOR ARGENTINA TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO AND AGREE TO FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE SECRETARY WOULD PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WHEN HE WAS IN ARGENTINA.

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15. ALLARA SAID THAT NUCLEAR TOPICS WERE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO ARGENTINA, WHICH WAS A LEADER AMONG THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN NUCLEAR MATTERS FOR OVER 30 YEARS. ARGENTINA HAD DEVELOPED ITS NUCLEAR CAPACITY FOR PEACEFUL ENDS AND IT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE ARGENTINES DO NOT WANT TO DISTURB THE POWER BALANCE IN THE AREA BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. ALLARA SAID THAT ARGENTINA WAS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF

ITS POLICY ON THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND THAT HE SAW VIRTUALLY NO IMPEDIMENT TO ARGENTINA'S RATIFYING IT. THE ARGENTINES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WHEN THE SECRETARY IS IN BUENOS AIRES.

16. MR. CHRISTOPHER THANKED ALLARA FOR THIS GOOD NEWS ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS TO RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THE

THOUGHTFUL AND CANDID CONVERSATION WHICH THEY HAD HELD. THIS TYPE OF EXCHANGE STRENGTHENED RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. PROBLEMS EXIST BUT THEY MUST BE DISCUSSED, NOT AVOIDED. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN BE RESOLVED. VANCE

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67.

Briefing Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, November 19, 1977

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL November 16–30 1977. Confidential. Sent through Lake. Drafted on November 18 by Feinberg.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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November 19, 1977

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/P - Anthony Lake
FROM: S/P - Richard Feinberg

President Videla: An Alternative View

A common view has been that President Videla would gradually but effectively move to improve the human rights situation in Argentina, and that he also represented the best hope for Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. If these views appeared probable when General Videla assumed the Presidency in March, 1976, a year and a half later, they are increasingly difficult to support. It is widely agreed that the GOA is failing to improve its human rights performance, and Videla is unlikely to counter his advisers who are opposed to ratifying Tlatelolco.

Videla probably has good instincts on human rights, but several fundamental factors are preventing him from taking effective action:

--He adheres to the "clandestine war" doctrine, which argues that subversion must be countered with illegal measures. He also accepts that this illegal war be waged in a decentralized manner, with local captains and commanders acting largely on their own. This makes it impossible for the top generals, including the junta, to effectively control the security forces--but does provide the junta members with plausible deniability.

--Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between terrorism and dissent. The loose application of the term "subversive" to the government's enemies has encouraged the security forces to strike not just at

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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terrorists but at a wide range of civilian opinion. Certainly less than half of the prisoners and disappeared persons (estimated by human rights groups at 15,000) were active terrorists; some estimates place the figure at under 15%.

Videla is closely tied to his minister of economics, Martinez de Hoz, whose austere economic policies have hit the middle and working classes very hard. These policies, which have successfully improved Argentina's external accounts, have failed to bring the rate of inflation under 100%. As the government now moves to attack inflation through stringent monetary measures, economic discontent will mount, as a recent wave of strikes foretells. Mounting popular discontent threatens to provoke further official repression. However well intended Videla may be, he will be hard put to fail to take the necessary political measures required by his economic policies.

--Videla's own personality and governing style is to seek a cautious consensus, in order to attain the central objective of maintaining unity of the armed forces. Therefore, even though the moderates in the military are numerically superior and could probably win in a showdown with the hardliners, they are less aggressive in putting their views forward. Videla prefers to accede sufficiently to right-wing pressures rather than risk a rift in the military. In the most recent promotion cycle, Videla apparently failed to make a serious effort to retire certain key hardliners.

These very basic elements help explain why Videla's performance on guaranteeing the security of his citizenry has been--and is likely to continue to be--disappointing.

The presence of Videla and other moderates has probably inhibited the hardliners from attempting to mount an all-out war on "intellectual and economic subversion," i.e., dissenters of all stripes, "speculators,"

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tax evaders, etc. Nevertheless, the numbers of dead, disappeared, tortured and jailed are so high as to have directly touched a large percentage of Argentine families.

Drafted by: S/P:RFeinberg:ejg
x20822, 11/18/77

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68.

Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House

Buenos Aires, November 22, 1977, 0025Z

Secto 11012

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0545. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of State. Vance was in Argentina November 20-22.

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PAGE 01 SECTO 11012 01 OF 03 220226Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BUENOS AIRES
TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTO 11012

NODIS/CHEROKEE

WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND DR BRZEZINSKI ONLY;
DEPARTMENT FOR HABIB AND TARNOFF ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN BUENOS AIRES

1. DURING A SERIES OF LONG AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA, AND FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES, WE REACHED BREAKTHROUGHS IN TWO AREAS OF PRINCIPAL INTEREST. THE ARGENTINES AGREED TO A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. THIS WILL BE CONTAINED IN A COMMUNIQUE BEING ISSUED THIS EVENING. THEY ALSO AGREED IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO LANGUAGE STATING THAT ALL GOVERNMENTS WHICH ADHERED TO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR PEOPLE. TO RESPECT INTEGRITY OF PERSONS AND THE RULE OF THE LAW.

2. IN COMPLETELY PRIVATE MEETINGS, VIDELA REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO YOU, WHICH HE SAID HE HAS ALSO MADE TO THE CHURCH, TO RELEASE SIGNIFICANT NUMBER (WELL OVER 500) PRISONERS AND TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL DETAINEES BEFORE

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CHRISTMAS, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, THE ARGENTINES HAVE AGREED TO PERMIT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF RED CROSS (ICRC) TO RESUME VISITS TO PLACES OF DETENTION. THE LATTER CANNOT BE PUBLICLY STATED. I URGED VIDELA TO GET THE ICRC'S PERMISSION TO MAKE THIS PUBLIC. I ALSO URGED HIM TO INVITE IN THE ICRC OR OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCY IN CASES WHERE TORTURE IS CHARGED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION. THEY WILL TAKE THIS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ALSO REPUDIATES INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND AGREES ON THE NECESSITY FOR MULTILATERAL COOPERATION INT THIS AREA. WE ALSO AGREED TO REACTIVE THE MIXED COMMISSION TO DISCUSS ECONOMIC SUBJECTS.

4. ON SPECIFIC CASE OF JACOB TIMMERMAN, ARGENTINES TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT THEY HAD EVIDENCE HE WAS LINKED WITH HANDLING OF FUNDS FROM TERRORIST SOURCES AND IS SUBJECT TO CIVIL CHARGES. THEY SHOWED ME A CONFIDENTIAL FILE INDICATING DEUTSCH ASSISTED IN THE ESCAPE OF HIS SON, WHO WAS HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE OF COMMUNIST OPERATIONS, AND THAT HIS DAUGHTER IS ALSO INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES HERE. THEY EXPECT THE FATHER WILL BE RELEASED BY THE COURTS, BUT NOT HIS DAUGHTER. I AM NOT SANGUINE THAT EITHER MR TIMMERMAN OR MISS DEUTSCH WILL BE RELEASED DESPITE OUR URGING.

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5. IN MEETING WITH JEWISH LEADERS LATER, THEY STRESSED THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT OFFICIALLY ANTI-SEMITIC, BUT THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ANTI-SEMITES IN GOVERNMENT OVER WHOM GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE TO EXERCISE FULL CONTROL.

6. DURING OUR MEETINGS, I STRESSED THAT THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS IS THE

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HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA, AND THAT UNLESS THAT SITUATION IMPROVES OUR RELATIONS WILL WORSEN, PARTICULARLY AFTER A CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT IMPOSES AN ARMS EMBARGO BEGINNING IN OCTOBER. MY SENSE IS THAT VIDELA AND SOME OTHERS AROUND HIM ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE SITUATION, BUT THERE STILL REMAINS MUCH FOR THEM TO DO TO AMELIORATE THE SITUATION.

7. OUR VIEWS GENERALLY COINCIDED WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST, ON WHICH THEY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, AND ON VARIOUS NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, WHERE WE AGREED ARGENTINA COULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL FALLING AS IT DOES BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED AND LESSER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

8. ARGENTINES WERE DEMONSTRABLY, EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE FACT OF THE VISIT AND THE NATURE OF OUR CONVERSATIONS, WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

VANCE
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Omitted here is the text of the joint communiqué (20 paragraphs).

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69.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, December 14, 1977, 1930Z

9523

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465-1125. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 09523 142127Z
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 HA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 PM-03 L-01
H-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 PRS-01 PA-01
USIA-01 /047 W

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P 141930Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3710

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS SHUM, AR
SUBJECT DETAINED OR ABDUCTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 9420; STATE 295886

1. AMBASSADOR RAISED MATTER OF RECENTLY
DETAINED OR ABDUCTED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
FROM MOTHERS OF PLAZA DE MAYO GROUP DURING
SOCIAL OCCASION WITH ADMIRAL MASSERA EVENING
DECEMBER 12, DURING COURTESY CALL ON MINISTER
OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ EARLIER ON THE SAME
DAY, AND ON DECEMBER 13 WITH CHIEF OF THE ARMY
STAFF GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA. WE ARE CERTAIN
VIOLA WILL TELL PRESIDENT VIDELA OF US CONCERN
OVER THIS INCIDENT.
2. MASSERA PROFESSED NOT TO HAVE KNOWN OF
EVENT UNTIL TOLD BY AMBASSADOR. HE THEN REFUSED
TO REGISTER SURPRISE SINCE--IN HIS WORDS--THIS
SORT OF MUDDLED, ILL-JUDGED CAPER IS WHAT ONE HAS COME
TO EXPECT OF THE ARMY. VIOLA KNEW OF INCIDENT BUT DIS-
CLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABDUCTIONS' ORIGINS AND/OR

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 09523 142127Z

INTENTIONS. HE CONFIDED THAT HE HAS MADE AND WILL
CONTINUE TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO DISCOVER WHO
AUTHORED AND CARRIED OUT THE EVENT BUT SO FAR HAS
NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. VIOLA WENT ON TO SPECULATE THAT

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SOME "OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION" OF THE ABDUCTIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE, HINTING THUS HIS BELIEF THAT ANOTHER MILITARY SERVICE (READ NAVY) HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE. MARTINEZ DE HOZ--AND ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER KLIX, TO WHOM THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED AT A SOCIAL OCCASION WITH A LARGER GROUP OF PEOPLE--TOOK THE HARD LINE THAT THIS IS BUT A NEW DIRTY INCIDENT IN AN OLD DIRTY WAR, ESSENTIALLY JUSTIFYING THE ABDUCTION AS HAVING PROPER SECURITY MOTIVATION EVEN WHILE DISCLAIMING KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

3. PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOTHERS' PROTEST MOVEMENT SPECULATE THAT THE ABDUCTION-DETENTION MIGHT HAVE BEEN STAGED TO DETER A LARGE PRE-CHRISTMAS DEMONSTRATION AT THE PLAZA DE MAYO SLATED FOR TOMORROW DECEMBER 15. IF THIS IS THE CASE THEN THEY EXPECT THE DETAINED GROUP TO REAPPEAR OVER THE WEEKEND, MONDAY AT LATEST. IF THIS FAILS TO TAKE PLACE THEN CLEARLY THE INCIDENT WILL TAKE ON EXTRAORDINARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE HISTORY OF DISAPPEARANCES IN ARGENTINA.

4. BUENOS AIRES HERALD--WHICH IS STILL THE ONLY LOCAL PAPER THAT HAS COVERED THE DISAPPEARANCES--REPORTED TODAY DECEMBER 14 THAT THE EMBASSY OF FRANCE HAS PROTESTED THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO NUNS WORKING FOR A FRENCH MISSIONARY ORDER HERE. THE FIRST, SISTER ALICIA (NEE ANA MARIA DOMON), A NATURALIZED ARGENTINE, WAS MENTIONED IN THE BUENOS AIRES REFTEL AMONG THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED FROM THE CHURCH OF SANTA CRUZ. THE SECOND, A SISTER LEONIE (NEE RENEE DUQUET) IS REPORTED TO HAVE

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 09523 142127Z

BEEN TAKEN OVER THE PAST WEEKEND BY FOUR MEN DRIVING AN UNMARKED, US-MADE CAR. SISTER ALICIA IS REPORTED TO HAVE WORKED WITH A MONSIGNOR NOVAK IN THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT, WHILE SISTER LEONIE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BISHOP OF SAN JUSTO, MONSIGNOR CARRERAS, AT THE CHAPEL OF SAN PABLO IN RAMOS MEJIA. THE HERALD GAVE AGES OF ALICIA AND LEONIE AS 40 AND 61, RESPECTIVELY.

5. WE WILL PURSUE OUR INQUIRIES, OF COURSE, INCLUDING AT FOREIGN MINISTRY.
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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70.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, December 30, 1977, 1715Z

310191

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780003-0409. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Rondon, cleared for information by Oxman and O. Jones and in EB/ITP/EWT and H, approved by Zimmermann.

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PAGE 01 STATE 310191
ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 HA-05 EB-08 H-01 MCE-00
ABF-01 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IGA-02 AID-05 ACDA-12 PM-05
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DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA:PERONDON:JC
APPROVED BY ARA/ECA:RWZIMMERMANN
D:SOXMAN (INFO)
HA:EOJONES (INFO)
EB/ITA/EWT/PBLAKEBURN (INFO)
H:DGELBER (INFO)

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ESTC, MASS, MILI, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: SALES TO ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

1. DEPARTMENT HAS AUTHORIZED EXPORT OF PONTOON BRIDGES AND RECOMMENDED TO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE APPROVAL OF BELL COMMERCIAL HELICOPTERS. ALTHOUGH ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN ADVISED OF ACTION, POST ALSO MAY WISH TO ADVISE GOA OF U.S. ACTION ON THESE CASES, WHICH SERVE AS EVIDENCE OF USG INTEREST IN A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA - ONE WHICH WE HOPE WILL EVOLVE FAVORABLY AS HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVES.

2. ON DECEMBER 19, ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR APPEALED TO ARA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCNEIL FOR PROMPT ACTION
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PAGE 02 STATE 310191

ON EXPORT OF PONTOON BRIDGES, HELICOPTERS AND NEPTUNE AIRCRAFT.

3. ON DECEMBER 20, DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZED EXPORT OF ALMOST \$3 MILLION IN ALUMINUM PONTOON BRIDGES. THESE ITEMS HAD BEEN PURCHASED UNDER FMS AND PAID FOR IN FULL.

4. ON DECEMBER 27, SALE OF 8 COMMERCIALY CONFIGURED BELL HELICOPTERS TO AIR FORCE WAS APPROVED IN DEPARTMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. WE UNDERSTAND THESE HELICOPTERS WILL BE USED INTER ALIA FOR RESCUE PURPOSES, AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT ARGENTINA BECAME VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ITS DEFICIENCY IN HELICOPTERS DURING NOVEMBER EARTHQUAKE RELIEF EFFORTS AS WELL AS AUSTRAL AIRLINES CRASH RESCUE OPERATIONS. FURTHERMORE, ARGENTINES AGREED TO DELETION OF ARMOR AND COLLINS KIT WHICH HAD PLACED HELICOPTERS PREVIOUSLY ON MUNITIONS LIST, AND ASSURED US THAT THE HELICOPTERS "WOULD BE USED FOR CUSTOMARY AIR FORCE PURPOSES."

5. DECISION ON NEPTUNE AIRCRAFT FOR CANNIBALIZING WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CHRISTOPHER

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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71.

Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, January 28, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Memos from WC to Bureaus, 1978, 4 of 5. Secret. Drafted by McNeil and Rondon on January 27.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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JAN 28

TO: The Deputy Secretary
FROM: ARA - John A. Bushnell *JB* Acting
SUBJECT: Is the Argentine Navy on the Side of the
Angels?

You requested our thoughts on whether Argentine Navy Commander Massera may not be one of the villains in the Argentine drama, after all.

Massera has worked actively of late to foster the notion that he is the most democratic member of the Argentine ruling junta and the one who would show the greatest respect for human rights. He has gone out of his way to befriend union leaders, Peronist politicians and Jewish leaders. He has also made it a point to tell visiting American officials that his Navy is innocent of wrongdoing because it has only a peripheral role in counter-terrorism. But this is nonsense. Massera's 1,000 man marine force is among the most active of the counter-terrorist forces. We have quite credible reports that the Navy has been responsible for repression against priests, and that the Navy Mechanics School in Buenos Aires has been used as a torture center. None of these activities could escape Massera's knowledge because of all the services in Argentina, Massera's is the most tightly controlled.

On the other hand, Massera is the most astute and ambitious of the Junta members, and smart enough to realize that a public stance on behalf of human rights will enhance his chances to become Argentina's President when he retires from the Navy (possibly late this year). It appears that Massera would like to seduce Argentina's labor unions and the Peronist Party into supporting him,

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(GDS)

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Authority NND 52947

By JG/NARA Date 4-18-11

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much as Peron (no democrat, either) courted labor in the forties. This explains Massera's public opposition to the belt-tightening policies of the Economy Minister, who is at once anathema to labor and closely linked to Videla.

Human rights aside, Massera is, or affects to be, a jingoist. He ordered the Navy to fire against Russian trawlers last fall in an action which caused casualties and had not been approved by Videla. And he seems to have flirted with the notion of a grandstanding military action against Chile in the Beagle Channel in an effort to curry nationalist favor. He has not shared Videla's desire for a close relationship with the United States, and had privately criticized Videla's attendance at the Panama treaty signing and indicated that Argentina should not accommodate to us on the nuclear issue.

The prevailing Argentine view is that Massera is a strong leader, not usually said of Videla, but that he is unprincipled. What militates most against Massera's ambitions is that the Army, which cares little for Massera, is by far the most important military force. At all events, the image which he seems to be successfully cultivating in some quarters does not exactly accord with the facts as we know them.

We have asked Embassy Buenos Aires for further comment.

ARA:FMcNEIL/ARA/ECA:FRondon:jd
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72.

Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 6, 1978

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA weekly meetings, 1978.
Secret. Drafted by Heavner.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ARA/INR/CIA Weekly Meeting, February

PARTICIPANTS: ARA - Assistant Secretary Todman, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Bushnell; CIA [REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 3.5(c) [REDACTED], INR/DDC -
Ted Heavner

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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No Human Rights Moderates in Argentine Regime. Respond-
ing to an earlier inquiry from Ambassador Todman, [REDACTED]
E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) [REDACTED] has now filed a report on

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the human rights attitudes of the Argentine military leadership. He said the report indicates there are no moderates there on the question of using harsh methods against subversives. All the military leaders are in agreement that they must use rough methods to control subversives. The references we had heard to "curbing excesses" meant only that the regime will not tolerate use of the campaign against subversives as a cover for settling personal grudges.

Ted Heavner
Ted Heavner
INR/DDC

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sp

73.

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman)
to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, February 15, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. Confidential. Drafted on February 14 by Rondon; cleared in draft in EB/IFD/ODF, S/P, and the Department of the Treasury and by Bova. Rondon initialed for all the clearing officials.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

FEB 15 1978

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NOT REVIEWED BY S/S

TO: The Deputy Secretary
FROM: ARA - Terence A. Rodman
SUBJECT: U. S. Reaction in IFIs to Argentine Human Rights Actions

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether recent human rights actions by Argentina are sufficient grounds for revising your earlier decision to vote against two Argentine loans in the World Bank, now scheduled for a vote on February 21.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

A vote is expected on February 21 on two Argentine projects which, before the developments outlined below, you decided to vote against: a \$109 million silo project in the IBRD and a \$9 million cement plant loan in the International Finance Corporation. The Argentine Ambassador has mentioned publicly that the silo project was developed after discussions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, referring to our possibly negative position on it as an indication of mixed and confusing positions being taken by the U.S. government. Even if we follow current instructions on voting, we need to know what to say to Argentine feelers about our response to human rights actions which they believe are positive.

A progress report on the human rights situation in Argentina was sent to the Department by our Embassy on February 7 and is attached.

-- Prisoner releases. Approximately 440 prisoners have been released from the state of siege powers of the Argentine Executive since December 20, 1977.

-- Prisoner lists. On February 3, in a significant, long sought after step, Argentina published a list of 705 state of siege prisoners. A second list of 795 prisoners appeared on February 13; further lists are expected.

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-- Right of option. Our Embassy believes that the right of option program, whereby prisoners may opt for exile, is now "definitely" being implemented, and the Argentine government has told foreign embassies that it will cooperate in helping prisoners meet visa requirements. The Embassy has underscored the importance of this measure to prisoner releases.

-- Treatment of prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross resumed prison visits in December and has reported that political prisoners are being held in the same physical conditions as other prisoners. This is an improvement.

-- U. S. interest cases. The Argentines have authorized the departure of certain high U. S. interest cases recently, including Guillermo Vogler and one of the Panero sisters.

-- Intangibles. The attached cable reports that the Argentines are becoming more "sensitized" to the importance of human rights steps and are no longer "stone-walling" the subject. The cable states also that there is an attempt underway to reorganize counter-subversive forces in order to achieve tighter control over them by the central government.

On the other hand, and as the same cable reports, there continue to be many problems. While disappearances may have declined in 1977, more recently they appear to have run at the same rate as a year before. According to our Embassy, it has heard of 39 disappearances since December 1, including two French nuns and mothers of the disappeareds who were abducted without a trace in mid-December. The Embassy adds that reports of secret detention centers persist, and that there is no evidence to suggest that torture for information is no longer practiced. In addition, the GOA admits that it is holding over 3600 prisoners under executive detention. Human rights groups estimate that many thousands more are being held secretly, in non-official detention centers. To date the GOA has answered few of our requests for information on missing persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross has not visited military camps where unaccounted for prisoners may be under detention. Few.

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- 3 -

prisoners have been released by the right of option program to date. In the case of high U. S. interest cases such as Timerman or Deutsch, they remain detained. Internationally, the Argentine government has mounted a campaign in the United Nations against Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

However you decide to handle this issue, our response will come very shortly after Under Secretary Benson decided against the sale of any further military training to Argentina. This means that we have continued to get progressively tougher with Argentina.

Under Public Law 95-118 (FY 1978 IFI authorizing legislation), opposition to a loan may consist of either a no vote or an abstention. Neither of the proposed options recommend support for Argentine loans at this time.

THE OPTIONS

1. Follow current instructions but acknowledge change privately. We would advise the Argentines that we decided to vote no on the \$109 million silo loan and the \$9 million cement plant because of continuing concern with the human rights situation in Argentina. We would note that improvements in human rights will be factored into the stance we take on future projects. We would acknowledge privately, however, to both the Argentine and other bank directors that we have noted favorable signs and express the hope that they indicate a new trend.

Pro:

-- This would demonstrate our ongoing serious concern over continuing disappearances and other human rights abuses but inject an element of hope into our IFI voting pattern in return for further human rights performance. We would not run the risk of suggesting that we are willing to alter our policies in response to minor improvements.

Con:

-- This would fail to recognize sufficiently or encourage actively Argentine human rights change, which may seem minimal to us but is important in the Argentine view of things. It risks signaling, especially when we have just decided to deny all military training requests, that we remain opposed adamantly to the government, and in the context of our posture, our action might not only serve as a

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human rights disincentive but impact negatively on other major interests, notably non-proliferation.

2. Abstain on both loans. We would inform the Argentines that their recent steps will affect our stance on the two loans, but we would not be more explicit prior to the votes. We would abstain on the loans, and explain privately to the Argentines and interested Bank members that our stance was taken in recognition of recent positive signs, emphasizing the need for further steps leading toward overall improvement in what remains a poor situation.

Pro:

-- This represents a prompt revision of our earlier negative stance in the IFIs, signaling our willingness to change as the Argentines change. It could also: a) help to stem human rights regression, because the Argentines would not wish to precipitate a return to no votes in the banks and, b) it would strengthen the hand of those in the government who are seeking human rights improvement and who would be able to point to our action as indicating acknowledgment of steps being taken.

Con:

-- The publication of two lists and some prisoner releases represent only the beginning of what is needed for real improvement in the human rights situation; to reverse our position with alacrity would undermine the seriousness with which we have viewed past violations, including very recent disappearances.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 2 to abstain on both the silo and cement projects, and privately explain our votes in terms of Argentine human rights steps (favored by ARA, S/P, Treasury, and the U. S. Director to the IBRD).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 1, (favored by HA) maintaining your earlier decision to oppose the

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two projects but authorize representations to the Argentines recognizing hopeful human rights developments.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Attachment:

Cable - Buenos Aires 965

Drafted: ARA/ECA:FERhondon:jc
2/14/78:x22401

should be
EB/IFD/ODF

Concurrences: EB/OF:FNash (draft)/ME
S/P:JWalker (draft)/ME
HA:MBova (draft)/ME
Treasury:WEscoube (draft)/ME

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74.

Note From the Deputy Executive Secretary of State (Wisner) to Secretary of State Vance
Washington, undated

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. No classification marking.

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Mr. Vance :

The issue here is whether to take a new look at the enormous backlog of Argentine arms transfer cases, with a view toward making selected approvals as an explicit "carrot" for Argentine human rights reform and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Harold Brown has suggested in his letter to you that we do this. PM, S/P, ARA, and L agree with Brown's suggestion and have identified certain categories of spare parts and safety equipment that they think we should approve. These approvals would be given to Argentina with a request for significant human rights reforms to be made before October 1 (the Congressional-mandated cut-off date for further sales to Argentina) and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco before the SSOD. Argentina would be told that no further approvals could be made until these conditions were met.

H also agrees that we should make some approvals, but proposes an alternative method of deciding which to make. There is a "grandfather clause" in the Congressional cut-off legislation which would allow us to go forward with those cases where contracts or LOAs were signed before August 4, 1977. PM, ARA, S/P argue against this approach, because it would allow some large end-item cases to go, which they think should be held, and it would not allow some essential spare parts for items we have recently approved. They also suspect that the total dollar value of approvals made by the H-proposed method might be larger than the categories of cases they proposed for approval.

HA is very much opposed to any approvals until Argentina has made meaningful human rights reforms. They have a considerable body of Congressional opinion on their side.

Harold Brown has also recommended that we approve training for some 68 Argentine officers. This has already been decided against within the Department, but not yet

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communicated to the Argentines. Opinion is split: one side argues that training is the last thing we should cut off, so long as those involved have not been guilty of human rights violations; the other side argues that training should be cut, at least for now, because of the domestic political controversy about human rights abuses by military officers.

The key consideration is whether our willingness to provide some of these spares as evidence of our continued interest in maintaining good relations with the Argentine military will indeed work to produce any "human rights" benefits in Argentina, or a more tractable Argentine position on nuclear non-proliferation. We have no firm evidence either way, except that they are moving very close to ratification of Tlatelolco right now.

PM, ARA, S/P, and I believe that with time running out on military sales decisions, this "card" is worth playing. The Argentines may do nothing in which case they will have gotten much-needed spare parts without having to put up anything in advance. But their need for spare parts will continue and they will clearly be mortgaging any prospects for further approvals on our part if they show no response, a point we would make clearly to them in communicating our decision.

Because of the very intense domestic political interest in Argentine human rights abuses, we must be well prepared to explain the rationale behind and nature of approvals on these cases, should you make them. There is a question of whether to consult interested members of Congress before or after making the decision. At any rate, no decision should be announced until after the President's trip.

The recommendations are at pp. 6-8. This memo, although long, is the most concise statement yet produced of the issue and the various positions, and it is the only one that has proposed specific solutions. Whatever your decision, someone will be unhappy.

Frank

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75.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, April 7, 1978, 0108Z

89468

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149-1018. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Schneider, McNeil, and Zimmermann; approved by Bushnell.

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ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 SCS-06 SY-05 MCT-01 AID-05 PC-01 /091 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA:JBUMPUS:BP
APPROVED BY ARA:JBUSHNELL
HA:MSCHNEIDER
ARA:FMCNEIL
ARA/ECA:RWZIMMERMANN

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 089468

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, BR

SUBJECT: REPORT OF NUNS DEATH

REF: BA 2346

1. DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED WITH DEEPEST CONCERN REPORTS OF MURDER OF TWO NUNS AND FIVE OTHER WOMEN PICKED UP IN DECEMBER ABDUCTIONS.

2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES WE MUST ACT FORCEFULLY NOW TO MAKE GOA AWARE OF OUR OUTRAGE AT SUCH ACTS. ARGENTINES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AS LONG AS SUCH DISAPPEARANCES OCCUR OUR RELATIONS WILL BE PLACED UNDER GREAT STRAIN, EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE TO RESPECT VIDELA'S EXPRESSED PERSONAL INTENTIONS.

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3. ACCORDINGLY, AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA TO EXPRESS U.S. SHOCK AT THE REPORTED DEATHS OF SEVEN WOMEN. FAILURE OF REMAINDER TO APPEAR ON PEN LISTS HEIGHTENS OUR CONCERN. AMBASSADOR SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS COME AT AN ESPECIALLY UNFORTUNATE TIME. THERE HAD BEEN SOME MODEST BUT POSITIVE STEPS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES HAD RESPONDED TO THESE WITH POSITIVE ACTIONS. WE HAD MOVED FROM "NO" VOTES ON IFI LOANS TO ABSTENTIONS ON THE LAST TWO LOANS AND HAD APPROVED THE SALE OF SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT. OUR POSITIVE ACTIONS WILL BE HARD TO MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE REPORTED DEATHS OF THE SEVEN WOMEN. TO OFFSET THE VERY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION CAUSED BY THE SEVEN DEATHS -- AND THE PRESUMPTIVE DEATHS OF THE OTHER 6 "MADRES" -- ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER VISIBLE PROGRESS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA.

4. AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONTINUE PRESENTATION BY SUGGESTING THAT GOA CONSIDER ACTIONS WHICH CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST THE PEOPLE WHO COMMITTED THIS CRIME. THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL AND IF SOME IN AUTHORITY WINKED AT THE CRIME THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED. THERE WILL BE GREAT PRESSURE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR CHANGES IN OUR POLICY TOWARD ARGENTINA IF SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE STEPS ARE NOT

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TAKEN. WE REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT THIS WILL BE FOR THE GOA, BUT WE MUST BE ABLE TO SHOW CONVINCING PROGRESS OR OUR RELATIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUFFER. OUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD COMMITTED THE GOA TO RELEASE OR TRY ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO RETURN TO THE RULE OF LAW AND TO PUT A HALT TO DISAPPEARANCES. YET ALL OF THESE AREAS OF CONCERN CONTINUE. THE DEATHS OF THESE WOMEN UNDERLINE OUR CONCERN.

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5. FYI. DEPARTMENT REALIZES THAT OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEATHS OF THE NUNS AND THE OTHERS IS BASED ON SENSITIVE SOURCES AND THAT THE EMBASSY CORRECTLY IS CONCERNED ABOUT PROTECTING THESE SOURCES. YOUR PRESENTATION WILL HAVE TO TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, REFRAIN FROM CONFRONTING THE ARGENTINES WITH THIS CRIME.
6. DEPARTMENT IS ALSO MOST CONSCIOUS OF THE REPORTS OF THE IMPENDING RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF JACOBO TIMERMAN AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE LAST PRISONER LISTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OUR PROPOSED DEMARCHE COULD EFFECT THESE POSITIVE GOA STEPS, BUT FEEL NONETHELESS, WE MUST SPEAK OUT.
7. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT FRANK MCNEIL RAISED THIS MATTER WITH AJA ESPIL ON MARCH 30 ON BASIS AFP TICKER ITEM. AJA ESPIL EXPRESSED HORROR AT POSSIBILITY REPORT WAS TRUE AND SPECULATED THAT INCIDENT WOULD NOT ONLY ANGER VIDELA BUT PERHAPS PUT HIM IN POSITION TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO SANCTIONED THIS OUTRAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, AJA ESPIL SUGGESTED TO JOHN BUSHNELL, PRESUMABLY AS A RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH BA, THAT REPORT MIGHT BE FALSE.
8. DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE PARALLEL PRESENTATION TO AJA ESPIL. TO INSURE THAT THE PRESENTATIONS ARE SYNCHRONIZED, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CABLING DEPT DATE AND TIME OF AMBASSADOR'S APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA. VANCE

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
76.

Memorandum From Stephen Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, April 12, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III. No classification marking.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 12, 1978

HR
Argentina

MEMORANDUM

TO: WC

FROM: SAO *SAO*

SUBJECT: Argentine Arms Transfer Cases

In view of the recent tragic reports out of Argentina, it is not clear that now is the appropriate moment to go ahead with any of the arms transfers which are the subject of the underlying Action Memorandum. Castro delivered the demarche on Monday concerning the nuns' deaths. McAuliffe was with him which is good. (The cable reporting the demarche is attached at Tab A.) Videla's response, while sympathetic, is like the responses he always gives, and it does not really change anything.

Tab 1 of the Action Memorandum sets forth the various categories of cases which are being held up and makes recommendations as to which categories ought to be approved and which delayed. While I think some of the suggestions in Tab 1 are logical, I am afraid that by focusing too heavily on the particular cases and categories in question, we could lose sight of the forest.

The core issue in our relations with Argentina is whether we are going to see genuine human rights improvements, and I think we are really at something of a crossroads with respect to that issue. The trend over the last six months has been quite halting: modest improvements punctuated by major retrograde developments such as the murder of the nuns.

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With the arms embargo six months away, it seems to me the time has come for us to sit down with the Argentines and have a rather explicit discussion of the various ways things could develop over the next six months. I think we should explain to them that because of strong views both within the Administration and in the Congress, we are frankly not in a position to go ahead with the large number of arms transfer cases that has accumulated and that the only way to begin to break this logjam is for there to be substantial, authentic human rights improvements in Argentina.

Specifically, I think we should tell them that unless they curtail the irregular detention practices routinely used by the security forces, and begin to charge and try -- or to release -- those held under executive authority, we will be unable to approve most of these transfers. If there were solid steps in these directions, we would be prepared to be responsive in a "calibrated and sequential" fashion, but if there are only minor improvements, then the status quo will persist.

I am afraid that unless we make this type of approach -- and instead simply approve certain categories of equipment and disapprove others -- we will send a very mixed signal to the Argentines, provoke considerable confusion and criticism on the Hill, and most importantly, forfeit a good chance to cause human rights improvements in Argentina. When all is said and done, we have, through this backlog of cases, built up a very considerable amount of leverage over the Argentines, and I think it would be a pity to squander it. In general, it is preferable to avoid quid pro quo arrangements in the human rights context, but in this particular instance, given the gravity of the human rights problems and the strength of our leverage, I think it would be worth making an exception.

I have informally discussed my suggested approach with Frank McNeil, and he thinks it is promising. A recent cable from the Embassy (Tab B) suggests that an approach of this kind would complement domestic pressures building in Argentina.

for the same types of improvements I have mentioned above. (What I am suggesting is in a sense a variation of the HA suggestion set forth at pages 3-4 of the Action Memorandum.) If the course I have suggested seems too problematic, then I would make the following recommendations:

- Categories I.C. and I.D. (listed at Tab 1) should be approved. (Indeed, I.D. should perhaps be approved right away, irrespective of my suggested approach. Perhaps the same is true of I.C., but I am less sure.)
- Category I.A. should be approved after a month or so.
- Category I.B. (spare parts), which is the big ticket item in this whole package, should be approved in stages over the next few months.
- Category II should be held in part and disapproved in part. (The items in II.B. are probably the best candidates for disapproval.)
- Training should be disapproved.
- Congress should be informed as we take the foregoing steps.

Finally, Lucy says in her covering memo that she is asking DOD to give us an accounting of the FMS "pipeline". I see no particular problem with this, although it does single out Argentina, since we have not sought such an accounting for any other human rights problem country. (Note that the FMS "pipeline" is quite different from the "pipeline" referred to by H in the Action Memorandum. Indeed, H's use of that term is sui generis and misleading. H uses "pipeline" to mean not only signed FMS contracts, which is what Lucy is asking DOD about, and Category I.C. but also any application for an export license or an FMS contract that was received prior to August 4, 1977, the day the Kennedy embargo was enacted. I see no rationale for claiming that applications which we have never acted upon are in any kind of "pipeline". I think Kennedy's office simply told H that they could live with such a formulation, and H has dubbed it "pipeline".)

77.

Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 26, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina III. No classification marking.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1978

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Arms and Training for Argentina

Cy:

I have reviewed the Argentine situation carefully. There have been some improvements in human rights conditions there, including the recent release of Timermán, but these are more than outweighed by the continuing disappearances and the tragic, unexplained deaths of two nuns and five other women who were picked up while demonstrating in December.

In view of this situation and the strong Congressional interest in our policy on arms transfers to Argentina, I think it would be inappropriate to go ahead with any of the pending arms transfer cases or to grant the Argentine request to purchase training. Instead, I would suggest that in conjunction with Raul Castro, a team consisting of senior State Department officials and senior U.S. military officers should meet at a high level with representatives of the Argentine Government.

7
what about this —
might this not help more than
the team would explain that because of human rights abuses in Argentina, we are not in a position to act favorably on either the large number of arms transfer cases that has accumulated or the Argentine request to purchase training, and that only substantial, authentic human rights improvements in Argentina would permit us to act favorably on these matters.

7
The team would inform the Argentines that if they curtail the irregular detention and abduction practices used by the security forces, and establish and meet a schedule for charging and trying -- or releasing -- those held under executive authority,

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we will respond in a calibrated and sequential fashion, as the human rights improvements occur, with approvals of the pending matters. Depending upon Argentina's response to the foregoing, the team would have authority to indicate approval of some of the pending cases.

If you agree with this approach, I will ask ARA in conjunction with other bureaus and DOD to prepare for my review proposed instructions for the team. I would envision the team going to Buenos Aires within the next ten days. The proposed letter at Tab 1 from you to Harold Brown informs him of the approach set forth above and requests DOD's cooperation.



Warren Christopher,

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discuss _____

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78.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, May 11, 1978, 1552Z

120048

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1569. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Rondon and Bushnell and in S/S-O and in substance by Schuller and Schneider; and approved by Christopher.

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PAGE 01 STATE 120048
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY ARA:JBUMPAS/RR
APPROVED BY D:WCHRISTOPHER
ASD/QASIA:ADM. SCHULLER (SUBS)
ARA/ECA:FERONDON
ARA:JBUSHNELL
S/S-O:JTHYDEN
HA:MSCHNEIDER (SUBS)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 120048

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: BA 3538

1. DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE APPRECIATE YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE CABLE CONCERNING ARGENTINE MISSION. WE FULLY AGREE THAT PREPARATORY WORK IS ADVISABLE TO ASSURE SUCCESS. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO APPROACH GENERAL VIOLA ALONG LINES YOU SUGGESTED IN PARA 5, REPTTEL, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING.

2. IN YOUR PRESENTATION YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT USG IS

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INTERESTED IN OVERALL IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE INTERESTED IN AND WOULD WELCOME THE NORMALIZATION OF ARREST AND DETENTION PROCEDURES AS WELL AS A PROGRAM FOR THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AND OTHER STEPS BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WOULD HAVE A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO.

IN YOUR PRESENTATION YOU SHOULD AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR AN "ESCAPE HATCH." RATHER, WE ARE INTERESTED IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AS TO WHERE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS HEADING IN VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.

3. BECAUSE THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION IS STILL UNRESOLVED, YOU SHOULD SIMPLY REFER TO IT AS "HIGH LEVEL," BUT YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD INCLUDE BOTH STATE DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY IN MAY 17-25 TIME FRAME. VANCE

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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79.

Instructions Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, May 20, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III. Secret.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MISSION TO ARGENTINA

1. The purpose of the mission of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs is to try to effect a change in United States relations with Argentina, a key state in Latin America.
2. United States relations with Argentina are at a crossroads due to continuing violations of human rights by the country and the resultant deterioration in our security relationships.
3. Argentina is particularly important to the United States because it is Latin America's leading nuclear technology state, with very advanced plans for the production of plutonium through reprocessing. Argentina also has a growing arms production and export capability, and is one of the most influential political and cultural leaders in the Spanish speaking world. Its present (world's 4th largest wheat exporter) and potentially far more impressive agricultural role, as well as possibly immense offshore petroleum prospects ensure Argentina's importance into the future.
4. The President, the Secretary of State, a growing number of Members of Congress as well as informed Americans are concerned about the course of events in Argentina, and the impact of these events on our human rights, non-proliferation, economic and military interests.
5. The Mission will serve to underline the United States desire for an improvement in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary would emphasize the problems which currently prevent fully normal relations and, depending on the Argentine response, state that the United States is prepared to be responsive, including with respect to Argentine requests for arms and training.
6. The Under Secretary will advise the Argentine Government that present practices in Argentina make it politically, and in some cases legally, difficult for the United States to follow through with previous military programs. We consider that the following practices and policies are at the root of the problem:

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5/20/78

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

- irregular detention procedures, that is, the practice of secret arrests, disappearances and summary executions of thousands (memo attached);
- large numbers of prisoners under prolonged detention without charge or recourse to due process;
- the persecution of members of the judiciary and of those members of the legal profession who defend political prisoners exacerbating the lack of legal remedies and due process;
- standard practice of torture, brutality and psychological abuse of political prisoners (memo attached);
- the limited "right of option" for political prisoners under executive detention;
- and a wide variety of restrictions on religious, political, press and labor activities (specifically, the arrests and disappearances of political and labor leaders; prohibitions on political and union activities; constraints on the press, including punitive short-term closings and arrests of many journalists; official harassment of religious groups, in particular the Jehovah's Witnesses and other sects denied government registration, and reports of incidents of anti-semitism targeted at members of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners.)

7. If appropriate, the Under Secretary would continue that the United States believes the following are examples of the kinds of actions which we feel would contribute tangibly to an improved atmosphere for government-to-government relations:

- A promise and perceptible action by President Videla to curtail the irregular detention and abduction practices of the security forces.

- An end to torture and mistreatment of prisoners.
- An accounting of those who have disappeared -- or at least those about whom information is known.
- The establishment of a timetable for promptly charging and fairly trying (preferably in civilian courts) or releasing those held under executive authority, in particular those not suspected of violence.
- The establishment of numerical goals by the Argentine Military Review Board for Right of Option for the release each month of a significant number of persons from executive custody.
- The actual release of a considerable number of prisoners from executive custody -- either freed or remanded to civilian or military courts -- by August 1. We have in mind action on perhaps 500 cases.
- The release of another tangible number of prisoners (for example, 500 additional cases) by September 15.
- An undertaking to continue this process so that during 1978 the Argentine government will release, grant right of option to, fairly try, or schedule for trial, in civilian or military courts, all remaining executive prisoners. X
- The enforcement of procedures to investigate at a high level allegations of security personnel involvement in future disappearances and torture, to try those who engage in, or are otherwise responsible for such practices, and to punish those found guilty.

8. The Under Secretary will, on the basis of their replies to the foregoing, inform the Argentines that as they take action on improving human rights, we will respond, in a calibrated, sequential fashion.

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~~-4-~~

9. The Under Secretary may inform the Argentine Government that as human rights improvements are taken in the above mentioned areas, the United States will begin to consider favorable action, in a calibrated manner, on pending aspects of the military relationship. These include the purchase of military training, safety related equipment, spare parts for previously supplied items, and items previously approved for sale or financing or needed to fulfill previously approved contracts.

10. If in early 1979, it is evident publicly that all prisoners have been removed from executive custody, and that there has been a resolution of the problem of violations of the rights of the person, including political prisoners, disappearances, torture and due process, and that some beginning steps have been taken toward restoration of civil and political liberties, the Administration would move to counteract the Kennedy/Humphrey Amendment.

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80.

Memorandum of Conversation

Buenos Aires, May 24, 1978

1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Lot 81F93, Embassy Buenos Aires Post Files, 1978, Box 48, POL 7—Newsom Visit. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rondon on May 25. There is no indication as to when or where the meeting took place. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "Key point is last paragraph of p. 4. See also—don't know where—'scope paper' for this visit."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Wednesday, May 24, 1978

SUBJECT: Human Rights and United States Relations with Argentina

PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Rafael Videla, President of Argentina
Col. Malea Gil, Presidency
David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Ambassador Raúl Castro
Fernando Rondon, ARA/ECA

KEY POINT IS
LAST PT of P. 4

SEE ALSO - DON'T
KNOW WHERE -
'SCOPE, PAPER' for
THIS VISIT

The Under Secretary met with President Videla for approximately 90 minutes.

Mr. Newsom opened the conversation, outlining the purpose of his mission, on behalf of the Secretary of State, to seek an improvement in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary said that he recognized the problems Argentina confronted and the extraordinary steps that had to be taken to face the situation. He acknowledged important Argentine steps to restore normalcy, including Christmas releases, action on the Deutsch and Timmerman cases, and Red Cross visits. The Under Secretary further acknowledged President Videla's interest in good relations as manifested by the ratification of Tlatelolco, a new civil air agreement and the resolution of all but one investment dispute.

President Videla welcomed the dialogue he said he began with President Carter and Secretary Vance. He commented that dialogue is worthwhile even if disagreeable things are said.

Mr. Newsom noted that he had read the reports of conversations between Videla and President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Assistant Secretaries Todman and Derian. Newsom remarked that Ambassador Castro has also conveyed the views of the United States, so that President Videla has participated in more than his share of dialogues.

ARA/ECA: FRondon/mp 5/25/78
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Mr. Newsom then outlined the political situation existent in the United States after the sixties, stemming from Vietnam and controversies over relations with other governments. He stated that there is a strong feeling in the U.S. Congress, represented, for example, by Senator Kennedy and Congressman Fraser, that while we should not interfere in other states, we should not appear to be endorsing the policies of other governments through our assistance programs, when it appears the human rights situations in these countries are not consistent with normal international standards. This predates President Carter's election. When he ran, human rights was part of his platform and, at the time, Patricia Derian was one of his national campaign managers.

The Under Secretary cited the Eximbank situation as an example of a case where the Executive does not have a free hand. The Bank currently has authorizing legislation before the Congress, part of which deals with lending to human rights problem countries. Eximbank therefore does not wish to take steps which could complicate its dealings with Congress. This is not an embargo as some have pictured.

President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Secretary Brown all recognize the importance of relations with Argentina, Mr. Newsom observed. In confidence, he said he is in Argentina because Secretary Brown raised with Secretary Vance the implications for the U.S. of a possible termination of military relations with Argentina. It was his task to determine, Newsom continued, whether present and future prospects for normalization are such that we can go before Congress and defend the resumption of military relationships on the basis that the Executive is confident of a favorable trend for human rights in Argentina. We recognize there are those who do not want good relations between our two countries. Actions may take place outside the control of Argentina which, nevertheless, affect the climate for relations. We had hoped that the Christmas amnesty would have helped us to demonstrate to Congress that resumption of normal relations is justified. Then we had the disappearance of mothers and nuns and we could not demonstrate a positive trend.

Mr. Newsom said that all you can tell me regarding future hopes for normalization, including control over disappearances, plans for the release of prisoners, right of option plans,

will help me to present a positive picture when I report to Washington.

President Videla responded that Argentina confronted two types of subversive action: one armed and the other ideological. Both sought to destroy the Argentine way of life and seriously undermined the governing institutions. The armed forces had to step in to save the country.

Having engaged in combat, borne the brunt of subversive action, and proven to be the only unified institutions, the armed services could not now risk internal disunity (within the military) and destabilization in order to prove Argentina is "western". Argentina had had no choice but to adopt certain measures. These were matters of Argentine internal affairs.

Videla stated that Argentina will have full democracy when its house is in order, economically, socially, politically, and in the field of internal security.

He would not be sincere if he were to give dates and numbers in order to save Mr. Newsom's visit.

President Videla stated there are no "loose groups" operating any longer. He added that the "right of option" would be applied with increasing generosity.

As an example of those we are interested in, Videla referred to a recent German request for information on eight of their citizens, six of whom have been charged and are being tried, one who has disappeared, and one who is a two-time murderer who was released in the 1973 amnesty and jailed again by the military government. This latter individual cannot be brought to trial legally by the military government because of the amnesty, yet he is unquestionably dangerous to society.

Mr. Newsom thanked Videla for his comments but noted the American tendency to ask for statistics and figures. Because we do get information from sometimes inaccurate sources, Mr. Newsom asked for statistics on detainees and a guess on the number of releases that might occur over time. Newsom suggested this information might be given to him later in the day.

Mr. Newsom referred to four categories of detainees, according to the Minister of Interior:

- those arrested under military law and tried by military courts;
- those being held for terrorist acts against whom there is insufficient evidence for a conviction;
- those who are being tried under civilian law and courts; and
- those who will be permitted to exercise the "right of option".

The President observed that 2,000 of 3,200 prisoners were arrested before March 24, 1976. All these cases are under review. He could not say how many of the cases would be subject to military courts and how many to civilian courts. The review would determine who should be held because they are dangerous and who can be released or given option.

In answer to the Under Secretary's question, Videla responded that those being examined by the review commission do not have access to counsel or the right to appear personally before the commission. Videla said the commission is not a court.

Mr. Newsom asked if President Videla might give us an idea of how many prisoners might be released by August 1 or September 15. Videla replied that commitments of this kind would be difficult.

Mr. Newsom continued, asking whether the release of 500 prisoners might be possible in 1978. President Videla stated that there would be an important number of releases and options by Christmas.

President Videla acknowledged that a U.S. parole program would help to implement Argentina's right of option program.

As Mr. Newsom moved to sum up his impressions, President Videla said that he wanted to place a positive weight on the Under Secretary's scale. Argentina would facilitate a visit by the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and this decision will be communicated to the IAHRC in June when Foreign Minister Montes travels to the UNGA. Until then, Videla asked that this decision be held confidentially.

Mr. Newsom then outlined positive signs, notably Minister Harguindeguy's decision to enforce humanitarian treatment of detainees by the police and security forces and Argentina's willingness to accelerate the "right of option" if we receive more prisoners. Newsom said he would have difficulty, however, with the question of indefinite detentions.

After discussing the desirability of calls on the Supreme Court and other Junta members, Mr. Newsom said he would paint an honest picture of his conversations. Whatever decision is reached by the United States Executive, it would not reflect a lack of interest in Argentina. A decision would be made in light of the total political circumstances in the Executive and Congress. He noted that if progress continues, we will seek to reverse the Kennedy/Humphrey Amendment but that will take time and probably cannot be faced until next year.

One way or another, Mr. Newsom promised that Ambassador Castro would convey the results of this trip.

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81.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, May 25, 1978, 1737Z

4040

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860101-2444. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 04040 01 OF 02 252043Z
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NODIS

FROM UNDERSECRETARY NEWSOM

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROWN DOD AND CHAIRMAN JCS

1. SUMMARY: AFTER DAY OF EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES, I CONCLUDE THAT FAVORABLE STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD IN ARGENTINA AND THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA, AT LEAST, WISHES THIS TREND TO CONTINUE. PICTURE EMERGING IN ONE AREA - PROCESSING OF DETAINEES - LESS CLEAR AND WE WERE ABLE TO GET NO NUMERICAL COMMITMENTS ON RELEASES. MOST POSITIVE NEW ELEMENT WAS PRESIDENT'S CONFIDING IN US THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTED FOREIGN MINISTER AT OAS SESSION IN JUNE TO ANNOUNCE ARGENTINA'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE VISIT FROM OAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. ON THIS BASIS, I AM RECOMMENDING THAT AMBASSADOR CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM VIDELA PRIVATELY THAT, ONCE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, WE WILL, AFTER CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS, RESUME SALE OF MILITARY TRAINING. END SUMMARY.

2. ON MAY 24, AMBASSADOR, FRED RONDON, AND I MET SUCCESSIVELY WITH UNDERSECRETARY ALLARA AND GROUP AT FOREIGN OFFICE, FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES, MINISTER OF INTERIOR HARGUINDEGY, PRESIDENT VIDELA, PRESIDENT OF SUPREME COURT HEREDIA, AIR FORCE CHIEF AGOSTI AND ADMIRAL MASSERA, NAVY CHIEF. THESE SESSIONS WERE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER MEETING WITH

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INTERIOR MINISTER AND GENERAL VIOLA DURING RECEPTION AT RESIDENCE IN EVENING.

3. MY APPROACH IN EACH MEETING WAS TO STATE THAT MY VISIT WAS MANIFESTATION OF DESIRE WITHIN USG FOR NORMAL RELATIONS WITH IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, BUT THAT SUCH RELATIONS WERE NOT POSSIBLE IN LIGHT OF WIDESPREAD U.S. CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERCEPTION OF SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. I WAS IN BUENOS AIRES TO EXAMINE WHETHER ARGENTINE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD WAS SUCH AS TO JUSTIFY IN EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS RELEASE OF OUTSTANDING ARGENTINE ORDERS. WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THROUGH AND AGREED ON DESIRABILITY CLOSE RELATIONS THESE TWO SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN NATIONS, BUT POLITICAL REALITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES APPEARED TO PLACE LIMITS ON WHAT WE COULD DO.

4. EXIM BANK LOANS WERE RAISED ONLY IN FOREIGN OFFICE MEETING. I EXPLAINED BANK'S DIFFICULTIES IN PROCEEDING WHILE ITS LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS AND IN FACE STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS FEELINGS, BUT EMPHASIZED FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN MADE. I HAD FEELING THIS NOT MAJOR LEVERAGE POINT WITH GOA. THEY HAVE AMPLE OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND FINANCING, EXCEPT POSSIBLY, FOR \$200,000,000 COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ORDER.

5. QUITE APART FROM OBVIOUS INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH

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US BECAUSE OF MILITARY SUPPLY, I FOUND, MORE THAN I HAD EXPECTED, FEELING THAT RELATIONS WITH US WERE IMPORTANT FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. THERE IS MYSTIQUE ABOUT U.S. HERE WHICH IS IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN DECISIONS THEY MAKE.

6. FROM CONVERSATIONS, THESE POSITIVE ELEMENTS EMERGED (IN ADDITION TO ACTIONS ON TIMERMAN, DEUTSCH, AND DECEMBER RELEASES):

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A. PRESIDENT INFORMED US IN CONFIDENCE (WHICH I PROMISED TO RESPECT) ARGENTINA WOULD ANNOUNCE ITS WILLINGNESS RECEIVE OAS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AT MEETING IN JUNE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DECISION HE MADE AS RESULT MY VISIT. IN EARLIER MEETING WITH FOREIGN OFFICE WE HAD BEEN INFORMED ARGENTINA UNHAPPY WITH OAS COMMISSION BECAUSE THEY HAD INTERRUPTED DIALOGUE TO PRESS FOR VISIT. I HAD MADE CLEAR IN THAT AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO VISITS BY OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS.

B. MINISTER OF INTERIOR IN RECENT SPEECH TO POLICE CHIEFS HAS EMPHASIZED NEED FOR HUMANE TREATMENT OF ALL ARRESTED PERSONS. SIMILAR WORD APPARENTLY HAS GONE OUT MORE QUIETLY TO ARMY. THERE APPEARS DEFINITE DIMINUTION REPORTS ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DISAPPEARANCE. (IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, I ASKED FOR ACCURATE DATA ON DETAINEES. MINISTER OF INTERIOR HANDED ME FACT SHEET IN EVENING STATING THAT 3,363 PERSONS ARE PRESENTLY DETAINED -- 1,544 APPREHENDED SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MARCH OF 1976, THE REMAINDER BEFORE THAT DATE. CLAIM IS MADE THAT 3,328 PEOPLE ARRESTED FOR "TERRORIST" ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY (2,554 OF THEM SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER), AND THAT A TOTAL OF 1,679 ADDITIONAL HAVE BEEN SENTENCED OR RELEASED THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCESS, CIVIL AND MILITARY. (OF THESE CASES, 911 HAVE BEEN TRIED SINCE MARCH OF 1976.) THE FACT SHEET STATES THAT 600 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY UNDER "RIGHT OF OPTION", 160 FOREIGNERS EXPELLED, AND 58 PERSONS HAVE DIED WHILE IN CUSTODY. (NOTE: NO DATES WERE GIVEN FOR THESE LAST FIGURES, NOR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES EXPLAINED.) MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED FAR LARGER NUMBERS OF DISAPPEARED. REFERRING TO LISTS PUBLISHED IN PRESS BY HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS THEY SAID THEY WERE NOW SEEKING TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY SO THEY COULD RESPOND TO RELATIVES.)

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C. CASES OF ALL SOME 3,300 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE NOW BEING REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHICH SHALL BE GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTION, WHICH RELEASED, AND WHICH REMANDED TO CIVILIAN COURTS.

D. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED HE WOULD SPEED UP EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF OPTION IF WE WERE TO OFFER MORE SPACES IN U.S. (I DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT IN VIEW MY UNCERTAINTY AS TO

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252044Z
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4040

NODIS

FROM UNDERSECRETARY NEWSOM

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROWN DOD AND CHAIRMAN JCS

WHAT ACTION ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY TAKE IN PENDING PROPOSAL
FOR 500 RIGHT OF OPTION PAROLES.)

E. PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF JUNTA MADE
CLEAR THEIR GOAL OF ULTIMATE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE. WHILE
IT MAY BE SUPERFICIAL IMPRESSION, I DID NOT GAIN FEELING
THAT PERSONALITIES IN JUNTA WERE SEEKING TO RETAIN POSITION
FOR OWN PERSONAL POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL GAIN AS IN SOME OTHER
COUNTRIES. I WAS IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT EACH HAS DATE FOR
STEPPING DOWN FROM JUNTA ROLE. HOWEVER WE MAY DISLIKE THE
WAY THEY CARRY IT OUT, THERE DOES SEEM DEFINITE FEELING
OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING COUNTRY BACK TO NORMAL
POLITICAL PROCESSES.

F. ICRC VISITS CONTINUE TO PRISONS WITH SOME EFFECT
ON CONDITIONS.

7. THERE ARE, ON THE OTHER HAND, LESS POSITIVE ELEMENTS:

A. THE DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESS IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
ONE ONLY; THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR ACCUSED TO APPEAR OR BE
REPRESENTED AS DOSSIERS ARE REVIEWED.

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B. PRESIDENT AND OTHERS WERE UNWILLING MAKE COMMIT
MENT ON TIME TABLE FOR REVIEW, ALTHOUGH THEY SAID RELEASE OF
ADDITION 500 BY END OF 1978 WAS "REASONABLE EXPECTATION."

C. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW LONG THOSE WILL BE DETAINED WHO
ARE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, BUT ON WHOM THERE IS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT IN COURT. I HAMMERED HARD ON UNACCEPTA
BILITY THIS SITUATION IN US AND HAVE, AT LEAST, RAISED THEIR
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THIS PROBLEM AREA. SINCE TOTAL REVIEW STILL
GOING ON IT IS DIFFICULT TO STATE HOW MANY MAY ULTIMATELY FALL
IN THIS CATEGORY OF INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL.

D. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ARRESTS UNDER STATE OF
SIEGE ORDERS. PRESIDENT OF ONE COMMUNIST PARTY DOMINATED
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION WAS ARRESTED FEW DAYS BEFORE MY
ARRIVAL. I POINTED OUT THIS WAS EXACTLY KIND OF EVENT WHICH
SET BACK EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. HE WAS RELEASED LAST
NIGHT (MAY 25) AFTER BEING HELD AT POLICE PRECINCT STATION.

E. REPORTS OF TORTURE CONTINUE TO BE RECEIVED BUT
CONFIRMATION IS DIFFICULT.

8. IT WOULD BE RASH TO PREDICT THAT WE WILL BE UNINTER-
RUPTED POSITIVE TREND IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. HARDLINERS
WITHIN REGIME WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO SANCTION OR TAKE
REPREHENSIBLE ACTIONS WHICH WILL GAIN WORLD ATTENTION. CONTROL
OVER ELEMENTS AT LOWER ECHELONS IS FAR FROM COMPLETE. NEVER
THELESS, THERE IS ON PART OF PRESIDENT VIDELA AND MEMBERS
OF JUNTA I MET CLEAR DESIRE TO IMPROVE SITUATION. SUCCESSION
OF DISCUSSIONS WITH US OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT CARTER,
HAS CLEARLY RAISED CONSCIOUSNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND

HAS, I BELIEVE HAD POSITIVE IMPACT. AMBASSADOR CASTRO HAS EFFECTIVELY CONTINUED DIALOGUE AND IS IN POSITION TO CONTINUE AND, PARTICULARLY, TO RAISE INDIVIDUAL ACTS WHICH REPRESENT SET BACK TO OUR EFFORTS.

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9. OUT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I REACH CONCLUSION THAT TRENDS HERE AND IMPORTANCE OF RESPONDING TO ARGENTINE DESIRE FOR NORMAL RELATIONS JUSTIFY MODEST STEP. WITHOUT SUCH STEP, I CANNOT SAY OUR ACCESS HERE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT WITH SUCH STEP OUR LEVERAGE IN HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE AND COOPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS (SUCH AS NUCLEAR QUESTIONS) MORE LIKELY.

10. PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO PERMIT VISIT BY OAS COMMISSION GIVES US POSITIVE STEP ON WHICH TO BASE POSITIVE RESPONSE. TO LET HIM KNOW THAT WE ARE RESPONDING, PROPOSE THAT AMBASSADOR CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM IMMEDIATELY THAT, AS RESULT VISIT, I AM RECOMMENDING THAT, ONCE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND, FOLLOWING SUCH CONSULTATIONS WILL RESUME SALE OF MILITARY TRAINING. WE WILL THEREAFTER, CONTINUE TO EXAMINE SITUATION AND, IF POSITIVE TRENDS CONTINUE (PARTICULARLY ON DETAINEES), WILL SEEK TO RESPOND WITH OTHER RELEASES.

11. AT SAME TIME, I AM SUGGESTING TO AMBASSADOR THAT HE CONTINUE, AS HE HAS, TO POINT OUT IMMEDIATELY THOSE ACTIONS WHICH WILL COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS (SUCH AS FURTHER ARRESTS, REPORTS OF NEW DISAPPEARANCES, ETC.)

12. GENERAL SURUT AND ADMIRAL SCHULLER WILL MAKE CALLS TOMORROW ON SERVICE CHIEFS AND WILL CONVEY MESSAGE SIMILAR MINE (PARA 3 ABOVE). THEY WILL MAKE NO COMMITMENTS ON FUTURE SALES OR GIVE INDICATION OUR CONCLUSIONS. THEIR VISITS WILL BE HELPFUL IN GIVING US FURTHER FEED BACK ON YESTERDAY'S CONVERSATIONS.

13. I WILL MEET WITH U.S. CORRESPONDENTS IN BUENOS AIRES ON BACKGROUND BASIS BEFORE MY DEPARTURE. EMBASSY WILL SEND REPORT. MY PLAN IS MERELY TO OUTLINE PROBLEM WITHOUT INDICATING WHERE I COME OUT OR WHAT I AM RECOMMENDING TO DEPARTMENT.

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14. I AM ALSO MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING "MOTHERS OF DISAPPEARED" GROUP, AND PRIVATELY WITH BUENOS AIRES HERALD DIRECTOR COX, NOTED FOR HIS COURAGEOUS PUBLIC ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. CASTRO

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82.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, May 30, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 5/78. Secret. Carter wrote, "Cy J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

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#25A

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 30, 1978

Cy
J

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Cyrus Vance C.V.

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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-2-

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina

Argentina. We have had our first indication that Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom's return, Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded that in addition to the announcement, positive strides would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, and that by year end an impressive number of people would be released. Such action could enable us to resume some

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- 3 -

900d shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal of the Kennedy/Humphrey new arms embargo. Videla seems genuinely to want improved relations with the US, and the question is whether his political situation will give him room to take the necessary steps.

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina

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83.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, June 26, 1978, 2313Z

162533

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0540. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Schneider, Bushnell, McGiffert, Oxman, in H and S/S-O, and for information in EB; and approved by Newsom.

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PAGE 01 STATE 162533
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DRAFTED BY P:DDNEWSOM:CHG
APPROVED BY P - MR NEWSOM
HA - MSCHNEIDER
EB (INFO)
ARA - MR BUSHNELL
DOD/OSD - MR MCGIFFERT
H - MR CUTTER
D - MR OXMAN
S/S-0: RCASTRODALE

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR, MMOL

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. PROGRAMS IN ARGENTINA

REF: STATE 161509

1. ON BASIS FACT THAT IAHRC DOES NOT FEEL ABLE ACCEPT
CONDITIONAL ARGENTINA INVITATION, SECRETARY HAS DE-
CIDED THAT:

(A) WE CANNOT GO FORWARD, AS HOPED, WITH MILITARY
TRAINING PACKAGE AND DEFENSE IS BEING INFORMED; ✓

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(B) IN RECOGNITION OF MODEST IMPROVEMENTS, WE WILL
(AFTER CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS) RELEASE SAFETY
ITEMS (LISTED SEPTEL),
INCLUDING COMPASSES FOR VESSELS OF U.K. MANUFACTURE;

(C) WE WILL INFORM EXIM BANK THAT, ON FOREIGN
POLICY GROUNDS, WE RECOMMEND AGAINST FINANCING
FOR ARGENTINA AT THIS TIME (THIS APPLIES PRIMARILY
TO ALLIS CHALMERS APPLICATION FOR YACIRETA HYDRO-
ELECTRIC PROJECT);

(D) WE RECOMMEND AGAINST EXIM ^{financing of aircraft} [FINANCING-OR-AIR4RAFT]

BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO EXPORT IF THEY CAN BE
PRIVATELY FINANCED.

2. DEPARTMENT HOPES ARRANGE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTA-
TIONS, INCLUDING SENATOR KENNEDY, ON THESE CASES
THIS WEEK.

3. EMBASSY MAY INFORM GOA, STRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE EXTEND NORMAL INVITA-
TION TO IAHRC (ALONG LINES OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN

COUNTRIES) AND HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN ABLE MOVE APPRECIABLY ON EITHER RELEASES OF DETAINEES OR ESTABLISHMENT OF RESPONSIVE MACHINERY FOR THOSE SEEKING INFORMATION ON RELATIVES WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED. OF COURSE, ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IAHRC AND THE GOA ENABLING THE COMMISSION TO GO TO ARGENTINA WOULD BE VIEWED AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THESE POINTS STRESSED TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLARA AS REPORTED REPTEL. (FYI: ARGENTINA ALSO HAS NOT HALTED ILLEGAL DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 162533

END FYI)

4. FYI: ANY PROSPECT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED EXIM BANK FINANCING APART FROM HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS WAS ELIMINATED BY ALLARA'S INSISTENCE THAT GOA LOOKED UPON RESTRICTIONS ON EXIM FINANCING AS POLITICAL ACT AND CLEARLY SOUGHT APPROVAL OF SUCH FINANCING AS INDICATION OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE. END FYI.

5. EXIM HAS INFORMED BOTH ALLIS-CHALMERS AND BOEING OF DECISION.

VANCE

~~SECRET~~

NNN

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

84.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, August 9, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "What do we do to get hold of the initiative? ZB."

102 RF

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions

LSR
do we do
to PS hold
7 the
in the?
LSR

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

? *Cable*
Cable
USHR

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest -- Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family -- the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for \$50 million and \$150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHR to visit in accordance with the IAHR's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Give me the memo
Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice. . . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..."

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourselves, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance \$270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. ~~I don't believe~~ that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice. The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are \$600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least \$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel -- including Kissinger -- to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated

than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape-goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.

UNCLASSIFIED

85.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 10, 1978, 2100Z

6232

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 1 of 2. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to USICA.

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 HA-05 AID-05 IO-13 XMB-02 EB-08
COME-00 TRSE-00 /085 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6958
INFO USICA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6232

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, HR, AR
SUBJECT: DERIAN TESTIMONY TO HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE

1. PRENSA, CLARIN AND BUENOS AIRES HERALD CARRIED
PROMINENTLY UPI REPORT OF TESTIMONY BY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY PATRICIA DERIAN BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE, SAYING DERIAN "CHARGED THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT WITH 'SYSTEMATIC TORTURES' AND 'SUMMARY
EXECUTIONS,' AND CLAIMED THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT
SIGNS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA
IS IMPROVING."

2. "IN TESTIMONY BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE US
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MISS DERIAN DECLARED THAT
SO MUCH EVIDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
ARGENTINA HAS ACCUMULATED THAT TO ARGUE ABOUT IT
WOULD BE A 'WASTE OF TIME'."

3. ACCORDING TO UPI DERIAN ALSO SAID THE GOA HAS
FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENT TO INVITE THE
IAHRC TO VISIT ARGENTINA AND SAID ARGENTINA HAS A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUENOS 06232 102137Z

VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM.

4. HERALD HEADLINED "HARSH STATEMENT ON
ARGENTINA IN THE U.S.," AND PRENSA "ACCUSATION

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 of 4

AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT." IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, PRENSA COLUMNIST MANFRED SCHONFELD STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE REPORTED DERIAN REMARKS IN WHAT WE EXPECT WILL BE THE FIRST OF A NUMBER OF EDITORIAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. BESIDE THE DERIAN STORY IN LA PRENSA WAS A UPI PHOTO OF A PHILADLEPHIA COPY ~~2~~ PUSHING HIS FOOT DOWN ON THE HEAD OF ONE OF THE MOVE GROUP ARRESTED TITLED "REPRESSION AGAINST EXTREMISTS IN THE U.S."

5. WE RECEIVED THE WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND USINFO 092045Z BRIEF REPORT ON SOME OF HER TESTIMONY. HOWEVER, THE LATTER DOES NOT CONTAIN THE QUOTE THAT UPI FEATURED. WE HAVE ASKED ICA TO PROVIDE IF AVAILABLE THE VERBATIM TESTIMONY ON ARGENTINA ASAP.

6. COMMENT: IN THE ALREADY OVERHEATED ATMOSPHERE I BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT EVEN SHARPER GOA AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE DERIAN REMARKS THAN WE HAD AFTER THE EXIM BANK REFUSAL OF CREDITS TO ALLIS CHALMERS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED HERE AS A PUBLIC AND FORMAL ACCUSATION BY THE USG OF ARGENTINA. THIS IS THE SECOND BOMBHELL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD. I ATTENDED A RECEPTION THIS MORNING SPONSORED BY THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE AT NEWBERRY (AEROPARQUE). I WAS THE ONLY AMBASSADOR AND ALSO ONLY U.S. EMBASSY STAFF PERSON INVITED. I FELT AS THOUGH I WAS WALKING INTO PROVERBIAL LION'S DEN. IMMEDIATE REFERENCE WAS MADE TO PAT DERIAN'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS. GREAT CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT A TOTAL DETERIORATION IN USG-GOA RELATIONS. THE ARGENTINE CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED IN A TACTFUL AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 BUENOS 06232 102137Z

COURTEOUS MANNER AND NOT IN ANGER, AS I HAD ANTICIPATED. I DO ANTICIPATE THAT WHEN THE WHOLE AFFAIR IS BETTER DIGESTED ALL HELL WILL BREAK LOSE.

7. MY "GUT REACTION" IS I MAY BE CALLED IN AGAIN BY THE FONMIN AS TO THE SOURCE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S INFORMATION ON SYSTEMATIC TORTURE AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. I FEAR GOA'S ASSUMPTION IS INFO CAME FROM THIS EMBASSY. GOA MAY WELL DEMAND THAT USG SUPPORT ITS PUBLIC ACCUSATION WITH EVIDENCE.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON LINE I MIGHT TAKE WITH GOA.
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 of 4

86.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 14, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: "RI DR item for the P."

4877 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 14, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
 FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *BP*
 SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina

This memorandum responds to your questions and comments on my memo of August 9 on Argentina.

You asked how we can get hold of the policy and also asked me for a memo on the fact that State did not consult with NSC in selecting its policy towards Argentina. I don't think it would be productive to send a memorandum to the Secretary expressing displeasure for not being consulted on a previous decision.

On Friday, I spoke to Vaky about Argentina. I asked him as well as Christopher's office, to keep me fully informed, and I expected that I would be asked to attend the meeting to discuss it. I wasn't, but Vaky brought me up-to-date. He said that he and Newsom had agreed to send Vaky to Argentina at the end of the month to make one last attempt at breaking the impasse in U.S.-Argentine relations. In order to improve the prospects of a successful meeting between Vaky and Videla, they hope to obtain State-NSC approval of several items in the munitions control list. This could then be presented as a positive gesture of our interest in good relations. In addition, it is vitally important that we make an attempt at mediating between an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Argentine Government in a way which permits the latter to save face and the former to preserve its institutional integrity. Vaky also thinks that a Presidential letter reiterating the President's interest in good relations with Argentina would be useful, and while I think it is also a good idea, I think we should wait until we have looked at the whole range of decisions that need to be made before we consider a letter.

I had originally planned to recommend that you send a memo to Vance which, in effect, requested that the next round of decisions on U.S. policy to Argentina would be made with full NSC involvement and consultation by the NSC, but after speaking with Vaky, and repeating your interest that we stay very much involved, he assured me that he would keep me involved. I am not so certain that Dave Newsom, who made the previous decisions without the NSC's involvement, is as interested as Vaky is. Perhaps a brief mention of this to the Secretary would be helpful. To the extent that I am involved. I will, of course, keep you fully informed.

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 by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

87.

Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, August 22, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78. Secret.

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~~SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D C 20301
22 AUG 1978

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Cy:

As a follow-up to the August 17 discussion between you, Zbig, and me concerning our deteriorating relations with Argentina, I would like to recommend some positive steps which I believe should be taken on an urgent basis to reverse the recent sharp downturn in those relations.

I believe there was general agreement between us that our relations with Argentina have very seriously deteriorated. I believe the recent Argentine Navy decision to withdraw from UNITAS may represent just the first of negative steps which the GOA will feel forced to take unless we moderate our approach. While our human rights policy is very important, we need also to take into account that Argentina is a key nation with respect to our non-proliferation policy and that a go-it-alone Argentina -- whether that might mean formation of destabilizing ties with Peru, a more provocative stand on the Beagle Channel issue, withdrawal from the Rio pact, or enhanced relations with Soviet bloc countries -- is not in our interest. Further, it may well be at this point that some modification of our approach, if properly explained, will actually help on the human rights issues.

I welcome Secretary Vaky's proposed September visit. But in addition, concrete actions are needed. On the military side, I recommend we moderate our position by approving before September 30 all the pending Argentine spare parts requests, including but not limited to those which are safety related, offering this as a gesture of U.S. good faith at a time when what Ambassador Castro characterizes as "out-raged nationalism" seems to be the governing factor in Argentine politics. Also, to the extent our law allows, I believe we should approve the pending requests to purchase DoD training courses.

There have been several developments since a hold was put on these transactions. Argentine public reaction to the denial of the \$270 million EXIM Bank loan for the hydroelectric project and to the public testimony by Pat Derian before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs has been, as we understand it, very negative.

Classified by Director, IA(ISA)OASD
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED @ 31 Dec 1986

Am 5/16/97

~~SECRET~~

2

The terrorist bombing of Admiral Lambruschini's residence, resulting in the death of his teenage daughter, has also served to strengthen the argument of minority hard-line elements of the Argentine military that reforms are premature. The alleged Tyson statement reflecting USG support for the Montonero terrorists, even though totally false, has done further serious harm to our efforts to promote democratization. The GOA has, in fact, taken some positive steps to meet the conditions laid down during Dave Newsom's visit by initiating an invitation to the IAHRC, by agreeing to a majority of conditions necessary for such a visit, and by continuing to consider the remainder. Finally, in view of the new junta-president power relationship established August 4, power plays between the president and junta, and within the junta itself, will probably continue for the near term, delaying the resolution of key policy issues.

Unlike the EXIM Bank decision, our decision to withhold training and spare parts has not been made public here or in Argentina. For this reason, I think we could safely modify our current position without seeming to vacillate. We need to do this immediately -- or at the latest by the time of the Vaky visit because of the administrative lead-time prior to the legislated embargo date of September 30 which would be needed to implement any go-ahead decision. In connection with such a decision we could inform the GOA privately that: (1) we recognize the internal political difficulties which have recently developed, (2) we are offering these approvals as concrete evidence of our good faith and determination to work together toward mutual objectives, and (3) we hope and expect they will see fit to develop and implement a set of substantial human rights initiatives soon.

Sincerely,

Harold

88.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 28, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Mathews. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski placed a check mark and wrote the phrase "a compelling, forceful report. ZB."

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LIMDIS
XGDS-4

August 28, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *Bob*
SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single-spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-President and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself reading through the entire 14-page Memcon, though I had intended only to skim it.

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have prepared below a short summary of that Memcon.

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"--plain-clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. Then begins the horror.

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punishment. He himself was:

- beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;
- subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged electric picara until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;
- subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;
- subjected to "the submarine"--repeatedly being held under water until almost drowned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LIMDIS
XGDS-4 (Classified by Z. Brzezinski)

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DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

✓ 30
a compelling, fresh report.
28.

So I did it. Worth reading.
R.L.

Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:

-- As he was moved from detention center to detention center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.

-- Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was applied; a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by and her boy friend shot when he objected; the group was beaten.

Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a litany of questions about the activities and political affiliations of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session, Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded, heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired. Then he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and to detention.

Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on an entirely different plane--as civilized people conducting a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner", and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would be found to have committed suicide. During his months in La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his own and worse.

// In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said he provided this information "to show you what you are fighting for". He asked that the Embassy treat the information carefully, "as my life is in your hands".

cc: Jessica Tuchman Matthews

ZB,

*This is a very good
summary of the material
Do you want to use it in
the WR?*

Rid

89.

Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, August 31, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen and Denend. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "set up meeting, incl. McGiffert, you, DA, & Vaky ZB."

5150

13D

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

August 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RPB*
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina

In my last memorandum to you on this subject, I told you that Vaky had assured me he would keep NSC fully informed as we developed an overall strategy to deal with our deteriorating relationship with Argentina. I regret that this has not been the case. Decisions are beginning to be made by the State Department in a haphazard, uncoordinated manner. I understand that Newsom has approved the licensing of several munition items, and today Christopher's staff called to inform me that Christopher had approved the sale of two Boeing helicopters for the Argentine army.

I asked Vaky what had happened to our agreement to develop an overall strategy, and he said that he had a strategy, and it was "in his head". Vaky said that these individual decisions are designed to send positive signals to Argentina, thus improving the atmosphere in our relationship and providing an inducement for Videla to agree to meet with Vaky.

Vaky's strategy may be correct, but I think there are serious holes in it, and continue to believe very strongly that unless we sit down and develop a paper which sets out a coherent strategy, we will run the risk of having these steps seriously misinterpreted by our domestic audience while at the same time losing potentially significant leverage on the Argentines. For example, when the U.S. business community learns that the Export-Import Bank has, at State Department request, denied issuing a letter of interest on a \$270 million sale of hydro-electric equipment, while a few weeks later State recommends the issuance of a license for the sale of two Army helicopters and other military equipment, the President and our policy will look foolishly inconsistent. In other words, while individual decisions may appear right one day, they may (appear to) be inconsistent. Unless we put all the steps together in a logical and coherent strategy which is publicly defensible, we will leave ourselves open to serious and legitimate criticism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)*J 6/26/00*

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

-2-

After requesting an accounting of items currently being withheld by the State Department for months, finally Pete Vaky gave me a list, and I am absolutely astounded by the sheer quantity of the trade we have, in effect, embargoed against Argentina. There are now pending 210 munitions lists license requests, valued at \$145 million; 29 Commerce license requests, valued at \$31 million; and approximately 11 Export-Import Bank transactions, valued at nearly \$600 million. (The latter figure I obtained in the brief which Coleman left with Owen; the brief indicated that the State Department had estimated that there was \$1.25 billion in non-military exports to Argentina being held up for human rights reasons.) The list is so staggering that I am led to wonder just how much U.S. trade world-wide is being held up by the State Department; it may be enough to have a significant impact on our balance of payments. The letter from Harold Brown to Secretary Vance (he sent you a copy at Tab B) unfortunately does not offer us any guidance. DOD has no strategy, except to open the floodgates.

I believe that there are certain steps that we can take:

-- (1) I would send our Ambassador Castro in to see President Videla (or General Viola) to convey a personal message from President Carter of concern about the state of our relationship and a wish that we both take steps to improve that relationship. As a positive gesture, Castro can inform Videla that we have approved licenses for the helicopters and for several other safety-related equipment. He should also state that President Carter would like it if President Videla could receive Ambassador Vaky to discuss ways to improve our relationship in greater detail.

-- (2) We approach the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in an informal way and suggest various formulae which could possibly break the deadlock and secure an agreement from the Argentine Government for an early visit. (Once an agreement is reached, we are in a legitimate position to begin moving on a large share of those items which are currently suspended.)

-- (3) In advance of Vaky's visit, the Export-Import Bank should begin approving several loans which are from our private sector to their private sector. We can justify that by saying that these loans cannot in any way be interpreted as supportive of the Government if they go directly to the private sector.

-- (4) The Vaky visit should be more than just atmospherics, although that should be an important element. He should make clear to Videla that we are prepared to move immediately on a large number of items if Videla reaches agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and takes several other carefully calibrated steps.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

These four steps are actually a rough outline of what a strategy paper should look like. I have drafted a letter at Tab A which suggests a high-level review of this issue. I recommend that instead of sending it to Secretary Vance you use it as guidance, and that you call Secretary Vance instead.

I don't believe that a major paper is required, but if State squawks at drafting a paper quickly, I would be prepared to do it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Secretary Vance and urge him to have a paper drafted which sets forth several objectives for an overall strategy.

Spoke to him
☒ APPROVE

☐ DISAPPROVE

Alternatively, that you send the letter at Tab A.

☐ APPROVE

☐ DISAPPROVE

cc: Henry Owen
Les Denend

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

90.

Memorandum of Conversation

Rome, September 4, 1978, 10 a.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–80, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Background. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Gardner's residence. Clift sent an abbreviated record of this conversation under a September 5 covering memorandum to Vaky, Aaron, and Pastor. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9–12/78)



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE

September 4, 1978, 10:00 a.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

President Videla
Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil
Dr. Ricardo Yofre

U.S. SIDE

Vice President Walter F. Mondale
A. Denis Clift
Interpreter:

VP: I am pleased to have this meeting. I remember the meeting we had in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. We want good relations and, speaking candidly, there are strains now. I hope today we can make some progress. I told the President of your request. He said by all means I should meet with you and he asked me to extend best wishes. He said we don't want trouble with Argentina, but human rights are a central concern. I will report to the President personally on your views.

V: Thank you, Mr. Vice President, for inviting me. For me it is an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because I feel our relations are deteriorating. I fully concur with President Carter's position on human rights. We have profound belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. We are with the United States and we are not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, we are concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. I spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time we have had to delay our announcement of an invitation to the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem--Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner's Residence

page 2
September 4, 1978

- V: (continued)
of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.
- VP: Were her statements made in Argentina or in Washington.
- V: In Washington before Congress. Mr. Vice President, the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is our concern.
- VP: I fully understand. We don't want to get into such a situation. We want to work with you to have good relations. As you know, the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be important if you could have the Interamerican Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link your actions with our own, but if you do something, then we could do something.
- As you know, the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to our press--people such as Jacobo Timerman. To the extent that you make progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress. We know that you have had problems in your country, and we want to work with you to establish a firm basis for progress.
- V: I understand, and government-to-government relations are not easy. My concern is when a problem between us is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where our citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where our businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan.
- VP: I understand. If we could get this turned around then we could move ahead, for example, on Allis-Chalmers. I would also like to suggest that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with you or with a person of your choice for a review of our relations.
- V: Would this be after the Interamerican Commission or before.

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner's Residence

page 2
September 4, 1978

VP: Oh, I think it should be as soon as possible.

V: Perhaps we could arrange a visit by the commission by mid-October.

VP: But could you announce the visit earlier.

V: Perhaps. I would like to point out that since our meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of our government:

- we have issued a list and names of all the detained;
- we have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared;
- last Christmas we released approximately 500;
- this last week, 65 individuals were freed;
- I have indicated that we are prepared to give a favorable response to the Commission on Human Rights;
- Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and under house arrest;
- Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and we expect the court to lessen the charges against him.

Officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect us.

VP: No, they would come exercising discretion. It will be important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the commission.

V: We could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced us to suspend our announcement. In the course of a few days, I believe we could develop a satisfactory announcement.

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner's Residence

page 4
September 4, 1978

- C: In considering the announcement, it is important to remember the tight timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment comes into effect on October 1.
- VP: We would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then.
- V: This was our intention. I don't think it can be done, however, before September 15.
- VP: We are encouraged that you will receive the commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done.
- V: Yes.
- VP: When may Assistant Secretary Vaky come.
- V: After our announcement on the commission. **

For Vaky we would prefer no other stops.
- VP: You would like him to visit Argentina alone.
- V: Ideally, yes.
- VP: I won't give you a yes on this, but I will recommend it and I will get back to you.
- V: Will you let us know ahead of time what his mission will be to permit us to prepare for it.
- VP: I will report to the President on my return and we will contact your ambassador immediately.
- V: Mr. Vice President, U.S.-Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels--economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. We can understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum of our overall relations and is not the single focus.

Memorandum of Conversation
Ambassador Gardner's Residence

page 5
September 4, 1978

- VP: We have no desire to interfere in the affairs of your country. We have enough domestic problems of our own. If we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. We want the best possible relations. The President was taken by you during the meeting he had last year. He is disappointed in the current course of our relations. He wants our relations to head in the right direction. I think we are now at a point where we can turn the right way.
- V: I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter.

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91.

Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice President Mondale

Washington, September 15, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries—Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential.

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MEMORANDUM


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5496

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 15, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: DAVID AARON 
SUBJECT: US-Argentine Relations: A Status
Report Since your Meeting with Videla

Following up your meeting with President Videla, we asked our Ambassador to speak to Videla's assistant. Ricardo Jofre, to obtain a timetable for Vaky's visit. We learned that the deadline for the submission of the bid by Allis-Chalmers was put off one month to October 15. We were also informed that the Argentines plan to announce in early October an agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a visit and that they expect a visit from Pete Vaky by the second or third week of October.

Christopher and Henry Owen met with John Moore and decided that a letter of interest could be issued to Allis-Chalmers about October 1, which is satisfactory to the Argentines and to Allis-Chalmers. The Argentine Government will be taking a number of steps, including releasing prisoners, before then, and that will make it easy for us to explain to the American public why we have altered our X-M decision.

Dave Newsom will be chairing a meeting next week to discuss an overall strategy for US policy to Argentina.

We have noticed in our conversations with the Argentines a new receptiveness and interest in discussing a wide range of issues, and we believe this was made possible by your conversation with Videla. Still, there is a long way to go. We have learned, for example, that the Argentines are playing games with us on ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco primarily because they feel we are playing games with them on human rights.

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92.

Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, September 25, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Pastor, Albright, and Renner.

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5150 Add-on

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 25, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN MATHEWS *JM*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Attached

I share some of Bob's frustration, but I cannot agree that our policy towards Argentina has been "disastrous". It has certainly been difficult, uneven and tense, but given the conflicting interests at stake I'm not sure exactly how it could have been improved. Consider:

- The human rights record of President Videla's administration is horrible. Reports of vicious and institutionalized torture are well documented. On the other hand, neither we nor Videla can control the indisputable terrorist threat, and Videla is probably better than anyone who would replace him on the right or the left.
- The GOA is caught between wanting to continue its long and close relationship with the US and wanting to prove its pride and strength by thumbing its nose at us -- as Brazil has done.
- The GOA wants to pursue (or at least keep alive) a nuclear weapons option. We don't want them to.
- Argentina has been the site of heavy foreign investment, while the Congress, over Administration opposition, enacts linkages between trade/investment and human rights. On the merits, if these restrictions apply anywhere, they apply in Argentina.
- There is a very high sensitivity to Argentine events in Congress. The Kennedy Amendment which takes effect next week is unique.

Given all these crosscurrents, both between the two governments and within the GOA, I don't know what an overall "strategy" would look like. Our actions haven't been as random as they might seem. I see two threads as having shaped our behavior toward Argentina. First, reaction to conflicting signals from the GOA -- promises of progress, short term progress then regression, a forward and back pattern repeated over and over. Not just on human rights, but equally on proliferation. Secondly, implementing the law -- the impending deadline of the Kennedy amendment, and the Harkin amendments, particularly on Ex-Im.

At one point an effort to explicitly define a "strategy" was made -- with bad results. That was Newsom's instructions for his visit there last spring. To a certain extent, that approach was repeated in Mondale's

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recent meeting with Videla, in that we tried to define an explicit tradeoff for the GOA -- you do this and we'll do that. While that approach seems tight and neat, it doesn't work because when the GOA doesn't do what it promises we cannot be flexible without appearing to "blink". When we change the conditions or give the quid without the quo, I suspect that we strengthen the hands of the hardliners within the GOA and further weaken the credibility of the moderates.

I have only two prescriptions and neither has to do with Argentina -- they are of general application. The first is that we devote considerable effort to an education project to convince Congress that linking certain trade and investment policies with human rights does not further the cause of human rights. This would be a long, slow process without a new "accomplishment" at the end, but I suspect it would be well worth the effort. The second is that we try, in administering the human rights programs, to avoid judging trends -- positive or negative -- at less than annual intervals. This would be hard to apply on visits from the Presidential level down to the Assistant Secretary, for it is on these occasions that we most often look for some hook on which to hang a positive action -- gift, loan, agreement or whatever. But there are other artificial deadlines to which we frequently react -- an impending IFI vote for example. The truth is that in reacting to short term changes we inevitably condemn ourselves to follow a jerky and inconsistent policy, for change that is lasting and meaningful on a societal scale seldom occurs in less than a year's time, and generally in much longer (obviously there are exceptions -- a revolution, etc.). Making this change in policy would require a Presidential decision since it would alter established ways of doing business. It also obviously carries the risk of being overly rigid, but least it seems to me worth a serious look -- a study of its pluses and minuses.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my drafting a Dodson-Tarnoff memorandum directing an interagency study of the advantages and disadvantages of a policy that would explicitly seek to avoid any US evaluation of positive or negative trends in human rights observance at less than annual intervals.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

cc: Bob Pastor
Madeleine Albright
John Renner

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93.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina

Washington, October 3, 1978, 0029Z

250739

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS 1978 Memcons for Vance. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Ruser, Newsom, and Vaky and in S/S; and approved by Perry. Vance was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY S:JPERRY
ARA/ECA - C. W. RUSER
P:ONEW;OM
S/S - JPERRY
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 250739

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY VANCE'S MEETING WITH ARGENTINE
FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES

1. SECRETARY VANCE MET WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES ON SEPTEMBER 29 IN NEW YORK. AMBASSADOR ROS AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL OF ARGENTINA AND UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM WERE ALSO PRESENT. FOREIGN MINISTER MONTES RAISED THE HUMPHREY/KENNEDY AMENDMENT AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND OFFERED ARGENTINE ASSISTANCE ON MIDDLE EAST EFFORTS.

2. MONTES NOTED THAT DURING THE MEETING BETWEEN VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE AND PRESIDENT VIDELA IN ROME, IT WAS AGREED THAT CERTAIN STEPS WERE TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THEN BY ARGENTINA. HE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN THE US EX-IM BANK AND THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THIS. THE NEXT STEP, WAS UP TO ARGENTINA. HE LEFT IN BUENOS AIRES A DRAFT OF THE POSITIVE REPLY TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) AND VIDELA PLANS TO REPLY BEFORE THE DEADLINE. MONTES HOPED THAT IF THE IAHRC GOES TO ARGENTINA IT WILL BE AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE.

3. MONTES NOTED THAT THE HUMPHREY/KENNEDY AMENDMENT GOES INTO EFFECT OCTOBER 1. FOR MANY YEARS THE U.S. HAS SUPPLIED ARGENTINE MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. THE CUT OFF OF SPARE PARTS WILL BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. PERHAPS THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND DETERMINE IF LEGALLY SPARE PARTS COULD BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA. AMBASSADOR NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE BROOKE AMENDMENT MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO RELEASE SOME GOODS WHERE THE CONTRACT WAS MADE BEFORE THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT. WE HAD REVIEWED SOME CASES AND HAD RELEASED SOME ITEMS, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND PERISCOPES. NEWSOM ADDED THAT THE USG HAD LOOKED AT A NUMBER OF ITEMS IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATION AND INEQUITIES TO MANUFACTURERS. CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS, HOWEVER, INDICATED THE AUTHORS OF THE AMENDMENT TOOK A STRICT VIEW WITH REGARD TO MILITARY SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY SPARE PARTS. NEWSOM SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THE HARDSHIP FOR ARGENTINA BUT MUST AWAIT AN IMPROVED SITUATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. MONTES NOTED THAT IN TERMS OF THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP SPARE PARTS WERE VERY IMPORTANT. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE ISSUE.

4. MONTES NOTED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES AND ESPECIALLY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITH REGARD TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. HE EXPLAINED THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SENT A DRAFT TO THE DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND THEN THE TREATY WAS SENT TO THE PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT RETURNED IT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR CHANGES AND THE TREATY WAS SENT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ON AUGUST 14 FOR SIGNATURE. IT THEN WENT AGAIN TO THE PRESIDENCY. FROM THERE IT WAS SENT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION FOR APPROVAL. MONTES INDICATED IT WOULD THEN REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE TO COMPLETE FORMAL LEGAL RATIFICATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIDELA'S INSTRUCTIONS, ALL STEPS IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WOULD BE TAKEN AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED MONTES ON CAMP DAVID AND MONTES CONGRATULATED HIM ON THE SUCCESS. MONTES RELATED THAT WHEN HE SPOKE WITH PRESIDENT CEAUDESCU IN ROMANIA, THE ROMANIAN LEADER SAID THAT ARGENTINA COULD USE ITS GOOD OFFICES EFFECTIVELY WITH BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS. MONTES PERSONALLY HAD

SPOKE TO BOTH THE JEWISH AND ARAB COMMUNITIES IN ARGENTINA AND OFFERED TO SPEAK TO THE AMBASSADOR IF THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF MONTES WOULD SPEAK TO THE AMBASSADORS IN BUENOS AIRES.

6. MONTES SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BECAUSE HE FELT THAT US/ARGENTINA RELATIONS WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES AND NOTED COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WERE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO MOVE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION AND WAS PLEASED THAT THE MONDALE/VIDELA MEETING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE. CHRISTOPHER

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AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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94.

Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale

Memo No. 999-78

Washington, October 19, 1978

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries—Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential. Sent for information.

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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo No. 999-78

October 19, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Argentina to Accept Human Rights
Commission Delegation

Argentina announced October 17 its willingness to permit a visit by a delegation from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), preferably between March and May of next year. An official in the Argentine president's office told Embassy Buenos Aires that the IAHRC delegation will have access to prisons, political leaders and the relatives of missing persons -- but not to military bases. Even so, he added, the decision to accept the delegation was controversial in Argentine military and government circles.

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95.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, January 26, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 28, Human Rights—Argentina IV. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in D at 6:02 p.m. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, “WC—Here is Patt’s thinking on Argentina, which I mentioned in my memo for your meeting Friday.” Reference presumably is to Friday, February 2.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

WC- Here is Pat's thinking on Argentina,
which I mentioned in D
my memo for your meeting
Friday.

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January 26, 1979

TO: The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary

FROM: HA - Patricia M. Derian

DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO
NOT REVIEWED BY S/S

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Argentina

The increasing magnitude and brutality of Argentine human rights violations convince me that it is time for us to take additional measures to underscore our concerns and bring pressure to bear on the Junta to make improvements. Only substantial pressure across a broad front is likely to have any real effect, and there are a number of things we can and should do.

The situation is clearly [deteriorating] not improving substantially

-- 38 bodies, many of them without heads or hands, were recently washed ashore on one of Argentina's Atlantic beaches. A Buenos Aires newspaper which had investigated the report killed the story at the direction of the Presidential Press Office.

-- Our Embassy estimates that about 55 disappearances a month take place in Argentina. The International Red Cross Representative in Buenos Aires recently characterized the disappearances as "a calculated policy" of the Argentine authorities.

-- For the past three weeks, security forces have arrested and threatened to imprison mothers of the disappeared who have held weekly silent demonstrations in the capital's main square for the past two years. This heavy-handed police intimidation follows by only a few weeks the soothing promises given the mothers by a Presidential Palace spokesman at Christmas.

-- An officer of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights told our Embassy in December that security forces simply murdered a couple in their own home without bothering to take them to a detention center. The same source said he had received other recent reports of such killings.

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(RDS-4 01/26/94, DERIAN, Patricia M.)

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- 2 -

-- We continue to receive numerous highly credible reports that torture is used routinely in the interrogation of detainees. The electric "picana," something like a supercharged cattle prod, is still apparently a favorite tool, as is the "submarine" treatment (immersion of the head in a tub of water, urine, excrement, blood, or a combination of these).

-- Prison treatment of the 3,200 acknowledged political detainees has deteriorated sharply in recent months, according to the International Red Cross representative in Argentina. Torture, beatings, and dietary neglect are common for them and for the unacknowledged detainees held in secret military facilities. Another source reported that fifty female detainees recently transferred between prisons "have not been exposed to the sun for so long that their skin color is greenish...Some have lost their eyesight. Many are mentally deranged."

These developments illustrate the reasons why I believe we should, at a minimum, take these actions:

-- Vote "No" on all IFI loans to Argentina which do not clearly meet the basic human needs criteria, and at least invite other donor countries to take similar action.

-- Switch from "Yes" to "Abstain" on IFI loans which meet the basic human needs criteria.

-- Instruct our Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission to make a strong statement condemning Argentine human rights violations.

-- Begin to deny commercial licenses of military-related equipment destined to the Argentine Armed Forces, as we now do with equipment for the police.

-- Deny or delay Export-Import Bank financing for new projects in Argentina. If necessary, we should seek a Presidential determination under the Chaffee Amendment that denial would advance U. S. human rights objectives.

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- 3 -

-- Mount major new diplomatic effort to persuade foreign arms suppliers to stop selling military and police equipment to Argentina.

-- Give careful consideration to suspending or halting entirely the pipeline of U. S. - origin military equipment purchased by Argentina under earlier programs.

-- In connection with, and explanation of, the above measures, issue a strong public statement condemning the continuing deterioration of Argentine human rights practices.

We simply have to begin to take measures like these if we expect to see any meaningful improvements. There is no longer any doubt that Argentina has the worst human rights record in South America. We cannot wait for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visit at the end of May. While we hope that Argentine Government preparations for the visit, and the visit itself, will result in some improvements, we should not rely exclusively on this event. A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official recently said his government plans to stonewall the Commission on the disappearance issue.

We would not be alone in taking more forceful measures. I understand that both Canada and the UK share the view that the situation is worsening. Canada, as a result, has halted transfers--not just of arms--to the Argentine military. Both countries, as well as some Scandinavian countries, are seriously considering opposing IFI loans to Argentina.

~~SECRET~~

96.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)

Washington, February 13, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Box 1, Argentina—August 9 Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “Rec’d 2/16.” Below this the hand wrote “(cc: SC [Steven Cohen]).” Derian crossed out “SC” and wrote below it: “my file Arg.”



~~1. CS~~
~~1. Hold for PD~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Rec'd 2116

(cc ~~to [unclear]~~)

my file Arg

February 13, 1979

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/S - Peter Tarnoff
 FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky
 SUBJECT: Evaluation of Argentine Human Rights Situation

Pursuant to your tasking memorandum of January 27 I enclose the paper now approved by ARA, INR, HA and S/P. I have included on two or three points a dissenting analyses and evaluation in the form of footnotes. These were basic differences which could not be reconciled.

Enclosure:

Argentine paper.

Drafted: ARA:VPVaky:lif

ADP Declassification Review
 DECLASSIFIED
 by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

SECRET
 RDS-4 2/13/94

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

UNCLASSIFIED

ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(c) Parameters and problems. The following assessment covers the Argentine government's 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments.

(c) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to rely upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments.

(c) We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below. The record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged.

(c) Current situation. With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

(c) -- Political prisoners: Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the disposition of the national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution (PEN prisoners) *

(c) * The current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units, or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons.

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

(C) -- Torture and prisoner mistreatment: Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include such things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military's conception of social order) groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety

officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or his or her summary execution. ~~§ 3(b)(1)(6)~~

the PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation. ~~§ 3(b)(1)(6)~~

(c) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 an ICRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year.

(c) -- Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (d) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers.

(c) ~~§ 3(b)(1)(6)~~ Reports received from released prisoners tend to substantiate ~~§ 3(b)(1)(6)~~ observations on the frequency of torture.

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(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.

(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we have any information, could be considered terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw into the security net a range of non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance of persons with a common association past or present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However, there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific act of the victim.

(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with few known exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals have criticized the government's economic, political and human rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the security forces.

(C) There has been no significant official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines' standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts

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regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.

(C) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government House in downtown Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on cases for which their operatives have been responsible.

(C) "Reappearances" emerged as a new and possibly under-reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human rights organizations.

(C) -- Fair public trial. All who have been detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges against them.

(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in civilian or military courts, *** there are two notable problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal groups such as the ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional evidence.

(C) -- Invasion of the home. The detention practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and stealing the personal property of the detainee.

(C) Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the net result was to leave the situation little changed.² Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.

(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds of abuses because the available statistical material is not always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in

(C) *** The status of PEN prisoners with respect to judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner held under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half or more of the current PEN detainees are either being tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition for exile under the right-of-option program.

the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month for the January-April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

~~(C)~~ On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence, the situation changed little during 1978.³

~~(S/NF/NC)~~ Counterterrorism uncontrolled. The conclusion that conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence that the security forces continued to operate without effective central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence sources stated that:

- President Videla and his moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and control over security operations;
- new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and military operations within the bounds of the law; or
- police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for abuses.

~~(C)~~ Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional and local military authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the law or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central control over operational counterterrorist units.

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(c) The political context. The "dirty war" argument so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, and no group was judged a serious and immediate security threat. High government officials, including President Videla, have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the "war" is over, i.e., that there is no continuing high-level internal security threat.

(c) The explanation for the continuing human rights abuses lies in armed forces, and especially army, politics rather than in internal security problems. The army is the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President Videla leads a group of military and civilian moderates who would prefer to see human rights abuses halted. Videla's priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree of army and military unity, because the development of irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick demise and the end of the military's National Reorganization Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed to the military government's reform program and believes his own role important. Thus, Videla's preferences give way to his long-term political goals when his preferences threaten military cohesion.

(c) In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla nor any other significant military figure, has questioned the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard core terrorists. Videla's differences with the so-called hardliners center on violations of the rights of non-terrorists. The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment as subversive. They do not entirely share the moderates' perception that the "war" against subversion is over.⁴ Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos Aires) and Major General Luciano Benjamin Menendez (Corps III, Cordoba) continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics that ensured human rights abuses.

(c) Other factors that diminished Videla's chances of achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and

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a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment with the general economic and political performance of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on Videla's part.

(c) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable changes involved the following officers:

- Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in Chief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units, his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.
- Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial processing of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a needed improvement over Suarez Mason.
- Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.
- Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of

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counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.

- Brig. General Juan Bautista Sassiain's appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel.
- Major General Luciano B. Menendez, a fanatic on subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez's retention may be attributable to the need for his services in the event of hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the March 1976 coup.⁵ Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand change.

(c) IAHRC visit. From the Argentine government's perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site investigation.

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than the IAHRC visit.⁶

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FOOTNOTES

1. HA Note: HA prefers the following wording for the text from sentence two of paragraph 1 through first sentence of paragraph 3.

"Although it is difficult to quantify precisely certain aspects of the situation - such as the exact number of people killed and tortured and the number being held in clandestine military camps - we receive a steady flow of detailed information from a wide variety of credible sources in Argentina about human rights events and conditions. These sources include our Embassy, [FO 13526(b)(1)(6)]

[REDACTED] and Amnesty International, Argentine Government officials, Argentine human rights organizations, victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses to incidents of abduction and torture, and relatives of victims."

2. HA Note: No overall trend of improvement in category - one terms can be shown. There was substantial qualitative deterioration in at least two areas - the widening scope of the victims of disappearance, and the worsening of treatment of political detainees. The simple passage of time can also be viewed as a negative factor - another year of widespread violations long after any terrorist threats has passed.
3. HA Note: HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties with quantitative material, the shift in targeting noted above is a significant negative development.
4. HA Note: However, Videla himself said last year that "A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" (Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978). INR and ARA view the inclusion of this statement attributed by the press to Videla as potentially misleading when used in the above context. The

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quote invites the inference that Videla supports the application of extreme security measures against those who have not committed violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence to support that contention.

5. HA Note: The army command changes present a mixed picture from which it is not possible to conclude that the overall political context for human rights improvement is more favorable than in the past.

6. S/P and
HA Note: S/P and HA would delete this last sentence because it contradicts the assessment that the command changes are "mixed".

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97.

Memorandum From John Spiegel of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, February 28, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-7/79. Secret.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 28, 1979

~~SECRET~~⁴
file
Argentina

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Pastor
National Security Council
The White House

FROM: John W. Spiegel *JWS*
Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Assessment of Current Human Rights
Situation in Argentina

Attached is a report on the current human rights situation in Argentina, done at Secretary Vance's request by the Assistant Secretaries for Latin America, Human Rights, Policy Planning, and Intelligence and Research. The report concludes that kidnapping, by official security units, continued during 1978 at a rate of roughly 55 "disappearances" per month. Approximately 90% of those abducted are estimated to have been tortured during interrogation, and many have been summarily executed.

On the basis of the attached report, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher believe that we cannot continue abstaining in the multilateral development banks on non-basic human needs loans to Argentina. The United States moved from a position of voting no on non-basic human needs loans to abstention because of signs that the Argentine government intended to address seriously the very grave human rights situation. We have urged the GOA to do so in repeated diplomatic approaches at the highest levels, including Secretary Vance and the Vice President. We had hoped that the GOA's decision last fall to invite the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina this May would provide a further inducement for improvements in advance of the visit, and for that reason we went forward with Export-Import Bank financing and some IMET courses. Notwithstanding our efforts and expectations, there has been no improvement in what remains the worst human rights situation in the hemisphere.

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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RDS-2/3 2/28/85 (Spiegel, John W.)

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- 2 -

As you know, the legal restrictions, from a human rights standpoint, on U.S. positions on loans by the multilateral development banks are much stronger and more explicit than in other areas of economic relations such as Ex-Im lending, OPIC guarantees, or export licenses, where we have followed a somewhat more liberal course with respect to Argentina. The U.S. is required by law to seek to channel assistance in the multilateral development banks away from countries whose governments engage in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," and to oppose loans to those countries unless the loans serve basic human needs. We consistently vote against loans to a number of countries where the situation is not as grave as in Argentina. Given these considerations, and taking into account the need to address this difficult bilateral issue in a positive way whenever possible, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher have concluded that the U.S. must move soon to a "vote no" position unless there are substantial improvements in the Argentine human rights situation.

Amb. Vaky is discussing with the Argentine Ambassador this need for improvement in the near future and the likely consequences of a continuation of the current situation.

Please let me know if you have any reactions to the attached report.

Attachment:

As stated.

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98.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 21, 1979

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Secret. Pastor drafted the memorandum on March 20, but recommended that it be used as taking points rather as a memorandum. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79-12/80)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience -- in the U.S. and elsewhere -- before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights

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-2-

policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last --the invitation-- may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization. I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified. (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S)

Or we should have a PRC on the above.

Zig.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

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99.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, March 27, 1979, 1831Z

2399

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165-0611. Secret; Immediate.

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ACTION ARA-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 COME-00 SP-02 AID-05 EB-08
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 2399

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 3/27/09; (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM AR
SUBJ: (S) AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES RAILROAD LOAN WITH PRESIDENT
VIDELA

REF: CASTRO-RUSER TELECONS, 3/26; STATE 075474; STATE 076152.

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ ALL TEXT.

2. I RECEIVED A CALL FROM DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY (MAR 26) INFORM-
ING ME MESSAGE WOULD BE ARRIVING SHORTLY REFERENCE USG VOTE ON
GOA RAILROAD LOAN TO TAKE PLACE TODAY (MARCH 27). I WAS INSTRUCT-
ED TO SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA ASAP, ANTICIPATING
MESSAGE, I CONTACTED PRESIDENT VIDELA'S OFFICE AND WAS TOLD
PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTEN HIS MEETING AWAY FROM PRESIDENTIAL
PALACE TO MEET ME AT 20:30 HRS LAST NIGHT (MARCH 26). DUE TO
NON-ARRIVAL OF DEPT'S MESSAGE, I CONTACTED DIRECTOR, (ARA/ECA)
FOR GUIDANCE AS TO CONTENTS OF MESSAGE. CONTENTS WERE FURNISHED
ME AND SUBSEQUENTLY AN AMENDMENT WAS GIVEN JUST BEFORE LEAVING
FOR MY MEETING WITH VIDELA.

3. ON ARRIVAL, VIDELA WAS WAITING FOR ME. HE APPEARED IN GOOD
SPIRITS AND INVITED ME TO HIS WORKING OFFICE. I HAD ALWAYS MET
WITH HIM IN HIS MAIN OFFICE. TO MY DISMAY, HIS WORKING

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OFFICE APPEARS TO BE AN ADJUNCT TO SOME BISILICA AS THE
DECOR IS HEAVILY RELIGIOUS. AFTER MY MAKING FULL INQUIRY
INTO THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF HIS FAMILY AND THE PRESIDENT
OF MINE, I GAVE MY OPENING STATEMENT. I TRANSLATED IN FULL
DETAIL CONTENTS OF MESSAGE GIVEN ME. I MUST ADMIT IT WAS
NOT PLEASANT TO READ TO THE PRESIDENT AN INDICTMENT OF
CHARGES THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATOR AND
FOR THAT REASON USG, AS REQUIRED BY LAW, IT WAS REQUIRED
TO VOTE "NO" ON LOANS FROM MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.
I THEN EXPLAINED TO VIDELA THAT IN 1978 THE USG CHANGED
ITS POSITION FROM VOTING "NO" TO ABSTAINING ON THESE LOANS
BECAUSE THERE WERE SEVERAL INDICATIONS WHICH INDICATED
IMPROVEMENTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. I TOLD HIM WE CONSIDERED
THE IAHRV VISIT AS A VERY POSITIVE FACTOR.

4. I THEN EXPLAINED TO VIDELA THE YEAR 1978 WAS EXTREMELY
DISCOURAGING. I THEN WENT DOWN THE LINE ON CHARGES AND TOLD
VIDELA SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS HAD NOT OCCURRED IN 1978.
BY THIS TIME PRESIDENT VIDELA APPEARED VERY MUCH LIKE THE
ACCUSED AND I AS THE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE. I TOLD THE PRESI-
DENT ARBITRARY ARRESTS, DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS DUE TO
EFFORTS OF SECURITY FORCES HAD BLATANTLY CONTINUED IN 1978.
I EXPLAINED THERE WAS AN AVERAGE OF OVER 50 PERSONS DIS-
APPEARED PER MONTH LAST YEAR. I EXPLAINED OF USG TOTAL CON-
TEMPT FOR TORTURING AND MIS-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

INTERROGATIONS AND THAT FURTHERMORE THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAINED VERY HIGH. DURING ALL THIS TIME I SPOKE FIRMLY, SUCCINCTLY AND AT A RAPID PACE SO AS TO AVOID THE PRESIDENT INTERRUPTING MY TRAIN OF THOUGHT. I WANTED TO BE SURE HE HEARD IT ALL. AS I WATCHED THE PRESIDENT, IT BECAME CLEAR HE WAS IN PAIN OVER MY STATEMENTS. (COMMENT: I WAS HAPPY I WASN'T TALKING TO MININT. HARGUINDEGUY, WHO WEIGHS ABOUT 240 POUNDS AND DOESN'T SPEAK BUT INSTEAD ROARS.)

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5. I CONTINUED TELLING THE PRESIDENT USG HAD BEEN MONITORING GOA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HOPING TO FIND POSITIVE INDICATIONS SO AS TO AVOID VOTING "NO" ON LOANS. I MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OVER THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION AND ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE TIMERMAN RELEASE. I THEN EXPLAINED THERE WAS LACK OF CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO INDICATE TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES HAD COMPLETELY CEASED. IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS, VIDELA WAS TOLD USG WAS READY TO VOTE "NO" ON TUESDAY, MARCH 27.

6. VIDELA WA THEN TOLD THAT BASED ON STATEMENTS MADE BY THEIR AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL ON MARCH 22, USG WAS WILLING TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK ON SITUATION. I INFORMED VIDELA THAT AJA ESPIL HAD STATED DISAPPEARANCES HAD STOPPED, THAT GOA WOULD INVESTIGATE NEW DISAPPEARANCES AND ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST ANY SECURITY FORCE RESPONSIBLE FOR DISAPPEARANCES. VIDELA WAS THEN TOLD AJA ESPIL HAD SUBMITTED TO HIS GOVERNMENT NAME OF PERSON SUPPOSEDLY DISAPPEARED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979 AS PER RECORDS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. VIDELA DISCLAIMED KNOWING ANY SUCH DISAPPEARANCE ON FEB. 9. (COMMENT: EMBASSY RECORDS FAIL TO INDICATE ANY DISAPPEARANCE ON FEB. 9. I ASKED AJA ESPIL, WHO WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY, TO SUBMIT NAMES OF MISSING PERSON, SO CASE CAN BE SUBSTANTIATED. END COMMENT:)

7. I TOLD VIDELA BASED ON HIS AMBASSADOR'S AND OTHER REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS, THE USG WOULD CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF ABSTENTION ON MARCH 27. AS I MADE THIS STATEMENT, VIDELA GAVE A LONG SIGH OF RELIEF, SMILED REACHED OVER, AND SHOOK MY HAND AND THANKED ME. (COMMENT: THIS ACTION WAS MOST PERPLEXING FOR ME AS I FELT AS THOUGH I HAD FAILED IN MY MISSION. I ANTICIPATED LITERALLY BEING TOSSED OUT DURING MY INITIAL PHASE OF THE INTERVIEW, BUT HAVING THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA THANK ME FOR AN "ABSTENTION" WAS TOTALLY UNEXPECTED. VIDELA WAS THOROUGHLY PLEASED WITH

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THE "ABSTENTION", EVEN THOUGH MY CHARGES OF HIS COUNTRY WERE HARD, FACTUAL AND NOT EASY TO ACCEPT. END COMMENT:)

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ACTION ARA-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 COME-00 SP-02 AID-05 EB-08

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8. I THEN SHIFTED OVER BY TELLING VIDELA USG HOPED GOA WOULD SOON START WORKING ON LISTS OF DISAPPEARED SUBMITTED BY US AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. I AGAIN STRESSED NEED TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS ASAP AND IMMEDIATELY HALT TO TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS. I COMPLIMENTED VIDELA FOR VIRTUAL CESSATION OF DISAPPEARANCES SINCE JANUARY AND WILLINGNESS OF GOA TO INVESTIGATE AND TAKE ACTION AGAINST SECURITY FORCES WHICH ACTED ILLEGALLY. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO VIDELA GOA'S ACTIONS WOULD BE MONITORED NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

9. TIMERMAN CASE: I TOLD VIDELA I HAD HEARD HE AND THE JUNTA HAD DISCUSSED THE FATE OF JACOBO TIMERMAN. HE SMILED AND SAID IT WAS TRUE. VIDELA MADE A GESTURE AS THOUGH PUTTING ON A PAIR OF GLOVES AND STATED THE TIMERMAN CASE COULD NOT BE HANDLED WITH BARE KNUCKLES BUT ONLY WITH KID GLOVES. I SUGGESTED THE PUTTING ON OF THE KID GLOVES SHOULD NOT PROVE TO BE A DILATORY TECHNIQUE. VIDELA THEN TOLD ME HE KNEW I HAD PERSISTENTLY DISCUSSED THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH GENERAL VIOLA AND VIOLA HAD IN TURN DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA. I THEN SAGGESTED PERHAPS IT MIGHT PROVE GOOD P.R. WORK IF TIMERMAN WOULD BE RELEASED ASAP SO AS TO AVOID GIVING APPEARANCE OF ACT BEING ONE OF PRESSURE BEFORE ARRIVAL OF IAIRC. HE AGREED. I THEN TOLD

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VIDELA I HOPED TIMERMAN CASE WOULD NOT TURN OUT TO BE ANOTHER TLATELOLCO RATIFICATION - JUST PROMISES AND MORE PROMISES. WITH A SHEEPISH GESTURE, HE TOLD ME STRONG EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO DECIDE TIMERMAN AND TLATELOLCO CASE BY MIDDLE OR END OF APRIL. IN A MOMENT OF LEVITY ON MY PART, I TOLD PRESIDENT I HOPED TIMERMAN AND TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RESOLVED BY APRIL 14, AS I WOULD BE VISITING THE DEPARTMENT ON THAT DATE. I ALSO TOLD VIDELA I WANTED TO GET CREDIT FOR TIMERMAN AND TLATELOLCO BEFORE I LEFT AS I DIDN'T WANT THE DCM, MAX CHAPLIN, TO GET THE GLORY. VIDELA LAUGHED HEARTILY AND SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS BEST TO ACCOMMODATE ME. I SUGGESTED TO VIDELA THAT IF TLATELOLCO WAS RATIFIED AND TIMERMAN RELEASED, THAT HE SHOULD PHONE PRESIDENT CARTER DIRECTLY, SO THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WOULD BE THE FIRST TO KNOW THE FATE OF TWO MATTERS OF HIS HIGH INTEREST. PRESIDENT VIDELA REPLIED THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD IN MIND OF DOING.

10. RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIDELA USG WOULD BE VERY APPRECIATIVE IF HE PUT IN A GOOD WORD WITH GENERAL HARGUINDEGUY, MIN OF INT, SO AS TO ACCELERATE RIGHT OF OPTION PROGRAM. VIDELA PROMISED HE WOULD BUT THEN CLARIFIED ISSUE BY STATING A NEW COMMITTEE HAD BEEN FORMED FOR RIGHT OF OPTION CASES. HE IMPLIED HARGUINDEGUY'S ROLE HAD BEEN DIMINISHED.

11. FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIONS: THE PRESIDENT GAVE ME ASSURANCES DISAPPEARANCES HAD STOPPED AND WOULD NO LONGER BE A FACTOR. HE EXPLAINED THERE WILL BE INSTANCES OF CRIMINAL DISAPPEARANCES FOR RANSOM AND PERHAPS AN OCCASIONAL SECURITY OFFICER WHO MIGHT GO OFF HALF-COCKED. HE DID AGREE TO INVESTIGATE ALL DISAPPEARANCES AND THAT CULPRITS WOULD BE TRIED IN A COURT OF LAW.

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12. DISAPPEARANCES: VIDELA STATED HE FORESAW AN IMPASSE DURING THE IAIRC VISIT. HE SAID GOA IN ALL SINCERITY LACKED INFORMATION ON DISAPPEARANCES AND WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY NOT BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO COMMISSION REQUIREMENTS. HE STATED DISAPPEARANCES WAS ONE PHASE OF IAIRC INVESTIGATION GOA WAS UNABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY ANSWERS. VIDELA EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE TO ABIDE BY THE RULE OF LAW. HE TOLD ME A SINCERE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO CLEAN HOUSE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF IAIRC.

13. I THANKED VIDELA FOR RECEIVING ME FAST AS SOON AS HE DID. HE REPLIED BY STATING HE WAS GLAD HE COULD ACCOMMODATE ME AS MIN ECON MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOLD HIM LAST WEEK USG WOULD VOTE "NO" ON RAILROAD LOAN. HE SAID HE LOOKED UPON ME AS A BEARER OF GOOD TIDINGS.
CASTRO

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100.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 27, 1979

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, David Newsom Files, 1978-81, Lot 81D154, Box 14, Latin America. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom. The meeting took place in the Embassy of Argentina. The time of the luncheon is not indicated in the memorandum. Copies were sent to ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, P, and the Embassy in Buenos Aires.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 27, 1979
Place: Argentina Embassy

SUBJECT: U.S.-Argentina Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David D. Newsom

Argentina Ambassador Aja Espil

Copies to: ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, Buenos Aires, P

During the course of a luncheon conversation, Ambassador Aja Espil stressed the need for a continuing dialogue with his country. He noted that it had been more than a year since my visit to Buenos Aires and a considerable time since the important meeting between Vice President Mondale and President Videla in Rome.

Some new contact at a high level was necessary in order to give support to the moderate elements in Argentina at a time when the military were reacting to a series of "shocks." He mentioned the Nicaraguan situation and the Argentine vote in favor of our resolution at the OAS. Also adverse from the military's standpoint were the recent visits of John Oakes of the New York Times -- who wrote two articles critical of the regime on May 15-16 -- and a delegation from the New York Bar Association. The problem with the military will be further aggravated by the results of the upcoming visit of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission.

The Ambassador emphasized that the vote on behalf of our resolution should be seen by us as a positive step to be acknowledged. He acknowledged that there were still human rights problems, but said there had been progress in the

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release of prisoners and the reduced number of disappearances. He acknowledged that the Timmerman case and the inability of the government to account for the disappeared remained serious problems.

He suggested that Ambassador Vaky might consider a visit to Buenos Aires after the inauguration of the Bolivian President in La Paz on August 6 (if this takes place). He suggested, also, that the Secretary receive the new Foreign Minister, Pastor, who will be in New York from September 22 to 26. He said "even a half hour" would be very important.

The Ambassador said it was important, particularly in view of the OAS vote to explain to the Argentine government our view on the Nicaraguan situation. The military reaction to this had been further aggravated by the appearance last week in Managua of a Montonero leader who proclaimed that "what has happened in Managua will happen next in Buenos Aires."

I responded by agreeing to discuss the matters he had raised further with Ambassador Vaky. I said we wanted good relations with Argentina, but that some of the matters he had raised clearly stood in the way. I asked whether, for example, it would be possible to make any progress on Timmerman. He said, "perhaps at the end of the year." He said Timmerman, unfortunately, talks too much and says the wrong things as far as the military is concerned.

On Nicaragua, I suggested that Argentina had close relations with some of the Andean states, such as Venezuela and that his government might want to talk to these countries. I said we were trying to take a less central role and to leave such matters as much as possible to the Latin American states directly interested. The Ambassador acknowledged this, but insisted that his government still considered us "the key."

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101.

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua
Washington, August 14, 1979, 2220Z

212082

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-1171. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Adams; cleared in S/S-O and in draft by R. Pastor and Bremer; and approved by Vaky.

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DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA:MMADAMS, JR.:MAS
APPROVED BY ARA:VPVAKY
NSC:RAPASTOR (DRAFT)
S/S:JBREMER (DRAFT)
S/S-O:RSTEVEN

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AMEMBASSY QUITO

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/10/85 (VAKY, VIRON P.)

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PORS, PARM, XK, XM, AR

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
PASTOR

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE "DANGEROUS" CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN NEAR FUTURE BUT NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NOT BE SOLE CRITERIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINA'S VOTE IN OAS ON NICARAGUA, AND NOTED THAT U.S. VALUES HIGHLY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A FRIEND -- AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM A "FESTERING SORE" IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ON NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING INDEPENDENT, UNALIGNED COUNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED TO NEED FOR COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY. TURNING TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF TLAHELCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE. PASTOR RESPONDED THAT TLAHELCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA COMPLETES ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATER PLANT AND "FEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMMARY.

3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST 10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER) HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

OF THAT MEETING FOLLOWS:

CENTRAL AMERICA

THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA SAW THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BELIEVED SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA.

IN RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AS VERY DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM CUBA TO LAY LOW AND TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE FROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES. AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSISTANCE IT WILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN, BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF GREAT INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERU.

IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE "INTENSE PINK". HE CONTINUED THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT COMMUNISTS USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECONOMY. THE GOA HOPES IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO PROCEED ALONG THE DEMOCRATIC PATH BUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY.

HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE LEADER OF THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE ONLY THING TO MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO BE THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
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RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. IF THIS COMMISSION APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT WILL SEE MARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN THE OAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO NOT COMPLETELY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE U.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE THE U.S.' TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE. AFTER THE U.S., THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE MEXICO, BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS

CONSIDERED A FRIEND -- AN ALLY. THE U.S. VALUED HIGHLY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO CONTINUE INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS AND OTHER ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THE U.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BUT, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING SORE IN OUR RELATIONS.

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TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE GNR; CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER WAY. NICARAGUA HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND UNALIGNED COUNTRY. THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS WHO ARE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. THE U.S. FEELS

THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TO HELP THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLEMS. IF THESE TENSIONS ARE NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE WILL LIKELY BE AN EXPLOSION OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE WHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCE WE ALL HAVE A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS ANDEAN GROUP COLLEAGUES HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT NICARAGUA WILL NEED A LONG PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL ABSORB ALL THE ENERGIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE NO TIME TO THINK OF EXTENDING ITS MARXIST VIEWS. BUT, THE MINISTER WONDERED WHAT THE RESULT WOULD BE IF IT IS THE SANDINISTAS WHO DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID AND CHANNEL RECUPERATION ASSISTANCE. WHO WILL GET ALL THE CREDIT FOR THIS EFFORT, HE ASKED, BUT THE SANDINISTAS. THE RESULT CAN ONLY BE THAT THE LEFTISTS WILL END UP ENLISTING THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR BEHALF SO THAT IN TWO OR THREE YEARS, SHOULD THE GNR ACCEDE TO ELECTIONS, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE THE LOGICAL WINNERS AND COMMUNISM WOULD TAKE OVER.

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THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED THE U.S. TO BE FORTHCOMING IN ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO ASSURE THAT NICARAGUA OVER TIME WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TOPPLE THEM. THE MINISTER SAID HE PERCEIVED THIS IN HIS TALKS WITH HIS CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. HE FELT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER COMMUNICATION ON IDEAS OF HOW TO STOP NICARAGUAN ENCROACHMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE FELT HONDURAS HAD A GOOD CHANCE TO SURVIVE ANY THREATS. BUT WITH RESPECT TO SALVADOR, THE TIME IS SHORT TO RESPOND TO THAT COUNTRY'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE FELT THAT UNLESS SALVADOR RESPONDED QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT WAS IN PERIL.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED

AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING PROVIDING MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOULD BE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA.

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS AND THAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH FROM A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT COULD GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TO CHANNEL ANY RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, HE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID
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AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVE OUR LONGER-RANGE OBJECTIVES.

THE TERRITORIAL SEA

THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE U.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 200 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT REFER TO. HE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARBLED STORY COMING OUT OF THE LOS NEGOTIATIONS.

TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PREDECESSOR THAT ARGENTINA WOULD MOVE ON TLATELOLCO, AND HE ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF IT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WANTED TO BE FRANK. ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENERGY, AMONG THEM NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW REACHED THE STAGE OF BEING ABLE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT ITS ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED THE GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN COMPLETE ITS ENERGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FULLY DETER-
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MINED TO SIGN TLATELOLCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT

HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED, ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAN ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT COMMUNIQUE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED.

THE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WHEN ARGENTINA COULD SIGN.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS COULD BE IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA WAS PRESSED ON THE MATTER SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT ABIDE BY THE COMMUNIQUE. HE ASSUMED ARGENTINA'S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATION OF A DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THE "CENTRAL CONCEPT" HAD NOT CHANGED; WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING.

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102.

Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 29, 1979, 0405Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS memcons 1979. Confidential; Exdis.

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Department of State

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/28/85 (BLACKEN, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, AR
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ARGENTINE FOMHIN
PASTOR

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: FOMHIN PASTOR COMPLIMENTED THE SECRETARY ON HIS UNGA ADDRESS. THEY DISCUSSED THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT, ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND THE EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON US/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SECRETARY MET WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR ON SEPTEMBER 24. ALSO ATTENDING WERE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL, UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND ARA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EATON.

4. SECRETARY'S UNGA STATEMENT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER COMPLIMENTED THE SECRETARY ON HIS UNGA SPEECH, PARTICULARLY HIS CALL FOR GREATER COOPERATION TO COMBAT TERRORISM. HIS REFERENCE TO THE TOKYO ROUND TO WHICH ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THE FIRST COUNTRY TO ADHERE; AND HIS FOCUS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IN THIS REGARD, HE INFORMED THE SECRETARY THAT ARGENTINA HAD ALREADY RECEIVED THE FIRST GROUP OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED VERY GREAT PLEASURE AT THIS NEWS.

5. NAM SUMMIT. PASTOR SAID ARGENTINA WAS NOT ONLY A FRIENDLY COUNTRY, BUT ALSO AN ALLY TO THE U.S. ARGENTINA HAD SOUGHT TO SUPPORT US-FAVORED POSITIONS AT THE NAM SUMMIT IN HAVANA, PARTICULARLY AGAINST EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND ON PUERTO RICO. THIS IS NOT JUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE US BUT BECAUSE OF A COINCIDENCE OF POLICIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN HAVANA AND SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH MANY OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE HAVANA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, HE WAS PLEASED THAT MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENT AFFECTING THE HEMISPHERE WAS CHANGED. HE WAS ALSO HAPPY THAT THE POSITION ADVOCATED BY PRESIDENT TITO OF MAINTAINING THE MOVEMENT'S TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT HAD PREVAILED.

6. NICARAGUAN ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY WAS HAPPY TO REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING IN QUITO WHERE US HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED WITH HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION AID TO NICARAGUA AND THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO REPROGRAM FUNDS FROM OTHER AREAS. WE WERE CONSIDERING ALSO A SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET FOR NOT ONLY NICARAGUA BUT ALSO EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA. THESE FUNDS WOULD BE KEYED TO THE EFFORTS OF THESE COUNTRIES TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WHICH THEY FACE, PARTICULARLY IN MOVING TOWARD MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. THE US HAD FOUND ITSELF SOMEWHAT HAMSTRUNG, HOWEVER, IN DEALING WITH EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, AND HE INTENDED TO SEEK A CONTINGENCY FUND FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN UNEXPECTED

CRISES. PASTOR SAID ARGENTINA HAD DECIDED TO GIVE IMPORTANT ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA, NOT IN FINANCIAL AID, HOWEVER, BUT FOOD AID. HIS COUNTRY WOULD GIVE "MANY THOUSANDS OF TONS" OF WHEAT TO NICARAGUA. ARGENTINA WAS DISTRUSTFUL OF NOT ONLY THE RADICALS, BUT ALSO THE MODERATES IN NICARAGUA. THE SECRETARY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF AN EFFORT WAS NOT MADE TO SUPPORT THE MODERATES WE WOULD YIELD THE FIELD TO THE RADICALS WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE REGION. PASTOR ASKED WHAT TYPE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS CONTEMPLATED. THE SECRETARY CLARIFIED THAT THE CONTINGENCY FUND TO WHICH HE REFERRED WAS FOR WORLDWIDE USE; HOWEVER, IN CENTRAL AMERICA AN EXAMPLE OF US ASSISTANCE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PROVIDING SPARE PARTS OF AIRCRAFT ENGINES TO EL SALVADOR.

7. SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA. FOMHIN PASTOR RECALLED THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THE FIRST LATIN COUNTRY TO EXTEND NAVAL AND AIR ASSISTANCE IN THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS. ARGENTINA, THEREFORE, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFIRMATION THAT THE BRIGADE WAS THERE THE FACT WAS MADE PUBLIC AND THE US ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE US WAS SEEKING RECTIFICATION OF THE SITUATION AND HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE STATUS QUO IS UNACCEPTABLE. WE ARE SEEKING A SOLUTION BASED ON CHANGES IN THE STATUS QUO WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY TO US.

8. MEETING OF AMERICAN ARMIES. PASTOR ASKED WHAT POSITION THE US WOULD TAKE REGARDING NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE AT THE MEETING OF AMERICAN ARMIES TO TAKE PLACE IN COLOMBIA. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD FAVOR NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE.

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ADP Declassification Review
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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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9. IAHRC VISIT. THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE VISIT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH HE TERMED A POSITIVE STEP, HAD GONE. PASTOR SAID THE VISIT HAD BEEN "VERY SATISFACTORY IN GENERAL TERMS" BECAUSE THE GOA HAD GIVEN FULL FACILITIES TO THE COMMISSION WHICH WAS ABLE TO CONDUCT ITS BUSINESS FREELY. HE BELIEVED THE REPORT WOULD BE OBJECTIVE, NORMAL AND REASONABLE. HE SAID, "WE DO NOT EXPECT APPLAUSE OR CONGRATULATIONS, BUT UNDERSTANDING." HE FELT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION TODAY AND THAT OBTAINING IN THE 1973-75 PERIOD IN ARGENTINA AND TO NOTE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE.

10. HUMAN RIGHTS IN US/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. PASTOR SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN WHAT IS TEMPORARY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND WHAT IS PERMANENT. HE SAID THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION HAD BEEN A REAL WAR AND ARGENTINA HAD SUFFERED AN INFLUX OF SUBVERSIVES FROM URUGUAY AND CHILE. "EVERY WAR," HE POINTED OUT, "HAS ITS DEAD, ITS MISSING IN ACTION, AND ITS PRISONERS." ARGENTINA, HOWEVER, WAS TRADITIONALLY A COUNTRY WHICH RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY; IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME "THIS SAD PERIOD." IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT PERMANENT. NATIONAL SECURITY HAD TO TAKE PRIORITY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS; NOW THAT THE FORMER IS GUARANTEED, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WOULD END RAPIDLY. THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CONVICTION WITH WHICH MINISTER PASTOR HAD SPOKEN. THE US WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT RECENT DISAPPEARANCES AND HOPED THEY WOULD BE CLEARED UP. PASTOR SAID THE SECRETARY "COULD BE ASSURED OF THAT." HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE US ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. "WE DO NOT WANT TO BE PUSHED AWAY FROM THE US BECAUSE WE DO NOT WISH TO BE INVOLVED IN ALL THESE ISSUES," HE SAID. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE US SPEAKS OF THESE ISSUES "AS A FRIEND, PUTTING THE CARDS ON THE TABLE." WE HAD A MUTUAL CONCERN ON THESE ISSUES AND DID NOT WISH THESE ISSUES TO DIVIDE US.

11. RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMEMBASSIES BUENOS AIRES AND MANAGUA. ABOVE TEXT HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH ARA DAS EATON.
MCHENRY

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103.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 16, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Confidential.

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(Entire Text) ✓
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consultations with Argentina on Human Rights

On January 8, you advised us of President Carter's request for a proposed course of action on the suggestion (BUENOS AIRES 0163) that the Argentine Government might negotiate specific human rights improvements for a U.S. commitment not to condemn them in the meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights next month.

Such a plan was drawn up, approved by the NSC, and transmitted to our Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires on January 11 (STATE 8592). However, earlier the same day, when delivering the message from President Carter to President Videla urging Argentine cooperation with us on restricting grain and soybean sales to the USSR (STATE 8135), our Charge, as instructed, raised this question. He told the Acting Foreign Minister that we had observed significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation over the past year and had been considering appropriate ways of recognizing these improvements (BUENOS AIRES 385). He then suggested that the Geneva session of the Human Rights Commission might be an occasion on which we could consult, should President Videla so wish.

The Acting Foreign Minister replied with great satisfaction, saying he would forward this news to President Videla. He asserted that recognition of Argentina's efforts in human rights was what the Government had wanted, and implied that genuine recognition would bring "understanding and support for Argentina." He said President Videla would make a prompt reply to President Carter's message, and the meeting ended with his expression of optimism about the future of US-Argentine relations.

Our Charge had planned to follow up this initial approach with a more substantive exchange with Colonel Cerda of the Office of the President as proposed in his original message. However, in the interim, the Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires and now has been instructed to personally approach President Videla to urge Argentine

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cooperation on grain sales and to propose that a special emissary be sent to Argentina to discuss with the GOA a number of issues, among them U.S. positions in multilateral fora dealing with human rights in Argentina (STATE 12183).

If the GOA expresses interest in consultations with us as a result of our Charge's approach to the Acting Foreign Minister, as a result of any subsequent approach to Colonel Cerda, or after meeting with our special emissary, we would propose to follow the plan furnished to the Embassy earlier (STATE 8592). Specifically, we would seek from the GOA a commitment to release a certain number of prisoners by a set date (if possible, a schedule of releases); a commitment to additional releases under the right-of-option program; and a reaffirmation of previous Argentine statements, not fully honored to date, that disappearances definitively will cease. With regard to information about the disappeared, we plan to convey our continuing concern that the GOA find a way to inform families of their fate.

For our part, we would plan to assure the Argentines that the United States does not and will not seek public censure or condemnation of the GOA in the coming meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Instead, we would look toward either:

-- a Commission request to the Secretary General to establish direct contact with the GOA; or

-- the Commission's appointment of a rapporteur to study the Argentine situation.

We do not believe that the human rights situation in Argentina has improved sufficiently to warrant merely keeping the situation under review, nor do we believe that the other members of the Commission would wish to appoint a special investigatory committee, since this already has been done through the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. We consider it unlikely that the Commission would seek to censure Argentina publicly, despite GOA fears, as this is the first time the Argentine case will come before the Commission. However, given Argentine fears, and the fact that both direct contacts by the Secretary General and the appointment of a rapporteur are confidential procedures, we believe it likely that our planned position will be acceptable.

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We also shall seek from the Argentines a commitment not to lobby against or offer resistance to the proposed resolution in the UNCHR that the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities be given authority to establish a special group of experts to "make contacts with governments and families concerned to assist in locating missing and disappeared persons." In return for this, we would assure the Argentines that we would not introduce or support resolutions dealing solely with Argentina.

for John A. Dooley
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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104.

Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, January 22, 1980, 9–9:45 a.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 31, Meetings—SCC 257: 1/22/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the summary. In preparation for the meeting, Sick sent Brzezinski a January 22 memorandum outlining issues for discussion. (Ibid.)

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

January 22, 1980

6104 C #11

Time and Place: 9:00 - 9:45 a.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Iran, Olympics, Pakistan, Argentina, Yugoslavia,
Intelligence, Military Deployments and
Bartholomew/Murray Mission

Participants:

State

Deputy Secretary Christopher
David Newsom
Harold Saunders

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Graham Claytor

CIA

Admiral Turner
Frank Carlucci

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

Vice President's Office

Denis Clift

White House

David Aaron
Hedley Donovan
Hamilton Jordan (briefly)
Lloyd Cutler

NSC

William Odom
Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

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~~Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.~~

7. Argentina. General Goodpaster has agreed to go to Argentina tonight. He will have a heavy series of briefings at State and the White House today. Mr. Claytor said that a finding that Argentina had made substantial progress on human rights (in connection with the Kennedy Amendment) would be extremely helpful. Others noted that the Kennedy Amendment merely established a deadline (October 1, 1978) for Argentinian performance on human rights but indicated no relief for subsequent improvement. Mr. Newsom noted that this amendment would be much harder to lift than the Symington Amendment on Pakistan. The Argentinian record is still very bad, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report which is coming out soon will be extremely derogatory. Mr. Aaron said that General Goodpaster must have something to encourage the Argentines to be helpful. The instructions for his trip are being drafted and will be reviewed this afternoon. State will take a new look at the legislation. We are prepared to be helpful to Argentina with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission. (S)

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[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

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105.

Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, January 22, 1980

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800028–2024. Confidential. Drafted by Whitman and Flood on January 21; sent through Christopher. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

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TO: The Secretary

THRU: D - Mr. Christopher *we*

FROM: ARA - John A. Bushnell, *John* Acting

Human Rights Report for Argentina

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the ARA version or the HA version (or parts of each) of the U.S. Human Rights Report for Argentina.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The President has asked that you review the Human Rights report for Argentina.

ARA and HA have reached substantial agreement on the major part of the Report's contents. However, significant differences remain in the introduction and in Section 1.a. (torture). The attachment highlights the differences between the reports.

ARA Position

ARA believes that the version of the Introduction to the Human Rights Report on Argentina that is being proposed by HA is unnecessarily provocative. In terms of our maintaining any powers of suasion with the Government of Argentina in the area of human rights, it could even be counter-productive:

-- The GOA is well aware that the attention of the Congress, of the media, and of the public focuses most readily on the introduction to these reports.

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-- The version proposed by HA is far more lengthy and substantially more detailed than those on other countries with human rights records no less serious than that of Argentina.

-- The detail contained in HA's introduction is repeated in the body of the report.

-- There has been substantial improvement in human rights, Basket I, in 1979 for which the GOA should be given credit.

-- The length and weight of the historical detail of abuses tends to submerge the evidence of very real improvements, and makes it unduly severe and harsh in tone. It will be seen by the Argentines in this light.

Argentines will compare this report with the ones on other countries and will be strengthened in their conviction that they are being singled out, that the United States has no intention of recognizing the progress they have made. Our actions in the public domain, and those by our representatives to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the private U.S. citizen member of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have already come under severe fire from the Argentines as being discriminatory. Any further exacerbation of their injured feelings might serve only to cut off our dialogue.

As regards the description of torture, ARA's version refers to the severe psychological and physical abuse that took place, but avoids specifics which we believe are inappropriate in a Government report. Such minute detail will certainly be perceived as unduly inflammatory and provocative by Argentina.

We have thus far retained considerable influence with the GOA, and have used it effectively in pressing for improvements in human rights. The HA version of the report would needlessly inflame relations and emotions. It would push Argentina toward greater isolation from us and the remainder of the Western world, and toward the Soviet Union, which has quietly supported Argentina in multilateral fora on human rights.

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HA Position

The revision of the report proposed by HA is the result of extensive discussions with ARA's Office of East Coast Affairs (ARA/ECA) during the period before Christmas, which culminated in agreement on December 21. The alternative version resulted from a post-holiday review of this text by the ARA Front Office.

The principal differences between the two reports lie in the introduction and with the section on torture:

-- Introduction: HA believes that ARA's revision tends to give the unintended impression that the Argentine Junta's repressive activities at least to some extent are justified, that the tone is unduly upbeat and optimistic, and that it omits essential information about the nature and extent of human rights violations in the country. Although most of the latter are covered in the body of the report, it is important to treat them in the introduction because:

-- the introduction sets the tone of the report;

-- as ARA points out, many readers focus almost exclusively on the introduction; and

-- as this is the first report on Argentina prepared during the Carter Administration, a more extensive treatment of historical antecedents is justified.

Moreover, the length of the proposed introduction is not out of line with those in many of the other reports we have prepared this year. The introductions vary in length from a paragraph to four pages, in accordance with conditions in the country concerned. They tend to be longer for countries being covered for the first time, especially with serious human rights problems.

-- Torture: ARA's version omits mention of torture methods. However, the guidelines approved last August by the Deputy Secretary for the preparation of all reports specifically requests the inclusion of this information. ARA's editorial revisions also soften the tone of this section; the same holds true for the opening words of the following section (on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). These sections would be substantially different from other reports.

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ARA argues that adoption of the HA version would complicate our relations with the Argentine Government. However, Congress established the requirements to submit human rights reports for the purpose of obtaining objective, accurate, and comprehensive information on human rights conditions in all countries. The purpose of the report is not to praise or condemn individual governments. The Deputy Secretary's guidelines call for both objectivity and specificity, and we have followed these norms in preparing all 155 reports. No report has been deliberately softened, toughened, or otherwise modified because of the state of our relations with the country concerned. We should not make an exception of Argentina, or appear to be willing to negotiate human rights principles for other objectives.

Recommendations

That you approve the ARA proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you approve the HA proposal. J

JAN 28 1980

Approve ☒ _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you approve some combination of the two.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

As Stated.

Drafted:ARA/ECA:GJWhitman:HA:PFlood:mas
1/21/80 X29166

*41. 1-28-80
Approved
T. J. Flood
1/28/80*

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106.

Telegram From the Consulate General in Argentina to the Department of State

Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1980, 0527Z

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0385. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

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FOR THE SECRETARY AND DR. BRZEZINSKI FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/25/85 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINR
SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S MISSION TO ARGENTINA:
GENERAL REPORT

~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

1. I BELIEVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE LAST THREE DAYS HAVE OPENED OPPORTUNITIES FOR US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS WHICH SEEM PROMISING FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO FOLLOW UP. DURING THE TALKS I SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS BOTH THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD VIEW THE EROSION OF THE US GRAINS EMBARGO AND THE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA AS A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE COUNTRY OF THE WEST.

2. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS, I FEEL, APPROACHED THE TALKS IN A POSITIVE, BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER. PRESIDENT VIDELA, RECALLING HIS MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS. BUT ALL THE SENIOR ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ALSO STRESSED THE ARGENTINE VIEW THAT MUCH OF ARGENTINA'S SUPPORT OF US INITIATIVES HAD GONE UNACKNOWLEDGED AND THAT US POLICIES HAD REQUENTLY

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FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ARGENTINA'S SEVERE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO RECOGNIZE IMPROVEMENTS WHEN THEY OCCURRED.

3. THE ARGENTINE LEADERS RESPONDED WELL TO MY PRESENTATION ON AFGHANISTAN. THEY APPEARED FULLY TO SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MOVE, OUR CONCERNS FOR ITS BROADER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR WESTERN UNITY. WHILE THEY REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED THE APPROPRIATENESS AND PROBABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE "BOYCOTT" (UNDOUBTEDLY IN GOOD PART FOR TACTICAL REASONS), THEY SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH THE RANGE, WEIGHT AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE MEASURES THE U.S. HAS TAKEN OR INITIATED. ONE FURTHER REPORT: IN THEIR RESPONSE, THEY ALSO NOTED ARGENTINA'S OWN RECENT STRUGGLE WITH LEFT-WING TERROR AND INSURGENCY WHICH HAD BROUGHT THEM, IN THEIR TERMS, ONLY "ISOLATION AND DISGRACE."

4. GRAINS EXPORTS. WHILE STANDING THEIR GROUND ON THE PUBLIC POSITION THEY HAD TAKEN, IN ESSENCE THE ARGENTINE LEADERS GAVE A POLITICAL AND MORAL COMMITMENT THAT THEY WOULD SEEK TO PREVENT DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN NORMAL LEVELS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MADE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN THIS PUBLIC POSTURE (AND THE

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POLITICAL REPRECUSIONS IN ARGENTINA IF THEY WERE PERCEIVED AS GIVING IN TO U.S. PRESSURE) THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DO THIS ONLY THROUGH INFORMAL AND PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS; AND THEY DECLINED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSSHIPMENTS BEYOND THEIR BORDERS, WHICH THEY ALLEGED WERE UNCONTROLLABLE BY THE GOA. TO THE EXTENT THEY MAKE GOOD ON THEIR WORD, THE DANGER OF MASSIVE DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED, BUT THIS LEAVES US RPT US WITH THE EQUALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF INDIRECT PURCHASES. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT

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OBJECT TO OUR PURSUING THIS PROBLEM WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND TRADING COMPANIES, AND THEY GAVE SOME INDICATIONS OF COOPERATION ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY RELUCTANT AND THIS WILL REQUIRE FOLLOW-UP. (ADDITIONAL DETAIL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPTTEL.).

5. HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FORTHCOMING OAS REPORT CLEARLY IS OF INTENSE CONCERN TO THEM, AS IS THE US GOVERNMENT'S OWN REPORT. THEY HAD ADMITTED THE IAHRG BECAUSE THEY EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE REFORMS AND IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, ALONG WITH THE DISMAL RECORD OF THEIR "DIRTY WAR." (IN PRIVATE, THEY STATED BITTERLY THAT THE COMMISSION STAFF HAS BEEN UNHELPFUL AND PARTIAL, CITING THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF ITS KEY MEMBERS.) THEY ASKED WHETHER WE COULD BE OF HELP IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE COMMISSIONS DILIBERATIONS. WE, OF COURSE, STRESSED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION AND OUR INABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE COMMISSION IN ITS REVIEW OF THE GOA'S COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT (DUE IN THE COMMISSION NEXT MONTH.)

6. WE EMPHASIZED THAT THE US INTEREST WAS NOT IN ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL CENSURE BUT IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (THE TENSION WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY IN EVIDENCE WAS REDUCED CONSIDERABLY BY THIS STATEMENT.) THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THE FORTHCOMING UNHRC

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MEETING; WE INDICATED THAT THE US, WHILE CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK, WOULD SUPPORT MODERATE APPROACHES ON AGENDA ITEMS AFFECTING ARGENTINA. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE PROPOSAL IN THE UNHRC FOR A GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS

DETAINED OR IMPRISONED. THEY EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT AN ATTEMPT MIGHT BE MADE (POSSIBLY BY CANADA) TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY CENSURING ARGENTINA; WE REPEATED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENT TO CENSURE ARGENTINA.

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ARGENTINA UNDER THE CONFIDENTIAL 1503 PROCEDURE, THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS REQUESTED US SUPPORT FOR A DECISION BY THE COMMISSION TO KEEP THE ARGENTINE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING AND PROSPECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. WE STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CURRENT US POSITION AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO REFER THEIR REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.

8. NUCLEAR ISSUES. THE ARGENTINE LEADERS, AS WOULD BE EXPECTED, DISPLAYED A STRONG INTEREST AND SENSITIVITIES OVER US POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THIS AREA. FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR STATED THAT THEIR PROGRAM WAS FOR PEACEFUL USES ONLY; ARGENTINA HAD NO DESIRE TO EXERCISE

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A NUCLEAR OPTION AND WOULD DO SO ONLY IF REQUIRED BY WORLD-WIDE OR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS (HE MENTIONED BRAZIL AND CHILE). HE SAID THAT THE RATIFICATION OF THE TLATELOLCO TREATY MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF AN APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA, NEGOTIATIONS FOR WHICH ARE NOW UNDER WAY. (I UNDERSTAND THERE MAY BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THE ARGENTINES WANTED.)

9. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SWISS AND THE FRG. WE STRESSED THAT THE US OBJECTIVE HAD NOT BEEN TO STOP THE SALES OR TO DENY TECHNOLOGY BUT LEGITIMATE CONCERN OVER SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS AS ARGENTINA IS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS WE STATED THAT THE US WOULD SHORTLY SUBMIT A REPLY ON THE ASSURANCES WE REQUIRE IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE PENDING SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR ARGENTINA'S RESEARCH REACTORS.

10. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. WE DETECTED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE RESUMPTION OF A RELATIONSHIP AMONG OUR ARMED FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUESTION, WE STATED THAT WE COULD SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF LIFTING OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE RESTORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MILITARY RELATIONS WAS AN INTEREST BOTH COUNTRIES SHARED. AS FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THIS GOAL WE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITS AND JOINT EXERCISES, PERSONNEL EXCHANGES AND CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS. THEY EVIDENCED INTEREST IN ALL OF THESE.

11. GENERAL CONSULTATIONS. IN THE DISCUSSIONS THERE

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SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT INCREASED CONSULTATIONS WERE REQUIRED AS A MEANS OF DEEPENING AND IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS.

12. THE ARGENTINES RAISED NUMEROUS OTHER POINTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPTELS AND MEMCONS.

13. AN ATMOSPHERE OF CORDIALITY WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT EVEN WHEN CONTENTIOUS POINTS WERE DISCUSSED. MY OVER-

ALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE TALKS HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT.
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107.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, March 26, 1980, 2134Z

2604

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005-0023. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 (3/26/10) (SMITH, GERARD)
TAGS: ENRG
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF MY VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES

1. [TS] ENTIRE TEXT

2. CONDITIONS FOR OUR VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES WERE NOT AUSPICIOUS. WHILE WE HELD TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY CASTRO MADEJO, HIS DEPUTY WAS IN MOSCOW AT THE SOVIET'S INVITATION. A HIGH-LEVEL GERMAN DELEGATION, HEADED BY VAN WELL, WAS ALSO HERE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ATUCHA II REACTOR. DURING OUR TALKS WITH VIDELA, PASTOR, MARTINEZ DE HOZ, GALTIERI AND VIOLA WE STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, THAT THERE WILL BE NO "LURCH TOWARDS DETENTE," AND OUR AIM TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA.

3. THERE CLEARLY REMAIN DEEP DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES FROM NON-PROLIFERATION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN STRATEGY. SOME OF THE EXPECTATIONS OF GOODWILL CREATED BY THE GOODPASTER MISSION WERE DISSIPATED BY THE CLASHES AT THE UNHRC MEETING IN GENEVA, WHICH

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WERE FULLY REPORTED IN THE BUENOS AIRES PRESS. BUT I BELIEVE ARGENTINA'S LEADERS -- CONSCIOUS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER BEEN EASY -- ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS ON THEIR TERMS. THEY STRESSED AGAIN, AS THEY HAD TO ANDY GOODPASTER, THAT WHILE THEY HAVE PRAGMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD, THEY CONSIDER ARGENTINA PART OF THE WEST. THEY CONSIDER SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON MILITARY RELATIONS AND OUR ATTITUDE IN THE OAS ON THE IAHRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IMPORTANT TESTS OF WHETHER WE SHARE THEIR DESIRE FOR COOPERATION. MY PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS ARE:

A) WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REBUILD THE RELATIONSHIP. ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IMPROVED OVER THE PAST YEAR -- MORE SO THAN THEY ARE INTERNATIONALLY BEING GIVEN CREDIT FOR. ARGENTINA IS AN IMPORTANT NATION, WITH CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON MAJOR US INTERESTS, AND ONE WITH WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE DECENT WORKING RELATIONS.
B) HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR POLICIES SHOULD BE BASED ON CURRENT PERFORMANCE, NOT THE GRIM RECORD OF THE PAST. WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH CURRENT SECURITY PRACTICES, THE CURRENT QUALITY OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, AND THE

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

OPENNESS OF THE EMERGING POLITICAL DIALOGUE. BUT I QUESTION WHETHER AN ACCOUNTING OF THE FATE OF THE THOUSANDS OF DISAPPEARANCES IS A REALISTIC OBJECTIVE AT THIS TIME; WE SHOULD, CONTINUE TO URGE MOVES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, BUT WITHOUT MAKING OUR RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA HOSTAGE TO THIS ISSUE. (NO MAJOR ARGENTINE POLITICIAN SEEKS SUCH AN ACCOUNTING.)

C) POLITICAL EVOLUTION. MOST OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP WISHES TO RETURN ARGENTINA TO ITS DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS -- IN A MANNER THAT WOULD AVOID PAST PATTERNS

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OF CHRONIC INSTABILITY. BUT WHILE PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY OF THE PERSON CAN BE EXPECTED, THE INSTALLATION OF AN EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL BE A MATTER OF YEARS. TOO MUCH OF THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY PERONISM AND ITS AFTERMATH. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS WILL ACCELERATE THIS PROCESS.

D) NON-PROLIFERATION. THERE WAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT DURING MY TALKS THAT ARGENTINA WILL RATIFY TLAELOLCO ANY TIME SOON; ON FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS WE AGREED TO DISAGREE. ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS WELL ADVANCED AND WILL MOVE AHEAD UNDER ABLE LEADERSHIP. OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVE, MUST BE TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE HEMISPHERE. THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP MAY BE ON THE THRESHOLD OF CONCERN OVER GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROLIFERATION AND MAY BE INTERESTED IN A DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL SOLUTION. THEIR NEW COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH BRAZIL OFFER HOPE OF FOSTERING MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND MERIT OUR SUPPORT.

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E) BILATERAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. FOR THE PRESENT? THE ARGENTINES DO NOT APPEAR INTERESTED IN COOPERATION BEYOND THE SUPPLY OF FUEL FOR THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS, TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAINTAIN REMAINING LINKS TO THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM BY RESOLVING THE RELATED SAFEGUARDS ISSUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF US LAW. I THINK WE CAN SOLVE THE ISSUE ON THAT BASIS.

F) OLYMPICS AND GRAINS EMBARGO. THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES ULTIMATELY WILL WITHDRAW FROM THE MOSCOW GAMES, AND THEY COULD HELP SWING

THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. (WE SHOULD KEEP THEM CURRENTLY INFORMED ABOUT OUR COUNT OF THE NUMBER OF PROSPECTIVE NON-PARTICIPANTS. ON GRAINS, I SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCUSING THEM OF HAVING UNDERCUT THE GOODPASTER UNDERSTANDING. THEY HAVE A CASE THAT WE HAVE UNDERSOLD THEM IN THEIR TRADITIONAL MARKETS. THE GRAIN THEY NOW HAVE AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT HAS BEEN SEVERELY REDUCED BY DROUGHT AND THUS THEY NO LONGER HAVE FUTURE ABILITY TO AFFECT A MAJOR PART OF OUR EMBARGO.

G) CENTRAL AMERICA. THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT REGION.

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THEY HAVE DECIDED TO FOCUS THEIR SUPPORT ON GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS, AND ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR.

H) RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND COOPERATION. THEY HAVE BECOME ONE OF ARGENTINA'S LARGER TRADING PARTNERS IN RECENT YEARS, COOPERATE WITH ARGENTINA IN THE UN, AND NOW PROBE ARGENTINE INTEREST IN MILITARY SALES AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION. THIS SHOULD BE A MATTER OF REAL CONCERN TO US.

4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE FORTH-COMING IAHRC REPORT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED WITH AN INVITATION TO THE ARMY CHIEF-OF-STAFF, GENERAL VAQUERO, SOMETIME THIS SUMMER, IF DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA CONTINUE FAVORABLE. THERE IS MERIT IN ECONOMIC TALKS, WHICH I UNDERSTAND ARE SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS YEAR, AND IN PERMITTING THE PURCHASE OF SUCH TECHNICAL SERVICES UNDER AID'S REIMBURSABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS THEY MIGHT FIND OF INTEREST, OR THE PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION WORKED OUT BETWEEN USDA AND THE ARGENTINE SECRETARIAT OF AGRICULTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING OUR VOTE IN THE IFI'S OR LIFTING THE PROHIBITION ON MILITARY SALES AND TRAINING UNTIL THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND IMAGE FURTHER IMPROVES. DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONTINUED ON POLITICAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. CASTRO

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108.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 6, 1980, 2:30–2:50pm

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen, Deal, and Pastor. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Argentina

Jose Martinez de Hoz, Minister of the Economy
Ambassador Jorge A. Aja Espil

United States

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, National Security
Council

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, May 6, 1980
2:30-2:50 p.m.

PLACE:

Dr. Brzezinski's Office

SUBJECT:

US-Argentine Relations; Grain Sales; Soviet Politics (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened by welcoming the warming trend in US-Argentine relations but stated his great concern about Argentine grain exports to the Soviet Union. He stressed the need to take tangible actions to show the depth of Western concern and resolve. This involves sacrifices, which we are making. Dr. Brzezinski went on to discuss in some detail the strategic meaning to the West of the Soviet move into Afghanistan — affecting not only the immediate region but all of the non-communist world. The increase in Argentine grain sales diminishes the impact of Western pressure on the USSR and it is strange to see a country of Argentina's tradition playing such a role. Brzezinski closed by saying that he found frictions in US-Argentine relations to be unnatural and thus wanted to address the grain problem frankly. (C)

Martinez de Hoz reassured Dr. Brzezinski of Argentina's commitment to the West and went on to restate Argentina's rationale on its trade with the Soviet Union. In speaking of the Argentine-Soviet grain sales agreement, Martinez said that the figures involved would be less than 1980, which is recognized as a peak year. He urged that the focus of pressure on the Soviets not be limited to grain but be extended to such things as European sales of capital goods. He urged a global comprehensive policy against Communist expansion. (C)

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Declassify on May 6, 2010

Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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Dr. Brzezinski observed that seeking a total solution often leads to no solution and noted that we are working with the Europeans to limit technology sales and tighten COCOM. He again returned to the question of Argentine grain sales noting that the growth had accelerated greatly this year and this made it harder for us to keep the other major suppliers on board. He urged Martinez to think about this problem not just in bilateral terms but in light of Argentina's role as a member of the West. It would be a pity if Argentina were seen by history to have played the same kind of role that France played when Hitler occupied the Rheinland. (C)

Martinez de Hoz said that Argentina wants to take a stand but frankly doubts that grain embargos will be effective. Brzezinski promised to supply information to Argentina to demonstrate that the embargo is being effective. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that there are problems for Argentina in implementing sanctions but said that more can always be done if there is determination. Argentina is, after all, one of the world's major countries and has a critical role to play. (C)

cc: Henry Owen
Tim Deal
Robert Pastor

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109.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, May 12, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80: 5/80. Secret. Drafted by Eaton, Ruser, and Whitman; cleared in draft by Dworkin, Flood, and Buchanan and in P, S/P, S/MS, EUR, E, EB, S/AS, INR/RAR, INR/RSE, OES, PM/ISP, PM/SAS, IO, ARA/PPC, and ARA/RPP. Dodson sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Bergland, Duncan, Earle, Jones, and Turner under a May 12 covering memorandum.

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ISSUES PAPER - ARGENTINA

I. THE SETTING

The United States has three major interests in Argentina: East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. It also has significant interests in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade and investment relations.

The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits have introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship while making a promising start at reducing the differences. The current status of our interests is as follows:

East-West Relations. As part of its probings to expand political and economic influence in South America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded to a limited degree because of:

- a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities;
- a strong desire for Soviet support in international fora on human rights matters;
- an interest in keeping open the possibility of nuclear supplies; and
- some desire for greater balance in its foreign relations between East and West.

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect for at least the next four to seven years have no desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural inclination for economic and political reasons toward warmer bilateral relations. Our improved dialogue with Argentina since January has produced:

- repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic commitment to the West;

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-- a degree of cooperation on grains exports despite our late start on consultations; and

-- greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America.

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's decision to join the Olympics boycott.

Nuclear Nonproliferation. It is clear that Argentina will insist on the continued development of its nuclear technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that it will not respond to pressure on these matters. Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own long-term self-interests will lead it more toward safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, symbolized by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled for May 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina is still considering whether to proceed now with the ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine interpretation that the Treaty permits the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful, and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements to maintain limited nuclear cooperation.

Human Rights. The status of human rights remains a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement on the facts of the situation, views differ on the scope and significance of the improvements that have occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, a central human rights concern, have declined, as have the number of political prisoners. We are aware of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There reportedly were 44 disappearances last year; 55 a month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, however, that suspected active terrorists would continue to be dealt with summarily. There is no present prospect that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands of people who have disappeared in recent years. GOA officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA officials say that, although there is insufficient evidence to try the others, the security forces regard

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them as dangerous and do not plan to release them. The latter group includes some persons who benefitted from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state of siege and lack of due process continue. The military government has committed itself to eventual return to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future form of Argentina's political party system, especially the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue with political leaders is now beginning, although political party activity remains prohibited.

In the economic area, the government continues to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector while strengthening the functions of provincial and local governments, progressively bring inflation under control, and encourage foreign investment as part of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate of investment. In the short term, these policies have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower-middle income groups. However, full employment has been maintained as part of a deliberate government policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In the longer term, these policies could produce sustained dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized economic system more compatible with a pluralistic political order than the statist centralism of the Peron period.

Argentine officials and human rights activists have praised our human rights report this year as balanced and objective. There were difficulties between the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February-March. These reflected honest differences over substantive issues such as the new disappearance procedure and the draft torture convention. The Argentines will be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations of their human rights performance later this year and early next year; they want to see an end to the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales, and positive U.S. votes in the international financial institutions.

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The discussion paper previously distributed described our continued political and economic consultations and military and nuclear relations over the next few months. Is there more that could and should be done in this period?

II. ISSUES FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and the Appropriate U.S. Response:

The discussion paper draws a distinction between expanding trade ties and political cooperation. The expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon and will continue, irrespective of U.S. action. The Argentine interest in political cooperation with the Soviets, on the other hand, is related to the Argentine desire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights issues and reduce the danger of censure in UN fora. A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is related to U.S. safeguards conditions (this issue appears to be approaching solution).

The basic approach proposed in the discussion paper is a political one: to manage U.S.-Argentine relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense of identification with the West, to pursue U.S. interests in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to achieve these goals without compromising our human rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have diminished our interest in human rights conditions.

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine-Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the various U.S. interests?

2. How can the U.S. obtain meaningful Argentine cooperation in restraining exports to the U.S.S.R. for the 1980/81 crop year?

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Argentine Economic Minister on May 6 for GOA cooperation in a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. in the coming crop year. Strategy and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain exporting countries are currently under consideration in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would seek from each exporter.

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a. An Argentine-U.S.S.R. grain agreement is in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it will state Argentine intentions to supply certain minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. take advantage of such an agreement to secure an understanding that Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels be too high to constitute "meaningful restraint"?

b. How can the U.S. persuade Argentina to announce publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the current premium on prices on Argentine grain which have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the cooperation effort.

3. What is the appropriate human rights stance for the U.S. in this period in the light of Argentine performance and our other interests?

a. In bilateral demarches and contacts with Argentina?

One approach would strongly press for improvements in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious accounting to families, either directly or indirectly, of the fate of disappeared persons; the other would proceed more selectively, with emphasis on further reform of current security and judicial practices rather than an accounting for the disappeared and other past violations. One approach would include occasional strong public criticism of the GOA's practices; the other, while maintaining our public posture of criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key, and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations.

b. In the OAS and the UN?

The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential work of the new group of experts on disappearances established by the UNHRC with strong U.S., West European,

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and Canadian support. It feels that the group's principal effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances (i.e., torture and summary executions) would lead to demands that those responsible be identified and punished. Although the methods of the working group remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group's work will be the basis of moves next year to seek the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina and the GOA's public condemnation in UN fora. This fear is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora.

The OAS has recently released a report on the human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights last September. The report is highly critical of Argentina and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The IAHR report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly this fall.

The Argentine position on how to deal with the IAHR report is still under study in Buenos Aires. One view circulating within the regime -- reportedly angered by the report's alleged failure to properly acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the improvements accomplished since 1978 -- is that Argentina should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering an exodus by other countries, including Brazil. In private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling on the issue in Buenos Aires. We have no evidence as of this time, however, that this view is about to be adopted as the Government's policy.

How should we deal with these matters in OAS and UN fora?

c. With our NATO Allies?

One approach would be to initiate a series of high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for the purpose of sharing information about human rights developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship, and of discussing the most effective way of dealing with these matters, including possible joint or parallel demarches, public statements, and coordinated action in international institutions (including the multilateral

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banks).

d. With regard to sanctions (vote in the IFI's, military training, and military sales)?

Our abstentions in the IFI's have not prevented ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases of new equipment to European sources; it is, however, beginning to create problems for the Argentines with respect to spare parts for U.S.-supplied equipment.

On the other hand, our measures have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Any possible modification of our posture in this area would have to take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with major human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and to other countries who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

4. How far should we carry military-to-military contact and cooperation under present circumstances?

Cooperation involves three possible levels:

-- visits, joint exercises, consultations on security matters;

-- the sale of military training;

-- a military supply relationship (new equipment and spares).

The sale of training under FMS and military supplies (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system.

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts (visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in our military supply policy at this time.

A second view is that we should avoid the political

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symbolism of support which these contacts imply, or minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough on human rights. A third view, on the other hand, argues that, because of our strategic interests and the improvement in human rights, we should streamline, liberalize, or lift altogether, the restrictions on the military supply relationship. This would involve a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export licences; and/or b) the modification or elimination of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

The denial of training (the sale of training under FMS is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising careers. (Videla, Viola, and Galtieri all received training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of major or below who have received U.S. training. One view questions whether the U.S. should continue to deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook of the next generation of Argentine military leaders. Another view argues that the present generation of military leaders is responsible for the government's repression of the past four years and questions the premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive influence on their outlook. It also argues that a military training relationship is a clearly visible, high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political support for a government.

5. Are our present policies with regard to nuclear relations with Argentina adequate?

The issues are:

-- At what level can we and should we pursue nuclear cooperation?

-- Is there anything more we can and should do to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco and acceptance of full-scope safeguards?

-- How would possible actions in these areas impact on our general relationship and would they be worth the cost?

The discussion paper argues:

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-- Nuclear Cooperation. We should try to resolve the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S. cooperation (see also below).

-- Tlatelolco. We should continue a dialogue with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible or desirable at this time. (We should, of course, on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment to ratify.)

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards assurances, the Administration must also address the issue of licensing of U.S. components for Argentine nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian, and Swiss companies. For example:

-- the U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, working with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid as a subcontractor for the pressure vessel for Atucha II. Siemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier.

-- Sulzer Brothers, the Swiss prime contractor for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian firms about components, some of which may be U.S. controlled.

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage or discourage such industrial collaboration. The current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep good faith with the Canadians who -- unsuccessfully -- insisted on full-scope safeguards as a condition of the sale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water plant.

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Significant U.S. exports, the future of U.S.-Argentine industrial cooperation in this important sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake in this issue.

III. THE BROAD CHOICES

Option A. Continue strong concentration on human rights.

We would maintain a cool and correct posture until the human rights situation shows substantial further progress, making clear that we are prepared to improve relations when and to the degree that fundamental human rights problems are solved. Military relations would be kept to a minimum; political relations should be cool and correct.

Rationale: The human rights situation remains exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance and relevance of other interests in our relations with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine human rights violations -- the apparatus of repression, the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful political and labor union activity, and the failure to provide information about disappeared persons -- all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting. It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests, but we should continue to watch Argentine-Soviet relations closely.

Option B. Continue the current level of effort for more balance in the treatment of our interests in Argentina.

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen working relations with the GOA, principally through stepped-up political consultations, but also through some increase in cooperation and increased military contact. We would continue to stress the importance of human rights, but need to establish priorities in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability. We should seek further specific improvements through dialogue in the improved atmosphere, but maintain our present policy on votes in the IFI's and the restrictions on military supplies. We should, however, seek to reopen the sale of training (which would require modification of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach, especially in the UNHRC, should seek to avoid pushing Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets.

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Rationale: Our approach to limit Soviet influence should be basically a political one. There has been progress in human rights -- notably, few new security cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and in public expression and a general decline in violence and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this progress. Certain issues in the relationship which have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked. There is no strategic need to relax military supply restrictions at this time. Training, however, is important to try to influence the next generation of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to create too much of an imbalance in our relations with Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle Channel issue is still outstanding.

Option C. Move a step further toward normal relations.

We would seek further to strengthen working relations with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment restrictions on the military supply relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human rights remain important to us and would continue our abstention on IFI loans. But we would more explicitly and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's general assurances that we were not interested in seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 UNHRC meeting, and would not support future moves for censure in UN or OAS fora in view of current and prospective progress.

Rationale: The deteriorating international security situation makes Argentine cooperation important. We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foster mutually profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of public censure in the UN, essentially for past human rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political observers agree that a solution to the problem of past disappearances is not feasible at this time and will come, if at all, as part of a broader political settlement, including a general amnesty. The Smith mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine political leader is pressing for an accounting at this time. The measures contemplated under this approach are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet probing for influence, to reestablish close working relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains and other East-West issues, and to elicit further Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters.

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Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, May 14, 1980, 10:30–11:15 a.m.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80, 5/80. Secret. Sent for information. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATIONPOLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING
May 14, 1980

TIME AND PLACE: 10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Minutes -- PRC Meeting on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTSStateWarren Christopher, Dep.
Secretary
John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
SecretaryDefenseW. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Dep. Secretary
Frank Kramer, Principal
Dep. Ass't. SecretaryAgricultureJames Starkey, Dep.
Under SecretaryCommerceLuther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary
for Internat. Economic Policy
and ResearchEnergyWoody Cunningham, Ass't.
Secretary for Nuclear EnergyArms Control and DisarmamentSpurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear
Exports Div. Chief, Bureau
of NonproliferationJoint Chiefs of Staff

Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence

Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

White HouseDavid Aaron
Henry OwenNational Security CouncilThomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a certain implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term game in the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although

~~SECRET~~Review on May 14, 2000
Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its impact on their people. In addition we are very much concerned about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against the GOA. Over time however this has developed into a cooperative vote trade-off between the two sides. In the coming months, Bushnell continued, Argentina will have a hard time taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until the decision on a successor is made in September and probably the period of inaction will continue until early next year when a new government is in place. We will not be able to force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human rights front to avert condemnation. The other important short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo where they have not been supportive of our interests.

Hodges asked whether Argentine human rights performance has improved.

Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but there are still gross violations and the system of repression remains in place. One could say that they have probably killed most of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now fewer political prisoners and in some instances the rule of law is being followed better.

Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured him that the current economic policies would continue under a new government next year. Hodges pointed out that we have a great economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do everything we can to maximize that.

Owen, speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentinians have undoubtedly made their decision and will follow the same policy next year as they did this year. They have almost certainly reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other than that provided by crop conditions.

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Starkey agreed with this conclusion.

Aaron said it was not clear from the paper what the issue is -- are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circumvented.

Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will not support us.

Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to find a way to announce a one-year policy success.

Aaron. Do we want to take some move against Argentina because of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was lectured at the highest levels of government here about the need for Argentine cooperation.

Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina to match the warnings that were given to Martinez.

Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn't care very much about its relations with the United States.

Christopher, discussing the purpose of the meeting, said that the real decision to be addressed is one of tone. The paper should then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out the individual implementing decisions in line with the broad decision on tone to be made by the PRC. Mr. Christopher also observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to court us.

Claytor said he did not blame them; our policies are forcing them to the Soviets.

Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about being a major supplier for their hydroelectric project. Martinez had said that he would favor the United States if all other factors were equal.

Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard.

Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary Christopher tomorrow.

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Keeny, discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question. We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) expand these relations unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility though on whether we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law. The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program.

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn them to the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make greater progress next year when there will be a new administration and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked, should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor" things.

Keeny said it depended on which items were involved.

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bankrupt in general and that we should do absolutely everything we can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.

Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the specifics.

Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not abandoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are unable to extend cooperation.

Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pending from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem over the next six months or so.

Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he believed that the group should support the middle option. We should give due weight to positive trends in the human rights area but should not try to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment

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at this time since that would be impossible with the present Congress and politically unwise. This Option B needs fine tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an initiative on the military side, including training at least.

Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher's summation, for the trends in human rights are important. The Commerce Department also supports Option B.

Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our relations. The options as stated in the paper are too static. Our goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, there is no possibility of changing the military legislation now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time being any change in our military supply policy. The Interdepartmental Group should set up an 18-month program with benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance.

At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We should make clear our irritation with them at this time and then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with Videla. We should take the opportunity of the new administration, however, for turning a new page. If we move to improve our relations with them now we will simply not have the respect of the Argentinians.

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine military to restore relations between our two armed services. At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small things interfere with our dealing with this problem.

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Pustay supported Claytor's statement and noted that we now have a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine military and JCS would like to pursue them. He noted for instance the Galtieri (sic) invitation which is being held up in State Department. Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come.

Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his own political purposes, would like to receive the invitation but not actually accept it until after the Presidential decision is made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are likely to become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether, following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want to give this signal of reward to them.

Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not take reprisals against them until they publicly announce the content of their agreement with the Soviets.

Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much in all likelihood. In any event the reality will depend on the Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some six months.

Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them undermine us.

Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us either next year.

Pustay, returning to the question of General Galtieri's visit, said that it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on the Olympics.

Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.

Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there seemed to be no stark alternatives that need to be put to the President. It was generally agreed that:

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1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement towards improvement in our relationship.
2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the electoral situation in Argentina.
3. We will also have to see whether we need to react to the Argentinian decision on grain.

These are short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group can review as it goes along. On the longer term:

4. If there is continued improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations with the new regime.

The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this improvement might involve.

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111.

Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, June 14, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 6-11/80. Secret. No drafting information appears in this memorandum. Concurred in H, EB, OES, PM, EUR/SOV, EUR/RMP, IO, S/AS, USOAS, AID/RDP, OPIC, STR, DOD/ISA, JCS, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, USDA, DOE, EXIM, ACDA, ICA, and L/PM and by Derian, Lake and Thornton. In the right-hand margin, Carter wrote, "Ed- good ideas. Same process should be followed with other difficult countries. J."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.

Subject: Steps To Improve U.S.-Argentine Relations

*Ed -
Good ideas
Same process
Should be
followed with
other difficult
countries*

J

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

I. OBJECTIVES

Our principal objectives in moving to improve our relationship with Argentina are to:

-- foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence;

-- encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices;

-- seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); and

-- obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns.

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and other Hemispheric issues.

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

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II. ACTIONS FOR 1980

1. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate:

-- a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1, during which he will review our policy concerns and the state of our relations and will be prepared to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature of the Argentine response.

-- a meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the U.S. delegation possibly to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand commercial relations.

-- periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues, with the first round to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

2. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in these relations (including consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). We plan to:

-- begin periodic security consultations with Argentina; the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

-- invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues;

-- invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting

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with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

Other issues are:

--High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability of proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

--Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, of seeking special legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.

3. Human Rights

We will continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

-- the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina;

-- there will be no new disappearances, including no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists;

-- all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will

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be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process;

-- guarantees will be instituted to prevent the torture of detainees; and

-- there be substantial progress, in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners--1,300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora and concluded that, while this should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an important U.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the UN Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church.

In addition to human rights discussions initiated by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, and will be fully briefed for this purpose.

4. Nuclear Relations

We want to move Argentina over time to accept IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities (including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to keep open the door for continued cooperation with Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate with your policy. We should:

-- try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program, as well as components for its power program;

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-- once this is done, undertake a review of the conditions under which we could facilitate expanded participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program. (A major case currently at issue is an export license application for the sale of a pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

5. Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

--Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs;

--Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;

--Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, the Permanent Council, and the NATO experts group on Latin America. Depending on the results of these consultations, we could consider further actions in Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues. We would continue the practice of consulting on human rights in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.

7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that many of these steps will restore a better balance

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in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations).

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

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Concurrences:

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood
EB - Mr Deane Hinton
HA - Ms. Patt Derian
OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo
PM - Mr. Daniel O'Donohue
EUR/SOV - Mr. Robert Perito
EUR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar
S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake
IO - Mr. Michael Newlin
S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke
USOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson
AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond
NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton
OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein
STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz
DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs
JCS - Admiral J.A. Lyons

~~E.O. 13526 3.5(c)~~

Commerce - Mr. A. Katz
Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten
USDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway
DOE - Mr. Les Goldman
EXIMBANK - Mr. Crafton
ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren
ICA - Mr. Victor Olason
L/PM - Mr. T. Borek

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112.

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, July 3, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1979–1980. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Zbig” in the top right-hand corner.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 3, 1980

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

ZB

SUBJECT: Report on US-Argentine Relations (U)

Attached is Warren Christopher's memo to you detailing the steps we are planning to take over the remainder of this year to strengthen ties with Argentina. This action program was worked out by the Latin American Interdepartmental Group and reflects your injunction to move more rapidly. (U)

There is no mention of Navy Secretary Hidalgo's trip, which was a bit of private initiative on Hidalgo's part unrelated to the program elaborated by the Interdepartmental Group. (In fact, DOD never even mentioned it at the meeting.) The Hidalgo trip can be a useful contribution, however, and State has briefed him carefully. (C)

Assistant Secretary Bill Bowdler will be going to Buenos Aires in late July. His visit and the attendant consultations will be symbolically the high point of our actions with Argentina this year and also the vehicle for tough bargaining, not just on human rights, but to pin down the Argentines on other issues of importance to us, especially their relations with the Soviets. (S)

There are two significant omissions in Christopher's report: A strategy for dealing with Argentine grain sales to the Soviet Union; and an understanding of the implications of a new US policy to Argentina on our overall approach to Latin America. (S)

With regard to grain sales, we have received intelligence reports indicating that Soviet trade officials will soon be in Buenos Aires to sign a long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Argentine Government for a minimum of 3 million tons. As this will be Moscow's first new LTA with a western supplier since the US embargo was announced on January 4, this will be

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Review on July 2, 1986

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Dec 8/26/10 NSC email
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BY [signature] DATE 11/14/10~~SECRET~~

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a significant positive development for the Soviets and a setback to our embargo policy; it will make it more difficult to keep the Canadians on board. We have already informed the Argentines of our concerns about such an agreement; they claim it is necessary economically, given their large trade deficit with the US and the fact that they are being squeezed out of other markets. (S)

We probably have little hope of turning the Argentines around on this, but should give one more try as a means of demonstrating our concern. In addition, we could argue that they should agree (as Australia, the EC and -- questionably -- Canada have done) not to exceed this year's sales. If we are to have any prospect of success, this will have to be done at a high diplomatic level -- preferably by Secretary Muskie calling in the Argentine Ambassador. Bowdler could follow up on this later in the month.

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend that you approve the steps in Christopher's memo with the following additional points:

-- Secretary Muskie would summon the Argentine Ambassador to urge once more that the Argentines not sign (or at least delay signing) a long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union and, failing that, that they hold sales to current levels. (S)

-- That as we proceed to develop closer relationships, DOD/JCS and other agencies involved with Argentina would continually reaffirm the importance which the Carter Administration attaches to human rights and democratization. (S)

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

113.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter

Washington, July 28, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State), 7/80. Secret.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1980

C

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Edmund S. Muskie *ESM*

1. Assistant Secretary Bowdler's Visit to Argentina -

ok I approved postponement of the trip today after reviewing the evidence of Argentine complicity in the Bolivian coup. The evidence is not conclusive, but it points to involvement by at least some elements of the Argentine military. Bill Bowdler's visit had been designed to advance our dialogue with the Argentines on the issues of grain sales to the Soviets, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights progress. Given the need to object publicly and privately to the Argentines' positions on Bolivia, the trip would at best serve no constructive purpose as far as these other issues are concerned. And, cancelling the trip is probably a more powerful statement than any Bill could have delivered in person.

Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

UNCLASSIFIED

114.

Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

Buenos Aires, August 15, 1980, 1936Z

6584

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800392-0933. Secret; Exdis; Noform.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 06584 172144Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----122830 172207Z /23
R 151936Z AUG 80
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6406

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 6584

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8/14/00 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M
TAGS: EAID MASS PEPR AR GT
SUBJECT: (S) GROWING ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN GUATEMALA

REF: STATE 203396.

1. ~~S~~/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE KNOW FROM BOTH ARGENTINE AND GUATEMALAN CREDIBLE SOURCES THAT THE GOA PERCEIVES OF CENTRAL AMERICA AS A VACUUM RAPIDLY FILLING WITH RADICAL LEFTWING EXILE GROUPS --SOME TERRORIST, TO INCLUDE MONTONERO GROUPS WITH CLOSE TIES TO HAVANA. GENERAL CARLOS MARTINEZ, CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) HAS STATED THAT HIS SERVICE HAS INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF THAT THE MONTONEROS AND OTHER SOTHERN CONE TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TRANSPLANTED THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN EXILE FROM EUROPE TO HAVANA, WITH AN INCREASINGLY GREATER PRESENCE AND MILITANT INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AT THIS TIME PRIMARILY NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR. (WE CANNOT CONFIRM THEIR VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH "HEADQUARTERS" IN HAVANA.) THIS IS, OF COURSE, CREDITED IN GREAT PART TO USG ABDICATION OF STRONG LEADERSHIP IN THAT REGION, AS RANKING

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 06584 172144Z

ARGENTINE OFFICIALS VIEW U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. THUS, SENIOR ARGENTINE OFFICIALS SEE CENTRAL AMERICA AS A NEW SAFEHAVEN AND FOCUS FOR CUBAN-LINKED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION LED BY THE SAME MILITANTS OF

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2 of 3

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THE RADICAL LEFT EXPELLED FROM ARGENTINA, CHILE AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. MARTINEZ EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN THAT THESE ACTIVISTS OF THE RADICAL LEFT, IF PERMITTED TO TRIUMPH IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WOULD USE THAT REGION AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR RENEWING SUBVERSIVE AND GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. THAT IS, PRESUMABLY, THE RATIONALE FOR ARGENTINA'S INTEREST IN ASSISTING GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, ESPECIALLY, IN RESISTING THE RADICAL LEFT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

3. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA REGARDS ARGENTINA AS THE ULTIMATE "SUCCESS STORY" IN DISARTICULATING THE LEFT, AND IS EAGER TO EMMULATE "THE ARGENTINE MODEL" IN REPEATING THAT EXPERIENCE IN ITS OWN COUNTRY. TO THAT END WE ARE AWARE OF TRAINING IN THE AREAS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY ALREADY GIVEN OR BEING GIVEN TO MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM GUATEMALA, SALVADOR AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WE SUSPECT THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ARGENTINA OF GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDEZ, MAY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CONTEMPLATING FURTHER ARGENTINE ASSISTANCE AND POSSIBLY MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR GUATEMALA. AT THIS TIME WE ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY AWARE OF POSSIBLE ARGENTINE AGREEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO SELL THEM MILITARY EQUIPMENT, TRAIN POLICE PERSONNEL, OR TO FACILITATE ARGENTINE EXPORTS TO GUATEMALA.
RUSER

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3 of 3

115.

Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie's Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Argentina

New York, October 1, 1980, 1756Z

Secto 8046

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800470-0449. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Asunción, Brasília, the U.S. Mission to Geneva, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. Muskie was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

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EXDIS

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PAGE 01 SECTO 08046 01 OF 03 011900Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
-----055626 011907Z /43

O 011756Z OCT 80 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 08046

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/01/86 (BOWDLER, WILLIAM G.), OR-S
TAGS: AR, PEPR, OAS, SHUM
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH ARGENTINE FM PASTOR
SEPTEMBER 30

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. PASTOR SPEAKING FIRST SUMMARIZED RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY AND AIMS OF CURRENT GOA, WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF OAS REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND EFFORTS TO MAKE ARGENTINA A PUBLIC TARGET, DEFENDED GOA RECOGNITION OF THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME IN BOLIVIA WHILE CLAIMING GOA HAS AND WILL COUNSEL MODERATION, AND DEPICTED US/ARGENTINE BILATERAL RELATIONS AS MAINLY A ONE WAY STREET WITH HIS COUNTRY ON THE LOSING END. NEVERTHELESS ARGENTINA IS A FIRM ALLY AND HOPES, WITH IMPROVING RELATIONS, IT WILL BE TREATED AS SUCH. HE MENTIONED A POSSIBLE VISIT OF THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT-ELECT TO WASHINGTON, AND INVITED THE
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SECRETARY TO BUENOS AIRES. IT WAS A TOUGH PERFORMANCE WITH NO OBVIOUS DEPARTURES FROM SCRIPT. THE SECRETARY, WHILE ALSO VOICING STRONG INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, EMPHASIZED THAT THERE ARE TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS -- BOLIVIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IN ADDITION HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE USG ATTACHES TO CONTINUED ARGENTINE RESTRAINT ON GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THE GOA WILL SOON RATIFY TLAELOLCO. END SUMMARY

3. BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY AND GOA FM PASTOR LASTED 45 MINUTES. ON U.S. SIDE WERE SECRETARY NEWSOM, AS BOWDLER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR SERVICE, AND INTERPRETER. IN ADDITION TO PASTOR WERE AJA ESPIL, AND FM OFFICIAL JORGE STOCK. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, PASTOR DELIVERED LENGTHY SUMMARY OF RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY, EMPHASIZING THE SOVIET-INSPIRED MARXIST SUBVERSION IN THE PERIOD 1973-1976 AND THE CHAOTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION THAT PREVAILED WHEN THE MILITARY TOOK POWER IN 1976. THE ARGENTINE MILITARY TAKEOVER WAS NOT IN THE CLASSIC LATIN AMERICAN MOLD; RATHER IT WAS DEMANDED BY "ALL THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE." THE ARGENTINE MILITARY SET FOUR GOALS FOR THEMSELVES: ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY; REORGANIZE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND MAKE IT MORE

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by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017

EFFICIENT; REVERSE THE ECONOMIC DECLINE; RESTORE DEMOCRACY. ACCORDING TO PASTOR, THERE HAS BEEN GOOD PROGRESS ON THE FIRST THREE OF THESE OBJECTIVES, AND THE GOA REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE FOURTH. IN THE LATTER REGARD, PASTOR NOTED THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MEETING WITH MORE THAN 50 INTEREST GROUPS TO DISCUSS HOW ARGENTINA'S CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ENSURE "SOLID AND STABLE DEMOCRACY" IN THE FUTURE. PASTOR CONCLUDED THIS PART OF HIS EXPOSITION WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT ARGENTINA'S MILITARY RULERS ARE NOT LIKE

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PINOCHET IN CHILE (WITH HIS LENGTHY TRANSITION PLANS) OR THE GOVERNMENT IN PARAGUAY.

4. PASTOR THEN ADDRESSED THE IAHRC REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. HE SAID THAT THE COMMISSION HAD ARRIVED WITH PRECONCEIVED IDEAS, THAT THEY SPENT ONLY 15 DAYS IN THE COUNTRY, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT EVEN CONCERNED WITH TAKING BACK THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE GOA. IN PASTOR'S VIEW, THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF THE OAS ARE SECURITY AND COOPERATION. HE RECOUNTED A LONG HISTORY OF ARGENTINE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER HEMISPHERIC NATIONS IN THESE REGARDS. THE GOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE OAS SHOULD BE A FORUM FOR ACCUSATION AGAINST ONE OR ANOTHER MEMBER. ALL COUNTRIES HAVE THEIR PROBLEMS. WE MUST NOT LET THOSE PROBLEMS INTERFERE AND IMPEDE PURSUIT OF THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. IT IS NEITHER FAIR NOR JUST THAT ARGENTINA SHOULD BE THE TARGET ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE OAS. ACCORDING TO PASTOR, SOME ARGENTINES ARE BEGINNING TO ASK IF IT WOULD NOT BE BETTER FOR ARGENTINA SIMPLY TO WITHDRAW.

5. ON BOLIVIA, PASTOR BEGAN BY SAYING THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN BLAMED FOR A MILITARY COUP IN 1962, THAT BRAZIL AND THE U.S. WERE THE SUPPOSED VILLAINS IN 1964, THAT THE U.S. WAS GIVEN CREDIT FOR THE DOWNFALL OF TORRES WHILE BRAZIL WAS MENTIONED WHEN BANZER STEPPED DOWN, AND NOW IT IS ARGENTINA'S TURN AGAIN TO GET THE BLAME. THE GOA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF PROVIDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA. PASTOR VENTURED HE THOUGHT THAT IF OTHER COUNTRIES HAD PROVIDED MORE ASSISTANCE ALONG THE WAY, THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. PASTOR ARGUED THAT RATHER THAN ENCOURAGING THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY, THE GOA HAD IN THE PAST COUNSELLED

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00
CIAE-00 INRE-00 (ADS) W

-----105810 081428Z /41

O 011575Z OCT 80 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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EXDIS

RESTRAINT (TO BANZER EARLIER THIS YEAR). WHEN GARCIA MEZA TOOK POWER, THE GOA WAITED 14 DAYS BEFORE ACCORDING RECOGNITION--AN UNUSUALLY LONG TIME FOR NEIGHBORS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. MORE RECENTLY IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH BANZER, THE GOA HAS ARGUED STRONGLY FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND PRUDENCE ON THE PART OF THE NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT AND THAT IT SHOULD QUICKLY SET FORTH A SERIOUS PROGRAM. PASTOR SAID THAT IF SOME ARGENTINE OFFICERS HAVE MADE STATEMENTS PRAISING THE NEW REGIME, THEY ARE SPEAKING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF OFFICIAL POLICY.

6. TURNING TO BILATERAL RELATIONS, PASTOR ASKED JORGE STOCK TO READ FROM A LIST OF ALL THE WAYS IN WHICH THE GOA HAS COOPERATED WITH THE U.S. IN THE PAST YEAR OR SO (NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, REFUGEES, AFGHANISTAN, MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS, HOSTAGES IN IRAN, ETC.), AND ON THE OTHER HAND, NEGATIVE U.S. ACTIONS INVOLVING ARGENTINA (THE UN

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WORKING GROUP ON MISSING PERSONS, VOTES IN THE IFI'S, NUCLEAR MATTERS, THE MALVINAS AND BEAGLE, FAILURE TO HELP CORRECT THE TRADE IMBALANCE, ETC.).

7. PASTOR CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH THE AFFIRMATION THAT ARGENTINA IS A WESTERN COUNTRY AND THAT IT RECOGNIZES THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP. ARGENTINA IS AN ALLY AND FRIEND OF THE U.S., AND WANTS TO TREATED AS SUCH. IN THIS REGARD, AFTER THE U.S. ELECTION, PASTOR SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF A "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING" BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, SETTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION ACROSS THE BOARD. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE DESIRE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT-ELECT OF ARGENTINA (UNNAMED) TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR, AND PASTOR INVITED SECRETARY MUSKIE TO VISIT ARGENTINA EARLY NEXT YEAR.

8. SECRETARY MUSKIE THANKED PASTOR FOR HIS REVIEW OF RELATIONS. HE AFFIRMED THE US INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS AND REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION IN THIS REGARD TAKEN LAST SPRING. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND WANT TO SEE THIS CONTINUE, THERE ARE TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE. WITH RESPECT TO BOLIVIA, THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE GOA HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE RECENT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME REPRESENTATIVE, AND WE DISLIKE THE "HARSH AND BLOODY" MEASURES WHICH HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED. ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME IS A SETBACK TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS; IT IS A PROBLEM WHICH NEEDS TO BE WORKED OUT. WHILE IT IS NOT THE U.S. DESIRE TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, REGIMES SUCH AS THE

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ONE NOW IN POWER IN BOLIVIA GENERATE VERY NEGATIVE FEELINGS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

9. TURNING TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA, THE SECRETARY NOTED RECENT IMPROVEMENTS BUT ALSO THAT THERE CONTINUE TO BE SOME 2,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 11 DISAPPEARANCES THIS YEAR, AND THAT THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY. TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT WHEN HE FIRST CAME TO THE SENATE THE U.S. AND ARGENTINA HAD GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS. THERE HAD FOLLOWED A LONG PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES, CAUSED IN PART BY INTERNAL ARGENTINE PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE MAY NOW BE ENTERING A NEW ERA OF IMPROVING RELATIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR BOWDLER WOULD BE DISCUSSING OTHER ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL WITH PASTOR, BUT THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION THEM ALSO. REGARDING THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION, THE SECRETARY WONDERED IF THE GOA WAS CONSIDERING RATIFYING TLATELOLCO; IT WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP. ON THE GRAINS EMBARGO TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ARGENTINE SHIPMENTS THIS YEAR WILL EXCEED BY 8 TO 10 PERCENT THE TARGETS AGREED LAST JANUARY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE REDUCED GRAIN IMPORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE FORCED A CUTBACK IN MEAT CONSUMPTION AND THAT, AS WE HAVE SEEN RECENTLY, THIS IS ALWAYS A SENSITIVE MATTER IN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. HE POINTED OUT THE CURRENT IRAN/IRAQ WAR AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST IN KEEPING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOVIETS NOT BE ALLOWED OR ENCOURAGED TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE INTO OTHER AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WERE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS DANGER OF WORLD WAR III. GOA SUPPORT ON GRAINS IS CRITICAL TO THIS EFFORT. WE ARE ASKING OTHER ALLIES TO ALSO MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN MANY

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
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O 011575Z OCT 80 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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AREAS--E.G., THE NATO ALLIES TO CONTINUE HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY SANCTIONS.

11. IN CLOSING HIS REMARKS, THE SECRETARY MENTIONED A CURRENT EFFORT WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO EXCLUDE EGYPT. PASTOR REPLIED IMMEDIATELY THAT HE HAD ALREADY TALKED WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND PROMISED FULL GOA SUPPORT.

12. WITH TIME RUNNING OUT, PASTOR COMMENTED QUICKLY ON SOME OF THE POINTS THE SECRETARY HAD MADE. ON BOLIVIA, THE GOA CAN NOT ABANDON IT BECAUSE IT MIGHT FALL APART, BUT IT WILL UNDERTAKE A CONSCIENTIOUS AND SERIOUS EFFORT TO STEER THE NEW REGIME IN A MORE ACCEPTABLE DIRECTION. PASTOR DENIED THAT THERE ARE ANY POLITICAL PRISONERS IN ARGENTINA; RATHER THERE ARE 1200 TERRORISTS THAT ARE BEING DEALT WITH BY THE JUDICIARY WHOSE POWER IS ABSOLUTE. REGARDING POSSIBLE DISAPPEARANCES THIS YEAR, THE GOA HAS ABOUT BECOME CONVINCED THAT PERSONS ARE BEING PAID

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TO DISAPPEAR, AND HE CLAIMED AS PROOF THAT SOME HAVE LATER SURFACED. ON GRAINS, PASTOR SAID GOA IS RESTRICTING SALES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BUT IT IS DIFFICULT AND, FURTHERMORE, ARGENTINA HAS AN UNFAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE WHICH MAKES ALL GRAIN SALES IMPORTANT. PASTOR AFFIRMED THAT ARGENTINA IS GOING TO RATIFY TLATELOLCO. ON THIS POINT, HE ARGUED THAT THE GOA WOULD HAVE DONE SO BEFORE IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR U.S. LACK OF COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. HE NOTED THAT THE RECENT DECISO SELL URANIUM TO INDIA WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE ARGENTINES TO UNDERSTAND. THIS LINE OF REASONING PROMPTED A FINAL PASTOR COMMENT ABOUT RECENT APPARENT U.S. APPROBATION FOR THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN TURKEY-- AGAIN IN CONTRAST TO OUR RELATIONS WITH HIS OWN MILITARY REGIME.

13. THE BILATERAL CONCLUDED WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS.
MUSKIE

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116.

Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 20, 1980

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79-12/80. Secret. Sent for action.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 20, 1980

~~SECRET~~/ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: THOMAS THORNTON

SUBJECT: M-B-B Follow-up — Argentina

Yesterday's M-B-B outdid itself in ambiguity on the Argentine front. (C)

State thinks it is supposed to prepare an overall review of US-Argentine policy for use in a PRC. (C)

Defense thinks that it is supposed to do a much briefer paper which would, presumably, find its way via us to the President. The paper would presumably cover only some small-scale actions on the military front that could be taken to keep the ball in play until the new administration(s) take over. (S)

Nobody is quite sure how this is to relate to the Viola (not Videla) visit since there is no particular reason to assume that Viola will even be interested in talking to anybody in this Administration. (C)

I would like some guidance from you on what has happened and is supposed to happen. After that I will meet early next week with Kramer (ISA) and Bushnell (State) to develop a plan of action. (C)

GUIDANCE REQUESTED: (Please check as appropriate)

1. Are we supposed to do a full-scale review of US-Argentine relations or simply put forth some specific decisions for the President to make ? (Note that the really big issue is Kennedy-Humphrey and with the Congress going out of session there is no way that this Administration can deal with that. (S)
2. Do you want a PRC or a coordinated interagency memo for the President to pass on ? (C)
3. Should further action be keyed solely to a Viola visit (which may well never take place) ✓ or should we be thinking in terms of routine contacts (as DOD prefers) ? (C)
4. What do you want to come out of this drill? As you know, my preference is to put everything on ice but my responsibility is to represent your interests. (A phone call or a meeting would seem to be indicated unless your preferences are pretty simple and straightforward.) (S)

*an option for
the P.
in the event he does meet with V.*

~~SECRET~~

Review on Nov. 20, 1986

ADP Declassification Review
DECLASSIFIED
by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017